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A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WORK OF 
OTHER INVESTIGATORS IN THE FIELD 
The difficulties which confront the writer who attempts 
"a survey and interpretation 11 type history of the Greek aspects 
of the Eastern Question are manifold, for such a study involves 
an understanding of the perplexing Eastern Question and entails 
an evaluation of this material and its collation into a his-
torical continuum wherein the Greek issue remains the core of 
the study. 
Before reviewing the pertinent works in the field, some 
general comments are in order on the nature and influence of 
history upon the people and students of the region. 
In the Balkans and the Near East possibly more than any 
other place in the world people do not read history, they ~ 
history. To Balkan and Near Eastern peoples history is a liv-
ing subject. It is instilled in them at home, in school, and 
by religion; it encircles them everywhere by ancient temples, 
impressive monuments, and magnificent churches and mosques. 
Poor in every other way, the region is rich in history, religion 
and folk-lore and, more often than not, all these are inextric-
ably interwoven. At the same time, their history, religion, 
and folk-lore instills in them an inbred fiery patriotism which 
after years of dormancy can erupt violently as so graphically 
expressed in 1821 by the Greek Deacon Athanasios (Diakos) 
who with eighteen comrades repelled 18,000 Turks for three hours 
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and refused to embrace Islam in these words: 
"Go you and your faith, your filth, to hell with 
youl I was born a Greek, a Greek will I die." 
A similar refrain could be uttered with equal vehemence by 
Albanian, Serb, and Bulgar and conversely by Turk and Arab; 
consequently, works written by these peoples dealing with heated 
Balkan and Near Eastern issues often suffer from a critical 
spirit attributable to a near sacrosanct and patriotic feeling 
on their part to present their nation's position in the most 
favorable light. They believe and practise "my country right 
or wrong. 11 This bias, however, is not restricted to Balkan and 
Near Eastern authors writing on "regional 11 issues for, with a 
few exceptions, "outsiders" have similarly been unable to with-
stand the ''magnetism" and the emotions of the region in order 
to write a more balanced piece of work. Invariably, these 
have proven either Grecophile, Turcophile, Bulgarophile, Serbo-
phile, et cetera. Similarly works on the Great Power conflict 
in the Balkans and the Near East seldom consider and even less 
seldom present a thorough understanding of the effect of the 
Great Power struggle upon the aspirations of the people of the 
region. Too often authors are engrossed in the Great Power 
conflict and treat any expression of nationalism or display of 
independent action on the part of the lesser states as an 
unnecessary irritant to the more pressing problems and welfare 
of the Great Powers. For example: 
1. Balkan and Near Eastern peoples were condemned for 
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"stirring up things" to achieve their independence; they 
were criticized for "flying off into wars" to redeem lands 
made to endure Ottoman rule even after that dominion was 
nominal. These critics have often used the thorny 
nationality problem in Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Rumelia, 
Thrace and the island of Crete to conceal the real issue 
at stake. For example, the Macedonian QUestion caused a 
war of~hnological statistics and falsification owing to 
the lack of a systematic population census of the Ottoman 
Empire. Hence, the distortions and discrepancies were 
fantastic. The number of Albanians were reported as low as 
6,ooo and as high as 660,000; Bulgarians from 57,000 to 
1,184,000; Greeks from 65,000 to 660,000; Serbs from 700 to 
2,043,000; and a low of 120,000 male Turks to a high of 
1,795,000. l Admittedly these hapless figures served to 
inflame the Macedonian Question and made an equitable solu-
tion of that problem most difficult; and yet, Austria-
Hungary and Russia, oblivious to ethnological statistics to 
support their claims sought to extend their influence into 
Macedonia either through the use of force or under the more 
subtle cloak of backing, at one time or another, the claims 
of Serbia or Bulgaria; whereas Britain found it advantageous 
to support the status quo in Macedonia, but insisted on 
1 
C. G. Christides, The Macedonia Camoufla~e. In the Light of 
Facts and Figures, (Athens, 1949), PP• 32-Jb. 
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political, economic, and social reforms, providing those 
reforms did not weaken the Porte's ability to present an 
effective bulwark against Tsarist expansion. Nevertheless, 
many authors treating the Macedonian question and Balkan 
Power politics leave the impression that officialism under 
Austria-Hungary or continued chaotic existence in a crum-
bling Ottoman Empire was preferable to Russian domination 
of the region. The problem of subject peoples was developed 
best by E. Venizelos in 1897 in a lecture to a British naval 
officer who held the usual preconceived opinion concerning 
"the folly of subject races." Venizelos, still a relatively 
unknown Cretan revolutionary, stated poignantly: 
"European policy is invariably the maintenance 
of the status guo, and you will do nothing for 
the subject races unless we, by taking the 
initiative, make you realize that helping us 
against the Turk is the lesser of two evils.u2 
2. After World War I Greece's Allies hastened to seize for 
themselves the lion's share of the Ottoman spoils without a 
semblance of historic or racial claims and opportunely be-
thought themselves of the Greeks to enforce upon the Turks 
the Sevres settlement. But only the Greeks were condemned 
for "over-bearing territorial ambitions"; and afterwards 
little was made of the surreptitious role played by Italy, 
France, and Russia in the Greek di,saster and even less said 
of the questionable behavior of the United States and 
2H. A. Gibbons, Venizelos, (Boston and New York, 1923) pp. 26-27. 
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Britain's complicity in the affair. And yet in the years 
after San Remo and Lausanne, Greece was condemned for her 
vaunting ambitions in the Near East and made the scape-
goat for the collapse of the Allied position in Asia Minor 
after World War I. 
3. The real issue of the "civil war" in Greece between 
1942-1949 was not between Monarchy and Republicanism but 
whether Greece would or would not become a communist dominated 
state. And yet Communism was able to perpetrate the fraud 
that the Greek communists were "freedom fighters" struggling 
against a reactionary "monarcho-Fascist" regime. This 
propaganda found fertile soil in the West and especially 
among western liberals who naively continued to swallow the 
whole pill that the Greeks in revolt were truly a coalition 
of Greek republicans, liberals, and socialists struggling 
for the cause of democracy in Greece. With few exceptions, 
tracts dealing with Greek history during and after World 
War II lack an understanding of the issues which precipitated 
the Truman Doctrine. 
REGIONAL AND SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 
AIDS AND REFERENCE WORKS 
BALKANS 
Three key general bibliographies treat the region and 
topic covered by this dissertation. First, the Division of 
Bibliography of the Library of Congress between 1943-45 issued 
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the following five mimeographed bibliograhies: 'lhe Balkans: 
I General; II Albania; III Bu1garia; IV Rumania; and V Yugo-
slavia; Greece; a listing chiefly of works in English and 
West European languages; second, the earlier and more detailed 
pre-World War II bibliographical guide to the Balkan region 
by Leon Savadjian, Bibliographie balcanigue, (Paris: Societe 
general el 'imprimerie et d'edition, 1920-1939), 8 vols. of 
which the first volume covers the decade 1920-1930, the second 
the years 1931-1932; and each of the remaining six treat single 
years. Savadjian's work also includes references to studies 
in the native Balkan languages and lists of periodical 
articles current in any year. Finally, there is the biblio-
graphical work by~· J. Kerner, Slavic Europe: A Selected 
Bibliography in the Western European Languages, Comprising 
History, Languages and Literatures, (Cambridge, Mass., 1918). 
In addition to the previous mentioned works the reader may 
consult the following R. J. Kerner, Social Science§ in the 
Balkans and in Turkey: A Suryey of Resources for Study and 
Research in the Field§ of KnOwledge, (Berkeley, Calif., 1930), 
and L. Strakhovsky, A Handbook of Slavic Studie§, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1949), and Tirina Sztachova, Mid-Europe: A Selective 
Bi9liography, (New York, 1953). Equally helpful as a gui~to 
Balkan material are the works by the New York Public Library 
entitled List of Works in the New York Public Library Relative 
to the Near Eastern Question and the Balkan States, Including 
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European Turkey and Modern Greece, (New York, 1910), and the 
more recent LU.S~ National Archives, Materials in the National 
Archives Relative to the Balkan States, LReference Information 
Circular No. ~' (Washington, D. c., 1942). 
NEAR EAST 
The regional bibliographical guide is A Selected and 
Annotated Bibliography of B9oks and Periodicals in Western 
Languages Dealing with the Near and Middle East with Special 
Emphasis on Medieval and Modern Times, (Washington, D. c., 1952), 
edited by Richard Ettinghausen 1 Equally instructive are the 
many bibliographical essays on selected topics and countries 
that appear periodically in The Middle East Journal; and since 
1955 the series of annual surveys published by the Middle East 
Institute, Washington, D. C. entitled Current Research on the 
Middle East. 
SPECIAL 
In addition to the regional bibliographical sources there 
are the three extensive and discriminating Foreign Affairs 
Bibliography volumes covering the years 1919-1952: the first 
by W. L. La~ger and H. F. Armstrong, eds. (1933), treats the 
period 1919-1932; the second, R. G. Woolberts, ed., (19~5), 
covers 1932-1942; and the third compiled by H. L. Roberts 
(1952) covers the decade 1942-1952. Also helpful is L. J. 
Ragatz, Bibliography for Study of European History 1815-1939, 
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(New York, 1941), and supplements thereof; C. Renouvin and P. 
Bloch, Guide de L'etudiant en histoire modern et contemporaire, 
(Paris, 1949). There are also the special bibliographies on 
the "Eastern Question" by G. Bengesco, Essai d'une notice 
bibliograhique sur la guestion d'Orient 1821-1897, (Paris, 
1897); V. M. Yonanovitch, An English Bibliography on the Ne~r 
Eastern Question, 1481-1906, (Belgrade, 1909); the previously 
mentioned "List of Works in the New York Public Library" and 
~last, but no least, the excellent, critical, and lengthy 
bibliographical references on the Balkans and the Great Power 
conflict found in the recent work by L. s. Stavrianos, The 
Balkans Since 1453, (New York, 1958); and W. L. Langer, 
European Alliances and Alignments 1870-1890, (New York, 1950, 
2nd ed.), and The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, (New 
York, 1935, 2 vols.). 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
For the individual Balkan countries one might consult 
the following: for Turkey see the recent Bibliography on 
Public Administration in 1urkey, (University of Ankara, Turkey, 
1959) which lists the principal articles and works on Turkish 
Administration and Constitutional Law, Turkey's two political 
parties, and the speeches of Kemal Ataturk; M. D. Mercanligil, 
Catalogue of Books on Ataturk and the Turkish Revolution, 
(Ankara, 1953); the two works by N. V. Mikhov, Bibliographie 
de la Turguie, de la Bulgaria, et de la Macedoine, (Sofia, 
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1908-1913, 2 vols.), and Sources bibliographigues sur l'histoire 
de la Turguie et de la Bulgarie, (Sofia, 1914-1924, 2 vols.); 
and lastly, the monthly publication of the Turkish National 
Library entitled Turkiye biblivografvasi published since 1928 
in Istanbul. Finally, on the question of Serbs, Croa~s, and 
Slovenes there is R. J. Odavitch, Essai de bibliographie 
francaise sur les Serbes, Creates et Slovenes dupuis le 
commencement de la guerre actuelle, (Paris, 1918), and for 
Bulgaria, see the above mentioned works by N. V. Mikhov. 
Although Greek historians have preferred to concentrate 
on the "Glory that was Greece" in preference to the history 
of Greece after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a fair 
amount of published material and bibliographical aids are 
available on modern and recent Greek history. ~he article 
The Public Archives of Greece, American Archivist, XV (July 
1952), pp. 249-257, by P. W. Topping is an excellent intro-
duction tc source material in Greece. 
The standard bibliography on early Greek history until 
1790 is E. Legrand, Bibliographie helleniQue, (Paris, 1885-
1928, 11 vols.). For the years 1790-1800 see A. P. Bretos, 
Neoellenike Philologia, (Athens, 1854); and for the period 
1800-1863 there is D. s. Ghines and V. G. Mexas, Ellenike 
Bibliographia 1800-1863, (Athens, 1939-1952, 3 vols.). There-
after sources treating Greek history and literature to the 
present time are as follows: General Council on Greek 
libraries, Ethnike Bibliographia, (Athens, 1930-1939); 
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Libraire B. N. Gregoriades, Ellenike Bibliographia, (Athens, 
1946-1950 monthly); Institute francais d'Athenes, Bulletin 
Analytigue de Bibliographie Hellenigue, (Athens 1945-1949) an 
annual publication which includes books, magazines and periodic 
literature and by far offers the best coverage for the five year 
period after World War II. Continuing, there is the Library 
of Congress, Greece; A List of References, Ann D. Brown and 
Helen D. Jones, eds. (Washington, D. c., 1943); N. G. Polites, 
Elleniki bibliographia, 1907-1920, (Athens, 1909-1927), and 
for more recent literature, the quarterly publication by A. 
Zambakes, titled Bibliophilos, (Athens, 1947). Finally, the 
excellent work prepared by Eloyd A. Spencer for The Library 
of Congress, entitled War and Postwar Greece: An Analvsis 
Based on Greek Writings, (Washington, D. c., 1952). As a 
supplement to the above works the following prove invaluable: 
the indespensible bibliographical articles on Greece by William 
Miller in the following journals: History, X (July, 1925), 
pp. 110-123; Cambridge Historical Journal, II (1928), pp. 229-
247, and VI (1938), pp. 115-120; Journal of Modern History, II 
(December, 1930), pp. 612-628; American Historical Review, 
XXXVII (January, 1932), pp. 272-279, and XI (July, 1935), 
pp. 688-693; and Joprnal of Modern History, IX (March, 1937), 
pp. 56-63. There is also the article by s. H. Weber continuing 
the work of William Miller in Journal of Modern History, XXI 
(September, 1950), pp. 250-256 and P. W. Topping, "Historical 
Studies in Greece, 1940-1946,''Byzantina Metabyzantina, I 
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(1949), pp. 113-127. For publications since 1946 there is the 
previously mentioned work by the French Institute of Athens, 
and, last but not least, the excellent article on Present-
Day Greece (Bibliography) by L. s. Stavrianos and E. P. 
Panagopoulos, in the Journal of Modern Historv, XX (June, 1948) 
p p • 1 49-1 58 • 
Before concluding the discussions on bibliographies there 
should be noted three bibliographies: two on the uGreek" islands--
Chios and Cyprus--and the third on the Patriarchate. All tr~ee 
subjects played a key role in Greek history: the Patriarchate 
as the head of the ecclesiastical body in the Ottoman Empire 
and in its dealings with the Ottoman Government insured the 
Greeks a predominant voice against the Slavs in the Balkans; 
the ruthless reduction of the island of Chios during the Greek 
war for independence by Turkish forces served to mass sorely 
needed support for the Greek revolt at the indifferent councils 
of Europe while Cyprus is the last expression of the enosis 
question and Greek dream embodied in the Great Idea. 
On Chios see Philip Argenti, A BibliographY of Chios from 
Classical Times to 1936, (Oxford, 1940); on Cyprus consult 
Claude D. Cobham, An Attempt at a BibliographY of Cyprus, 
(Nicosia, 1929) and N. G. Kyriazes, Kypriake bibliographia, 
(Larnaka, Cyprus, 1935). Finally, for a guide to the records 
of the Patriarchate see Kataloyoi tes Patriarchikes Bibliothekes, 
(Alexandria, Egypt, 1945-1947). 
Probably more had been written on Greece than any other 
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single Balkan or Near Eastern nation. However, most of these 
works tend to be either fragmentary or emphasize solely cultural 
or regional topics. For example, there is no comprehensive 
political history comparable toR. W. Seton-Watson's A History 
of the Humanians from Homan Times to the Completion of Unity, 
(Cambridge, England, 1934) or an economic survey comparable 
to the two first-rate studies by D. Mitrany, The Land and the 
Peasant in Rumania, (London, 1930), and H. L. Roberts, Rumania: 
Political Problems of an Agrarian State, (New Haven, 1951) 
which concentrates on the twentieth century and includes a 
study of reforms after World War II. Similarly there is no 
study on Greece describing the economic development of the 
nation comparable to J. Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and 
Economic Change in Yugoslavia, (Stanford, California, 1954), 
although an otherwise void is partially filled by D. Zographos, 
Istoria tes ellenikes georgias, (Athens, 1922-1924, 3 vols.). 
For the most part the more important treatments of Greekeconomic 
development, especially those in English, are to be found as 
individual articles. These are: Agrarian Reform, International 
Review of Agricultural Economics, XIII, (August, 1921 ), pp. 462-
472 and G. Servakis and C. Pertountzi, 11 The Agricultural 
Policy of Greece" in 0. s . .Horgan, ed., Agricultural Systems 
of Middle Europe, (New York, 1953) ch. 4,and K. A. Doukas, 
"Agrarian Reform in Greece~' American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, V (October, 1945), pp. 79-92. For the constitutional 
issues of Greek history one might look at G. T. Bacopoulos, 
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Outline of the Greek Constitution: Political Svstems Since the 
Greek Revolution of 1821, (Athens, 1950) and N. Kaltchas, 
Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece, 
(New York, 1940). In conclusion, however, all is not bleak for 
the student of Greek history for two works are almost unique 
to Greece in Balkan history: first, the international relations 
of Greece are treated in the monumental work by E. Driault and 
M. Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 a nos 
jours, (Paris, 1925-1926, 5 vols.); the second is the excellent 
treatment of Greece's dire financial straits in the nineteenth 
century by J. A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great 
Powers 1821-1898, (New Y0rk, 1944). 
There are numerous general histories on Greece and these 
include the extensive work by G. Finlay, HistorY of Greece, 
(Oxford, 1877, 7 vols.) of which only vols. VI, VII include 
the nineteenth century; E. S. Forster, A Short History of 
Modern Greece 1821-1956, (New York, 1957, 3rd. ed.); J. 
Mavrogordato, Mgdern Greece: A Chronicle and a Suryey 1800-
1931, (London, 1931; W. Miller, Greece (London, 1928); K. 
Papparregopoulos, Istoria tou Ellenikou Ethnos apo Arxaiotaton 
Mexri tou 1930, (Athens, 1932), and the recent work by N. G. 
Svoronos, Histoire de la Grece moderne, (Paris, 1953). Of 
the above works the histories by Finlay, Papparregopoulos and 
Svoronos are best and offer much more than the travelogue, 
anecdotal and uninterpretive accounts of the others. 
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CHAPTER I THE EARLY PERIOD 1821-1830 
The more important works by way of a general background 
to events leading up to the Greek hevolution are as follows: 
the excellent article by w. Miller, "Greece Under the Turks," 
Westminister Review, CLXII (August, 1904), pp. 195-210, and 
CLXII (September, 1904), pp. 304-320; T. Papadopoullos, Studies 
and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and 
People Under Turkish Domination, (Brussels, 1953), A. Andreades, 
L1administration financiere de la Grece sous la domination 
turgue, (Paris, 1902); H. D. Bourazelis, H bios tou Ellenikou 
laou kata tin Tourkokratian, (Athens, 1939) and the above 
mentioned history by G. Finlay and the recent meaningful 
history of Greece since 1453 by Svoronos. 
For the intellectual awakening which preceded the revolution, 
the works by or on Adamantios Korais and Rhigas Pheraios, the 
two intellectual grants of the modern Greek renaissance are 
essential. These include A. Coray, Memoire sur l'etat actual 
de la Grece, (Paris, 1803); the standard biography of Korais 
in English by s. G. Chaconas, Adamantios Korais: A Studv in 
Greek Nationalism,, (New York, 1942); and the definitive 
biography of Pheraios by A. Dascalakis, titled, Rhigas 
Velestinlis, (Paris, 1937). Finally, as regards the Philike 
Etairia, one might consult T. Ch. Kandiloros, E. Phelike Hetairia, 
(Athens, 1926) and M. Lascaris, Ellenes kai Serboi kata tous 
Apaleutherotikous tou Agonas 1804-1830, ~thens, 1936). 
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A considerably body of literature exists treating the 
philhellenic movement which supported the Greek revolution. 
The most important works in this vein are as follows: M. A. 
Cline, American Attitude Toward the Greek War of Independence, 
(Atlanta, 1930); D. Dakin, British and American Philhellenes, 
(Saloniki, 1955); Booras, H. J., Hellenic Independence and 
American Constribution to the Cause, (Rutland, Vt., 1935); 
T. Spencer, Fair Greece Sad Relic, (London, 1954) which is an 
excellent study of English literary philhellenism before Byron; 
D. P. Whitehall, The Philhellenic Movement in France, 1821-
1830, (Harvard University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
1939); and the following significant articles by v. Penn; 
'*Philhellenism in England," Slavonic Review, XIV (January, 
1936), pp. 363-371 and XIV (April, 1936), pp. 647-660; 
"Philhellenism in Europe, 1821-28," Slavonic Review, XVI 
(April, 1938), pp. 638-653. 
For the diplomacy of the revolution see Vols. I and II of 
the standard work on Greece's international relations by Driault 
and Lheritier cited above. A brief but excellent interpretation 
of the diplomaticoc~rences during the revolution can be 
found in the work Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, A Survev of 
Foreign PolicY, (New York, 1937) by the patron of Balkan 
history, R. W. Seton-Watson. See also s. Lascaris, Diplomatike 
historia tes Ellados, 1821-1914, (Athens, 1947); otherwise see 
the following standard works on the diplomacy of the revolution: 
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c. W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, (London, 
1930); C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-
1822, (London, 1925); H. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of 
Canning 1822-1827 (London, 1925); c. K. Webster, The Foreign 
Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, (London, 1951, 2 vols.); J. H. 
Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 
(Cambridge, 1950); V. J. Puryear, France and the Levant from 
the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah, (Berkeley, 
1941). For Ottoman partition plans by the Powers of this 
period which also affected the Greek revolution see Chap. 2 
of the exemplary work by XXX L. s. Stavrianos, Balkan Federatioru 
A History of the Movement To·,.,ard Balkan Unity in tv1odern Times, 
(Northampton, Mass., 1944) and for the 1829 definition of 
Russia's Near Eastern policy Land the all important Treaty of 
Adrianople under which Turkey agreed to accept Greece as a 
tributary state, governed by a prince selected by the Power§/ 
seeR. J. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy in the Near East after 
the Peace of Adrianople, Including the Text of the Protocol 
of 16 September, 1829," Cambridge Historical Journal, V (1937), 
pp. 280-290; s. Turan, "1829 Edeine Antlasmasi," Ankara 
Universitesi, Dil ve Tarih-Cografiyor Fakultesi Dergesi 
(March-June, 1951 ) , pp. 111-151 • 
CHAPTER II: THE MIDDLE PERIOD 1830-1923 
For Greece the period between 1830 and 1923 proved a time 
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of extreme crisis diplomacy whence (1) the fortunes of Greece 
interwoven with the Great Power rivalry in the Balkans and 
the Near East--and (2) Greece attempted to seize upon the 
opportunity afforded by that rivalry and crumbling Ottoman 
power to redress the gross myopia shown by the Powers in 
greatly delimiting Greece's original frontiers in the London 
Protocols of 1830 and 1832. Consequently, the history of 
European diplomacy and Balkan and Near Eastern crisis between 
1830-1923 are also an integral part of the history of Greece's 
external relations during the period herein under review. 
For convenience the period is divided as follows: 1830-1856; 
1857-1877; 1878-1923; 1924-1949. 
Five standard works, all classics on the subject which 
they treat, are useful by way of an introduction to the 
period, the region and its problems. These are Sir Charles 
Eliot, Turkey in Europe, (London, 1908, 2nd ed.); J. A. R. 
Marriot, The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in 
European Diplomacy, (Oxford, 1924, 3rd. ed. revised); William 
Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, (Cambridge, 
1936, 4th ed.); R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of NationalitY 
in the Balkans, (New York, 1918); and L. s. Stavrianos, 
Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan 
Unity in Modern Times, (Northampton, Mass., 1944). Other 
ready reference works are the definitive work by E. Driault 
and M. Lheritier, cited above; the excellent work by A. W. 
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Ward and G. P. Gooch, Cambridge Historv of British Foreign 
Policy 1788-1914, (Cambridge, 1922-23, 3 vols.); the unique 
study by H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the 
Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia, (Liverpool, 1951); and, 
the handy compilation of agreements germane to the unfolding 
international problems of the Near East, J. c. Hurewitz, 
Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East L1535-195§7, (Princeton, 
N. J., 1956, 2 vols.). 
1830-1856: The more important works dealing with the 
Near Eastern crises between 1830-1841 which in part are traced 
to the unsettled issues of the Greek revolution are as follows: 
J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, 
(Cambridge, 1950); s. M. Gorianov, Le Bosphore et les 
Dardanelles, (Paris, 1910); H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to 
India, (New York, 1928); s. Lane-Poole, The Life of Stratford 
Canning, (London, 1888, 2 vols.); P. E. Mosely, Russian 
Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question 1838-39, 
(Cambridge, 1934); V. J. Puryear, cited above; F. S. Rodkey, 
The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, }~ance 
and Russia 1832-1841, (Urbana, 1924); and c. K. Webster, ~he 
Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, (London, 1951, 2 vols.). 
The significant articles whi~h treat the first Near Eastern 
Crisis after the Greek war for independence are G. H. Bolsover, 
"Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey," Slavonic and East 
European Rteview, XXVII (December, 1948), pp. 118-145; F. s. 
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Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the hejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-
41," Journal of Nodern History, I (December, 1929), pp. 570-
593, and II (January, 1930), pp. 193-225; and M. Verete, 
"Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern 
History, XXIV (June, 1952), pp. 143-151. 
For the Crimean War and events leading up to that 
memorable folly one might begin with the intensive bibliographi-
cal survey by G. D. Gooch, "A Century of Historiography on 
the Crimean War," American Historical Review, LXII (October, 
1956), pp. 33-58. Also to be considered is the excellent 
memorial volume by G. B. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy and 
Other Historical Essays, (Glasgow, 1947) consisting of articles 
published in various journals over the years. 
The more important works which discuss the diplomatic 
preliminaries leading up to the Crimean War and a supplement 
to S. M Gorianov's analysis cited above have been presented 
chiefly by three historians. These are V. J. Puryear, England, 
Russian and the Straits Question 1844-1856 (Berkeley, 1931); 
E. Tarle, Krimskaia Voina, (Moscow, 1945, 2 vols.); and H. 
Temperl~y, England and the Near East: The Crimea, (London, 
1936). The following two excellent specialized works are also 
important: V. J. Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy 
in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in th~ 
Levant 1834-1853, (Stanford, 1935); and F. E. Bailey, British 
Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish 
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Relations 1826-1853, (Cambridge, 1942) also found in convenient 
summary form by the same author in "The Economics of British 
Foreign Policy, 1825-50," Journal of Modern History, XII 
(December, 1940), pp. 449-484. Finally, the peace conference 
itself is treated by H. Temperley, "The Treaty of Par~s and 
Its Execution," Journal of Modern History, IV (September, 
1932), pp. 387-414 and IV (December, 1932), pp. 523-543. 
1857-1878: On the international relations of Greece dur-
ing these decades, the most detailed and authoritative works 
are the third volume of E. Driault and M. Lheriter cited pre-
viously, and s. T. Lascaris, La politique exterieure de Grece 
avant et apres le congres de Berlin, (Paris, 1924). The 
standard account of the Balkan crisis from the viewpoint 
European diplomacy remains w. L. Langer, European Alliance and 
Alignments 1871-1890, (New York, 1950, 2nd. ed.). The 
following model accounts are also important: D. Harris, A 
Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The 
First Year, (Stanford, 1936), and Britain and the Bulgarian 
Horrors of 1876, (Chicago, 1939); G. H. Rupp, A Wavering 
Friendship: Russian and Austria 1876-1878, (Cambridge, 1941); 
R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, 
(London, 1935); M. D. Stojanovich, Great Powers and the 
Balkans 1875-1878, (New York, 1939); B. H. Sumner, Russia and 
the Balkans 1870-1880, (New York,, 1937); and W. G. Wirthwein, 
Britain and the Balkan Crisis 1875-1878, (New York, 1935). 
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The following specialized accounts are also essential: L. s. 
Stavrianos' Balkan Federation etc. for its treatment of inter-
Balkan relations and D. E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus 
Convention Policy of 1878, (Cambridge, 1934). Finally, for the 
settlement of the crisis in European diplomacy which followed 
the Russo-Ottoman War there are the excellent monographs by 
W. N. Medlicott on The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic 
History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880, (London, 
1938) and Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, (London, 
1956). 
1878-1923: After the Congress of Berlin the Balkans and 
the Near East were subjected to an intensive Western economic 
penetration through extensive Government loans and private 
invested capital. One effect of the new "imperialism" was to 
intensify Great Power political rivalries and produce sharper 
and more frequent conflicts. 
The more important accounts treating the new "imperialism" 
are as follows: D. c. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in 
the Ottoman Empire, (New York, 1929); E. M. Earle, Turkey, the 
Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway, (New York, 1923); H. 
Feis, Europe the World's Banker 1870-1914, (New Haven, 1930); 
and w. B. Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad, 
(Columbia, Mo., 1936). The standard works on Greece, J. A. 
Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers 1821-1896, 
(New York, 1944) and c. Evelpides, Oikonomike kai koinonike 
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historia tis Ellados, (Athens, 1950), 
The best accounts of the reoccurring Balkan crisis 
between 1870 and 1902 are found in the admirable works of W. 
L. Langer, European A111ances and Alignments 1871-1890, 
(New York, 1931) and Diplomacv of Imperialism 1890-190,, 
(New York, 1950, 2nd, ed., 2 vols.) which, next to E. Driault 
and M. Lheritier, Histoire diplomatigue ••• vel, 4, is also 
the best survey on the diplomatic events of the Greco-Turkish 
War of 1897 and the Cretan insurrection. In addition one may 
consult s. T. Lascaris, La politique exterieure ••• , cited 
previously. The Cretan question is also treated in the mono-
graph by J, s. Dutkowski, 1 1occupation de la Crete, 1897-1909; 
uoe experience d 1administration internationale d 1 un territoire, 
(Paris, 1953) and the biographies of Venizelos by D. Alastos, 
Venizelos: Patriot, Statesman, Revolutionary, (London, 1942); 
s. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos, (London, 1921); and H. A. 
Gibbons, Venizelos, (New York, 1923). 
The best account of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and the 
Cretan question in Greek is A. Ainian - Mazarakes, Historike 
melete 1821-1907 kai o polemos tou 1897 LMeta paratematos 
1898-190~, (Athens, 1950, 2 vols.) which contains a 500-page 
discussion of the political and military aspects of the war. 
Only the Macedonian problem surpassed the Cretan question 
as a pandora's box for the Great Powers. Possibly no other 
region of Europe has brought forth such distorted ethnological 
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statistics and fantastic distortions. An excellent introduction 
to the jumbled Macedonian question can be obtained thrcugh the 
unique monograph by H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A 
Reyiew of the Ethnographia Cartographv of Macedonia, (Liverpool, 
1951), and then H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Race and 
Their Future, (London, 1906). While Brailsford's Macedonia is 
slightly pro-Bulgarian it remains the best general study 
available on Macedonia. See also Colonel Leon Lamoucha, 
Quinze ane d 'his to ire balcanigue 1904-1918, (Paris, 1928), an 
account by the French delegate for the reorganization of the 
Macedonian gendarmerie. For an introduction to the international 
ramifications of the Macedonian question see the brief bJ.lt 
comprehensive work by Elizabeth Barker, hacedonia, Its Place in 
Balkan Power Politics, (New York, 1950). 
The better accounts of the Macedonian question by non-
Balkan authors are J. Ancel, La Macedoine (Paris, 1930); and 
w. Jacob, Die makedonische Frage, (Berlin, 1931). The principal 
accounts by Balkan authors are in the main biased and polemic 
traets. The Bulgarian position is forcefully presented by 
I. Ivanov, La question macedoine, (Paris, 1920) and s. Panaretoff 
(Historicus), Bulgaria and Her Neighbors, (New York, 1917). 
Also pertinent are the works treating the Bulgarian revolutionary 
society IMRO such as Stoyan Christowe, Heroes and Assasins, 
(London, 1935) and J. Swire, Bulgarian ConspiracY, (London, 
1940). The Serbian viewpoint is given in J. Cvijic, Remarks 
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on the Ethnography of the kacedonian Slavs, (London, 1906) and 
S. Gopcevic, Makedonien und A1t-Serbian, (Vienna, 1888). See 
also the references to Macedonia in w. s. Vucinich, Serbia 
Between East and West: 'I'he Events of 1903-1908, (Stanford, 
1954) which includes information on recent research and 
interpretation on the Macedonian question by Yugoslav historians. 
The Greek position is set forth in N. Colocotronis, La Nacedoine 
et l'hellenisme: etude historigue et ethnographigue, (Paris, 
1919); s. P. Phocas-Cosmetatos, La Macedoine: son passe et son 
present, (Lausanne, 1919); and N. B. Vlachos, To Makedonikon 
os Fasis tou Anatolikou Zetematos, 1878-1908, (Athens, 1935). 
The monograph by Vlachos is by far the best account in Greek. 
Finally, because of its rather unique approach, an interesting 
account is found in Christopher J. Christides, The Macedonian 
Camouflage, In the Light of Facts and Figures, (Athens, 1949). 
By all odds the best account of the diplomacy of the 
Balkan wars is E. c. Helmreich, The DiplomacY of the Balkan 
Wars 1912-1913, (Cambridge, 1938). See also the Report of 
the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, (Washington, D. c., 1914) which 
contains interesting data but which, however, should be used 
with caution. In the policies of the Balkan States and the 
Balkan policies of the Great Powers leading to the outbreak 
of the First World War the following studies are indispensible. 
In the Balkan policies of the Powers after 1878 leading 
x.xvii 
to the First World War see the well-documented works by w. L. 
Langer, cited previously. See also A. F. Pribram, The Secret 
Treaties of Austria-Hungarv, 1879-1914, (Cambridge, 1920) and 
the brief but ably done work by A. c. Coolidge, The Origin of 
the Triple Alliance, (New York, 1936). For valuable material 
on "war origins" in the Balkans see pertinent references in 
the following accepted works on the background of the war: 
The recent work by L. Albertini, ~he Origins of the War of 1914, 
tr. and ed. by I. M. Massey, (London, 1953); the exhaustive 
and authoritative account by S. B. Fay, The Origins of the 
World War, (New York, 1936, 2nd. ed.); and the able and 
detailed analysis of the roots of the war from documentary 
materials by B. E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914 
(New York, 1930, 2 vols.). The better French account is 
P. Renouvin, Les origines imroediates de la guerre, (Paris, 
1937); and its German counterpart is H. Lutz, Die europaische 
Politik in der JUlikrise,1914 (Berlin, 1930). 
The standard monograph on the spark which touched off the 
war remains ~. W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo, (London, 1926), but 
it should be balanced against recent disclosures by Albertini, 
cited above. The earlier Bosnian crisis which led up to 
Sarajevo is ably treated in B. E. Schmitt, The Annexation of 
Bosnia 1908-1909, (Cambridge, Eng., 1937) and N. Nintchitch, 
La crise bosniague 1908-1909 et les puissance europeanes, 
(Paris, 1937, 2 vols.), based on Serbian archive material. 
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Another account worthy of consideration is W. D. David, 
guropean Diplomacy in the Near Eastern Question 1906-1909, 
(Urbana, 1940). On the Habsburg lands two convenient accounts 
are A. J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1896-1914, (Cambridge, 
1951) and R. A. Kann, The Multinational Empire, (New York, 
1950, 2 vols.). 
For the background to Greece's involvement in the war, 
the principal source remains Vol. V. of E. Driault and M. 
Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece, (Paris, 1926) 
which attempts to steer a middle road between Royalist and 
Venizelists. The Venizelist position is f~cefully presented 
in the several biographies of Venizelos cited earlier. The 
opposite viewpoint is given in A. Frangoulis, La Grece et le 
crise mondiale, (Paris, 1926), s. Phocas-Cosmetatos, The 
Tragedy of Greece, (London, 1928), and Prince Nicholas, Political 
Memoires 1914-1917, London, 1928). Finally, the Saloniki 
muddle is treated in the unpublished doctoral dissertations by 
J. H. Lehmann, Greece and Saloniki: A Study in Allied 
Cooperation 1914-1917, (Northwestern University, 1949) and J. 
K. Warren, The Diplomatic Relations between Greece, France and 
England 1914-1917, (Ohio State University, 1924); and in the 
forthright account by General M. P. Sarrail, Lthe French 
commander of the Allied Armee de l 10rieni7 Mon commandement en 
Orient 1916-1918, (Paris, 1930). 
The best account of the peace conference is H. w. V. 
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Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Pari§, 
(London, 1920-1924, 6 vols.). Temperley, however, does not 
cover the treaties with Turkey. Another classic survey of the 
peace conference is H. Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919, (New York, 
1953); and an analysis of the peace conference and treaties 
from the standpoint of power politics can be found in H. A. 
Gibbons, An Introduction to World Politics, (New York, 1922) 
while G. B. Noble, Policies and Opinions at Paris, (New York, 
1935) examines the climate of opinion and press at the 
Conference. 
An excellent account of the British point of view and 
policies at the Conference is presented in David Lloyd George, 
Memoires of the Peace Conference, (New Haven, 1939). The French 
point of view is presented by Andre Tardieu, The Truth About 
the Treaty, (Indianapolis, 1924). The American positions are 
presented in the following standard accounts: R. s. Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement, (New York, 1922) which 
is rather detailed and authoritative; E. M. House, What Really 
Happened at Paris, (New York, 1921) which give much insight into 
Wilson's and House's motives and acts and discusses the Greek 
problem; Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, (New York, 
1921) which is mainly a criticism of Wilson's work at Paris. 
The following are the more important special works on the 
peace settlement in the Balkans and the Near East. For the 
breakup of Austria-Hungary see the comprehensive work by D. F. 
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Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1919): Transition from 
Empire to Republic, (New York, 1939); F. Deak, Hungary at the 
Peace Conference: 'I'he Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon, 
(New York, 1942); and the excellent account by the leading 
Western authority on Hungary, c. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her 
Successors: The Treatv of 'Irianon and Its ConseQuences 1919-1937, 
(New York, 1937). The Bulgarian point of view is given in G. P. 
Genov, Bulgaria and the Treaty of NeuillY, (Sofia, 1935). Next 
see Count Carlo Sforza, Fifty Years of War and Diplomacy in the 
Balkans, (New York, 1940). Count Sforza, an experienced Italian 
diplomat, was the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople 
after the war and opposed the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna. 
The best account of the Sevres Treaty and of the secret treaties 
is H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 
1913-1923, (Norman, 1931). The story of the Turkish nationalist 
movement is found in Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal, (New York, 
1928) and Kemal 's ''marathon speech" to the Peoples Party, A 
Speech Delivered bv Ghazi Mustapha Kemal ••• October 1927, 
(Leipzig, 1929) wherein the great Turkish leader reviews the 
naticnalist movement between 1919-1924. For additional works 
on· the Kemalist movement see Ivl. D. }J.ercanligil, Catalogue of 
Books on Ataturk and the 'l'urkish itevolution, (Ankara, 1953). 
The best account of the Greek venture into Smyrna and 
Anatolia is found in volume 5 of E. Driault and M. Lheritier, 
cited previously and A. A. Fallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture 
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and After, (London, 1937). Otherwise see the relevant chapters 
by R. H. Davison, Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausaooe in 
the Diplomats 1919-1939, ed. by G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert 
(Princeton, 1953). Finally see A. J. Toynbee, The Western 
Question in Greece and TurkeY, (London, 1922). 
For the population exchanges under the Turco-Bulgarian 
Agreement of 1913, the Greco-Bulgarian Agreement in 1919 and the 
January 1923 Convention for the Exchange of Minorities signed by 
Greece and Turkey see the fine work by s. P. Ladas, The Exchange 
of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, (New York, 1923). 
See also LLeague of Nation§/ Greek Refugee Settlement, (Geneva, 
1926). 
The ethnographic effect of the exchanges on Macedonia is 
treated by H. R. Wilkinson cited previously. 
The best general history on Albania is J. Swire's, Albania: 
The Rise of a Kingdom, (London, 1929). See also the relevant 
chapters in H. N. Brailsford's, Macedonia ••• cited previously. 
Also useful are the two studies by Stavro Skendi, The Political 
Evolution of Albania, 1912-1944, (New York, 1954) and Lat the 
risk of getting ahead of the stori/ Albania under the Communists, 
(New York, 1957) in the Mid European Studies Center Hand Series. 
The difficult Epirus question is ably treated in Pierpont 
Stickney, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European 
nEer.national Affairs, 1912-23, (Stanford, 1926). 
1924-1949: The best single work on the Balkans in the 
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interwar period is H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the 
Wars 1918-1941, (Cambridge, Eng., 1945). The dramatic events 
since 1939 are treated in the comprehensive study by R. 1. Wolff, 
The Balkans In Our Time, (Cambrldge, 1956) which, however, does 
not include Greece. This deficiency is made up in 1. s. 
Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, (New York, 1958) an excellent 
overall introduction to the region's complex, economic, social, 
political and diplomatic history. Stavrianos' Balkan study 
fills a dire gap in Balkan history left by the long out-of-date 
Ferdinand Schevill, The History of the Balkan Peninsula, From the 
Earliest Times to the Present, (New York, 1922). 
On Balkan federation or union see Stavrianos' Balkan 
Federation, cited previously; the workmanlike discussion of the 
subject by R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences 
and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935, (Berkeley, 1936); T. I. 
Geshkoff, Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe, 
(New York, 1940); N. J. Padelford, Peace in the Balkans; The 
Movement Towards International Organization in the Balkans, 
(New York, 1935); and A. P. Papanastassiou, Vers l'union 
balkanigue, (Paris, 1934). 
There is no special study on Balkan diplomacy between the 
wars; diplomatic developments can be traced in the annual Survey 
of International Affsirs, edited by A. J. Toynbee and published 
by the Royal Institute of International Affairs since 1925. 
There is an excellent chapter on the subject by H. 1. Roberts, 
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"International Belations between the Wars" in Challenge in 
Eastern Europe, ed. by c. E. Black, (New Brunswick, N. J., 
1954); otherwise see John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers & Eastern 
Europe, (New York, 1953). 
The diplomatic background to Greece's involvement in the 
war is described in the first part of Field Marshal Alexander 
Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, trans. by Pat. 
Eliascos, (Athens, 1949). See also P. Pipinelis, Historia tes 
exoterikes politikes tes Ellados, 1923-1941, (Athens, 1948). 
The diplomatic background of the Italian invasion of Greece is 
given in Royal Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Greek 
White Book: Italy's Aggression Against Greece: Diplomatic 
Documents, (Athens, 1940); and The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 
(New Y~rk, 1946). Finally, Sreece's role in the war is treated 
by Winston s. Churchill, The Second World War, (Boston, 1948-
1953, 6 vols.). 
Before considering works dealing with post-war Greece, con-
sult Appendix A, note on evidence in c. M. Woodhouse, Apple of 
Discord a survey of recent Greek politics in their international 
setting, L1941-1946_/, (London, 1951 ). Woodhouse's account is 
not only by all odds the classic work on the Greek resistance 
movement, but his "note on evidence" itself is a gem for the 
initiate to "written evidence from Greek sources." An excellent 
survey of the Greek scene during these troubled times is F. A. 
Spencer, War and Postwar Greece: An Analvsis Based on Greek 
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Writings, (Washington, D. c., 1952). See also the account by 
W. H. lvlcNeill, The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath, (London, 
1947). McNeill's account, however, does not approach the 
standard work by Woodhouse in depth, detail or interpretation. 
The story of ELAS is told by its military co~nander, S. Saraphis, 
H ELAS, (Athens, 1946) which has been translated in abridged 
form as s. Sarafis, Greek Resistance Armv: The Storv of ELAS, 
(London, 1951); the EAM story is told by D. Glenos inTi einai 
kai ti thelei to EAM? LWhat Is the EAM and What Are Its Aims1/, 
(Athens, 1942) and the Archeio ethnikes antistases, LArchives 
of National Resistanc~, (Athens, 1946). The case of ELAS-EAM 
is also presented by L. s. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma 
and Opportunity, (Chicago, 1952) and in the same autror's 
brief survey "The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A 
Study in Resistance, Organization and Administration, 11 Journal 
of Modern History, XXIV, (March, 1952), pp. 42-55. That which 
is surprising is that as late as 1952 and 1958 Stavrianos could 
still revel in the professed economic and social platform of 
EAM-ELAS and the ''Eree Greek Government" but remain oblivious 
to the deeper causes of the struggle waged in Greece between the 
so-called "monarcho fascists" and "democrats." But then again 
Stavrianos did not have the opportunity afforded this writer 
and Col. c. M. Woodhouse to delve deeper into the cause of the 
"Apple of Discord." 
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A CONCISE PRESENTATION 
OF THE INVESTIGATION AND THE REASONING INVOLVED, 
THE METHODS USED AND THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED. 
The Eastern Question has created the need for a systematic 
knowledge of its integral national aspects--Albanian, Arab, 
Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Rumanian, and Serb. Too often the 
international aspects of the problem have been treated without 
sufficiently presenting the effect Great Power actions and 
decisions had upon the lesser states and peoples of the region. 
This paper represents the first known attempt at an historical 
continuum of the state of the Greek Question within the 
Eastern Question between 1821 and 1949. 
The topic of this study first interested the writer dur-
ing residence in Greece between 1949 and 1954. At that time 
Greece had emerged from ten years of continuous war, Axis 
occupation, and a communist guerrilla war which, indicative of 
the little kingdom's precarious existence since its creation 
in 1830 by the Powers, had made Greece the first "hot spot" 
of today's Cold War. 
In 1949 the words heard most often in Greece were "the 
English, Americans, Russians, Communists and Monarcho-fascists, 
and Democrats and Fascists," but these in turn were laconically 
encompassed in one all-inclusive phrase, "the Great Powers." 
Any discussion of the Greek question in 1949 was certain to 
include all of these words, and, depending on the political 
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inclinations of the debaters, one was usually condemned or 
emphasized at the expense of the others. 
Between 1949 and 1954 the writer had the opportunity to 
discuss the subject with Greek college students, university 
graduates and professors, government officials, and high 
ranking military officers, and, in most instances he found 
general agreement that Greece's difficulties wereneither new 
now peculiar to Greece, nor for that matter, entirely Greek. 
Regardless of their political alignment, these Greeks stressed 
that from time to time Greece's difficulties became acute as 
a result of international politics and Great Power rivalry. 
They insisted that what had happened between 1940 and 1949 
was just another chapter in the crises history which Greece 
has endured since its inception as a state in modern times. 
Moreover, they pointed out that one could not fully appreciate 
the Greek question in 1949 or 1940 or 1922 etc. without under-
standing the role played by the Great Powers in the emergence 
of the modern Greek state, and the subsequent struggle by the 
little kingdom to overcome the formidable obstacles to national 
unity and political tranquility so necessary to attain a 
reasonable measure of economic self-sufficiency and social 
progress. These they insisted could only be overcome by a 
strong Hellas holding a respected position in the comity of 
nations. 
Initially the study planned to treat the years between 
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1947-1949 continuing where C. M. Woodhouse left off in his 
excellent book Apple of Discord, A Survey of Recent Greek 
Politics in Their International Setting, that crucial period 
in Greek history when the United States succeeded to the 
British mantle in Greece (and Turkey). But investigation 
soon revealed that the "Apple of Discord" and the root of the 
perennial "Greek Dilemma" proved to be imbedded in the Greek 
War~ Independence and the subsequent emergence of the modern 
Greek State between 1830-32 under the auspices of England, 
France, and Russia whose special interests in the "Eastern 
Question" have had a retarding effect upon Greece's domestic 
life as well as her international position down to the present 
day. Possibly more than any of the other Balkan States Greece 
was a creature of all the Great Powers, and invariably Greece's 
external and internal politics reflected in miniature the 
greater rivalry between the Powers. This situation was 
compounded further by Greece's geographic position which re-
peatedly exposed the Greek nation to a periodic renascent 
Ottoman nationalism and a reawakening Slavic Balkan national 
consciousness whose aspirations served the Pan-Slav imperial-
ism of Tsarist Russia. 
The scope of the study entails an investigation of the 
consequences of the historic "East-West Conflict" upon Greece 
from 1821 through 1949. The plan envisages a concentration 
upon the Greek issue within the "Eastern Question." 
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Numerous studies treat the overall historic "East-West 
Conflict"; but there is no study of the history of the Greek 
issue within the "Eastern Question." As a result, the writer 
was forced to search for material pertinent to the Greek 
question from the numerous documents, studies, papers, and 
articles on the East-West Conflict and evaluate its special 
effect upon Greece. The data may be considered adequate but 
lacking was its integration in one monograph with an evalua-
tion and interpretation of the larger East-West Conflict as 
it affected Greece. The investigation covered the years 
1821 through 1949. In 1821 the Greeks arose in rebellion and 
confronted Europe with the spectre of a general upheaval in 
the Balkans and the danger of Russian expansion to the 
Mediterranean, while in 1949 Russia's most recent attempt to 
advance to the Mediterranean was defeated by the Truman 
Doctrine. 
After World War II the Greeks were placed in the forefront 
of Great Power rivalry when the Sqviets attempted to penetrate 
the Near East through Greece (and Turkey). First Britain and 
' then the United States bethought themselves of the Greeks to 
check Soviet expansion. For five years Greece was made the 
shuttlecock of the Great Power rivalry as a result of an on-
again-off-again ruinous "Civil War" and in the end was rescued 
from the clutches of Communism, only to become entrenched in 
the Western orbit. The destructive Communist Guerrilla War 
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was only one-half the story, for its adverse effects upon 
Greek politics and life will be felt for decades to come. 
The Greek dilemma has many aspects. First, Greece occupies 
the peninsula which commands an arena of intense political 
rivalry. Its mainland and islands situated in the eastern 
Mediterranean are a key to three continents, Europe, Asia, and 
Africa. Second, Greece has been a small and poor nation 
occupying a powerful geographic position and has remained an 
issue in and a key to the "Eastern Question." Third, Greek 
independence was secured and guaranteed by many powers that 
continued to retain an "interest" in Greece. Lastly, Greek 
nationalism with its inability to relate the desirable to the 
possible and to evaluate correctly the reality of events as 
played on the world scene found fertile soil in the nationalism 
of the "Great Idea" and the belief that for survival the 
little kingdom had to strengthen itself economically and 
politically by absorbing adjacent lands. These lands, however, 
more often than not were inhabited predominantly by Greeks 
faced by absorption or annihilation by the more powerful Balkan 
Slav community or the Ottoman nation. This situation led to a 
fervent desire for enosis by exohellenes and a national 
anagke by the Greek Government to effect a union which it had 
so long sought and desired. Like the Cyprus question of today, 
however, the overall great power conflict took precedence over 
Greece's aspirations and the Greeks were put off with promises 
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and the insistence by the Powers for quiet diplomacy, neither 
of which was calculated to fulfill Greece's aims. Hence, 
like the turtle which only makes progress when it sticks out 
its head, Greece repeatedly attempted to force the issue only 
to suffer periodic chastisements and intervention by the 
Powers which seriously affected her domestic life and interna-
tional position. A discussion of this problem quickly savors 
of the chicken and the egg enigma. The thesis advanced here 
is that the Great Powers must assume the major responsibility 
for the Greek dilemma since their obsession with their own 
acute rivalries caused them to create states in the Balkans 
and the Near East which were drawn to guarantee weakness 
and rivalry and become objects of power politics. This fact 
has been glossed over by the many "experts" and "specialists" 
of the Eastern Question who have been prone to criticize the 
Greeks and the other Balkan and Near Eastern peoples for events 
over which historically they had little control. When the 
Powers are judged by their actions, and not their explanations 
of these actions, it is clear they all practised imperialism. 
Whether it was the brazen imperialism of Russia and Austro-
Hungary or the subtle imperialism in buttressing the Ottoman 
Empire as pursued by Great Britain to achieve British objectives, 
both kinds were detrimental to peace in the Balkans and the 
aspirations of the Balkan peoples. These policies served 
to make the Balkans the celebrated "powder-keg" of Europe 
xli 
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much in the same way that the Powers today have converted the 
Middle East into a new "tinder-box." Yet it has re.tnained 
fashionable to exonerate the real wrongdoers for the instability 
of the region and condemn Balkan and Near Eastern peoples for 
the inequities of the Great Powers. 
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The problem with which we are faced has a history and a 
background. Greece's difficulties are not new or entirely 
Greek and they became acute, from time to time, as a result of 
unusual circumstances. The problem solicits no quick or easy 
answer. Deep problems underlie the fluctuating currents of 
Greek history. The Great Powers have been party to many of 
Greece's difficulties and Greece's neighbors instruments of 
Great Power machtpolitik in the Balkans. As a result, Greece's 
survival, as its founding, has depended and still depends on 
the dexterity of its maneuvers between East and West. 
Greece's tragedy has been fourfold: first, its territory 
occupies the peninsula which commands an arena of intense 
political rivalry. Greece is the key to the Near East where 
Asia ends in the west and Europe begins in the east. It is a 
bridge to Africa. Its mainland and islands are the keys to 
three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Second, since its 
creation it has been a small and poor nation occupying a 
strategic geographic position. Third, Greek liberation was 
made possible by the aid of many Powers that continued to 
retain their "interest" in Greece. Their constant interference 
in Greek affairs attended by intense intrigue and rivalry 
has been detrimental to Greece. Lastly, Greek nationalism 
with its inability to relate the desirable to the possible 
and to evaluate correctly the reality of events as played on 
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the world scene belies the conception of the "wily Greek." 
The Greek people have been characteristically quick to counsel, 
quick to decide, quick to ally, and quick to command. This 
disposition found fertile soil in the nationalism of the 
"Greek Idea" with the belief that for survival the little king-
dom had to strengthen itself economically and politically by 
absorbing adjacent lands. These lands, more often than not, 
were inhabited predominantly by Greeks who were faced with 
absorption or annihilation by a reawakening of Slavic Balkan 
peoples or renascent Ottoman nationalism. This situation led 
to a fervent and natural desire for enosis by exohellenes and 
the historical anagke and almost religious passion felt by 
the Greek Government to effect a union so long sought after 
and for so long desired. 
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The principle of the Balance of Power dominated the foreign 
policies of the Great Powers in the 19th Century. But balance 
of power politics ran counter to the aspirations of the Balkan 
peoples whose independence and territorial ambitions were only 
possible at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the subse-
quent disruption of the established equilibrium in Europe. 
The application of this principle to the Balkans by the European 
powers made it possible for the Turk to keep in bondage a 
century longer peoples it alone could no longer hold through 
military power or diplomacy. 
Ottoman attempts to suppress Balkan insurrections were 
extremely cruel, and at most, only partly successful. The 
weaker the Porte became, the more rigid became its policies, 
the more desperate became its countermeasures, and the more 
numerous became the atrocities between master and rayah. As 
the revolutions continued and the atrccities increased, the 
European chancelleries belatedly realized that they could no 
longer remain oblivious to the disastrous situation in the 
Balkans. They agreed, reluctantly, that action must be taken, 
but mindful of the principle of equilibrium, they could not 
agree on procedure. The Greek revolt forced the Po~ers to 
perform "the untoward act." 
The Greeks enjoyed special consideration in the Ottoman 
Empire since the fall of Constantinople in 1453· "Greeks of 
the Phanar" had assumed privileged positions in the economic 
and administrative affairs of the Sublime Porte and in the 
religious life of the non-Muslim segment of the Empire. Since 
they had been politically dormant for centuries, except for 
the brigandage of the Klephts, and economically entrenched in 
the financial affairs of the Empire as well as dominating the 
Greek Orthodox Church in the Balkans through control of the 
Patriarchate, it appeared that the Greeks would be the last 
to challenge their lot and turn on their "benefactors. n But 
revolutions, like nationalism, are more often a matter of 
heart than mind. 
The uprisings in the Danubian Principalities and the 
Morea in 1821 confronted Europe with a reappearance of the 
danger of Russian expansion to the Mediterranean. Then as 
3 
now, it was not a question of Greece, nor of Turkey for that 
matter, but the question of Europe and the maintenance of the 
balance of power through preservation of the territorial in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire. As it is today in other areas 
of the world, it was one of those hopeless colonial situations 
which mark the decline of an historic relationship which the 
major participants refused to recognize until one of them 
seized the initiative and merged its "grievance" with that of 
the insurgents. Russia did this in the Greek revolt. From 
that day forward Greece became a Great Power problem. 
From the earliest beginnings of its political existence 
Russia has pursued a course of southern expansion into the 
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Near and Middle East. This course was motivated by many and 
varied reasons. Whether it was primarily a result of a national 
expansion of a growing polity, or an "urge to the sea," or 
economic and strategic necessity, it cannot be denied that 
all three influenced Russian policy. Moreover, whether the 
actors in the Russian drive southward were Kievan Rus, Tsars, 
or Commissar, the drive was the same, acquisition of a southern 
outlet for the "Empire." 
A glance at the four traditional European and Middle 
Eastern outlets--the Adriatic, the Aegean, the Dardanelles, 
and the Persian Gulf--which Russia has coveted throughout the 
course of her history proves interesting. Three of the four 
possible outlets for Russian access to the Mediterranean are 
in the Balkans. Taking a map and starting first with the 
Adriatic there is the port of Trieste, which until the Stalin-
Tito rift Russia came closest to acquiring. It is no mere 
accident that Russia insists on control of 11 insignificant 11 
Aloania, for this small country, like the heel of the Italian 
boot on the west, controls the outlet to the Adriatic. In 
this respect, the importance of Italy in the Soviet's Adriatic 
and Mediterranean scheme also becomes apparent. 
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The second outlet which Russia covets is in Greece. The 
Greek ports of Piraeus and Salonika with their natural harbors 
are among the best in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Salonika 
is the natural outlet for Balkania and the core of the Macedonian 
Question. Geographically, Salonika was to Austria-Hungary and 
Greece's Slavic neighbors what Constantinople was to Russia. 
Recent Communist attempts to take over Greece were shrewdly 
calculated since Greece strategically dominates all three 
possible Russian outlets into the Mediterranean. A satellite 
Greece would dominate the entire Eastern Mediterranean, control 
the approaches to the Dardanelles and outflank Turkey; to the 
south the island of Crete commands the sea lanes to the oil 
pipelines of the Middle East, the Suez Canal and Commonwealth 
lifeline; to the west, the Ionian Islands with their natural 
anchorages control the Adriatic. 
Greece not only occupies the dominant strategic position 
against Russia's Mediterranean designs but also holds the key 
to control of Eastern Orthodoxy. Today, as in the past, only 
Greece is in a position to challenge Russian plans for control 
of the Orthodox Church. 
The Dardanelles are the third possible Russian outlet 
into the Mediterranean and the marrow of historical Russo-Turk 
rivalry and animosity which has continued to the present day. 
The last southern outlet which Russia covets is the 
Persian Gulf. Russo-Persian relations are not of prime concern 
here; however, it must not be forgotten not only important for 
oil but also as a potential outlet for the Russian Empire. It 
was no mere coincidence that during and after World War II, 
Iran, along with Greece and Turkey, was included in Soviet 
diplomatic pressures, for these nations alone blocked Russian 
southern expansion. 
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Historically, England and Austria-Hungary, and later 
Germany, were Russia's chief antagonists in her drive southwards. 
Until the advent of World War II, the Powers had been success-
ful in containing Tsarist and Communist expansion; however, 
recent events have proved to be more favorable to the Soviet 
Union. Since 1947 the United States has assumed the task of 
buttressing the nations along Russia's southern fringe as the 
bulwark against modern Russian imperialism. 
Since the 18th Century Russia had sought to play a role 
in the Balkans very similar to the one Austria had reserved 
for herself in central Europe and Italy--arbiter of problems 
in the Near East. In Russia's case it meant being initially 
an intermediary between her co-religionists and the Sultan and 
later between the fledgling Balkan nations and Turkey. However, 
when the "arbiters 11 are judged by their actions and not their 
explanations, both were engaged in southward expansion. The 
methods may have varied but the results were the same. It is 
not ironic that a century later their 20th Century counter-
parts, Germany and the Soviet Union, had their falling out 
in the same area. 
Great Power politics demand that human considerations and 
nationalist aspirations of lesser states be subordinated to 
the policies of the interested big powers. For Austria, a 
continental Power, this meant maintenance of Metternich's 
"consecrated structure"; for England, an insular Power, it 
meant maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire since 
its dissolution would not only disrupt the equilibrium of 
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Europe but its dismemberment would remove the last substantial 
political bulwark to Russian expansion. It is not surprising 
that Castlereagh could set aside his doctrine of non-interference 
in the Greek issue since, as in the Lowlands, its application 
would have threatened British interests. Thus it was in the 
19th Century, with nationalism seizing the long-dormant 
Balkan peoples, the Porte became the tool of Austria and England, 
while Turkish intransigeance accorded Tsarist Russia the 
opportunity to camouflage its imperialism under the ruse of 
protecting co-religionists or brother Slavs. 
From the outset the Greeks were caught between East and 
West, for Greece's independence and later the extension of its 
boundaries could be realized only at the expense of 1urkey and 
the Anglo-Austrian policy of containment. At the same time, 
Greece could expect little from Russia, for concessions from 
that quarter would be at the expense of Pan-Slavism and Tsarist 
expansion. Furthermore, being non-"Catholic," she received no 
temporal support from the West.1 and could expect no sympathy 
from Catholic powers. Finally, her early boundaries, like 
most boundaries in the Near East, reflected neither a political 
nor an economic necessity but were drawn to guarantee weakness 
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and rivalry and became an object of power politics. The real-
ities of the Greek problem clearly show that since its inception, 
the little Kingdom has been caught between East and West. 
Throughout its history, it has had to depend on one bloc or 
another for survival and its ability to conduct its international 
affairs has been seriously curtailed. This inherent situation 
has brought Greece periodic chastisements and unsolicited 
transgressions by the Great Powers with serious effects on her 
domestic life as well as her international position. 
1 It would appear that only when "westerners" are massacred or their 
institutions desecrated that the problem appears in a different light to 
Western Governments and temporal authorities. The one noted exception 
being "the Bulgarian Horrors" and Gladstone; even then, however, Disraeli 
could refer to the insurgents of Balkania as "the coffee house rabble of 
Europe." More recently when scores of Churches and cemetaries of the 
Eastern rite were desecrated and their priests lynched and stoned in 
Turkey during the September 1956 Istanbul, Izmir, riots in Turkey, 
Western Governments and Churches lodged no protests and expressed no 
indignation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE GREAT POWERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GREEK INDEPENDENCE 
On March 25, 1821 the Greek people, dormant under the 
Ottoman yoke for nearly four centuries, arose in rebellion. 
During their long period of enslavement the tradition of 
independence had never been really extinguished. 
With the marked decline of Ottoman power at the turn of 
the nineteenth century three dynamic forces touched off the 
insurrection: first, the spirit of the French Revolution which 
prevailed throughout Europe at that time; second, the resur-
gence of the consciousness of Greek racial identity stimulated 
by Korais 1 classical nationalism calling for revival of 
ancient Hellenic tradition; and the Greek revolutionary 
society, Hetairia Philike, organized in 1814 in Odessa for 
action against the Turk; third, Greeks were able to secure 
powerful positions outside Turkey from which to intrigue 
against the Sultan as, for example, Capo d'Istria, close 
confidaht and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Alexander I 
and a leader of the "Greek Party" at the Tsar's court. How-
ever, it was not until the martyrdom of Lord Byron at 
Missolonghi in 1824 and the announcement of the Egyptian plan 
for the Morea, that the Greek revolt received the drama so 
badly needed to win the sympathy of the outside world and 
become a cause celebre. 
In contrast to the local scene, the international 
situation was not conducive to revolutions and the Greek 
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insurrection met with the hostile apathy of Western Europe 
and Imperial Russia. Having recently emerged from the 
struggle against Napoleon, the Great Powers of Europe were 
in the throes of a violent reaction; their aim was the main-
tenance of the status quo, domestic and international, as 
established by the Congress of Vienna. The preservation of 
autocracy in every country in Europe and even overseas, 
through armed intervention if necessary, became the fixed 
policy of the Holy Alliance, the Quadruple Alliance, and the 
Concert of Powers. To Metternich, whose principal concern 
was "to control the revolutionary spirit in Europe," the 
revolt of the Greeks against their "legitimate" ruler, the 
Sultan, was a highly reprehensible act which should be 
suppressed before it set an example for other oppressed 
peoples. Although the Austrian statesman, from time to time, 
showed his willingness to consider the expulsion of the Turk 
from Europe,~ he could not envision replacing them with a 
great Christian State of "a republic of bandits or a monarchy 
organized by the scum of the revolutionaries of Europe." 
If Metternich had his way, he would have marched an Austrian 
2The ruse of legitimacy so skillfully applied by Metternich in 
disturbances in western Europe could not apply to the Balkans and the 
Porte for (1) Continental Europe had waged war against the Sultan and 
historically challenged the Porte's transgressions into Europe; (2) 
the Sublime Porte had never been-considered a member of the "fraternal 
association of monarchs" nor was ever considered to have had displayed 
those Christian "qualities" basic to its membership; (3) and lastly, and 
in any case, the Sublime Forte had refused to join the Holy Alliance. 
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army into Greece just as he had marched one into Piedmont 
and Naples the previous year with disastrous results for 
Italian independence. Castlereagh, supposedly, was not as· 
Machiavellian: he believed that the Greeks "form a branch 
of that organized spirit of insurrection which is system-
atically propogating itself throughout Europe," and that 
England was not prepared to see the liberty of Greece bought 
at the price of Russian supremacy in the Mediterranean. For 
Castlereagh, the Greeks would simply have to rely upon "the 
hands of time and of Providence to achieve their aims." On 
the other hand, Imperial Russia under Tsar Alexander--and 
later Nicholas I--was torn between hatred of revolution and 
sympathy for her co-religionists, the Greek Orthodox 
Christians of the East. But under Alexander I the Russians 
preferred to repudiate the Greeks and the terms of the 1774 
Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, which accorded them the right to 
protect Orthodoxy within the Ottoman Empire,3 rather than 
risk a breach in the Holy Alliance. 
These were the professed feelings of the Great Powers 
in the Greek Question; however, the unrevealed issues were 
chiefly three: first, Anglo-Austrian--and later French--
concern over possible Tsarist unilateral action in Balkania; 
second, the prevention of a general European war which might 
} Russia's claim to the protection of all Greek Orthodox subjects 
of the Porte was based primarily upon a liberal interpretation of 
Articles VII and XIV of the 1774 instrument. 
1 1 
result from Russian egress into the Mediterranean; third, 
western concern to buttress the Sultan in opposing Russian 
advances on Constantinople and the Straits. The Greek re-
volt against the Turk excited the rivalry of the Great 
Powers for an independent Greece would not only be an 
important step in the disintegration of the Ottoman power, 
but would enable the power that succeeded in achieving 
hegemony over Greece to command ingress and egress at the 
Dardanelles and to and from the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
independence or enslavement of Greece was of little direct 
concern; the real issue was the importance of Greece's 
geographical position in the power conflict, as it is in the 
world power conflict today. Greece, a small country occupy-
ing a major strategical position, is faced with the paradox 
that it cannot bem~er of its own destiny because its 
position decides the destinies of great powers and the 
areas of the three continents which they struggle to command--
Southeastern Europe, the Near East or Western Asia, and 
Northeast Africa. This was true in 1821 and is the tragedy 
of modern Greece today. 
The military engagements fought between the insurrection-
ists and the Sultan's forces are not germane to this study. 
It is significant to note, however, that for four years the 
Greeks fought, on the whole successfully, and held the Turks 
in check as the revolt spread from the Morea northward to 
Sterea Hellas and to Aegean islands. During this time 
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the Greeks received moral encouragement from citizen-sponsored 
European and American Philhellenic societies while the posi-
tion of their governments was most aptly expressed by 
Metternich when he stated that he was confident that the 
Greeks, if left to their own resources, would speedily succumb 
to the overwhelming strength of their oppressors. By the 
end of 1823, with the spread of the revolt throughout the 
Greek peninsula, popular feeling in Europe for the Greeks 
increased and voluntary Philhellenic organizations began to 
form not merely to hold public meetings but to collect 
subscriptions and discuss the floating of a loan in favor 
of the insurgents. In England the populace, as opposed to 
the Government, demanded the overthrow of Turkish tyranny. 
It became evident to all that it would be difficult to 
force the Greeks to revert to the status guo ante bellum. 
In January 1824 Russia took the initiative in proposing 
a special Congress for the settlement of Greek affairs and 
laid down the two conflicting principles that the moslem 
yoke should not be reimposed upon a Christian population, 
but that full independence could not be conceded since it 
might serve as a point of departure for fresh revolutionary 
movements. The Tsar's plan envisioned the creation of 
three vassal Principalities--an Eastern section formed by 
Thessaly and Attica, a Western locale comprising Epirus, and 
a Southern Greece composed of the Morea and Crete. The newly 
created Principalities would be required to pay a fixed 
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tribute to the Turkish suzerain and allowed to trade freely 
under their own flags in an autonomous archipelago. In 
this manner, the Tsar hoped to restore peace whileperpetuat-
ing the principles of the Holy Alliance. The Porte and the 
Greeks were not consulted and vigorously denounced the 
Russian proposal. The Greeks declared further that they 
would rather die than resubmit to Turkish suzerainty. It 
is probably true that under the Tsar's scheme the "divided 
Balkan Principalities would revolve as satellites round the 
Russian sun,"~ but what is equally true, however, is that 
the alternative was not independence either. The still-born 
Principalities, like all small nations, had no choice in 
deciding their destiny once they became a Great Power issue. 
Since restoration of the status guo ante bellum was no~ an 
improbability, if they did not rotate "round the Russian sun,. 
they would be forced into the Western orbit. 
By 1824 the other powers realized that the Sultan could 
not reimpose his authority on Greece and altered their policy 
toward the insurgent Greeks. Austria was the first to 
change its policy. Metternich, who had fervently hoped that 
the Greek uprising would die from exhaustion and lack of 
support, now proposed that the powers recognize the 
independence of the Morea and islands as the best solution 
for the Greek Question. Metternich had heretofore vehemently 
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4 Robert William Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914,(New Yo~k, 
1937) P• 101. 
opposed the self-determination principle while supporting 
the tenet that the Ottoman Empire should be preserved on 
the basis of legitimacy. However, what really plagued 
Austria was fear of the Tsar's unilateral action in the 
Greek revolt and Russia's subsequent advance onto the 
peninsula--both actions detrimental to Austrian hegemony 
in middle Balkania. Metternich's decision, therefore, was 
based on pure opportunism. 
Britain also watched Russian action in the Balkans 
with great concern. Castlereagh, strongly influenced by 
British Levantine monopolists and the growing British 
strategic position in the East, was not interested in 
Greece's independence, but like Austria, feared the 
challenge of Imperial Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
It is manifest that the Greek Question had become a political 
area for the Powers while the future of Greece was 
important only in so far as it served them with an issue 
to further their Balkan policies. 
Britain and France had been at odds with each other 
since the Napoleonic Wars but their relations had improved 
by the summer of 1825. Charles X of France, a distinct 
reactionary, happened to be a confirmed Philhellene, and 
even more so when attracted by the idea of a French prince 
upon the throne of a new Greece. In August the alienation 
of Russia from Austria was completed. The process had been 
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accelerated by Metternich during his visit to Paris in March 
when he indiscreetly boasted of his ascendancy over Tsar 
Alexander. The Tsar advised Canning, who had succeeded 
Castlereagh, that "the Turkish power is crumbling," and that 
the two Powers together could "establish in the East an 
order of things conformable to the interests of Europe and 
to the laws of religion and humanity." At about the same 
time Count de Villele, the French Prime Minister, indicated 
that he favored Anglo-French amity and the casting aside of 
Metternich as too Machiavellian. With the side-tracking 
of the Austrian Chancellor and Russian and French advances 
to London, it was apparent that England would not assume a 
decisive role in the outcome of the Greco-Turk belligerency. 
During the first four years of the Greek revolt the 
Sublime Porte lacked the power to enforce obedience and 
flatly rejected all foreign counsel for treatment of the 
rayahs. Repeated attempts by the British ambassador, 
Lord Strangford, in Constantinople to negotiate a settle-
ment collapsed in the face of Turkish intransigeance. 
Tsarist protests to the Porte were not only rejected, but 
the Russians were openly accused of fermenting the Greek 
revolt. The Sultan considered all these. overtures offensive 
to his dignity and was unwilling to make the slightest 
concession to the rebels. Sultan Mahmud II, a proud and 
obstinate ruler, was determined to put down the insurgent 
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rayahs and rebellious pashas in the provinces and reestablish 
his absolute power. Both the insurgents and the rebellious 
pashas were cancerous growths to the Porte; the first because, 
if successful, they would give new hope to nationalists in 
Turkey's other European territories; the second because, 
they not only served as examples for conquered peoples to 
challenge the Porte but greatly weakened the administration 
of the Empire.5 This inflexible policy by the Porte in the 
face of increasing revolt was to be its first undoing; the 
second came as a result of the Janissary uprisings in the 
Sultan's armies and the increase in rebel activity. In 
1822 the Porte sought military assistance from his vassals 
abroad, thereby, enlarging the scope of the revolt. He 
found a willing ally in Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. 
Owing to depredations caused by their merchant ships on 
Egyptian commerce Ali Pasha was already hostile to the 
Greeks and like the Powers, feared the advent of a Russian 
fleet in the Mediterranean. Probably foremost in Mehement's 
mind was the opportunity to obtain from his tottering 
5 Two significant examples were (1) the unsuccessful revolt and 
destruction of Ali Pasha of Janina, February 5, 1822, after which the 
Turks were free to push the campaign against the Greeks; (2) the des-
truction of the Janissaries on June 15-16, 1826 in the event known in 
Turkish history as "The Auspicious Incident" when the main .body of the 
Janissary Corps in Constantinople was blown up in its barracks, and 
upwards of 10,000 Janissaries were said to have been massacred by 
loyal supportors of the Sultan and the city mob. 
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suzerain major political concessions for his domain in 
Egypt and economic and territorial spoils in Syria, Crete, 
and the Morea. These gains would give Egypt comrnand of the 
sea approaches to the Eastern Mediterranean •. 
In 1824 Sultan Nahmud proclaimed his powerful Egyptian 
vassal champion of Islam and Mehemet's son, Ibrahim Pasha, 
Vizier of the Morea with command of Islamic operations 
against the renegade Greeks. The Porte's action in plac-
ing the suppression of the Greek revolt in the hands of 
his Egyptian vassa~ proved to be the beginning of direct 
Great Power interference iil the Greek uprising. 
With the capture of the island of Chios in 1822, the 
Turks had commenced what appeared to be a systematic 
extermination of the Greek race. Following its capture by 
Kari Ali, the entire Greek population was put to the sword 
by Turk soldiery, sold as slaves, or driven into exile. 
Its population sank from 113,000 to a mere 1,800 and utter 
ruin fell upon one of the most cultured Greek cozr.r,uni ties. 
From 1822-1824 Egyptian forces played a decisive role in the 
conquest of Crete. It seemed certain that the Cretans 
would suffer the same misfortune that had befallen the 
people of Chios when Ibrahim established his base on Crete 
in the winter of 1824. The previous summer Egyptian forces 
had captured Kasos and Psara, two key Greek positions in 
the eastern Aegean, and Egyptian reinforcement aided the 
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Turks in several land and sea engagements. Effecting a landing 
in the Morea in February 1825, Ibrahim quickly subdued the 
whole peninsula and laid siege to Navarino, and it now 
appeared, more than ever, that the revolt had resolved it-
self into a conflict between Greeks and Egyptians. At the 
same time the Turks, under Reshid Pasha, coming from the 
north renewed the siege of Missolonghi which had been 
immortalized, a year before, by the death of Lord Byron. 
Turco-Egyptian successes aroused increased sentiment in 
Europe where the Greeks were now regarded as descendents 
of the heroes of classical Hellas renewing the struggle 
against the barbarians; but neither the heroism of the 
Greeks nor the savagery of Ibrahim could persuade the 
European Governments to take a determined stand. It was 
not until the rumor spread that Ibrahim planned to carry 
off into captivity all Greeks whom he had not found time to 
massacre and planned to colonize the Peloponnesus with 
Egyptians that European diplomacy was moved to take positive 
action. The Egyptian plan resulted in adverse reaction for 
the Porte. Philhellenism spread rapidly through England, 
France, Prussia, Austria, and Switzerland, and aroused 
public sentiment caused the Great Powers to take another 
look at their Greek policy. Tsar Nicholas I, who had 
succeeded the mystic Alexander I, needed little encouragement 
to clamor for action against the Turk. Since the Treaty of 
Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774, Russia had an international status 
as protector of Eastern Christendom and could use Ibrahim's 
19 
project as a pretext to intervene in favor of her coreligion-
ists • The plan for a systematic extermination of the 
Greek population of the Morea was widely believed, and 
EnglandQ, acted quickly to prevent unilateral action by 
Russia. Cannin~ who had become responsive to British public 
opinion and the realities of the Greek revol~quickly re-
cognized the belligerency of Greece. He realized the 
dilemma faced by the Porte--that every success of_the Turco-
Egyptian forces rendered the Greeks more and more objects 
of European sympathy and compassion, while every failure of 
the Porte to suppress the revolt made Turkey a more tempt-
ing and easy prey for ambitious Powers. Canning correctly 
sensed that the Turks had not a moment to lose if they were 
to save anything from the deteriorating situation. 
The Sublime Porte remained adamant to all reason. The 
British Government, albeit, had no alternative but to sound 
out Tsarist intentions since continued Turkish obstinacy 
threatened Britain's eastern interests. On April 4, 1826 
the Duke of Wellington signed the Protocol of St. Petersburg, 
the first indication of the creation of a Greek state in a 
6
. In the United States, the Congressexpressed sympathy with the 
Greek cause, but active diplomacy vas naught. Only a few American 
Philhellenes arrived in Greece to give positive help to the Greek in-
surrection while one American, Samuel Gridley Hove, rose to surgeon-
general of the Greek forces. From Britain Lord Cochrane went to Greece 
in 1826 "with considerable private funds with which to reinforce the Greek 
Navy," while Sir Richard Church became commander-in-chief of their land 
forces. 
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diplomatic document. The Protccol stated that the Greeks 
should form a vassal state paying an annual tribute to the 
Sultan and enjoy freedom of administration, religion, and 
commerce with the right to expropriate the Turkish estates. 
In addition, Russia agreed to support British mediation at 
the Porte and that both Russia and Britain should renounce 
territorial extension or commercial advantage and agree 
later as to the boundaries of the future 11Greece." 
A diaeresis of the new Power position resulting from 
the Protocol of St. Petersburg is interesting since it is 
tacit acknowledgement of the fact that by 1826 Russia and 
Britain had become the principal adversaries in the Greek 
Question. Both Powers now agreed to renounce territorial 
extension into the Greek peninsula but by doing so Britain 
denied herself nothing because she commanded the Mediterranean 
and her fleet could blockade the Aegean archipelago and 
thereby control Greece. With Russian acquiescense in re-
nouncing territorial designs in the area, the Russian 
Black Sea fleet remained bottled-up and therefore was no 
threat to British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. 
Lastly, the Protocol was significant, for Britain succeeded, 
at least for the time being, in preventing the Tsar from 
effecting unilateral action in the Greek Question. While 
the Protocol indicated a meeting of the minds between the 
two Powers seemingly the farthest apart on the Greek 
Question; it was a serious blow to the congress system 
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created at Vienna. After the Protocol of St. Petersburg 
Canning stated that the Holy Alliance 
"no longer marches ~ corps. I have 
resolved them into individuality and 
having done so, I employ the disjecta 
membra each in its respective place 
for its respective use, ~ithout 
scrupple or hesitation."'/ 
In the midst of negotiations leading to the Protocol 
of St. Petersburg Tsar Nicholas had dispatched an ultimatum 
to the Porte regarding the Russo-Turkish dispute over the 
Danubian Principalities and Serbian autonomy which his pre-
decessor, Tsar Alexander I, under the influence of 
Metternich and Castlereagh, had allowed to be separated 
from the Greek dispute. The Tsar's ultimatum gave the Porte 
six weeks in which to comply with Russian demands.B On 
22 
May 12, 1826 the Sultan accepted the Russian exaction, a 
decision strongly affected by the Protocol of St. Petersburg, 
since it appeared that he had lost the support of his princi-
pal ally Britain, and alone, was incapable of withstanding 
Russian pressures. On October 6 the Sultan signed the 
7Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford de Redcliffe, (London and New York, 
1888), Vol. I, P• 431. 
8 Since the Protocol does not directly concern Greece, it is not 
considered in any detail. Briefly, it demanded the restoration of the 
"Rumanian" Principalities to the position before 1821; it demanded the 
enforcement, in favor of Serbia, of the Treaty of 1812; and it gave 
the Porte six weeks to send envoys to the frontier to negotiate all 
points of difference. 
Convention of Ackerman, in effect, consenting to all Russia's 
demands. Nicholas' success greatly increased his prestige 
in the Balkans and Constantinople; but elsewhere in Europe 
the Tsar's diplomatic coup was eyed with deep suspicion. 
The reason for British acquiescense to Ackerman is not clear; 
but it can be assumed that since the Convention dealt pri-
marily with an area generally acknowledged as a Russian 
sphere of interest, English concern was at a minimum. It 
was only when the Russian bear approached the Mediterranean 
that Albion recoiled. 
In order to redress the prestige accrued Russia as a 
~esult of the diplomatic coups of St. Petersburg and 
Ackerman, Britain sought to conteract growing Russian 
influence in Balkania. On November 22 Canning forwarded 
the bilateral agreement of St. Petersburg to France, Prussia, 
and Austria. Of the three only France, which had been 
isolated in Europe as a result of her defeat during the 
Napoleonic wars, expressed a readiness to make it the basis 
of a treaty ~ trois. Metternich, with the passing of 
Alexander I, had lost his influen~ein St. Petersburg. In 
England the Austrian's diplomatic position on the Greek 
issue had been weakened immensely by Canning's recognition 
of Greek belligerency, an act detrimental to the Metternich 
System. Lastly, not being an initial party to the St. 
Petersburg Protocol, he now felt himself formally isolated 
on the Greek Question. Prussia, from the start of the Greek 
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revolt, had taken a position that the Ottoman Empire was 
not a "legitimate" government but would not become embroiled 
on either side in an area not within its primary interest. 
Prussia's only "active" role in the revolt was that it 
sent military instructors to aid in the reorganization of 
the Sultan's army following "The Auspicious Incident," there-
by laying the foundations for German-Turkish friendship 
which was continued by every German government down to the 
early years of the twentieth century. The French position 
in the Greek dispute is perplexing. France, a European 
and Mediterranean land and sea power, posed a threat to 
British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. While 
French officers were helping to create an Egyptian army, 
French public opinion stimulated Greek resistance; their 
monarch was intrigued with the idea of a French prince for 
24 
the Greek throne. The French military mission in Egypt, albeit, 
was not concerned primarily of course with creating an 
Egyptian army for duty in Greece but with the more important 
mission of securing French interests in Egypt in the face 
of Anglo-French rivalry in North Africa. But like Russia 
and England, France also had selfish designs. By her 
willingness to participate in the Greek dispute France would 
be readmitted to the concert of powers from which she had 
been ostracized by the Treaties of Paris and Vienna and she 
would be a party to any partition of the Ottoman Empire. 
The year eighteen hundred and twenty-seven proved to be 
a turning point in the course of the war. The internal 
Greek situation had approached disaster and the success of 
the revolution hung in the balance. Finally, the Greek 
factions, whose rivalries had paralyzed all plans of joint 
action against the Turk, united to elect Count Capo d' 
Istria as president for a term of seven years. This 
characteristic of union-in-danger still prevails today; 
Greeks will not unite of their own free will until threatened 
with complete annihilation from without. 
The strengthening of the Greek effort under the cownand 
of one man proved fallible because within one month his 
'~ings were clipped" substantially by the newly ratified 
Constitution of Trozene. The Constitution virtually 
deprived the executive of all power and vested it in a 
single chamber, the Senate, where rule by factions again 
prevailed. There are inherent historical and socialogical 
reasons for the Greek fear of "a strong man." Historically 
the fear embodies 2500 years of history, going back to the 
days of classical Hellas and the tenet of ostraeizm. In 
social relations every Greek takes pride in his individualism 
and equates it with liberty to the extent of rejecting all 
authority. In many ways, he is much like the Frenchman. He 
places greater emphasis upon the individual than the community 
or group and fears the leader symbolized by the man on 
horseback. But unlike the French, the Greek has a latent 
respect for that power and authority symbolic of the man on 
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horseback. Efforts by Sir Richard Church, commander-in-
chief of insurgent land forces, and Lord Cochrane, commander 
of the navy, to spur the Greeks to united action proved 
illusory. The crowning point of repeated Greek set-backs 
came on June 5 when the Acropolis, that ancient citadel of 
classical nationalism, capitulated to the Turks and the 
Greeks found themselves exhausted and near collapse. 
On the international scene London had become the center 
of negotiations on the Greek Question. As previously noted, 
in November 1826 France had indicated a desire to become the 
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third party to a treaty based on the Protocol of St. Petersburg. 
On July 6, 1827, France, England, and Russia signed the 
Treaty of London, with a view to 
"setting a term to the sanguinary struggle 
which, while handing over the Greek provinces 
and islands to all the disorders of anarchy, 
brings each day fresh obstacles to the 
commerce of the European states." 
To this end the Powers agreed to offer the Porte their 
mediation in its quarrel with the Greeks and to insist upon 
an i~mediate armistice. They warned that if the Turks re-
fused an armistice the three powers would support the 
Greeks. In the meantime, the British Cradock mission to 
Egypt had made desperate efforts to induce Mehemet Ali to 
withdraw from the conflict for it was believed that with-
drawal of Egyptian aid would force the Porte to accept the 
terms of the Treaty of London. The treaty was not wholly 
unfavorable to the Porte. It proposed that the Greeks pay 
a fixed annual tribute to the Sultan as their suzerain and 
that they be governed by authorities of their own choice sub-
ject to the approval of the Porte. It further provided that 
Turkish proprietors on Greek soil be bought out with equitable 
compensation, and that the Greek-Turkish border be fixed by 
subsequent negotiations between the Powers and the two 
parties. Finally, the Powers renounced any exclusive 
territorial or commercial advantage in the newly created 
autonomous state, under'to.ok to guarantee the new settlement, 
and notified the Porte of their decision to enter upon con-
sular relations with the Greeks. An analysis of the afore-
mentioned clauses reveals that the Powers granted the Greeks 
an autonomy short of national independence and went so far 
as to jointly guarantee the new settlement and the suzerainty 
of the Porte. 
The Sultan refused to even consider the 1827 Treaty of 
London. The Porte's arrogant rejection should have been 
expected since dictation of terms to an Oriental potentate 
is contrary to the face saving formula. The conditions did 
not accord the Sultan an opening to "force" the Powers to 
back down on their "repressive demands." VJhen dealing with 
the Eastern mind, compromise affords a way out and this had 
not been offered the Turk--he was bluntly told what was to 
be done. A more diplomatic approach, if a settlement was 
wanted, would have been for the Powers to recommend initially 
complete independence and after "negotiations" concede to the 
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vassal-type solution. However, the compromise approach may 
have been impossible: first, because no Power really de-
sired complete independence for Greece; second, for fear if 
independence were recommended, the Greek might hold the 
Powers to the independence stipulation. In any case, Greece 
was not offered complete emancipation and the Sultan retained 
his suzerainty. 
The Treaty of London was a victory for British diplomacy. 
Once again Britain had succeeded in holding the line against 
Russia by preserving Turkish dominance on the Balkan penin-
sula at the expense of Greek eleutherianism. At the same 
time, the British could yield to European desires by consent-
ing to an autonomous Greek state; but by making it a vassal 
of the Sultan, Britain's dominant position in the area was 
still secure since through the Porte, Britain served her 
interests best without overtly antagonizing Russia. The 
position of the other interested parties to the treaty could 
be expressed most appropriately as follows: France was still 
only a jackal among wolves; Austria, under Metternich, re-
mained a coyote howling about "consummating the triumph of 
a new revolution in Europe" but doing nothing; and Greece re-
mained a piece of the Ottoman carcass. 
In August a three-Power note demanding an armistice was 
sent to the Porte and to the Greek Government at Nauphlia. 
The Greeks accepted the terms im~ediately but the Turks re-
fused, whereupon the admirals of the fleets of the three 
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Powers were instructed to stop all reinforcements and supplies 
from reaching the Sultan's forces in Greece. On September 20, 
Admirals Codrington and de Rigny of the British and French 
fleets, respectively, anchored off the Ionian Islands, in-
formed Ibrahim Pasha of their purpose. With the arrival of 
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the Russians, the combined Allied fleets maneuvered off 
Navarino to enforce the blockade. A dispute soon arose over 
anchorage of the Allied and Egyptian squadrons in Navarino 
harbor which ended October 20, 1827 in the complete destruction 
of the Turco-Egyptian fleet. Europe was gripped with wild 
enthusiasm when the news of the decisive, but accidental, 
naval engagement became known. The Turks, demanding repara-
tions, sulked in indignation and this "untoward event" 
brought a diplomatic rupture between the ttree Powers and 
Turkey. The conflict between the Greek insurgents and the 
Turkish forces practically ceased as the Sultan proclaimed 
a "religious and national" war against Russia and repudiated 
the Convention of Ackerman. Before Britain could mediate the 
dispute, the Tsar merged "his special grievances in the 
general cause" and declared war on Turkey on April 26, 1828. 
Russia disclaimed any intention of retaining conquests or 
destroying the Ottoman Empire, and pointed out that she would 
proceed alone, if necessary, to enforce the Treaty of London. 
As Russia invaded the Danubian Principalities and 
pushed southwards, events in Greece move&rapidly. An Anglo-
French convention with Mehemet Ali provided for the evacuation 
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of Egyptian forces from the Morea and was carried out by a 
French expeditionary force under General Maison during the win-
ter of 1828-1829. After an initial stalemate on the south bank 
of the Danube, Russian forces took Varna and moved south on 
Adrianople in the direction of Constantinople. In the mean-
while, British diplomacy had hastened to achieve a solution to 
the Greek Question and bring the Sultan to terms before the 
Tsar's forces could be in a position to march on Constantinople. 
On March 22, 1829 an ambassadorial conference hastily drew up 
the First London Protocol, proposing an autonomous and tributary 
state of Greece composed of the Morea and Sterea Bellas south 
of a line formed by the Gulfs of Volo and Arta including Euboea 
and the Cyclades Islands, but excluding Crete. The new 
principality was to be ruled by a prince not chosen from the 
ruling families of France, England, or Russia. In September 
Russia concluded the Treaty of Adrianople with Turkey which, 
among other things, forced the Turks to accept the Treaty of 
London and the London Protocol of March 22 as the basis for 
immediate negotiations with the three Powers. The Greeks re-
jected the Protocol of March 22 as inadequate. On February 3, 
1830 a new London Protocol proclaimed the independence of 
Greece which included Attica, Boeotia, and Euboea but the 
northern boundary of mainland Greece was moved back to the line 
Aspropotamo--Gulf of Lamia, i.e., almost to the Gulf of Corinth; 
in addition the Cyclades, exclusive of the islands of Crete and 
Samos were added. The infant state was to be governed by a 
hereditary monarch not chosen from the reigning families of 
the three protecting Powers. At last, nine years after the 
standard of revolt had been raised in the Morea, the Greek 
people accepted a State created for them. Albeit its emer-
gence was a definite step on the road to national rivival; 
but the new state contained seeds of chronic troubles which 
at the outset could have been averted by greater foresight 
and statesmanship on the part of the Great Powers. 
CONSE~UENCES 
The Greek consequences of the Protocol of London of 
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1830 may be described in one word--irredentism. For the 
Great Powers this meant the issuance of frequent threats and 
even coercion to keep the Greeks from "flying into wars" with 
Turkey and destroying the general "tranquility of the East." 
In the fight for national unification and survival, 
Greece had to contend with three major obstacles: (1) a 
dying but periodically-resurging Turkey that would not re-
linquish integrel parts of her empire inhabited by Greeks; 
(2) the other Balkan states that had come into being at a 
later date and whose ambitions conflicted with those of 
Greece; and (3) the Great Powers of Europe whose objectives 
interfered with the national aspirations of Greece and whose 
interests could best be served by bringing pressures on the 
little kingdom in order to maneuver policy decisions in their 
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favor which were often detrimental to Greece. N0 t infrequently, 
however, decisions made by the Powers were beneficial to 
Greece; but it is equally true that benefits accrued by Greece 
were secondary and only incidental compared to the profits 
garnered by the Powers. 
The 1830 Protocol regulating the status of the new 
Greece, drew Greece's frontiers on such a niggardly scale9 
that Prince Leopold of Coburg, afterwards Leopold I of 
Belgium, declined to accept the new throne when it was offered 
to him. By Leopold's refusal Greece lost a wise ruler and 
Otho--Otto of Bavaria--became Greece's first monarch only 
after the London Conference of Allied Powers discussing the 
establishment of the new state issued a second protocol on 
February 3, 1832 which relunctantly extended the frontiers 
of the new state to the Volo-Arta line. At that, Greece was 
not able to lay the political or economic foundations for a 
progressive and tranquil state. Otto's unpopularity--as the 
popularity of Greek monarchs since--not only resulted from 
attempts to establish a centralized and bureaucrative system 
wholly unsuited to the conditions of the country and people 
but from economic wants and conditions which inherently plague 
the peninsula. 
9 Among the scholars who agree on the niggardliness of the Great 
Powers in drawing up the boundaries of Greece see: Seton-Watson, op. 
cit., and also his The Rise of Nationalitz in the Balkans, and William 
Miller, A History of the Greek People, 1821-1921, 
Leopold's refusal to accept the crown is understandable, 
for the new creation of the Powers was not a viable state. 
In the first place, it was far from being economically self-
sufficient since only twenty percent of its area of 18,856 
square miles was arable land. Worse still, the land had 
been ravaged to such an extent during the War for Independence 
that even the productivity of this area was seriously impaired 
for most of the fighting raged in the Morea. In addition, 
Epirus and Thessaly--then the bread basket for Greece--were 
omitted and the relatively productive islands of Chios, Samos, 
and Crete were expressly excluded. The latter remained a 
festering wound until 1912. The glaring incompleteness of 
the work of 1830 is further emphasized by the fact that out 
of approximately six million Greeks living in a comparatively 
compact geographical area under Turkish rule, only about 
650,000 were emancipated. This disappointment of the 
excluded Hellenes was intense. It proved a gangrenous sore 
in the internal politics and foreign policy of Greece. Their 
desire was manifested in an unequivocal determination for 
union with Hellas. Henceforth, there were two classes of 
Greeks--the free and the unredeemed. To the former belonged 
those few who had already achieved freedom through inclusion 
in the newly created Kingdom of Greece while ttose who still 
remained under Turkish occupation were the unredeemed, a 
condition manifest in the Cyprus Question today. Since its 
modern beginning, Greece was a curse of the myopia of the 
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Great Powers and was faced with a constant struggle to over-
come this difficulty. For allowing such a state of affairs 
to arise the three Allied Powers, Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, ·cannot be entirely acquitted of blame, but this is 
not to say that the Powers alone bear the responsibility. 
Nor does it exclude Greece from its responsibility over the 
course of years. But in the words of a Greek proverb, "A 
good start is half an accomplishment," in this case the 
beginning was made by the Great Powers and they should share 
at least one-half of the consequences for the formidable 
obstacles to national uru!ication, political tranquility, 
and a reasonable measure of economic self-sufficiency and 
social progress could only be overcome by a strong Hellas 
holding a respected position in the comity of nations. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM LONDON TO LAUSANNE: 1832-1923 
Great Power Containment vs. Greek Expansion 
After the Second London Protocol of 1832 Greek irreden-
tism found expression in the "Great Idea" and the dream of a 
Greater Greece. 
The Greater Greece envisioned by this study consists of 
territories which were predominantly inhabited by a Greek 
element--Greek in language, custom, and religion--in the 
lands which lay in close proximity to Greece in Epirus and 
Thessaly, the southern part of Macedonia, the Ionian Islands, 
the Kithiras, Crete, and the many Aegean Islands which en-
circled the Greek mainland, and the other territories further 
removed from Greece such as Thrace, the Greek islands off 
the coast of Asia Minor, the Asia Minor littoral about Smyrna, 
the Black Sea littoral near Trebizond, and the islands of 
Rhodes and Cyprus which did not border the newly created king-
dom but were part of the "Great Idea" because their dominant 
Greek element caused them to gravitate towards the "Mother 
Country.," and, in turn, caused Greece to reach out and shepherd 
them back into the fold. The two-way elan between a free 
Greece and an unredeemed Greece in effect found expression 
in the Greek Question and the "Greek" or the "Great Idea." 
Admittedly Constantinople was the jewel of the "Great 
Idea," but in the long wake between the final fall of the 
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seat of Byzantium to 'I'urkey in 145'3 and the creation of a 
new Hellas in 1832 Constantinople had ceased to be "Greek" 
and had become a symbol rather than an achievable aspiration. 
Greece had neither the power nor the friends to support a 
"Greek" Constantinople. Furthermore, the Powers were consis-
tent about one thing in the long and tortuous history of the 
Eastern Question: no Power or the 11appanage" of any Power 
would be allowed to seize Constantinople from Turkey, or 
alone control the Straits to the exclusion of the other 
Powers, and for the lack of a better solution left the seat 
of Byzantium in the hands of Turkey. Finally, Turkish 
writers have correctly defined the Eastern Question as "the 
problem of how to divide up the Ottoman Empire," and it be-
came evident early in the long struggle of the Eastern 
Question that Constantinople was never meant to fall to any 
such paltry state as Greece.10 
The dream of a Greater Greece was not a product of 
megalomania as has often been derisively asserted by Greece's 
critics when Greece, after 1832, attempted repeatedly to re-
dress the gross myopia of the Powers in drawing Greece's 
10 
This does not mean that all Greeks gave up or have given up 
their dream of a nev Byzantium centered at Constantinople; in 1958, for 
example, aaong the approximately 300 political parties which registered 
with the Supreme Court of Greece one vas the "National Imperial Byzantine 
Party of Greater Greece" under the party leadership of Michael ("the first") 
Angelopoulos, a self-styled descendent of the emperors of Byzantium. 
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original frontiers. Greece's aspirations were as justifiable 
as those of the thirteen American colonies for a United 
States of America and American expansion westward to create 
an American nation, as those of Italy for a united Italy, or 
of the Germanies for a united Germany; and even then Greece's 
attempts at expansion were different from that of the United 
States and Greek irredentism was different from that of Italy 
and Germany because the force behind Greek irredentism and 
expansion had been equally, if not in the main, centripetal 
rather than centrifugal. The force behind the struggle for 
independence had been provided by "exohellenes" such as 
Adamantios Korais, Rhigas Pheraios, the Greek merchants of 
Odessa who organized the Philike Hetairia, Alexander 
Yspilantis, and Count Capodistrias; afterwards, the Greek 
Idea found bedrock in a new line of "exohellenes" whose 
aspirations were embodied in Eleutherios Venizelos whose very 
name became synonymous with the "Great Idea." 
The two-way elan for the union of the motherland and 
her unredeemed sons and daughters after 1832 was also prompted 
by concrete and imperative economic demands placed upon the 
little kingdom: Greece required arable land to grow the 
necessities of life not found in the historic impoverished 
Morea whose mountainous terrain now made up the hulk of the 
newly created kingdom; Greece needed arable land to relieve 
the little kingdom from overdependence on foreign food 
sources and the amenability to economic pressures; and Greece, 
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last but not least, desired a land connection across Thessaly 
with the terminus of Europe at Saloniki. 
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The aberration of 1832 had placed an Ottoman sash, con-
sisting of an unbroken barrier of Turkish territory inhabited 
largely by Greeks, across Greece's northern boundary which the 
Porte could squeeze at his discretion and prevent Greek contact 
with the principal terminus of the European communication system 
in the southern Balkans at Saloniki. As long as Turkey com-
manded Greece's land approach to Europe, Greece remained iso-
lated from Europe--an "island"--and her principal communication 
with Continental Europe from 1832-1912 lay chiefly through the 
port of Piraeus. It is not surprising then that even today the 
Greeks, in referring to travel, "go to Turkey" and not to Asia, 
while travel to the Continent is "going to Europe" although 
geographically Greece is part of Europe. 
The enforced isolation of Greece by Turkey after Greece 
acquired her independence is made clear in the history of the 
railroad in southeastern Europe. Railroad building began in 
the Balkans soon after the Crimean War, and large-scale 
development began in 1868 with the Sultan Abdul Aziz granting 
a concession of the Austrian Baron Hirsch which envisioned 
linking Constantinople to Vienna through Adrianople, Philip-
popolis, Sofia, Nish, Sarejevo, and northwards to the 
Austrian border to connect with the terminus of Austria's 
southern railways. By 1875, Saloniki became part of the main 
line to Uskub and Mitrovitza in upper Macedonia and a second 
line connected Constantinople to Adrianople and Sarambey in 
Eastern Rumelia; finally, on August 12, 1888 Vienna was 
connected by track all the way to Constantinople. 
For forty years after Saloniki was linked to Europe by 
railroad, Greece remained isolated from the southern terminus 
of the European network at Saloniki since the Porte repeatedly 
refused to permit the construction of a seventy-mile line in 
Macedonia which would have linked Europe through Saloniki with 
the terminus of the Greek railway in Thessaly. The difficulty 
was finally overcome after the First Balkan War when Greece 
seized Saloniki and thereby linked Europe to Greece. 
In the ninety years from 1832-1923 Greece attempted on 
at least six occasions to break out of the shell of 1832; and 
each time Greek action sprang from special European and Near 
Eastern conditions favorable to Greek aspirations, namely (1) 
the Crimean War 1853-56; (2) the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-78; 
(3) the Revolution in Eastern Rumelia 1885-86; (4) the Cretan 
Insurrection 1897-1912; (5) the Tripolitan War 1912, and the 
Balkan Wars 1912-13; and (6) World War I which for Greece 
continued until 1922 and destroyed the Great Idea. During 
this entire period on only one occasion was territory ceded 
Greece by the Powers short of Greece's participation or 
enforced non-participation in war; on April 28, 1864 Great 
Britain formally abandoned her protectorate over the Greek 
inhabited Ionian Islands to Greece in order to stabilize 
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George I's new Danish dynasty on the Greek throne. Previously, 
the Greek National Assembly had offered the crown to Prince 
Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, but England had 
politely declined the proffer for it dared not offend Russia 
by making this great extension of her influence in the Levant. 
The Ionian Islands are a stellar example of a strategic 
piece of "Greek" real estate which through the course of 
history and Power conflicts underwent centuries of foreign 
rule before becoming part of Hellas. Until the 13th century 
the Ionian Isles were part of the Greek theme of Cephalonia 
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of the Byzantine Empire. After the Latin conquest of 
Constantinople in 1204 the islands fell in part to the Angevins, 
the Venetians and the Despot of Epirus; the Isles came under 
the total sway of Venice in 1386 which commenced four hundred 
years of continuous Venetian rule; thereafter in quick 
succession the islands were occupied first by France who 
acquired the islands from Venice in 1797 under the Treaty of 
Campo Formio, by Russia in 1799 following their capture from 
France by a combined Russian-Turkish fleet, whence they were 
organized briefly as the Russian dominated Septinsular 
Republic 1799-1807 under Russian occupation and guaranty and 
Turkish protection, by France again in 1807; and Britain in 
1815 who after fifty years finally ceded them to Greece in 1864. 11 
1 1 The occupation of the Ionian Islands by the British in 1815 brought 
the Greeks their first extended contact with Great Britain, and, at the same 
time, the British administration in the islands helped to fam4liarize 
educated British public opinion at home with the aspirations of the Greek 
inhabitants and the Greek nation which resulted in large numbers of 
Englishmen adding Hellas in the course of the "Grand Tour11 out of which 
emerged that class of English Philhellenes who later placed their personal 
services and fortunes at the disposal of the insurgent Greek nation during 
the war for independence. 
The Ionian Islands were singularly unlike the ether Greek 
territories in that they never suffered the imprint of Ottoman 
rule; on the contrary, they suffered long rule under the West 
and consequently, even today, it is not uncommon to hear the 
natives of Sterea Bellas and especially the native of 
"Old Greece" in the Morea refer derisively to their Ionian 
brethren as Frangkoi or Franks. Nevertheless, the inhabitants 
of the Ionian Islands emerged from Frangkokratia as Greek as 
the Greeks who underwent centuries of Turkokratia, and serve 
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to point up orie Greek trait, peculiar to few races which caused 
the Porte innumerable troubles and the Powers countless pro-
blems and crises. Ancestral lands inhabited by Greeks even 
after centuries under foreign domination remain true to their 
Greek heritage and the Greek Idea unless--as Mustapha Kemal 
aptly recognized--they and their Idea are forcibly uprooted. 
Briefly, remove the cause for the idea and you remove the 
Idea. 
GREECE AND THE CRIMEAN WAR 1853-57 
In October 1853 the Ottoman Empire declared war on 
Russia and within one month the Sultan suffered a major 
defeat at Sinope and Russian forces astride the Danubian 
principalities threatened to move against the Turks in the 
Balkans. 
Taking advantage of Turkey's preoccupation with Russia, 
Greek guerrilla bands crossed the Greek frontier in January 1854 
and invaded Thessaly and Epirus which caused Turkey in March 
1854 to sever relations with Greece. Greece prepared for 
war and, unless the Porte met Greek claims in Thessaly and 
Epirus, threatened hostilities against Turkey. At the last 
moment, however, the Greek war threat against Turkey was pre-
vented from becoming real by an Anglo-French occupation of 
the port city of Piraeus, the hub of Greece's contact with 
the outside world and gateway to the Greek capital, Athens. 
The Anglo-French occupation of Piraeus lasted until 
February 1857, one full year after the termination of the 
Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris of March 1856, during which 
time the Porte was able to reimpose effective control through-
out Thessaly and Epirus. In this manner, Britain and France 
prevented Greek expansion during the Crimean War and helped 
the Porte to retain an Ottoman sash across Greece's northern 
frontier. 
Greece's experience during the Crimean War was the first 
of many similar episodes among Greece, the Powers, and 
Turkey; it was an early instance of Greece's tendency to 
throw discretion to the winds, believing that a little king-
dom could seize upon favorable circumstances emanating from 
the greater Power conflict to achieve her own aspirations; 
it foretold the ambivalent policy of Greece's protectors 
towards Greece who, on the one hand, claimed to be Greece's 
protectors but, on the other hand, restrained Greece from 
achieving legitimate aspirations essential to Greece's 
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economic and political welfare but opposed to the position of 
the Great Powers in the Eastern Question. Greece's experience 
during the Crimean War clearlyportended what was in store for 
Greece during the Middle Period of her history. 
GREECE AND THE RUSSO-OTTOMAN WAR 1877-78 
Greece, on February 2, 1878, seized the opportunity 
offered by the general upheaval in the Balkans in 1877-78 re-
sulting from the second war within twenty-five years between 
Russia and Turkey and an uprising in Thessaly, to declare 
war on the Porte. 
Turkish prostration at the hands of combined Russian, 
Rumanian, Serbian, and Montenegrin forces in the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1877-78 proved too great a temptation for Greece not 
to join the other Christian peoples of the Balkans in the war 
against Turkey; but, once again, the Greeks were constrained 
from operations against Turkey by the Western Powers, and 
especially by menacing British fleet maneuvers in the Aegean. 
Although British naval action in the Aegean was directed at 
the Straits and Russia, it held obvious signs for Greece; 
thirty years earlier in January 1850 Britain had dispatched 
a fleet to Greece to collect the questionable claims of an 
even more questionable British subject,12 and Greece had 
1 2The Don Pacifico affair. Don Pacifico, a Portuges.e Moorish Jew 
born in Gibraltar held extensive, although questionable, claims against 
Greece; he pressed these claims with vigor until an anti-semitic mob 
burned his house in Athens. 
again experienced the influence of the British Mediterranean 
Fleet during the Crimean War. In addition, the war fever over 
the Eastern Question had again seized the British and it was 
echoed across Europe by that most aptly expressed slogan, "We 
don't want to fight, but by jingo, if we do, we've got the 
men, we've got the ships, we've got the money too." Conse-
quently, at a time when Russian forces were encamped before 
the gates of Constantinople and a general upheaval by Balkan 
peoples against Turkey had successfully taken place, Greece 
was constrained by the West from marching in and seizing 
Thessaly and Thrace. 
Under the treaty of San Stephano, Russia, Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Montenegro, and Serbia received extensive concessions 
from Turkey; but Greece received nothing as a result of her 
forced non-participation in the conflict by Britain and 
anxiously watched her Balkan brethren divide the Ottoman 
spoils in Balkania amongst themselves. 
San Stephano was ominous for Greece. It confirmed 
Greek suspicions of the Slav design in the Balkans, to make 
Greece the mere fingernail of the Balkan peninsula and re-
place the Ottoman sash across Greece's northern frontier with 
an onerous Slav belt. Hereafter, the Turkish corridor between 
Greece's northern boundary and the Slav territories was given 
a place in Greek military and diplomatic calculations that 
took precedence over all other areas to which Greece aspired. 
This exigency was lost in the thinking of the Powers, but 
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for Greece the Slav subject now became as real and acute as 
the Ottoman question. Hereafter, Greece had to be alert and 
a party to any action from any quarter, large or small, that 
threatened to change the status guo in the Balkans. 
The terms of the Treaty of San Stephano, if carried out 
would have been a disaster to the West. Most disturbing to 
the West were the following: (1) Austria feared that the 
creation of a Russian dominated Greater Bulgaria would pre-
vent Austria's expansion into Balkania. (2) Britain feared 
that the creation of a Greater Bulgaria would perilously 
weaken the Turkish position in the Balkans, and the Russian 
acquisition of the Transcaucasian areas of Kars, Ardahan, 
Batum, and Bayazid merely presaged a new Russian move to the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf of Alexandretta, which ~hen coupled 
with "San Stephano Bulgaria" would negate the strategic 
significance of the straits and place Russia astride both the 
Balkans and the Near East in a position to outflank 
Constantinople, threaten Britain's imperial interests in the 
Near East and most of all her newly acquired strategic and 
tangible economic stake--the Suez Canal. 13 
.. 1.3 
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In November 1875, Disraeli pulled off a momentous coup for British 
Near Eastern interests b.r concluding the Anglo-Egyptian agreement for the 
purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal Company. As a result, 
the British Government received 44% of the shares of the Suez Canal Company, 
making Britain the largest single investor in the Suez Canal Company and the 
major influence in promoting the Canal's safety. Britain now held a tangible 
economic stake in the Eastern Mediterranean which eventually witnessed the 
beginning of modern British penetration in Egypt. 
The Powers remained adamant in their stand against San 
Stephano and called upon Russia to retract the settlement. 
An impasse resulted and war clouds hovered on the horizon as 
Russia sought support for her position in Vienna. Meanwhile 
Britain anchored a fleet off Constantinople, mobilized, and 
reinforced her Mediterranean garrisons to meet the new 
Russian threat in the Near East. The balance of power was 
altered when Austria turned aside Russian overtures and 
openly joined Britain in mobilization and military prepared-
ness for war against Russia. In the face of such determined 
opposition, Russia backed down from her1ofty perch of San 
Stephano and agreed to attend a congress of Powers in Berlin 
to discuss the issue under the directorship of Bismarck 
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especially after the invitation was made by ''the honest broker."14 
The Congress of Berlin met for one month between June 13 
and July 14, 1878; but its work had been essentially completed 
beforehand in secret agreements among the Powers, and all 
efforts to introduce new business before the Congress were 
1~ Why Bismarck could not be an "honest broker" for the Russians at 
Berlin, notwithstanding the statement accredited to him that the Eastern 
Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, and that 
the Kaiser William I had written to Alexander II after the Franco Prussian 
War 1870-71, "P~ssia will never forget that she owes it to you that the 
war ~ith Franc!V did not assume the most extreme dimensions ~ith Austri~; 
may God Bless you for it," see the very recent work by L.C.B. Seamen, From 
Vienna to Versailles, (New York, 1956), pp. 122-124. Briefly, it wouldln;t 
only have been an act of political suicide but the consummation of the 
Russian success, with its overtones of Pan-Slavism, did not merely menace 
Turkey but it menaced Austria-Hungary equally, and therefore Germany itself. 
sternly repressed by Bismarck in his role of "honest broker." 
These secret engagements included the Anglo-Russian Agreement, 
30 May 1878; the Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 4 June 1878; and 
finally the Anglo-Austrian Agreement of 6 June 1878. 
In the settlement at Berlin all the States participating 
in the Congress with the exception of Greece received 
definite concessions or were ceded territory at the expense 
of the Ottoman Empire. The awards were commensurate with 
the power of the recipients and served only to increase 
tensions in the Balkans between the Great Powers, the Great 
Powers and the small Balkan States,among the Balkan States, 
and between the small Balkan States and Turkey. For example: 
Russia felt cheated by "the honest broker" and cooled towards 
Germany; the Austrian mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to garrison the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar brought Austria 
into open conflict with Turkey and South Slav aspirations; 
France was promised Tunis and found herself in conflict with 
Italy; Italy, on the other hand, was granted concessions in 
Albania wedged between South Slav and Greek aspirations; 
Russia received the Dobrudja which was pawned off to Rumania 
for Bessarabia against the wishes of the Rumanians, as a 
result, Rumania cooled towards Russia and fcund herself in 
conflict with her neighbor Bulgaria who aspired to the 
Dobrudja; the breaking up of "San Stephano Bulgaria" into 
three parts, "Small Bulgaria," Eastern Rurnelia, and l•lacedonia 
only served to whet the appetite of "Small Bulgaria" for 
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Eastern Ruroelia and permit Macedonia, that most maligned 
region of the much maligned Balkans, to remain a cancer in 
the Ottoman Empire and pitch the Porte against Greeks, Serbs, 
and Bulgars, and these Christian peoples against one another; 
the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar was returned to Turkey and continued 
as an object of Serbian-Turkish rivalry; Britain, for its 
part, under the Cyprus Convention of 4 June 1878 occupied 
Cyprus in return for a defensive alliance with Turkey against 
Russiat15 which England knew would not have to be redeemed 
since five days before the Convention was signed, London and 
st. Petersburg had secretly ironed out their differences over 
Transcaucasia in the ~~glo-Russian agreement of 30 May, which 
made war very remote between Britain and Russia. Hence the 
Sultan, who had bartered away the largest island in the 
Eastern Mediterranean for an empty promise, was put out with 
perfidious Albion. Finally, Greece emerged from the Congress 
of Berlin with a promise of Thessaly and a miasmatic prophecy 
15 The convention provided: "If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars or any of 
them shall be retained by Russia and if any attempt shall be made at any 
future time by Russia to take any further territories as fixed by the 
Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan in defending them by forces of arms." Cyprus was selected as 
a naval base for it ~d "the double advantage of vicinity both to Asia 
Minor and Syria; it would enable us without any act of overt hostility 
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and without disturbing the peace of EuropeJ ~a~cumulate material of war 
and, if requisite, the troops necessa~ for_operations in Asia Minor or 
Syria, while it would not excite the jealousy w~ch other Powers would feel 
~any acguisitions_on the mainland." Author's italics. Lady G. Cecil, 
Ljfe of Robert Harguis of SalismlLJ, Vol. 2, p. 269. The author would 
also like to suggest that possibly Cyprus was selected for it would not 
be subject to mass land attack, and since British sea power dominated the 
Mediterranean its loss was nearly impossible, i.e., if she did not want 
to cede it "voluntarily." 
for the future; Disraeli, now elevated to the peerage as 
Lord neaconsfield, almost sneeringly suggested that Greece 
was "a country with a future and could afford to wait." 
49 
The Powers, always conscious of the larger power conflict, 
remained blind to the aspirations of Balkan peoples. Britain 
was singularly content with the settlement of Berlin, so much 
so that Disraeli on his return to London was able to announce 
to his countrymen the restoration of "peace with honor" and 
that he had "consolidated the Turkish Empire." In reality, 
however, the Congress, as noted previously, settled little 
and in the Balkans, especially, where a settlement was needed, 
it only deepened further the existing tensions. It had left 
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece with very limited territories, 
and Balkan nationalists profoundly dissatisfied with the 
Powers. It had left Turkey with territory in Europe over 
which it had little effective control ready for picking by 
her covetous neighbors. It had left the Powers with a Turkish 
promise of political and religious reforms which without an 
effective policing system only served to increase tensions 
that often led to massacres and interracial conflicts. Turkish 
resistance to effective reforms could only be overcome through 
a strong line by the Powers, but even then reforms were only 
half-measures, if they were measures at all, and certainly 
no solution for the complex problems of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1878. It is strange then that the Powers could still pro-
pose as late as September 1903 the so-called Mlirzsteg reform 
program to remedy the ailments which plagued the Ottoman 
Empire in Macedonia--unless, of course, the Powers were still 
undecided on how to divide up the Sultan's dominions. 
Certainly the minor surgery performed on the Ottoman 
Empire at Berlin did little, if anything, to put the Sultan's 
disorderly house in order and rid his empire of its many dis-
tempers. The piecemeal policy of the Powers to correct the 
colonial problems of the Porte at best committed the Ottoman 
Empire to a slow death. No less an authority than Bismarck, 
on the morrow of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, told 
the Turkish representatives: 
"Well, gentlemen, you ought to be very much 
pleased. We have secured you a respite of 
twenty years. You have that period of grace 
in which to put your house in order. It is 
probably the last chance the Ottoman Empire 
will get, and of one .thing I am pretty sure, 
you won't take it. 1116 
Disraeli did not live to witness the incompatibility of 
the Berlin settlement wtich he and his cohorts, Bismarck and 
the Austrian foreign minister Count Julius Andrassy, imposed 
upon the people of Balkania. He died in 1881, and his pass-
ing was not missed by the peoples of the Balkans. 
After Berlin these much maligned people, whom Disraeli 
scornfully called "the coffee house rabble of Europe," and 
whose homelands were contemptuously regarded as the "powder 
16 . 
J. A. R. Marriot, The Eastern Question, (Oxford, 1924) p. 346. 
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keg of Europe," a phrase as misleading as it is incorrect. 
Balkan explosions were not directly the making of Balkan peoples 
but the consequences of the Powers imposing upon these peoples 
ill-conceived and unrealistic solutions to their real problems. 
This is not to say that the people of the Balkans had a better 
solution for their problems, but they were not given a place 
nor were their desires aired adequately at the notable con-
gresses and conventions called to deal with the Eastern Question. 
These people were simply told to listen to counsels of in-
action, place their future in the hands of the Powers, and 
rock and rol-l with the backwash from the decisions of the 
Powers. If anything, there never was ~powder keg in Europe 
but only powder kegs, and these existed principally in 
St. Petersburg, Vienna, and London whose fall-out always 
seemed to settle in the Balkans. 
GREECE AND THE REVOLUTION IN EASTERN RUMELIA 1885-86 
The unsettled conditions in the Balkans after the Congress 
of Berlin reached a climax in September 1885 in revolution 
in Eastern Rumelia as a prelude to the union of Eastern Rumelia 
with Bulgaria. 
The events in Eastern Rumelia soon lost their local 
character when, true to all Balkan experience, they became a 
political football among the Powers, Russia, England, and 
Austria. Russia contrary to her earlier position now resented 
Bulgaria's expansion into Eastern Rumelia for the Bulgarian 
people had developed a strong national consciousness which 
threatened to check Russian ambitions in the Balkans. 17 Tsar 
Alexander II brought pressures to bear upon the Prince of 
Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenburg, to renounce the action 
in Eastern Rumelia and forsake the consummation of the "union 
of the two Bulgarias." England, who now saw in Bulgaria a 
new instrument to combat Russian expansion in the Balkans, 
reversed its earlier position on a Big Bulgaria and, to counter 
the change in Russian policy, urged the Porte to recognize 
the fait accompli in Eastern Rumelia and appoint the Prince 
of Bulgaria the Governor General of Eastern Rumelia as well. 
Austria, who feared that Bulgarian action in Rumelia fore-
shadowed a new advance towards Macedonia, which Austria 
coveted, urged, rather than restrained her ally Serbia to 
move against Bulgaria (i.e., away from Macedonia) after an 
ambassadorial conference of the Powers in Constantinople re-
fused to rescind the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. 
As a result, Serbia with at least the tacit support of Russia 
and the approval of Austria declared war on Bulgaria on 
November 13, 1885, thereby initiating a new period of war and 
17For a recent clear and concise presentation of the complicated 
situation see Charles Jel3vic~ Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: 
Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bu1~aria and Serbja 
1879-1886 (Berkeley, 1958). 
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tension in the Balkans. 18 
On January 4, 1886, Greece seized upon the international 
muddle in the Balkans and the added opportunity of a new 
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crisis-in-the-making in Europe proper between France and Germany 
/over anti-German agitation in France, provoked by the revanche 
propaganda of General Boulange.!:7 to present a note to Turkey 
demanding territorial concessions by way of compensation for 
Bulgarian claims. Greece repeated her claim to Epirus which 
the Porte had refused to give up despite the "invitation" 
tendered him at Berlin, and after being called upon to do so 
in 1881 by a conference in Constantinople attended by repre-
sentatives of Turkey and the powers Lbut not Greec~, finally 
agreed to release only the southernmost corner of Epirus in 
the district of Arta to Greece. In addition to Epirus the 
Greeks called upon Turkey to rectify the Thessaly-Macedonia 
frontier question which had remained unresolved since 1881 
when Turkey, as "invited" by the Powers at Berlin, finally but 
begrudgingly ceded Thessaly to Greece but retained, on grounds 
1$Austria, in return for extensive eaonomic and railway concessions, 
had signed an alliance with Serbia in 1881, wherein Austria pled~ed support 
for Serbian expansion to the south (i.e., away from Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Initially, Austria advised Serbia to place Serbian trust with Austria who 
promised to obtain for Serbia compensation for any Bulgarian gains in the 
Rumelia crisis, but when pressed b,r her worthless, capricious, and 
especially subsevient ally Prince Milan Obrenovic that he must exercise 
his energies in order to recoup the popularity of his Serbian subjects and 
soothe public clamor for compensation provoked b,y Bulgaria 1s sudden grab 
in Rumelia, Austria succumbed "reluctantly" to Serbian pressures for 
action and urged her ally to march on Bulgaria, their common foe. 
that it provided a defensible line, a small strip of the ceded 
territory which remained a thorn in Greek-Turkish amity. 
Although the crisis over Eastern Rumelia seemed a most 
opportune time for Greece to press its claims against Turkey, 
it soon became evident that Greece would not be allowed by the 
Powers to take advantage of the ?orte's preoccupation with 
Bulgaria and the preoccupation of Austria and Britain and 
Russia with the Serbo-Bulgarian war: first, there came the 
note warning Greece on January 24 against an attack on Turkey, 
then the unsuccessful ultimatum of April 26 that demanded 
that Greece disarm, which Greece refused to heed, and finally, 
the blockade of the Greek coast from May 8 - June 7, which 
fcrced Greece to back down from war and demobilize. 
For a second time within ten years Greece was prevented 
from pressing claims against the Porte and forced to withdraw 
sullenly before the censure of the Powers. This time, how-
ever, the Greeks found it especially difficult--and with some 
justification--to take the bitter pill forced upon them. The 
first to feel the wrath was Delyiannes, the Prime Minister, 
rabid spokesman of irredentism and closest to the fiasco, who 
was .toppled from office; his crime: adding to the Greek 
debt without obtaining any advantage as GreEce's claims were 
shunted aside ignominiously by the Powers, the Congress of 
Berlin and the 1881 Constantinople Conference notwithstanding. 
The refusal by the Powers to countenance Greek claims to 
Epirus and rectify the Thessaly-~~cedonia frontier question 
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especially embittered Greece when the Powers held to their 
position even after they accepted the union of Eastern 
Rumelia and the Bulgarian Principality,19 an action which not 
only flouted the Berlin treaty but placed the Bulgarians one 
step closer to Macedonia, a region of mixed ethnography to 
which Serbia, Bulgaria, and Gteece laid claim. In order to 
understand fully Greece's chagrin over the settlement in 
Eastern Rumelia one need only consider that within less than 
two decades history had recorded, (1) the establishment of 
the Autocephalus Bulgarian Exarchate established by the 
Sultan's firman of March 11, 1870 with the dreadful Article X 
Lwhich permitted the Bulgarian church to add new dioceses 
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upon the vote of two-thirds of the inhabitants of any area, 
thus clearing the way for Bulgarian expansion into Christian 
areas still controlled by the Sultan and especially Hacedonis/, 
(2) the ominous vision of San Stephano in _1878 with its 
Greater Bulgaria, and now (3) the union of Eastern Rumelia in 
1886 with its portentious consequences. The Greeks, with 
19 On April 5, 1886 the problem of the union of Bulgaria and Eastern 
Rumelia was settled between the Powers and Turkey by recognition of the 
Prince of Bulgaria as Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia, but without 
Prince Alexander specifically named as a result of Russian pressure. Sub-
sequently, the Russians provoked a successful palace revolution against 
Alexander only to be faced with a new prince, Ferdinand of Saxe-coburg, a 
man who proved considerably more pro-Geiman and pro-Austrian Lhe actually 
heid a commission in the Hungarian ar~ than Alexander and on October 5, 
1908 proclaimed Bulgarian independence and took the title of Tsar. In 
April 1909, the Turkish Parliament formaliy recognized Bulgarian 
independence. 
reason, could well clamor "anathema tous Tourkous, 11 "anathema 
tous megalous" and now "kai anathema tous Boulgarous," and 
in Greek it sounded good, melodramatic, and climactic, and 
described their frustrations over the events in Eastern 
Rumelia. 
GREECE AND THE CRET'AN INSURRECTION 1896-1912 
Crete provides an excellent opportunity by way of an 
introduction to add a brief paragraph on tte history of 
ancient and early Greece since Crete was an integral part of 
the Greek Idea and provided some of the roots of the Great 
Idea. 
The earliest center of Greek culture flourished on the 
island of Crete from 3400 B.C. until 1100 B.C., during which 
time Crete transmitted her Minoan culture and influence to 
the comparatively backward Achaeans, the vanguard of a new 
people in the Peloponnesus who became known as Hellenes. The 
Achaeans under the tutelage of Crete eventually established 
a second center of Greek culture at Mycenae which overr·an 
Crete itself and spread Mycenaean culture, colonies, and 
trade throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas 
to the very shores of Asia Minor and Troy, memories of which 
have been preserved for history in Homer's renowned Iliad on 
the Trojan War and the Odyssey on the wandering Odysseus. 
Mycenae, in turn, succumbed to the Dorians, a people of the 
same Hellenic race as the Achaeans, who established the third 
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center of Greek culture, the civilization of classical Greece 
based at Athens. Athens, in time, succumbed to the Greeks 
who had settled in the northern part of the Grecian peninsula 
and established a Macedonian State that united all the Greek 
city-states and went on to establish the fabulous empire 
associated with Alexander the Great and create the Hellenistic 
Age, much of which found preservation under ancient Rome and 
provided a basis for a new Greek civilization in a new Roman 
Empire, the Byzantine Empire. 
Crete can claim four firsts in Greek history: first, it 
provided Greek history with its earliest civilization; second, 
Crete was the earliest teacher of Bellas; third, at least 
until the modern day Cyprus question, Crete was the thorniest 
problem between Greece and Turkey and Greece and the Powers; 
and fourth, Crete provided Greece with its first--some would 
say only--and greatest modern day statesman, Eleutherios 
Venizelos. 
There is probably no eparchy in Greece, except possibly 
Mane, which is so essentially Greek as the island of Crete, 
and surely there are no greater Greek patriots than the 
Cretans. Its occupation by the Venetians from the fall of 
Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade in 1204 to 1669 resulted 
in only the slight infusion of Western blood and ideas; its 
island position sixty miles off the southern tip of the 
Morea has historically preserved it from any Slav or Albanian 
admixture; and the Turks made little effort to colonize the 
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island and over the course of history only constituted an 
official class and an army of occupation. Even the Cretan 
Muslims who apostatized to Islam had done so chiefly in 
detestation of Latin sway and Venetian rule in the Mediter-
ranean in repetition of that hallowed cry which greeted the 
Papal emissary to Constantinople after the Council of 
Florence in 1439 -- "Better Islam than the Pope," and "It is 
better to see in the city the power of the 1~rkish turban than 
that of the Latin tiara. u20 But even then these Cretan con-
verts to the religion of Islam retained their Greek language 
and preserved it over the long course of Ottoman rule and in 
the 19th century following the creation of the Greek state, 
removed the veil of Islam and reconverted to Orthodox 
Christianity. 
Over the course of history Crete was forced to serve 
many masters. Like the Ionian Islands, Crete was strategically 
located. Its island position dcminated the east-west sea 
routes of the Eastern Mediterranean and the north-south 
routes in the Aegean which made the island historically a 
bone of contention between Great Powers. From the fall of 
ancient Rome to the 19th century the island, at various times, 
20 Of course there were Cretans who went over to Islam as did other 
Ne~r Eastern and Balkan Christians, in order to enjoy the numerous advantages 
which ~ere the rights of all MUslims in the ottoman Empire, but these, in 
the ma1n, consisted of the select upper-class which seems, regardless of 
time and place, to have the uncanny but questionable ability to serve 
many masters. 
came under the sway of the Byzantine, Arab, Venetian, and 
Ottoman Empires, and afterwards became an issue between the 
Sultan and the new Powers which clashed over control of the 
Near East. In 1806 Napoleon, in his plan to partition the 
Ottoman Empire among France, Austria, and Russia, consigned 
Crete to France; between 1822-40 Crete fell to the Sultan's 
vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who had the idea of creating 
an Egyptian Empire of his own in the Near East (until his 
conquests in Syria and Asia Minor threatened the very 
existence of the Ottoman Empire which caused the Powers to 
intervene in the second war between Egypt and the Sultan 
1839-41 and forced Mehemet Ali to relinquish Crete to the 
Sultan and retire to Egypt); in 1830, the Powers, did not 
incorporate the island into the new Greek kingdom, due to 
their private rivalries, and thereby laid the groundwork for 
a series of round-robin revolutions on the island between the 
Greek and 'l'urkish inhabitants which caused a series of crises 
between Greece and Turkey and Greece and the Powers only 
matched by the modern day Cyprus problem. These revolutions 
occurred in 1841, 1858, 1866-68, 1875-78, 1889, and 1896 
whence the Cretan problem finally came home to roost, where 
it had been initially hatched, in the Chancelleries of Europe 
notwithstanding repeated attempts by the Powers to induce the 
Porte to reform the Ottoman Empire in 1839 by the Hatti 
Sherif of Gulhane, in 1856 under the Hatti Humayun, and in 
Crete in particular by the Organic Statue of 1868 and the 1878 
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Pact of Halepa which emerged from the Congress of Berlin. 
In the nineteenth century Turkish misrule created a 
grievous problem principally among four peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire--these were the Bulgarians, Macedonians, 
Cretans, and Armenians. The Bulgarians, for their part, did 
not wait for the reforms to mature and by 1886 had removed 
themselves almost entirely from direct rule of the Porte. 
The next spark of revolution in the Ottoman Empire came in 
1889 from that fire pot Crete which had been stimulated 
into action by Greece's acquisition of Thessaly and Bulgaria's 
sudden grab of Eastern Rumelia in 1885-86; however, once 
again this Cretan insurrection went the way of previous revo-
lutions. The next to try their hand at revolution, but with 
disastrous results for themselves, were the Armenians, whose 
abortive revolutionary attempts in 1894, 1895, and 1896 to 
secure for their brethren in Turkey's Asiatic provinces the 
reforms envisaged by the Treaty of Berlin resulted in the 
infamous Armenian massacres which reached a climax in 
Constantinople itself when approximately 6,000 Armenians were 
hunted down at random and slaughtered mercilessly by Turkish 
soldiers and mobs under the very noses of the ambassadors 
whose nations had pledged at the Congress of Berlin to 
secure for these people reforms and '~ho will superintend 
their application.u21 The carnage inflicted upon the 
21 The Treaty of Berlin, 13 July 1878, Article XI, paragraph 2. 
All told, between fifty and seventy-five thousand Armenians perished before 
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Armenian people was so complete that it helped set the stage 
for the revolt in Crete and eventually for the Balkan peoples 
"to liberate" their Christian brethren in Macedonia. 
The Armenian massacres caused repercussions in Europe 
61 
to a degree unknown since the days of the "Bulgarian horrors, 1122 
and they made it increasingly evident tha~ the Powers, as in 
the Greek war for independence, would be forced to take 
decisive action to remedy the continuing rayah problems of the 
Porte. However, there was one question. Would the Powers 
set aside their private rivalries to take this last chance 
offered by the Armenian massacres and the seething Cretan 
and Macedonian Questions to issue real solutions to grave 
problems, before the rising Balkan States took matters into 
their own hands? 
The outcry against the Turk was greatest in England where 
public opinion called on the Government to enforce upon the 
Sultan the promised reforms of Berlin and public opinion soon 
proved strong enough to move Lord Salisbury, the Prime 
the blood-bath had run its course. Admittedly Turkish action was not un-
provoked, but the totality of Turkish brutality visited upon all elements 
of the Armenian population, and Sultan Abdul Hamid's wanton action in 
the affair can never be condoned regardless of the provocations. The 
most that can be said about Abdul Hamid is that he intensely disliked 
Christendom which had gradually torn from his grasp some of his. fairest 
provinces; he reveled in the murder of Christians, and to condemn him of 
murder would be like condemning a patriot for being a patriot. 
22 For an account of the uprisings and ensuing outrages and the 
diplomacy to which they gave rise, see W. L. Langer, The DiplomacY of 
Imperialism, (New York, 1935), Vol. I, Chaps. 5-7. 
Minister, to think the moment most opportune for a far-
reaching settlement of the problems of the Near East. In this 
direction the famous "Cowes Yacht Races Interview" occurred 
on August 5, 1895 between Lord Salisbury and Kaiser William II, 
"the Sultan's 'brother' between Berlin," in which the Queen's 
first minister hinted broadly at the advisability of partition 
of the Ottoman Empire as the best solution for the chronic 
afflictions in the Levant. In a follow-up to the Cowes Yacht 
affair the British issued a note to the Powers which urged 
joint action by the Powers in the Armenian problem, and in 
November Britain, with the approval of Italy and Austria, 
who had taken a lead in reco~nending international naval 
action against the Porte against the advice of Germany, man-
euvered a naval squadron outside the Dardanelles, but halted 
the action short of entering the Straits because of a fore-
boding over what France and especially her ally Russia might 
do. 
Russia had taken a stand on the Armenian question not un-
like its position in the Eastern rtumelian affair, for the 
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Tsar had a problem with his own Armenians, and Russian ministers 
were cynically making it known that "they did not want another 
Bulgaria in Asia Minor." The Tsar had even gone so far as to 
approve the "Nedilov Scheme" in which the lo.ussian forces 
planned to seize Constantinople and settle Turkey's problems 
to Russia's satisfaction.23 
23 Langer, Vol. I, pp. 205-209. The Nedilov plan never materialized. 
France, Russia's ally, still hesitant to paay a bold hand in foreign affairs 
The division of the Powers in the Armenian question did 
not go unnoticed in the Ottoman Empire; it greatly increased 
tensions in the Balkan States among the Christian subjects 
of the Porte, and nowhere more so than on that "great Greek 
island" Crete. 
After the Greek war for independence, relations between 
the Christian Cretans and the Turkish authorities were torn 
with bitterness occasioned by chronic civil war between the 
Cretan Christians and the Porte. Tensions on the island were 
heightened further, for not only were these Cretans forced to 
endure Turkish misrule and reprisals but periodically their 
attempts at revolution for enosis incurred the wrath of a 
hostile Turkish minority on the island employed by the 
authorities as unofficial levies against the Christians. The 
sanguinary struggle on Crete reached especially cruel pro-
portions since the local situation was aggravated intensely 
by the fact that the Turkish Muslims reveled in taking 
vengence upon those Cretans who had deviously forsaken 
Mohammed and reconverted to Christianity. The historic 
employment ofirregulars and unofficial levies as instruments 
of official Ottoman policy against the Christian elements in 
following her lightening defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and continued 
animosity, discouraged the Tsar against wanton unilateral Russian action; 
and the Kaiser counseled the Russian Foreign Minister that at most a 
follow-up of British action before the Straits was a remote impossibility, 
and ultimately German influence was thrown on the side of ignoring the 
Armenian tragedies and doing nothing. 
the Empire is well renown. This practice reached its height 
under Sultan Abdul Hamid in the Bashi-Bazuks of ":Bulgarian 
Horrors" fame, the Hamidie (Kurdish) regiments in the 
Armenian massacres, and on Crete with the employment of the 
local Turkish Muslim inhabitants against the Christians on 
the island.24 
The Cretans like the Armenians had been promised reform 
by the Congress of Berlin. In fact, the "reform of Crete" 
like the "reform of Armenia" and the "reform in Hacedonia," 
had been one of those reoccuring demands upon the Sultan. 
Greece embittered by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, 
' then the 1881 Constantinople Conference, and Bulgaria's 
success in Eastern Rumelia in 1885, was excited anew by the 
international crisis stemming from the Armenian massacres and 
24 In more recent times,Turkish "mobs" ran rampant in the anti-
Greek · Istanbul, Ismir, etc. riots of September, 1955 in protest to the 
rumored softening of British polia,y towards enosis in the Cyprus Question. 
The events repeated themselves again in June 1958 but this time on Cyprus 
itself when Cypriote-Turks ran amok against Greek-Cypriotes and "far from 
denying their complicity in Cyprus riots which had taken place, official 
spokesmen of the Turkish Government are stated here to have indicated 
that they had the power to turn on and off the activities of Turkish 
rioters •••• 11 ; Peter Lyne, Parliamentary Correspondent of the Christian 
Science Monitor, "Cyprus Plan Faces Obstacles," The Christian Science 
Monitor, Monday, June 16, 1958, p. 5. In attempting to counter the 
Greek-Gypriote drive for enosis, the British on Cyprus borrowed a page 
from Turkish history and directed Turkish-Gypriote displeasure against 
the Greek Cypriotes, and while outlawing and pursuing the Greek 
"terrorist" organization EOKA, the British for a long time remained 
oblivious to the activities of TNT, so-called Turkish terror organization 
against the Greeks. 
Today the employment of "unofficial levies" or the "mob" as 
instruments of government policy against foreigners is still practised 
with devastating effect in Turkey and in the United Arab Republic, Iraq, 
and Communist China. 
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the repeated crises on Crete ever since the Porte suppressed 
the Cretan insurrection of 1889 and annulled the reforms 
promised Crete after the Congress of Berlin by the Pact of 
Halepa. The Sultan's firman rescinding the concessions 
embodied in the Halepa pact led the Muslim governors to rule 
Crete without summoning the General Assembly which invariably 
led to new clashes between the Porte's administrators and 
the Christian inhabitants, fresh atrocities and new reprisals, 
which increased the tensions on Crete and on the Greek main-
land for enosis--a situation which endured until 1896 and 
erupted in a new Cretan insurrection, a new period of crises 
between Greece and Turkey, and new tension between Greece 
and the Powers • 
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For one year the Greek Government withstood nationalist 
pressures from Greece and Crete urging official government 
support of the Cretan revolution; but it took no effective 
steps to stop enosis propaganda in Greece and the traffic in 
supplies from the Greek mainland to the insurgents on Crete 
because to have done so in the face of the ardent desire of 
the Greek populace would have been political suicide, especially 
since the Cretan revolt, by the summer of 1896, had spread 
throughout the island and showed a semblance of success. 
No politician or king could have withstood for long these 
pressures from Crete, and certainly no man could challenge the 
"Great Idea" whose strong currents for "martyred Crete" 
L,like "martyred Thessaly," "martyred Epirus," "martyred 
Macedonia, 11 and later a "martyred Smyrna 11 and a "martyred 
Cyprus~ had always induced the cantankerous Greeks and 
Cretan patriots to throw prudence to the winds on the slight-
est provocation. Under these circumstances, tte most that 
any government could do was to adopt an unofficial hands-off 
policy towards Crete; and, at the same time, turn away from 
the unofficial traffic in arms and propaganda going to Crete--
until even this rather dubious position was swept up by 
nationalism, causing King George I, in view of the strong 
resolve of his people, to associate himself publicly with 
the nation's demands for enosis and cause the government to 
land Greek troops on the island in .February 1897 with the 
expressed purpose of carrying out the island's annexation 
to Greece. 
The Powers, in dread of the extension of the uprising 
on Crete to Macedonia, where Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek 
revolutionary cow1ittees were attempting to start an insurrec-
tion in that troubled province in order to exploit the 
Armenian and Cretan crises,-.,ere eager to check the Cretan 
revolt but once again wavered on a unified policy. Germany 
and Russia supported the status guo on Crete and in July 
1896 were joined by Austria which proposed that the Powers 
blockade Crete from the Greek mainland and abandon the Cretans 
to their folly. This position was rejected by Britain where 
anti-Turkish feeling continued to run high because of the 
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Armenian massacres. 2·5 
In spite of widespread popular sympathy in Europe for 
the Cretans, no European government indicated an approval of 
Cretan aims and whereas all the Powers expressed indignation 
over the Porte's treatment of the rayahs in repetition of the 
Armenian crises they stopped short of intervention, especially 
since Germany and Russia were in support of the Turks, and 
Britain without the support of Austria, would not venture 
alone. Instead, true to past history the Powers once again 
prevailed upon the Porte on August 25, 1896 to accept a 
"new reform scheme" for Crete drawn up by the ambassadors of 
the powers at Constantinople, which would introduce a large 
measure of self-government to the island. The plan envisioned 
a Christian governor named by the Sultan and approved by the 
Powers, an assembly with wider powers than heretofore allowed 
under the Halepa plan and a government in which two-thirds 
of all government positions were to be filled by the Porte's 
Christian subjects. In addition, the scheme envisioned a 
reformed gendarmerie, judicial and financial system, and a 
European commission to supervise the proposed reforms and 
25 The Sultan had rubbed salt into the Turkish atrocities when he 
personally decorated Zekki Pasha, the official in charge of Ottoman 
brutality, for public "services" in the Armenian revolt and passed off a 
British request for a commission of inquiry by blandly stating that there 
had not been a massacre, but, on the contrary, only a revolution by 
Armenian brigands that had been suppressed. 
guarantee their execution. 
The Cretan insurgents reluctantly accepted the new reform 
scheme in the face of the determined opposition of the Powers 
to their claims for enosis, and once more an uneasy peace came 
to Crete as the Powers placed a new reform lid on the Cretan 
Question. The reforms proposed under the new scheme were 
extensive to say the least, and the provision for an interna-
tional commission to guarantee their execution would have gone 
far towards bringing peace to Crete--if reform was the answer 
to the Cretan problem--but it soon proved to be just another 
instance of the Powers imposing their solution to the Cretan 
Question which, at most, brought only a temporary respite in 
the sanguinary struggle on the island. 
Once again, they refused to face up to the bete-noire of 
the Cretan problem--enosis--which proved to be the Achilles 
tendon of the entire reform scheme. Therefore, the peace 
was short-lived. On February 2, 1897, Cretan nationalists 
resumed the path of revolution to achieve their desire of 
unity with Greece, and four days later again proclaimed the 
union of the island witt Greece, thereby initiating a new 
round in the struggle for enosis. 
For one whole year Greece held back from taking action 
on the Cretan insurrection and watched anxiously while the 
Powers attempted to resolve the Cretan issue by imposing new 
reforms upon the Porte and its Christian subjects--until the 
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Cretans made their new appeal for enosis and strong public 
opinion in Greece, whipped into a frenzy when reports of 
Armenian-type massacres by Turkish soldiery against Cretan 
Christians reached Athens, forced the Greek Government on 
February 10, in the face of the expressed position of the 
Powers to dispatch a flotilla of ships and 1500 troops to 
Crete to carry out the island's union with Greece--whereupon 
the Powers on February 15, landed an international force on 
Crete to hold the island in "deposit" and to prevent the 
' Greek troops, allied with the Cretans, from ousting the 
Turkish garrison from the island and effecting enosis. The 
Powers proceeded to strike down the Greek flag which had been 
hoisted all over the island and take over frcm the Turks the 
uneasy occupation of the island under a ne~vain and profit-
less policy. 
On March 2 the Powers presented notes to Greece and 
Turkey which promised autonomy for Crete within the Ottoman 
Empire, and demanded the withdrawal of Greek forces from the 
island on pain of "measures of constraint," thereby loosing 
a new chapter in the Cretan struggle for enosis. 
The demand that Greece withdraw its forces from Crete 
landed like a bombshell on Greek aspirations, for by withdraw-
ing its troops, Greece would lose its newly acquired pre-
eminent position on the island. Greece, which now had Crete 
within its grasp, would be forced to release her grip and, in 
effect, accept the island's return to Turkey. It is certainly 
true that Turkey's direct control in the island's affairs 
had been reduced imt'1easureably by the autonomy promised the 
island and that hereafter the Porte would enjoy only nominal 
power and minimal authority; but to the Greeks on mainland 
Greece and on Crete, who had waded through repeated revo-
lutions towards enosis, autonomy fell far short of enosis. 
For them, the island was either free or was not free; any 
arrangement short of enosis was national betrayal, and to 
see enosis slip from their hands by withdrawing their troops 
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from Crete was nothing short of national calamity. Consequently, 
on March 18, the Greek Government, as if under the circum-
stances it could do nothing else, rejected the mote of the 
Powers and refused to withdraw Greek forces from Crete, not-
withstanding countless assurances by the fowers of reform 
and improved conditions for the island. 
Frustration over Crete and increasing agitation in Athens 
for action to settle Greece's claims against 'l'urkey for once 
and for all and present the Powers with a fait accompli caused 
Greece to drift recklessly to war against Turkey. Cn March 15, 
1897 the Greek Government decreed mobilization and on April 10, 
in the midst of a fervent frenzy for war, Greek guerrillas, 
supported by the Ethnike HetairiJ~crossed the Greek frontier 
26 In 1895 two nationalist organizations became especially active 
in Greece itself in promoting Greek aspirations: first, the Ethnike 
Hetairia, a secret society founded to promote Greek interests, especially 
in Macedonia; second, the Cretan Committee, an overt organization 
operating in Greece to promote Greek aspirations in Crete. Even then, 
however, the Cretan enosis movement had existed before the formation 
of these committees. 
and attacked Turkish outposts in Macedonia. A week later the 
road to war was completed as regular Greek army units invaded 
Epirus and Macedonia which caused Turkey to declare war on 
Greece. 
Greece was soundly defeated in the "Thirty Days' War" 
which ensued. Turkey was assisted greatly in its speedy 
victory by three factors outside of Greece's unpreparedness 
for war. These were: the presence of the naval forces of the 
Powers in the Greek waters which prevented the Greek navy 
from conducting extensive operations against the sea of 
Turkish troops and supplies from Asia Minor to Macedonia; the 
reorganization, training, and reequipment of the Turkish 
army by the von der Goltz German military mission which had 
whipped the Turks into an effective fighting machine; third, 
Austria and Russia who had warned Serbia and Bulgaria against 
participation in any Greek assault upon Turkey. 27 The Greco-
Turkish War of 1897, disastrous as it was for Greece, was 
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2? The role of the German military mission in the Turkish victory over 
Greece in 1897 has received more than its fair share of praise for the 
Greek defeat in 1897. Often forgotten is the fact that its accomplish-
ments were made decidedly easier b,y (1) the neutralization of the Greek 
fleet b.1 the Powers and (2) by the Austrian Agreement of April 30, 1897, 
wherein these powers pledged themselves to work for the maintenance of 
the status guo in the Balkans; but if partition became inevitable, to work 
for the division of the area among the Balkan states, and to insure 
compliance of the agreement in the Balkans; Austria and Russia warned 
S2rbia and Bulgaria against intervention in the Greco-Turkish conflict. 
Loee A. F. Pribram, Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1870-1914, 
(Cambridge, Mass.), Vol. I, RP· 184-190 for full text of Russian-Austrian 
Agreement of April 30, 1897~ 
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not entirely in vain, nor was the settlement autornatical.ly 
as favorabl~ for Greece as generally pointed out.28 Its 
positive effect was to be felt principally in three areas: 
first, on Crete, then in Greece, and finally, upon the redeemed 
and unredeemed peoples of the Balkans. 
The Cretan insurrection and the ensuing Greco-Turkish 
War caused the Powers to realize, alas, that Balkan problems 
such as the enosis issue in Crete, long considered serious 
by the Powers but never acute, had become acute. As a result, 
the Powers went so far as to grant the Christian Cretans the 
substance of their demands short of the magic word enosis in 
an autonomous regime under which the control of government 
passed from the island's Huslim minority to the Christian 
majority; the Turkish garrison was confined to an islet in 
Suda Bay where the Turkish flag was permitted to fly as a 
recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty over Crete, and lastly, 
the Sultan agreed to accept Prince George, the second son of 
the reigning King George I of Greece, as the High Commissioner 
for the Powers on Crete but under the suzerainty of the Sultan. 
28 Professor William Langer states that, "After the exchange of 
thousands of dispatches and notes betw~en the Powers, aft~r the most 
flagrant breach of international l~w Lin the Balkans, ye1/ by the Greeks, 
after the interve~tion of Europe Lafter European action had just prevented 
the union in 1891/ and a crisis that threatened a general conflagration 
in the B~lkans Lthese peoples should accept enslavement of their 
brethren/ and possibly a European war, the Greeks totallz defeated on the field 
of battle, LPot mentioning role_played by certain Power§/ secured what 
they had started out to get," Lo~y after a year's struggle with the 
Powers and a new war with Turkez/. See W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of 
Imperialism 18Qb-1902, (New York, 1935.), Vol. I, p. 378. 
Briefly, Crete was granted complete reform, complete autonomy, 
and something which resembled an "Eastern Rumelian solution," 
that for a lack of a better term can be called "halfu or 
"personal enosis." It may be argued that in the settlement 
imposed on Crete by the Powers after the Greco-Turkish War 
enosis was granted to Crete in pr.inciple, if not in fact; and 
-
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enosis would have followed as a matter of course. Equally true, 
however, is the principle that in the Eastern Question nothing 
followed as a matter of course; for if it had, the "Sick Man of 
Europe" would not have been sick for so long, nor would its 
enslaved subjects have remained enslaved for so long. 
Considering her defeat in the war just passed, Greece 
fared rather well by the treaty of peace, or so it would 
appear since Turkey in victory was denied any territorial 
gains and made to return the totality of her conquest in 
Thessaly, except for a single village and certain strategi-
cally located sectors along the Greek-Turkish border. In· 
return for this concession, however, 1urkey was granted a 
large war indemnity which eventually was fixed at four million 
pounds, or about $20,ooo,ooo, a seemingly small enough sum for 
the chancelleries of Europe but a heavy burden for so small a 
nation as Greece already in dire economic straits. In order 
to insure that the Greeks dischargedtheir indemnity to 
Turkey and Greece's contracted debt towards its foreign 
bondholders, Greece was required to place her finances 
under the control of an International Financial Commission 
which was authorized to collect certain specified taxes and 
to use the revenue to service past debts as well as to 
service the "Indemnity Loan" which Greece was to pay Turkey.29 
The bill legalizing the International Financial 
Commission of Control was bitterly attacked by all Greek 
political factions and the Greek populace as a dishonorable 
and despicable measure which defamed Greece's honor and 
violated its independence when it was presented to the Greek 
Parliament for ratification. Under the circumstances of 
total defeat and the "guardianship" of the Powers, however, 
the Parliament of Greece, in abject submission passed the 
measure and reluctantly placed Greece's finances under the 
control of commissioners of the Great Powers until Greece re-
tired her debt to 1urkey. Needless to say, the net effect 
of this foreign financial control was to leave sour disdain 
for foreign economic control, and it irked the Greeks to 
know that the Powers were collecting the moneys to pay 
Turkey.~O 
29 L. s. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, ( New York, 1958), 
p. 473. Interestingly enough, in fixing the indemnity the representatives 
of the Great Powers became concerned lest too large an indemnity force 
the Greeks to cease further payments to the foreign bondholders and 
because of this complication the problem of Greece's foreign debt was 
considered in the peace settlement, and the sum was fixed ultimately at 
$20 million since the Powers felt that this was the greatest amount Greece 
could pay to Turkey and at the same time meet its obligations to Greece's 
foreign bondholders. 
30 For the financial problems of the Balkans and Greece for the 
"Middle Period" see: D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the 
Balkan Empire, (New York, 1929), H. Fees, Europe the World's Banker 
1870-1914, (New Haven, Conn., 1930), and J. A. Devandis, The Greek Foreign 
Debt and the Great Powers 1821-1898, (New York, 1944). 
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The third effect of the Cretan insurrection pervaded 
the Balkans and was probably the most important for the 
Ottoman Empire. This was that the Greco-'I'urkish VJar pointed 
out the paradox that the Cretans were able to gain a good 
share of their aspirations despite the ignominious defeat of 
Greece. 
"This treatment by the Powers of Turkey un-
doubtedly encouraged all the Balkan States to 
pursue forward policies. If the Greeks, 
though routed by the Turks, were able to get 
what they wanted through the help of the 
Powers, the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins 
could also hope for gains at fairly small risk.'a1 
After Greece's defeat in the Greco-'I'urkish War, the 
Cretan Question remained open for fifteen years, and for a 
decade from 1898-1909 the Powers continued to hold Crete in 
"deposit" and rejected appeals by Crete for union with 
Greece. 
After 1898 the struggle for enosis continued, but now 
Cretan action was directed against the Powers who replaced 
the Turks as the new "occupiers" of Crete. British, French, 
Russian and Italian troops now policed the island where 
formerly they were Turks, and the Cretans soon found out 
that the Powers were equally as opposed to the island's 
union with Greece as Turkey had been. Attempts by the 
Powers to divert Cretan energies away fron enosis towards the 
construction of creative government on the island resulted 
31 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, (New York, 
1956)' p. 196. 
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in repeated failures, out of which emerged to prominence 
a relatively unknown Cretan politician and leader of the 
enosis movement, Eleutherios Venizelos who carried the 
the 
struggle formosis from/Cretan General Assembly to the 
mountains of Crete and eventually to the Greek Parliament 
itself. 
Following the take-over of Crete by the Powers, the 
Cretans continued to issue manifestos for enosis, but each 
manifesto was turned aside by the Powers as contrary to the 
spirit of the "deposit" and that it would offend the Sultan, 
the island's suzerain, and incur the hostility of Turkey. 
Nevertheless, the Cretans continued to agitate for enosis, 
and on March 30, 1905 the Powers denied a formidable Cretan 
appeal for enosis that resulted in fresh attacks upon their 
forces, a situation which increased tensions on the island 
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and inevitably led to new disturbances by the Cretans and 
countermeasures by the troops of the Powers. The unrest 
reached a new climax three years later when the Cretan 
Assembly seized upon the successful Young Turk revolt against 
the Sultan on July 24, 1908 and the general consternation pre-
vailing amongst the Great Powers, Turkey, Serbia, and 
Montenegro over the proclamation of Bulgarian independence 
on October 5 and Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on October 6 to proclaim the island's union with Greece on 
October 7, 1908 and formed a committee of five me~bers, one 
of whom was Venizelos, to carry on the government in the name of 
King George; once again enosis was prevented by the Powers 
who remained adamant before the strong appeal of the Cretan 
Assembly and the island's Christian inhabitants and forbade 
the union. 
A year later enosis again presented itself as the Powers, 
in the face of the continuing tension in Europe over the un-
settled Bosnian crisis,32 withdrew their occupation forces 
from Crete and the Cretans three days later proclaimed enosis, 
only to have the Powers return a detachment of troops to 
Crete to strike down the Greek flag which had been hoisted 
over the island; and warned Constantinople and Athens at the 
same time that the Cretan question Land the Macedonian 
question7 was not an issue to be settled solely between the 
Porte and the Greek Government but was a matter of great con-
cern to the Powers. And so the Cretan question was allowed 
32 In the meanwhile the Balkan crises resulting from the Bulgarian 
proclamation of independence and Austria's annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had been greatly eased and the chief issues settled by a 
series of diplomatic notes and agreements. These included the following: 
(1) an Austro-Turkish Agreement (26 February 19C9) by which Turkey rec-
oganized the annexation in return for compensation, (2) a Russo-
Bulgarian Agreement (18 March 1909) by which Russia canceled her 1878 
indemnity claims against Turkey and Turkey, in turn, withdrew its claim 
for compensation from Bulgaria, (3) a German note to Russia (21 March 
1909) which called upon the Tsar to back down from contesting the Austrian 
action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to persuade Serbia which had 
threatened war with Austria and had been forced to back down by the 
Powers on 2 March to recognize the annexations, (4) a Serbian note to 
Austria (31 March 19U9) by which Serbia recognized the Austrian annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finally (5) on 9 April 1909 Turkey 
recognized the independence of Bulgaria. Complete Russo-Austrian con-
ciliation however did not take place officially until February 1910 when 
Austria and Russia agreed to maintain the status guo in the Balkans, the 
Russian action was predicated on fear of further Austrian expansion into 
Balkania while Austrian assent emanated from its satisfaction of Russian 
acceptance of Austria's coup in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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to linger on and the Sultan was permitted to retain his pre-
carious position as suzerain of an island where he had little 
control and which wanted him even less for three more years 
until Turkey was forced to abandon its claims to Crete on 
May 30, 1913 by the Treaty of London after its defeat in the 
First Balkan War and the Powers were presented with a fait 
accompli. Previously, on October 12, 1912 Cretan representa-
tives, against the objections of the Powers, were admitted to 
the Greek Parliament under the leadership of Venizelos, now 
Premier of Greece and of whom Europe was to hear much more. 
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The "reform of Crete," one of the myopias of the Powers 
towards Greece, was never the answer to the Cretan problem. 
Neither the Christian Cretans nor the Turkish Nuslim minority 
on the island wanted reform and the Porte itself opposed re-
form; reform on Crete or anywhere else for that matter, 
established a dangerous precedent for the remainder of the 
empire. But even when the Sultan was brought around by the 
Powers to promise reform, he merely "promised" reforms until 
forced to institute reforms by the Powers, and then he found 
himself caught in the midst of a struggle between his 
Christian subjects who agitated for the execution of the re-
forms and his Muslim brethren who opposed reform since reforms 
threatened their preeminent position in the affairs of the 
empire. In the case of Crete, a "reformed Crete" was 
especially feared by the Porte and the Turkish inhabitants 
for reform could only mean a step in the direction of union 
with Greece. Ever since the Greek War of independence it 
was no secret that Greece admitted a desire for Crete, and to 
deny that Nationalist agitation in Crete was encouraged from 
Greece is to belabor the obvious; similarly, the Greek 
majority on Crete never camouflaged its desire for enosis, 
and from the outset after 1832 it was only a question of 
whether union would take the road of ballots or bullets. The 
Cretans, denied enosis by the Powers in 1830 and afterwards, 
had no desire for reform, but repeatedly took the road to 
revolution since the crux of the Cretan question had never 
been one of reform or autonomy. Besides, to accept the idea 
of a "reformed Crete" or an autonomous Crete was to accept 
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the idea that the Greek portions of the Ottoman Empire could 
be prevented from enosis through a process of reform. Finally, 
after 1832 the Powers had left the redeemed and unredeemed 
Greeks no other alternative but to stir up things in order to 
shake the Powers out of their complacency. The question was 
best developed during an interview in 1897 on Crete between 
a British naval officer, who held the usual pr~conceived 
opinion concerning the folly of subject races "stirring up 
things" which pervaded the thinking of the Powers. The very 
correct Britisher asked the then Cretan "brigand" Venizelos, 
"Why do you not put yourselves in our hands? 
You know we have already freed Crete all 
except in name, and if you work with the 
Powers, your day will ccme more quickly than 
by forcing our hand and compelling us to 
oppose you. 11 
In response, Venizelos in one sentence lectured the Britisher 
in the history of the struggle of the unredeemed peoples of 
the Ottoman Empire in the last hundred years in the Near East 
by saying, 
"European policy is invariably the maintenance 
of the status quo, and you will do nothing for 
the subject races unless we, by taking the 
initiative, make you realize that helping us . 
against the Turk is the lesser of two evils!G3 
GREECE AND THE BALKAN WARS 1912-1913 
Three "little" wars in the Mediterranean and the Balkans 
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presaged World War I and the end of the Ottoman Empire. The 
first of these was fought in 1911-12 by Italy against Turkey; 
the second by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro in 
1912-13 against Turkey; the third in 1913 by Serbia, Montenegro, 
Greece, Rumania, and Turkey against Bulgaria. Apparently, 
Venizelos' prophetic words in 1897 went unnoticed in Europe 
for if the Powers had heeded them, there might not have been 
a Tripolitan War, Balkan Wars, nor World War I triggered in 
anger by Serbian frustration over Serbia's forced exclusion 
from the Adriatic by Austria in the settlement of the Balkan 
Wars. 
Three factors are clearly discernible as important steps 
which contributed to the establishment of the 1912 Balkan 
33 H. A. Gibbons, Venizelos, (Boston and New York, 1923) pp. 26-27 
alliance system, the diplomatic miracle which took place in 
the Balkans leading to the Balkan Wars.3~ These were as 
follows: first, reaction in Serbia and Russia to Austria's 
venture in the Bosnian affair and the resultant feeling that 
the Balkan bloc of a sort was needed in order to contain 
Austria; second, apprehension ~~ong the Balkan States over 
the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and its consequences for 
the Christian subjects of the Porte in Balkania; third, 
Italy's success against Turkey in the Tripolitan War. 
After Austria's annexation of Bosnia, the Russian Foreign 
Minister Alexander Izvol$ky made a speech in the Duma on 
December 25, 1908 in which he advocated the creation of a 
Balkan bloc. The speech was received favorably in Russia, 
and in Europe Izvolsky's call for a Balkan bloc received 
favorable comment among Russia's Western allies, Britain and 
France, for sponsorship of a Balkan league by Russia might 
prove beneficial. It would mean that the leagues' leadership 
would pass to Russia, and Russia could restrain her Slav 
brethren from adventurousness and at the same time use the 
league to contain Austria in Balkania. 
From the outset a Balkan league under Russia's leader-
ship would be affected by two diverging aims: (1) dismember-
ment of Turkey in Europe by the Balkan States; (2) the aim 
3~ Probably the best single work on the period is E. Helmreich, 
The Diplomagy of the Balkan Wars, (Cambridge, Mass., 1939). A useful 
background to the story is provided in R. W. Seton-Watson The Rise of 
Nationality in the Balkans, (London, 1917). ' 
of Russia--concentration upon peace, for dismemberment and war 
would give Austria an opportunity to advance deeper into 
Balkania. The conflict of aims between Russia and the Balkan 
States was made clearly apparent on October 15, 1912, a week 
after the outbreak of the First Balkan War, when the French 
Premier Raymond Poincare stated that "it is too late to wipe 
out the movement which she LRussis/ has called forth •••• she 
is trying to put on the brakes, but it is she who started the 
motor.u35 As for Serbia's reaction to the Bosnian crisis and 
its relation to the Balkan alliances, one need go no further 
than to note that on October 2, 1912, just a fortnight be-
fore the outbreak of hostilities, Count Berchtold, the 
Austrian foreign minister who succeeded Aehrenthal, wrote, 
82 
"We delude ourselves if we do not face the fact that our pro-
cedure in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the first impetus 
to the Balkan League •••• u36 
The second factor which helped bring out the united 
front of the Balkan states against Turkey was the success of 
the Young Turk Revolution of July 25, 1908 and its consequences 
in Balkania. The fear of nationalism and reform by the Young 
Turks had moved Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
37 Cited in s. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, (New 
York, 1934, 2nd. rev. ed.), val. I, p. 433. 
36 Cited in Stavrianos, p. 531, Lrrom the Berchtold me~ir, 
October 2, 1912, in Osterreich Ungarns Aussenpolitk, IV, p. 528~/ 
led Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria to declare Bulgaria's 
independence for both Austria and Bulgaria became alarmed 
lest the Neoturks claim that the Ottoman Empire now had a 
progressive government which could guarantee the welfare of 
both the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the empire. 
Similarly, a unified 'Turkey ran counter to the nationalistic 
ambitions of Christian Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro and 
even Muslim Albanians and the Arabs who were showing signs 
of a national awakening. For the Christian States in the 
Balkans a reformed Turkey would mean a reformed Nacedonia and 
remove that territory from the reaches of the small states. 
The admirable program of the Young Turks called for extensive 
reforms which included military service for all subjects--
Christian and i"1uslim--of the Sultan, universal suffrage, a 
common jurisprudence and a uniform tax system throughout the 
empire, and popular education, all calculated to achieve 
national unity. The real dilemma of the Porte and the Young 
Turk Revolution was whether the reforms were going to take 
place in the antiquated Ottoman Empire or within a new 
creation, a Turkish nation, such as Kemal established 
fifteen years later. By choosing to reform the Ottoman 
Empire, the Young Turk's program quickly degenerated into a 
process of "Ottomanization" which alienated all the nationali-
ties, the non-Turkish Muslim inhabitants of the empire as 
well as the Christian peoples. Nowhere was this truer than 
amongst the lvJ:uslim Albanians who for so long had been the chief 
pillar of Turkish rule in the Balkans without accepting 
Ottomanization under the Sultan, and were not willing to 
accept Ottomanization at the hands of the Neoturks. Conse-
quently, attempts by the Young Turks to force Ottomanization 
upon all the Albanians alienated the Nuslim population who 
joined the Christian Albanians in a series of revolutions 
against the Porte from 1909-1912, which removed Ottoman con-
trol from Albania and created an autonomous province in 
which the nationalists made Albanian the language of instruc-
tion and administration and insisted that local revenues be 
expended locally, citizens be permitted to bear arms and 
Albanian soldiers be required to serve in Albania only. The 
nationalists even laid claims to the four vilayets of 
Scutari, Kossovo, Monastir, and Ioannina. Thus, the Young 
~urks' Ottomanization policy, the success of the Albanians 
in resisting the Turks, the awakening of Albanian nationalism, 
and the creation of an "Albanian State" with the announced 
claims to the above-mentioned four vilayets, challenged the 
expressed aspirations of Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Greece and contributed to the establishment of the 1912 
Balkan alliances. The third factor which contributed to a 
united front in the Balkans against 'l'urkey was the Tripolitan 
War (September 28, 1911-0ctober 18, 1912) between Italy and 
Turkey _3·7 The significance of tl:.e Tripoli tan War in Balkan 
37 The Italians had diplomatically prepared the groundwork for 
their venture in North Africa against Turkey by 1) membership in the 
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history is two-fold: first it gave added evidence of the 
military weakness of the Porte; second it reopened the Eastern 
Question. The acquisition of Tripoli by Italy in the face 
of the apparent indifference by the Powers so soon after the 
Turkish surrenders in the Bosnian, Bulgarian, and Cretan 
affairs, indicated to the Balkan states that the Powers either 
would not prevent wars confined within the realm of the 
Ottoman Empire or no longer agreed on the sanctity of the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and would acquiesce to a 
fs11 accompli quickly arrived at by a tour de force. 
While the Tripolitan War was a constructive factor for 
the Balkan alliance, it had a pronounced negative effect on 
Italo-Greek relations, for by the Treaty of Lausanne (October 18, 
1912) that terminated the Italo-Turkish conflict, Italy came, 
into possession of the Greek inhabited Dodecanese Islands, 
which, added to the historic Greek dislike for Italy and the 
Greco-Italian rivalry in Southern Albania (or Northern Epirus 
as the Greeks chose to call the area), only served to increase 
greatly the tensions between these arch-rivals in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.38 
Triple Alliance (20 May 1882), 2) a Franco-Italian Agreement (14 December 
1900) by which Italy gave France a free hand in Morocco in return for a 
free hand in Tripoli, 3) the Racconigi Agreement (24 October 1909) between 
Russia and Italy wherein both powers promised to work for the status guo 
in the Balkans, but Italy agreed to support Russian aspirations on the 
Straits, while Russia agreed not to oppose the Italian designs in Tripoli. 
38 Under the 1912 Treaty of Lausanne, Italy pledged to return the 
Dodecanese to Turkey as soon as Tripoli had been pacified; but the resto-
ration did not come until 1947, long after the Turks had abandoned Tripoli 
to the Italians and then not to Turkey but to Greece as a result of Italy's 
defeat in World War II and Greece's participation in that war on the side 
of the Allies against the Axis. 
ftl!-">-----
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Greece had learned a valuable lesson from her ignominious 
defeat in 1897. The war had proven that the current state of 
Greece's internal and external affairs was not in step with 
her aspirations. Greece was neither prepared for war nor 
would she be able to "go it alone" again in another conflict 
with Turkey without great risk in spite of the state of decay 
of the Ottoman Empire. It was evident that this weakness 
would have to be corrected before liberated Greece would be 
allowed to raise her voice again he behalf of the "unredeemed" 
Greeks. 
The Greek public regarded the defeat of 1897 as a great 
betrayal of Greek nationalism. The war was followed by con-
stant bickering between Greek political parties and frequent 
changes of government with the attendant evils of a wholesale 
spoils system that seemed to prove that "politics" had been 
chiefly responsible for the lack of an effective national 
policy.39 
39 Politics can be a "dirty" business in any country, but Greek 
politicians, with few exceptions, are unsurpassed in their ability to 
give lip service to the national ideal and appear as champions of the 
people while all the time they champion no one but themselves and their 
coterie, and nothing but their party. They invariably place party wel-
fare first, and everything else, and this includes reasons of state, 
comes second. Consequently, modern Greece has produced few "elder 
statesmen." In the 19th century, only one can be singled out --
Charilaos Trikoupis; in the 20th century, Venizelos; and today possibly 
Constantine Karamanlis if he ever succeeds in raising Greece out of the 
morass of World War II and Greek politics out of the dirt which it has 
wallowed in since the passing of Venizelos from the Greek political 
scene. Until now Karamanlis has laid a foundation for a revolution in 
Greek politics by his ability to get things done without resorting to 
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The baneful situation which preceded and followed the 
Greco-Turkish Wars continued until l~y 1909 when, in imitation 
of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, some five 
hundred young officers of the Greek armed forces formed a 
"Military League" to call upon the politicians to take action 
to reform Greece and the Greek armed forces. Having failed 
to stir the Chamber of Deputies and the Cabinet into positive 
action, the Military Leaguers threatened force and called 
upon Venizelos, now renowned in Athens for his exploits on 
Crete, to come to the capital and serve as the League's 
political adviser. On January 23, 1910 Venizelos arrived in 
Athens to take up his new post and receive his initiation in 
Greek politics. For the next nine months Venizelos guided the 
Leaguers in their.struggle for reform against the old politicos; 
he was elected to a new national assembly, convened on 
September 14 to revise the constitution, which he soon dominated; 
and finally Venizelos was appointed Premier on October 18, 1910 
by King George I over the protests of the old guard politicians. 
On December 24, 1910 Venizelos became premier in his own right 
following the overwhelming victory of his newly formed Liberal 
Party in a nation-wide election. Three hundred of the three 
"rousfetia" and demagoguery, and while the "old guard" has attempted to 
call Karamanlis many,things, their severest criticism being that he is 
a neophyte. No one has been able to accuse Karama.nlis of "lining his 
own pockets or the coffers of his party," or of possessing a selfish 
and egotistical desire of luxuriating in the public limelight which had 
been the practise of certain Greek politicians, especially after World 
War II. 
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hundred and sixty four new deputies elected to the new parlia-
ment were members of the Liberal Party, r'epresenting a personal 
triumph for Venizelos whose Christian name, prophetically, was 
Eleutherios--signifying freedom--and who after having rid 
Crete of the Turk was now called upon to rid Greece of chaos 
and apathy, and wipe out the memories and consequences of "1897." 
Upon becoming Premier, Venizelos immediately undertook 
the task of reconstruction. Three days before assuming the 
reins of government he had made clear the wide sweep he con-
templated and the direction that his new policy would take. 
In an audience with King George I the Premier stated that 
"If your majesty consents to leave me full 
liberty of action and to ratify this pro-
gramme, I promise to present to him in five 
years a renovated Greece, capable of in-
spiring respect and supporting its rights. ,11~0 
To this effect Venizelos forced through the Assembly fifty-
four amendments to the Constitution of 1864, out of which 
emerged the revised Constitution of June 11, 1911 which coupled 
with additional legislation touched upon every phase of national 
life from education, the spoils system, agriculture, expropria-
tion, and a special consideration which made foreign officers 
eligible for state service, paving the way for the utiliza-
tion of foreign military (French) and naval (British) missions 
to reorganize, train, and equip the Greek military establishment. 
ItO 
· Gibbons, p. 90. 
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Finally, in the realm of foreign affairs, Venizelos called 
the Greek minister to Constantinople to handle the diplomatic 
portfolio of government, a significant appointment for it 
indicated that relations with Turkey would have a foremost 
Place in the foreign affairs of the Kingdom. 
In O.ctober 1911 Venizelos took the first step towards 
Greece's alliance aims by officially proposing a treaty of 
alliance with Bulgaria, thus laying the groundwork for the 
Balkan alliance system.41 Although Bulgaria evaded Venizelos' 
advances for an alliance for fear of becoming embroiled in a 
war over Crete, the proposal itself was extraordinary for it 
paved the way for a rapprochement between historic enemies 
and demonstrated the falseness of the idea that in the Balkans 
there can be no friends. Unlike the Eussian advances for a 
Balkan alliance which were directed towards creating a 
barrier in the Balkans against Austrian influence and even 
included Turkey as a component of that system.42 Venizelos' 
moves were clearly directed against 'Turkey, the course which 
4l Even before Venizelos became Premier of Greece, however, he 
had toyed with the idea of a Bulgaro-Greek rapproachement, and in this 
direction had talked seriously with J. D. Bourchier, correspondent of 
the influential London Times, whom he had come to know well from his 
Cretan days. Ultimate~y, Mr. Bourchier with a colleague from the 
London Times, H. Wickham Steed, acted as brokers during the early 
exchanges of notes between Greece and Bulgaria which eventually led to 
the treaty of alliance between Greece and Bulgaria. 
42 M. Charykov, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, during 
1909-1911 urged that Turkey be allowed to join any Balkan alliance. 
the Balkan states eventually took in order to organize them-
selves into a Balkan League, even though right up to the 
declaration of war by the League against the Porte, Russia 
believed she could direct the League's energies against 
Austria rather than Turkey and keep the Balkan states in 
check. 
In 1912 a diplomatic revolution took place which over-
turned all existing precepts of diplomacy in the Balkans. 
It had been an axiom among Ea&;ern and 1tJestern diplomatists 
that the Balkan States hated one another far too cordially 
ever to unite in a comrnon cause. This view was confirmed by 
current intense rivalry over Macedonia and Thrace. It was 
believed also that Turkey's policy of "Divide et impera," 
and the Porte's exploitation of national jealousies in her 
European territories had made cooperation practically 
impossible among the Balkan States, let alone undertake a 
crusade against their former master. Besides the Porte 
basked in the fallacious belief expounded by many military 
experts that the Ottoman Empire would be rnore than a match 
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for the Christian Balkan States in any outbreak of hostilities. 
Lulled by their military and diplomatic estimate of the Balkan 
situation the Turks and the Powers awoke to find that clever 
diplomacy had smoothed over historic Balkan jealousies. 
On March 13, 1912 the first treaty of the Balkan 
alliance system was concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia 
and was supplemented on May 12, by a military convention. 
~-----
The treaty had been in the making since October 1911, but had 
been delayed by Bulgarian insistence that the alliance be 
directed solely against Turkey rather than Austria, as Serbia 
insisted, but more important because of the conflicting 
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claims of the two countries in Macedonia. In the end, however, 
the Russian ministers in Belgrade and Sofia, M. Hartvig, and 
M. Neklyudov, made each government scale down its claims in 
Macedonia to effect an alliance. 
When the final draft of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was 
drawn up, the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov who wished to 
avoid war in the Balkans at any cost and viewed the proposed 
alliance as a passive anti-Austrian instrument, showed alarm, 
for the military convention with its secret annexe clearly 
provided for a possible war against Turkey and a division of 
the spoils. However, Sazonov's objections were quickly dis-
pelled by Hartvig's insistence that, stripped of its 
military provisions, the alliance would be of no interest to 
either party, and that this would "open a wide field for sub-
terranean agitation from outside to the detriment of Slav, and 
consequently of Russian interests" in the Balkans.43 Conse-
quently, Russia agreed to the treaty of alliance between 
Bulgaria and Serbia, but insisted that the Serbo-Bulgarian 
agreements be directed against Austria. 
43 Cited by Hugh Seton-Watson, p. 349 and taken from Krasny 
Arkhiv, vol. IX, p. 5 (dispatch of 14th/27th November). 
-By the secret annexe Serbia and Bulgaria agreed to 
administer Hacedonia jointly for a period of three months; 
thereafter, Serbia was to receive the Sanjak of Novi Bazar 
and the territory north and west of the Shar mountains 
LOld Serbia!, and Bulgaria the area south and east of the 
Rhodope mountains and east of the Struma river. The remainder 
of Macedonia existing between the Serbian and Bulgarian zones, 
i.e., "The territory lying between the Shar l'1ountains and the 
Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago, and the lake of Okhrid," 
was to be created, if possible, into an autonomous lvfacedonia; 
but if partition was decided upon later, then the major por-
tion of territory existing between the Serbian and Bulgarian 
zones as earlier defined was to be annexed by Bulgaria, and 
any disputed area was to be left to the arbitration of the 
Tsar of hussia. Under the military convention to the treaty 
Serbia agreed to assist Bulgaria against ':L'urkey or Rumania 
Lthe Dobrudja question/, while Bulgaria pledged to assist 
Serbia against Turkey, Rumania or Austria-Hungary. 44 
The general tenor of the Bulgaro-Serbian agreements 
became known to the Powers at an early date, but they were 
not taken seriously for in the main the European powers 
counted on Russia to hold the Balkan states in check from 
aggesssion against Turkey and viewed the new alliance chiefly 
44 
· Texts of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty et. al. can be found in 
I. E. Gueshoff, The Balkan League, (London, 1915), pp. 112-127. 
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~ a defensive move against Austria. If anything, it was 
generally conceded that the new Slav alignment would add 
appreciably to creating stability for Balkania. 
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For their part, the Greeks were nothing short of glee-
ful over the treaty alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia; and 
two months later, on May 29, 1912, effected a miracle of their 
own as Venizelos concluded an alliance with Bulgaria which, 
like the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, was supplern.ented by a 
military convention on October 5, 1912. The rapprochement 
between Greece and Bulgaria was nothing short of a miracle 
for it buried an enmity whose roots predated by nearly half 
a millenium the hatred both nations felt for the Ottoman 
Turks. This remarkable achievement was mainly the result of 
the skill and forbearance of two statesmen and arcr: i tects of 
the Balkan alliance system in its true sense, Venizelos and 
the Bulgarian :Minister {1911-191.3/ Geshov who had been con-
ducting Greek and Bulgarian conversations concurrently with 
Bulgar-Serbian negotiations in the autumn of 1911 and winter 
months of 1911 and 1912. 
Before the Greco-Bulgarian alliance was completed Russia, 
as in the case of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations, stepped 
in and insisted that the treaty include no plans for aggression 
against Turkey. Once more, however, Russian opposition to 
the full alliance, political and military, was overcome when 
the Balkan conferees pointed out to the Tsarist :Minister in 
Sofia that if Greece were discouraged by Bulgaria, she might 
well join anti-Slav bloc and make common cause with Austria. 
RussiaPgullibility in this matter is difficult to explain 
away for it was obvious to even the less astute student of 
Balkan affairs that ever since her disastrous defeat in the 
Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 Greece had been smarting against 
'I'urkey, and with Venizelos, a sworn enemy of the Turks, at 
the helm of the Greek state there was little doubt as to 
which course Greece would take. It can·only be supposed 
that St. Petersburg finally accepted the definitive treaty 
between Greece and Bulgaria because Russia intent upon forg-
ing a strong Balkan shield against Austria, recognized that 
the Greco-Bulgarian alliance treaty was no mean feat in it-
self and felt confident that she could restrain these balkan 
states from hostilities against the Porte. The Bulgaro-
Greek alliance as eventually signed contained the pledge 
that the signatories to the treaty would render each other 
mutual assistance if either state were attacked by Turkey or 
"threatened by systematic disregard by Turkey of treaty 
obligations" especially those conceded by the Porte to the 
Greek and Bulgarian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire Lan 
implied reference to Nacedonis/. Upon the persuasive advice 
of Venizelos, the description of Greek claims in Macedonia 
was left undefined; and upon Bulgaria's insistence Bulgaria 
was absolved from any commitments in a war arising over Crete 
whose dubious autonomous status had continued to provoke 
repeated crises between Greece and Turkey and Greece and the 
Powers. Finally, the military annex to the treaty specified 
the number of troops to be furnished by Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Serbia in case of hostilities, and their respective roles in 
operations against Turkey, especially in the provinces of 
Kossovo, Monastir, and Salcniki which lay to the north of 
Greece. ~·, 
The Balkan League was completed by a Bulgaro-Montenegrin 
alliance in September and in October by a Serbo-Hontenegrin 
alliance. There was no Greco-Serbian alliance or Greco-
Montenegrin pact, and Bulgaria remained the pivot of the 
League and Greece's link to the other three members. 
A definitive settlement for Macedonia was postponed in 
the Greco-Bulgarian treaty, as in the earlier Serbo-Bulgarian 
treaty, for Macedonia was the quintessence of Balkan power 
politics, and Venizelos realized that the complex nationality 
problem in Macedonia presented a question which, without pro-
longed negotiations, would prevent the delimitation of a 
border between Greece and Bulgaria.46 Besides, the Macedonia 
secret societies of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia--the 
,Ethnike Hetairia, the ''Internal" Macedonia Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO), and the Union of Death (Black Hand), 
95 
45 
For the text of the Bulgaro-Greek alliance see Gueshof~pp. 127-1.33. 
46 See APPENDIX I, for Some Figures Behind the Macedonia Riddle. 
respectvely--had opposed any definitive settlement of the 
Macedonian question short of satisfaction for the ultra-
nationalist claims of each. And, finally, the Greek govern-
ment had wisely allowed its Macedonia claims to be postponed, 
for Venizelos strongly suspected that Bulgaria and Serbia 
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had already partitioned Macedonia betwixt themselves; and even 
so there was still the region of Epirus for Greece to seek out 
territorial gains if by chance she were excluded from any 
extensive Macedonia gains. In any case, Greece had not re-
nounced her claims in Macedonia. Moreover, possession was 
nine-tenths of the law and remained to be carried out. Finally, 
in the estimation of Venizelos the prime necessity was the 
creation of an effective Balkan alliance against 1·urkey. All 
other things were secondary. 
It is interesting to note that in the light of events 
which have occurred after the Balkan ~ars to the present time 
none of the three Balkan states seriously considered the idea 
that once liberated the whole Macedonia should be set up as 
an autonomous or independent state.47 Apparently, cent-c;_ries 
47This was the Bulgarian position especially after the Balkan 
Wars, the Yugoslav position especially at the close of World War II and 
during the Greek Civil and guerrilla wars in Greece, and an adjunct of 
the plan of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), the driving force behind 
the "revolutions" in Greece after World War II under the cover of the 
National Liberation Front (EAM), which, in order to rally the Slavo-
Macedonians to their side and curry the favor of the Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian communist comrades, was willing to detach "Greek Macedonia" 
from Greece and cede it to an autonomous or independent Macedonia re-
public within the fold of the "People's Democratic Federation of the 
Balkans. 
of historic jealousy and the keen rivalry for Macedonia after 
the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 and its 
acquisition from the Porte of the "eparchies" of Skopile and 
Okhrid in 1872, which initiated a new forty year cultural, 
ecclesiastical, and armed struggle for power in hacedonia, 
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had precluded the existence of a genuine independent Macedonia 
free from Balkan intervention; but even more important was the 
fact that a sapling Macedonia would be constantly threatened 
by the Austrian Drang nach Sudosteuropa with its terminus at 
Saloniki, the historic and geographic center of Macedonia. 
The small Balkan states were not going to rrliberate" Macedonia 
from the Turk only to have it fall to Austria. 
Pr·ovocation for war against Turkey began on August 14, 
1912 when Bulgaria presented a note to the forte denouncing 
Turkey's inability to keep order in Nacedonia, and demanded 
autonomy for that area. On the same day Count Berchtold, the 
Austrian Foreign Minister, dispatched a note to the Powers 
which suggested that Turkey be forced to institute far reach-
ing reforms in Macedonia and that the Balkan states be restrained 
from hostile action against the Porte; whereupon, Austria and 
Russia were commissioned by the Powers to act to stave off 
any untoward acts in the Balkans. Austria and Russia counseled 
moderation; but the Balkan Allies were not to be deterred 
from their aims, and on September 30, 1912 the League members 
in concert publicly denounced tr.,e Porte's inability to keep 
order in Macedonia and announced mobilization. Turkey 
countered by ordering the mobilization of the Turkish armies, 
and on the following day announced that Turkey would execute 
the reform of Macedonia. However, the Balkan States were not 
to be diverted from the course which they had set, and turned 
aside the Porte's announcement of reform for Nacedonia. On 
October 8 the Russian and Austrian ministers at east of the 
Balkan capitals presented notes which had been in the making 
ever since August 13 to each of the League members warning 
that the six Powers would carry out reforms for Macedonia 
themselves, and if the League proved contrary and war did 
break out, the Powers "would not admit at the end of the con-
flict any modification of the territorial status quo of 
European 'Iurkey." But the time had passed when the Powers' 
threat of diplomatic intervention alone would suffice to 
hold back the Balkan states as it did in the Greco-Ottoman 
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War of 1897. And as if to prove the impractical position of 
the Powers, the Montenegrin representative at Constantinople 
quit his post and on his way home stated brazenly in Bucharest: 
"Montenegro wants territorial increases and will not give back 
whatever conquests she makes. n48 1'his statement suggested the 
aims of the League as a whole for Montenegro cared little 
for reforms in Macedonia. From the outset of the formation 
of the Alliances, lviontenegro had insisted that Montenegrin 
48 Walter P. Hall and William s. Davis, The Course of Europe Since 
Waterloo, (New York, 194l), P• 578. 
desires could be satisfied only by sweeping territorial 
gains. 
On October 8, the very same day the Austro-Russian note 
demanded that the League members cease and desist from taking 
~ction against Turkey, the League put its plan into action. 
11ontenegro, the League's "provocateur," insolently declared 
war on Turkey; nine days later she was adventurously joined 
in the hostilities against Turkey by her allies Serbia and 
Bulgaria, who on October 13 along with Greece, had demanded 
widespread reforms for 11acedonia which were beyond the pale 
of the Porte's comprehension and which Turkey could not 
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grant short of losing all control over Macedonia. On October 18 
Greece followed Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria in declaring 
war on Turkey. 
The First Balkan War was short and the results miraculous. 
Within the brief space of one month--in less time than it took 
Bismarck to humble France in 1871--Geshov was able to write 
triumphantly, 
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"The Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman 
Empire, four tiny countries with a population 
of 10,000,000 souls defeating a Great P~~er 
whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000." '1 
By November 3, the Bulgarians had swept the Turks from~hrace and 
encamped at the Tchataldja lines before Constantinople; by November 8, 
Greece occupied Saloniki and was clearingup Greek Macedonia and southern 
Epirus; and two days later, the Serbs, after having liberated north 
and centrai Macedonia from the Turk, raced across northern Albania and 
reached the Adriatic, thereby completing the sweep against the major 
Turkish armies in the Balkans. 
The Balkan League's sweeping October and November 
victories made mockery of the concept, "invincible Turk. 11 
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The Porte was saved from possible disaster only by the inter-
vention of the Powers, who while unable to prevent the war, 
had no intention of permitting the Balkan States to drive the 
victory home and determine the peace terms. The Powers called 
upon the League to accept an armistice, and Austria, Italy, 
and Russia, who had become most apprehensive after the 
initial League victories against Turkey, even threatened 
force to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Austria and 
Italy had already voiced vehement objection to Serbia's 
advance to the Adriatic across Albania and the enlargement 
of Montenegro's boundaries at the expense of territory in 
northern Albania, and made no secret of the fact that they 
favored the creation of an autonomous Albania as a buffer 
against the Slavs on the Adriatic. Russia, too, while 
indifferent to Serbia's expansion to the Adriatic, would 
not countenance a Bulgarian attack upon Constantinople and 
called upon Bulgaria under the pain of force to turn away 
from Constantinople. Thus, the League members, excepting 
Greece, agreed to an armistice with Turkey. 
The Greeks refused to sign the armistice until their 
follow-up operations in Epirus and the actual occupation of 
the Aegean islands by Greek forces were completed. Venizelos, 
however, agreed to attend the peace negotiations and took 
part in the Conference in order to be present at the formal 
distribution of the spoils and the settlement. The Greek 
fleet which had done yeomanlike work during the war in pre-
venting Turkey from moving supplies and reinforcements from 
Asia to Europe by ship was now merrily occupying the Turkish 
islands in the Aegean w~ich Greece had long coveted and pro-
vided an insurance factor that the Porte would not move rein-
forcements from Asia to Balkania under the guise of the 
armistice. Since the Turkish road network had proven wholly 
inadequate to carry the war needs, the Greek fleet guaranteed 
that the Turkish position in the Balkans would remain pre-
carious. This proved true after the collapse of the peace 
negotiations when the Young Turks attempted to resume 
hostilities with what they had in Europe only to lose in the 
field of battle what they had refused to sacrifice at the 
conference table. 
The London Peace Conference opened on December 17, 1912 
under the leadership of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign 
Minister, but moved slowly because of Turkey's reluctance to 
cede the Aegean islands and Crete to Greece and to surrender 
Adrianople to Bulgaria. When the Powers finally prevailed 
upon the Porte to make the most of a bad situation and come 
to terms on January 22, 1913, the conference came to an 
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abrupt end because of a successful coup d'etat in Constantinople 
by the extreme nationalist wing of the Young Turk movement 
which countermanded the treaty cessions of Kiamil Pasha and 
resumed the war on February 3. The new Ottoman government of 
Enver Bey, however, was no more successful in prosecuting the 
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war than was Kiamil Pasha. The beleagured Turkish fortresses of 
Ioannina, Adrianople, and Scutari now succumbed in quick 
succession to the besieging Greeks, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins. 
On Hay 20, 1913, faced with a hopeless situation, the Turks 
reopened negotiations and on May 30, 1913 signed the Treaty 
of London ending the First Balkan V.lar. 
By the Treaty of London the Porte abandoned all claims to 
Crete, and all territory west of a line drawn between Midia on 
the Black Sea and Enos on the Aegean, except Albania, was ceded 
to the Balkan League as a whole. Save for Cvnstantinople and 
the immediate environs of the straits, Turkey in Europe was 
brought to an end. At the same time, the London Treaty left 
the status of Albania and the Aegean islands to the decision 
of the Powers and remained silent on t~e actual division of 
the Enos-Midia line spoils which proved tragic. The combina-
tion of the Albania question and its influence upon the 
division of the Enos-Midia spoils created a situation which 
led to the Second Balkan War, otherwise known as the War of 
Partition, tragically undoing the most glorious page in modern 
Balkan history. 
Before proceeding to the fall-out among the Balkan allies 
over Macedonia, we might first turn to some of the backroom 
diplomacy which effected the London settlement. As the First 
Balkan War was drawing to a close Austria came out vehemently 
in support of an independent Albanian state, insisting that 
it contain the important cities of Scutari and Durazzo and 
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include frontiers which would encompass "tbe entire Albanian 
nation." In effect, the Albania pictured by Austria would cut 
into Montenegro in the north and dip deeply into Old Serbia 
and "Serbian Hacedonia 11 in the south. 
Austria's concern for an enlarged Albania was well cal-
culated, for by it Austria hoped to prevent the growth of 
Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkans and stave off the creation 
of a solid South Slav belt from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, 
for Austria and Italy were both Adriatic powers and it was 
not to their interest to have a Slav state roost on the shores 
of the Adriatic to challenge their Adriatic supremacy. In 
addition, Austria feared that an enlarged Serbia would only 
increase the agitation for "independence" among the Slav 
territories of the Empire wbich would threaten the very 
existence of Austria itself. That tbe Austro-Italian position 
in the Albanian affair was directed primarily against Serbia 
becomes readily apparent when it is noted that twelve years 
before the First Balkan War Austria and Italy had come to a 
secret understanding to create an autonomous Albania stretch-
ing from Ioannina (Janina) in the south of Shkoder (Scutari) 
in the north, which encompassed the entire Adriatic coast from 
Herzegovina and Epirus which lay to the west of Serbia and 
over which Turkey had tenuous control.50 Serbia, with her 
50 
H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, A Review of the Ethnographic 
Cartography of Macedonia, (Liverpool, 1951), p. 182. 
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Balkan allies Montenegro and Greece, now threatened to eliminate 
the Albanians altogether from the political arena, and what 
Italy and Austria were telling Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece 
in 1912-13 was a reaffirmation of the 1900 Austro-Italian 
agreement on Albania which, in effect, amounted to "hands off 
western expansion, face eastwards," which of course would pit 
the Balkan States against one another in Nacedonia. It is 
not surprising then that Austria would brook no interference 
with her position on Albania, going so far as to forewarn the 
other Powers that she would not permit an outlet on the 
Adriatic, and similarly was opposed to the extension of 
Hontenegro across northern Albania. And as if to emphasize 
her position in the affair, Austria mobilized extensive forces 
in Bosnia to support her position on the Albania issue which 
caused Russia to back down from supporting Serbia's insistence 
for an access to the Adriatic and forced Montenegro and Serbia 
to abandon their conquests of Scutari and Durazzo. It is not 
surprising then that in the Treaty of London, the question of 
Albania was left to the decision of the Powers for "Albania" 
affected the position of Austria, and Austria affected Europe 
itself; and true to the history of the Eastern Question, no 
small nation was to be entrusted with a problem whose solution 
threatened the very existence of a great power. 
The incorporation of Ioannina into the Austrian sponsored 
Albania ran counter to Greek claims for Ioannina; Greece, with 
much reason, had refused to participate in the armistice until· 
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Greek forces were able to secure this dream Lioannins/ of 
Greek nationalism so as to present the peace conference with 
a fait accompli. Greece's precipitous activity in the capture 
of Ioannina aroused the enmity of Italy and Austria, and these 
supporters of an autonomous Albania attempted to induce the 
Greeks to abandon their conquests in southern Albania in a 
repetition of the blackmail diplomacy practised against 
Serbia and Nontenegro, yet they had to refrain from pushing 
their "Albania claims" against Greece when confronted by 
Germany, France, and Britain. Germany, the power behind the 
Triple Alliance, supported the Greek cause in Epirus for 
dynastic and special reasons which went back to Greece's defeat 
in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897;51 whereas France and Britain 
were no more interested in seeing the further extension of 
Austria influence southwards into the Ioanian and Mediterranean 
Seas, clearly His Britannic Majesty's sphere of action, than 
Austria was in witnessing Slavic expansion to the shores of 
the Adriatic. Ultimately, Austria was forced to agree to 
Greece's possession of Ioannina and central Epirus, but was 
51 K. C • 1ng onstant1ne and her German wife Queen Sophia, the sister 
of Kaiser Wilhelm II, had been living under a cloud of unpopularity ever 
since Greece's ignominious defeat in 1897, at which time the Greek Army 
of Thessaly under the command of the then Crown Prince Constantine 
abandoned the rich northern portion of the Thessalian plain and its 
prize city of Larissa to the Turks trained by German officers who also 
took part in the operations against Greece. The unpopulariti of the 
Crown Prince and his wife over this incident was not entirely restored 
until the Crown Prince proved himself by his participation in the 
victorious Macedonia campaign and the capture of Saloniki in the Balkan 
War and his brother-in-law, the German Kaiser, backed up the Greek 
claim to Ioannina. 
joined by the Powers in refusing to counternance Greek claims 
to "Northern Epirus" whose subsequent story belongs to the 
history of the European War and are an integral part of the 
modern era of Greek history and Balkan affairs. 
While the Powers were carrying on discussions between 
Turkey and the Balkan League in London, Rumania, which had 
taken no part in the First Balkan War, submitted a claim for 
compensation in consideration for rewards which Bulgaria was 
to realize by reason of her participation in the war. The 
Rumanian claim was considered by an ambassadorial conference 
of the Powers in St. Petersburg and consisted initially of 
the city of Silistria which had been promised Rumania after 
the Berlin settlement of 1878 but had remained in Bulgarian 
hands. 
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Rumania's claim to Silistria was granted by the conference, 
but the Rumanian government, not content with Silistria alone, 
now extended its claims to include the so-called "quadrilateral," 
better known as southern Dobrudja.52 The new Rumanian claim 
found support in Germany and especially in Austria which 
recommended that Bulgaria receive Saloniki in compensation 
for any cession to Rumania. The Austria proposal, however, 
was decried by the other Powers as a grievous injustice to 
Greece, and in the end Rumania received only Silistria by the 
52 Rumania had received the northern Dobrudja at the Congress of 
Berlin. The "quadrilateral" was the territory lying north of a line drawn 
almost due east from Silistria to the Black Sea coast. 
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St. Petersburg Convention of May 8, 1913. 'The conference 
itself proved important, for by defeating the Austrian pro-
posal on Saloniki, the Powers acknowledged indirectly Greece's 
right to the conquest of Saloniki. 
Austria's refusal to back down from her position regard-
ing Albania and Serbia under any circumstances, even when her 
intransigeance threatened to lead to war with Russia and en-
gulf the Balkans and possibly Europe in a new war, indicates 
the extent to which Austria would go to secure her position 
against Serbia. Austrian resoluteness in the Albania affair 
foretold the seriousness of any new crises between Austria 
and Serbia. Before the new crisis hatched by Sarajevo 
spurred Austria to a war against Serbia which, at least, in 
its formative stages began as a Third Balkan War, Austrian 
action with respect to Albania played a significant part in 
provoking the Second Balkan War. 
The course of the fighting in the First Balkan V.Jar 
greatly altered the zones in ~~cedonia which Serbia and 
Bulgaria had agreed to occupy under the Serbo-Bulgaria treaty. 
The situation in Macedonia ante bellum was briefly as follows: 
the direction of Bulgarian operations against the Turk left 
Bulgaria in possession of a very small part of Macedonia; but 
gave her the whole of Thrace proper Lexcept for Constantinople 
and environ§/ which lay beyond the irnnediate reaches of Serbia 
and Greece; on the other hand, Serbia and Greece found them-
selves in possession of practically the whole of historic 
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Macedonia--with Greece in possession of the coveted prize of 
Saloniki. Elsewhere the Greeks had occupied the Aegean islands 
and "Northern Epirus" but Austria and Italy challenged Greece's 
right to "Southern Albania" whose status, like the Aegean 
islands, was eventually left to the decision of the powers; 
Serbia had advanced across northern and central Macedonia 
and northern Albania to the Adriatic only to be forced to 
abandon the latter territory by the Powers to the proposed 
independent "Principality of Albania." Upon the conclusion 
of the First Balkan War, therefore, the situation with 
respect to the spoils of war was as follows: (a) Bulgaria 
occupied Thrace, (b) Greece occupied southern Albania and 
southern Macedonia, (c) Serbia occupied Novi-Bazar, 110ld 
Serbia," Skoplje, and Bitolje in the heart of Macedonia which 
included the territory disputed by Serbia and Bulgaria in 
the Secret Annex of their treaty of 1912, (d) there existed 
two treaties, a Serbo-Bulgarian treaty which had divided the 
Macedonia spoils in the period ante bellum and a Bulgaro-
Greek treaty which had postponed the division of these spoils 
until after the war. Obviously the new situation in the 
Balkans at the end of the First Balkan War had opened a 
"Pandora's Box" which would be dangerous even for the most 
sage diplomacy, let alone the ungentle methods of Balkan 
diplomacy and the rivalry of the Powers, and in the matter, 
the Bulgarian position was the most simple; Bulgaria needed 
only to stand by tbe letter of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty under 
which it could not be denied that Bulgaria was to receive the 
lion's share of Macedonia. Consequently, the Bulgarian's 
flushed by their victories against Turkey, which had taken 
them to the very gates of Tsargrad, and obsessed by the idea 
of the Great Bulgaria of San Stephano, insisted upon the 
letter of the treaty with Serbia. 
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Serbia and Greece could not and did not deny the compacts 
which they had signed with Bulgaria; but they could argue, with 
much moral justice, for what little it was worth, that the 
conditions under which they had signed the agreements with 
Bulgaria had drastically changed since they--Greece indeed much 
less than Serbia--had expected to exact rewards in Albania from 
which they were now excluded by the fiat of the Great Powers. 
Besides, Bulgaria's gains in Thrace were far greater than 
-
had been envisioned in the treaties; and whereas Bulgaria, 
contrary to tre treaty, had sent no troops to the Vardar 
sector of operations in Macedonia, Serbia had made a much 
larger contribution to the Bulgarian operations against 
Adrianople, which in fact decided the successful outcome of 
the battle, than had been required under Bulgaro-Serb military 
convention. Was it just then that Serbia, which had met all 
her treaty commitments, should on the one hand be denied a 
major share of the spoils promised her, while Bulgaria insisted 
upon the primacy of her claims? If so, then Serbia would be 
left with relatively nothing for her effort. Of course, 
Bulgaria could retort with equal moral emphasis that it was 
largely because of these "unredeemed" lands of Hacedcnia for 
which Bulgaria went to war in the first place, and if denied 
them, she would also be painfully wronged. But then, the 
Greeks, with a shrug of the shoulder, could state that 
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Greece had occupied southern Macedonia by reason of conquest 
as Bulgaria had latched on to Thrace, and Greece was not 
obligated to surrender her newly won territory because of any 
prior arrangements to which she had not been a party. 
Notwithstanding the rigidity of Bulgaria's position, 
Venizelos, the statesman of the alliance, attempted to 
conciliate Bulgaria to save the League and was prepared to 
surrender Greece's claim to the territory east of the Struma 
river even though the whole of the Aegean littoral was inhabited 
predominantly by Greeks with a minority of Turks and fewer 
Bulgarians, and Bulgaria had no ethnological claims to any 
portion of it but based her claims to the region solely on 
the treaty to which Greece was not a signatory. 
The Bulgarians continued to insist upon the whole treaty 
and nothing but the whole treaty which inevitably led to 
bitter disputes and military incidents between these former 
allies.53 The increasingly deteriorating situation moved the 
53The incidents included a Bulgarian attempt to dislodge the 
Greeks from their positions at Nigrita on the right bank of the Struma 
in March and another attempt to oust Greek forces from the Mount Panageon 
district east of the mouth of the Struma. Similar incidents occurred on 
the Serbian front facing Bulgarian troops. 
111 
Russian government to invoke the arbitration provision of the 
Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. It was much to the interest of 
Russia that her Balkan proteges should not have a falling out, 
as it was very much in the interest of Austria that the re-
verse should happen. It pleased Austria highly when the 
Bulgarians proved very truculent in the matter and the dis-
putants initially even refused to accept Tsarist arbitration, 
then proved evasive in their discussions of the problem with 
Russia, and finally Bulgaria found herself shunned by Russia 
for insulting the Tsar by requesting that because of "reasons 
connected with technical problems of mobilization of the 
Bulgarian army" the Tsar's decision must be made within seven 
days. 
Serbia who never accepted the Tsar's invitation to 
arbitration, stood aside while the Russian foreign minister 
Sazonov turned upon Bulgaria and accused the Bulgarians of 
serving an "ultimatum" upon the Tsar at the direction of 
Austria and formally renounced all Russian commitments 
towards Bulgaria, including the important Lfor Bulgaria/ 
Russo-Bulgarian military convention of 1902 in which both 
nations mutually pledged to assist each other in the event of 
an attack on either by Rumania. The Russian announcement is 
significant, for it was not clothed in diplomatic language; 
to a point, the "Sazonov Note 11 notified Bulgaria that "Now, 
after your declaration I communicate ours to you! Do not 
expect anything from us, and forget the existence of any of 
our engagements from 1902 until today."5~ 
Attempts by Venizelos to play the role of the "honest 
broker'' between Greece's estranged confederates also failed 
and soon old hatreds were rekindled. The disputes became 
increasingly embittered and induced new threats until on the 
night of June 29 - 30, 1913 the Bulgarians, without any 
declaration of hostilities launched an attack against the 
Serb and Greek lines which resulted in a new all-out Balkan 
war. 
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The Bulgarian attack on the night of June 29 - 30 proved 
disastrous,for Greece and Serbia~in the face of the uncompro-
mising attitude of the Bulgarian government and repeated in-
cidentsJ had entered into a "secret" treaty for mutual defence 
on June 1, 1913; on June 27, 1913, just three days before 
Bulgaria launched the attack against Greece and Serbia, the 
Montenegrin foreign minister had announced that Hontenegro 
would side with Serbia in case of war with Bulgaria;andJat 
best,Bulgaria could count on a malevolent neutrality from its 
two other Balkan neighbors Rumania and Turkey in a renewal of 
the Balkan conflict. 
It is difficult to envision how a settlement of the 
Macedonian question might have been effected short of a new 
war, especially once the problem was complicated by the 
~ Cited by E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 
1912-1913, (Cambridge, 1938), p. 361. 
intervention of the Great Powers in behalf of an Albanian 
principality and the irreconcilable position of Austria and 
Italy in forcing Serbia to relinquish its conquests on the 
Adriatic. While the "legality" of the Bulgarian position 
cannot be questioned, Bulgarian obstinacy in refusing to 
allow any modification of the terms of the Secret Annex of 
the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty cannot be pardoned for it was in-
congruous with the new situation. It alienated both Greece 
and Serbia at a time when an unsatisfied Bulgaria should have 
concentrated upon challenging Greece's acquisitions in 
Macedonia rather than Serbia's gains in Hacedonia proper 
since Serbian and Bulgarian claims in Macedonia overlapped 
to such a degree that any agreement on that score was nearly 
impossible, and joint Serbo-Bulgarian demonstrations against 
the Greek position and especially towards Saloniki might 
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have induced Greece to scale down appreciably her Macedonian 
gains elsewhere. Thus, whereas Greek and Bulgarian claims 
were in conflict, Greek and Serbian claims were complementary 
and Bulgarian diplomacy should have attempted to disrupt this 
common interest. Instead, Bulgarian action drew Greece and 
Serbia closer together and eventually into an alliance and 
military convention against Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria, isolated in the Balkans, also found herself 
isolated in Europe for she could expect no quarter from the 
Powers for after ensuring the creation of an Albanian 
principality in the Treaty of London the European concert had 
washed their hands of the ~~cedonian question. But there 
remained two possibilities -- Austria and Russia. 
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In no case was the Austrian balance sheet vis a vis 
Bulgaria favorable to Bulgaria for while Austria might go to 
war against Serbia over Albania, her surrender on the 
Saloniki issue at the conference of St. Petersburg indicated 
that she would not go to war over hacedonia. Besides Austria 
sought to disrupt the Balkan alliance system and keep the 
Balkan Slavs in turmoil in order to divert them from opposing 
Austria in Balkania and disrupt Russia's Balkan policy. In 
addition, Rumania, bUlgaria's other erstwhile foe in the 
settlement of the First Balkan War, was Austria's formal ally 
to whom the German Kaiser had attached great importance as a 
stepping stone to a new Balkan bloc crnnprising humania, 
Greece, and Turkey and even Serbia under German-Austrian 
leadership. In the past, both the Kaiser and his ardent 
friend King Carol I of Rumania had advised Austria to abandon 
Bulgaria and come to terms with Serbia. Finally, while 
Austria's support for Bulgaria in a second Balkan war might 
have accorded Austria the opportunity "to finish Serbia off 
altogether," afterwards Austria might well have found herself 
facing in a Great Bulgaria an equally ardent foe of Austrian 
aspirations in the Balkans. 
Russia was the one Power in a favorable position to 
arbitrate the Macedonia issue, and while it may have been 
impossible for Russia, without the support of her aJlies 
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Britain and France, to make the Greeks submit to arbitration, 
this was not true with respect to the Serbs who had occupied 
the heartland of Macedonia. The European Concert had gradually 
come to look upon Serbia as primarily a Russian responsibility 
and sphere of influence. In fact, since 1900 Serbia had 
turned towards Russia and pro-Russian sentiment had increas-
ing sway at Belgrade.55 In the light of the pressures being 
brought against Serbia by Austria in the Adriatic crisis 
Russia might well have been able to prevail upon the Serbs to 
arbitrate their dispute over Macedonia with the Bulgarians. 
By the alienation of the Russian Tsar, how~ver, Bulgaria lost 
~ 5 In 1900 Alexander of Serbia married his mistress Draga Mashin, 
whose friends were strongly pro-Russian. The year and the event proved 
the decisive turning in Serbian foreign policy -- away from Austria and 
toward Russia, from which it did not again swerve. The raEprochementwas 
speeded by a visit to Belgrade Land Sofia in 19~ by the Russian foreign 
minister Lamsdorff. After the assasination of .Alexander in 1903, the 
restoration of the Karadjordjevic dynasty was expected to restore .Austrian 
influence at Belgrade but it did not materialize. In fact, under the new 
dynasty, Serbian agitation for the Serbian cause in Bosnia and Hungary 
increased and the Serbs placed their new contracts for military arms and 
equipment with the French firm of Creusot and bypassed the traditional 
recipient of Serbian military equipment contracts, the Austrian Skoda 
works. In 1904, the Serbs, under Russia's leadership, concluded provi-
sional agreements with the Bulgars relative to commercial affairs, 
military collaboration, and a common policy towards Turkey. In 1905 the 
provisional commercial agreement gave way to a definitive commercial 
treaty with preparations for an ultimate Serbo-Bulgarian custom's union. 
The treaty was opposed by .Austria and in 1906 led to the 11Pig War11 between 
Austria and Serbia which forced the Serbs to conclude a new commercial 
treaty with Bulgaria without the political overtures of a custom union. 
In 1908, Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina caused the Balkan Slavs 
"to close ranks" against .Austria under Russia's leadership and led to the 
reemergence of Panslavism and renewed agitiation of the Greater Serb idea 
as a means to face .Austria's expansionist move into Balkania. From 1908 
onwards Russian and Serbian foreign policies were jointly concerned with 
the menacing Austrian threat to Serbia and the Balkans which eventually 
sparked the First Balkan War. 
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the support of Russia, the one Slav Power and nominal leader 
and arbitrator of the Balkan alliances in an unfettered position 
to invoke arbitration and mediate Bulgaria's case without in-
curring charges of meddling in the affairs of the League from 
within the League or outside the League. 
The Bulgarian surprise attack against the Serbian and 
Greek lines ended in complete tragedy for Bulgaria. Within 
one month to the day of the .Bulgarian "demonstration" on the 
night of June 29 - 30, Bulgaria lay prostrate before Greece, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and Turkey and sued for peace. 
The peace conference convened in Bucharest and the treaty 
was signed on August 10, 1913 between Bulgaria and Greece, 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; however, Bulgaria refrained 
from concluding a treaty with Turkey in the hope that she 
might receive support from the Powers with regard to Adrianople 
and the territory eastward to the Enos-Midia line. This 
obstinacy was to no avail for in the end Bulgaria received 
no support from the Powers and was forced to sign the Treaty 
of Constantinople on September 29, 1913 with Turkey which 
formally restored Adrianople and the territory of Thrace east 
of the Maritza River to the Sultan. 
In the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria surrendered her 
claim to almost the whole of Macedonia but was allowed by 
Venizelos to retain a small stretch of territory on the Aegean 
seaboard in Thrace between the Mesta and Maritza rivers which 
accorded Bulgaria access to the Aegean Sea through the small 
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ports of Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis), Makri, and Porto 
Lago as compensation for her contribution in the First Balkan 
War. The fairness of Venizelos' treatment of Bulgaria at 
Bucharest is indicated by the fact that Greece in victory per-
mitted Bulgaria in defeat to retain a greater Greek population 
than the Bulgarian population which remained under Greek rule, 
a situation which would hardly have been permitted if the 
tables had been reversed, and Bulgaria fared better at the 
hands of the Greeks than she did at the hands of her Slav 
brethren of Serbia. 
The Serbs and Greeks retained those parts of Macedonia 
which they had occupied in the course of the First Balkan 
War. Hence, Serbia acquired north and central Macedonia with 
the city of Bitolje (Monastir) of which the majority of the 
inhabitants were Bulgarian rather than Serbian, and Greece 
annexed southern Macedonia with the city of Saloniki and 
extended her coastline eastward to incorporate the port of 
Kavalla and the seaboard to the Mesta river. While there-
tention of the Kavalla region of western Thrace might seem 
anomalous with the viewpoint that Venizelos treated Bulgaria 
fairly at Bucharest since the region north of Kavalla is pre-
dominantly inhabited by Bulgarians, it should be noted that 
the Rhodope mountains effectively cut off the coastal region 
from the interior and the real exit for Western Macedonia 
to the Aegean lies down the Vardar-Struma corridor to 
Saloniki, the geographic and historic outlet not only for 
Macedonia but for the whole of Balkania. Lastly, geographic-
ally Bulgaria faces the Black Sea and not the Aegean. 
Finally, under the Bucharest treaty Serbia divided Novi-
Bazar with Montenegro but retained the major portion for it-
self and Rumania acquired the long sought after southern 
Dobrudja. 
In the two Balkan Wars Greece proved the greatest gainer 
and was nearly doubled in population in Europe. Venizelos 
had expanded Greece's frontier to include the island of Crete 
in the south and extended Greece's northern boundary to in-
clude sizeable portions of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace, 
which at last removed the Turkish sash across Greece's 
northern frontier and joined Greece with Europe. Neverthe-
less, after the Balkan Wars approximately two and a half 
million Greeks, principally in Turkish Thrace and in Asia 
Minor -- along the south coast of the Sea of Mamora in the 
region of the sandjak of Ismid and the vilayet of Brusa, the 
west coast of Asia Minor in the vilayets of Smyrna and Aidin, 
and the south coast of the Black Sea in the district of 
Trebizond--remained unredeemed and became the subject of a 
new war between Greece and Turkey which closed the book on 
the Great Idea. 
The territorial balance sheet at the end of the First 
and Second Balkan Wars was as follows: 
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AREA and POPULATION OF THE BALKAN STATES before and after the Balkan Wars56 
AREA (Sq. Miles) Percent ES:J;:IMATED POPULA:J;:ION Percent 
Before After change Before After change 
Albania ...... 11,317 . ........ 850,000 
Bulgaria 33,647 43,310 +29. 4,337,516 4,467,006 + 3. 
Greece 25,014 41,933 +68. 2,666,000 4,363,000 + 67. 
Montenegro 3,474 5,603 +62. 250,000 500,000 +100. 
Rumania 50,720 53,489 + 5. 7,230,418 7,516,418 + 4. 
Serbia 18,650 33,891 +82. 2,911,701 4,527,992 + 55. 
Turkey in 65,350 10,882 -83. 6,130,200 1,891 ,ooo - 69. 
Europe 
After tte Balkan Wars Greek troops remained in possession 
of southern Albania and the Aegean Islands whose ultimate 
status, by the London Treaty, had been left to the decision 
of the Powers. The latter, in turn, entrusted the problem to 
the British foreign minister and the ambassadors of the other 
five powers in London, which on December 20, 1912 announced in 
favor of an independent Albania. On July 29, 1913 "an 
independent sovereign principality," of Albania was established 
with a prince to be selected by the Powers. Having created a 
state, the Powers now attempted to delimit the boundaries of 
the new principality with Serbia and Nontenegro in the north 
and with Greece in the south. 
After the Balkan Wars the Greek Government appealed to 
the Powers, urging that the question of "Northern Epirus" be 
decided on the basis of self-determination. 'I'he Greek appeal 
won the support of the Triple £ntente but the importunities of 
:6 Source: Report of the International Commi~~~g~_!c:> ... .J~uire into 
the Causes apq_Q.9~ct -~·t~P,e Balkan Wars, (1-lashington, D. C., 1914~, p. 418. 
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Italy and Austria-Hungary forced the Powers to adopt a compro-
mise, short of self-determination, by which a commission was 
dispatched to the region to determine the language of the inha-
bitants instead of taking a plebiscite to determine whether 
the inhabitants preferred to belong to Greece or Albania. The 
result was practically predetermined from the start when the 
Italians and Austrians insisted that the language criterion 
be used to settle the Epirus question. In November 1913 the 
Comrnission decided by the Protocol of Florence that "Northern 
Epirus" should form part of the new Albanian principality, and 
in December the Powers under the leadership of Lord Grey agreed 
that the disputed area of southern Albania be given to Albania 
and Greece should receive compensation for "Northern Epirus" 
in the Aegean Islands. Greece reluctantly acquiesced in this 
decision and withdrew her troops from N0rthern Epirus in the 
face of an Austro-Italian ultimatum which demanded that Greece 
evacuate southern Albania by December 31 and the threatened 
military action by Italy. The decision of Florence and the 
precipitous action by Austria and Italy caused the inhabitants 
of the district to proclaim a Provisional Government which 
found ready support from Greek "volunteers" who crossed into 
11 Northern Epirus" and repulsed incursions by Albanian 
"nationalists." The new situation in "Northern Epirus" induced 
the Powers to recognize the autonomous status of "Northern 
Epirus 11 under nominal Albania suzerainty--a rather dubious 
status under any circumstances--on the eve of the First World 
War. Thereafter, Greek interests in southern Albania came 
into open conflict with Italian ambitions aimed at carving a 
sphere of influence for Italy on the Balkan peninsula under 
the guise of protecting Albanian interests against Greece. 
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The action by the Greek Government to surrender "Northern 
Epirus" to avoid Scylla caused Greece to fall onto Charybdis 
by accepting in exchange the Aegean isles which Turkey 
quickly challenged. Turkey especially disputed Greece's 
claim to Lesbos (Mitylene), Chios, and Samos on the ground 
that they command the approach to Smyrna and lie too close to 
the large Greek populations on the west coast of Asia Minor. 
'I'urkish protests and Greece's determination to remain in 
occupation of the Turkish islands in the Aegean initiated a 
new threat of war between Greece and Turkey which was over-
shadowed and postponed only by the outbreak of the First World 
War. 
The First and Second Balkan Wars put an end to Turkey in 
Europe, and while the treaties ending the wars decided the 
Macedonian question, they did not settle it. If anything, 
the treaties assured a new round of wars in the Balkans, for 
Serbia and Greece felt despoiled by Austria and Italy in 
Albania, and Bulgaria had been treated roughly by Greece, 
Serbia, and Rumania which insured Bulgaria's association with 
the power or side which offered her the largest share of the 
territories Bulgaria lost in the Balkan Wars. Turkey, similarly, 
chafed under the loss of its dominions in Europe. The effect 
of the Balkan wars and in particular the Treaty of Bucharest 
on inter-Balkan relations and the European power alignments 
was aptly summarized by the British foreign minister as 
follows: 
"It left Bulgaria sore, injured and despoiled 
of what she believed belonged to her. Any 
future Balkan peace was impossible so long as 
the treaty of Bucharest remained. Turkey, of 
course, was also sore and despoiled. Thus 
when the great war came a year later, there 
were two powers, Bulgaria and Turkey, hunger-
ing for a revanche and ready to take whichever 
side would give them a prospect of obtaining 
it. This naturally was the side of Austria and 
Germany. For Serbia was at war with Austria, 
while Greece and Rumania were symp&thetic to 
Serbia or to the Western Powers .")7 
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Two decisions taken at the peace treaties which climaxed 
the Balkan Wars cemented the aims of Greek and Serbian foreign 
policies in the Balkans after 1913. The first was the 
Macedonian "settlement"; the other was the Albanian question 
which had been decided in the main by Austria and Italy to 
the detriment of Serb and Greek aspirations, Austro-Serbian 
relations, and, most important, the peace of Europe. That 
Serbia and Austria were drifting towards war after the Second 
Balkan War is clear when it is noted that on the day before the 
Treaty of Bucharest was signed Austria-Hungary communicated 
to Germany and Italy her intentions of taking "defensive" 
action against Serbia over Albania and claimed that since the 
51-viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty~Five Years. 1892-1916, 
(New York, 1925), vol. I, p. 254. · 
action was "defensive" it wolild bring into operation the 
casus foederis of the Triple Alliance and on October 18 
Austria presented Serbia with an ultimatum which did not 
mince words and indicated the tenor which diplomatic rela-
tions between Serbia and Austria was to take hereafter. 
The Austrian note demanded that Serbia get out of Albania 
within one week. Though the Serbs quickly complied with the 
Austrian demand, they bitterly resented tbe high handed 
methods of the Austrians and when added to Austria's 
annexation of Bosnia to which Serbia had never become really 
reconciled, made it almost certain--short of a diplomatic 
miracle--hereafter that Serbia could be counted as Austria's 
implacable enemy. 
While Austria's disdainful treatment of Serbia in the 
Albania affair was aimed directly at Serbia it also affected 
Russia and served to increase the basic hostility between 
Austria and Russia in the Balkans since Balkan crises were 
never Balkan in their marrow and only·reflected the greater 
power conflict. Russia had blown both hot and cold in 
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support of Bulgarian and Serbian aspirations in Balkania ever 
since the 19th century and while she suffered singular defeats 
in 1856 and 1878, she had never been forced to endure such 
humiliation as resulted from the determined Austrian opposition 
to Slav aspirations in the 1909 Bosnian crisis and the 1913 
Adriatic crisis. For Russia, a third "surrender" to Austria 
in 1914 after two surrenders within the previous five years 
would not only have been a fatal blow to her prestige in the 
Balkans but would have questioned her "Bundnisfahigkeit 11 
on the continent of Europe, and in all probability a new 
"surrender" to Austria would have forced Russia to face East 
again. It is not surprising then that after the Serbs were 
forced to back down before the Habsburg ultimatum on Albania 
the Russian foreign minister Sazonov found it necessary to 
rally the peoples of the Balkans and toured the Slav nations 
of Southeastern Europe and Rumania holding forth promises of 
territorial enlargement at Austria's expense. Serbia was 
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made "the highlight of the foreign minister's tour for Serbia 
had been let down twice by Russia in the face of Austrian 
threats, and both were now ostensibly menaced by Austria's 
bellicosity and designs in the Balkans. In addition, Russia's 
and Serbia's position vis 1 vis Austria was not improved any 
by ominous words emanating from Berlin. Whereas the German 
foreign office on the one hand attempted periodically to 
exercise a restraining influence upon Vienna, on the other 
hand Vienna received the firm support of the German Kaiser for 
its policies against Serbia. And there was no question who 
spoke for Germany. This was demonstrated on October 26, 1913, 
the day Serbia capitulated to the Austrian ultimatum over 
Albania, when the Kaiser Wilhelm II announced boastfully that, 
"When His Majesty, Emperor Francis Joseph, 
demands something, the Serbian goverr~ent 
must give way, and if it does not, then 
Belgrade will be bombarded and occupied until 
the will cf His ~lajesty is fulfilled. And of 
this you can be certain, that I stand behind 
you, and am ready to draw the saber whenever 
your action makes it necessary."58' 
Austria postponed her attack upon Serbia, but only for 
nine months. On June 24, 1914, five hundred and twenty-five 
years to the day after the Battle of Kossovo, that singular 
event in Balkan history,59 a new singular event took place as 
a youthful Bosnian student from Belgrade and member of the 
Black Hand assasinated the Austrian arch-duke Franz Ferdinand 
at Sarajevo which gave Austria the pretext it long desired to 
rid herself of Serbia. And, to insure German support in the 
matter, Austria consul ted her German ally from whom she re-
ceived the famous "blank check" in the promise of German 
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support for whatever policy Austria might adopt towards Serbia 
to clear up the situation. But before Austria cashed her 
"blank check" and declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914 
there was the usual diplomacy by ultimatum which had become 
characteristic of Balkan diplomacy. On July 23, Austria 
presented Serbia with a forty-eight hour ultimatum deliberately 
couched in terms unacceptable to Serbia and as expected Serbia 
58Cited by E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 
1912-1913, p. 428. 
59 June 28, is an interesting date in Balkan history. First there is 
the disaster of Kossovo, the anniversary of the Arch-duke Frances Ferdinand's 
marriage and then the tragedy of Sarajevo, and most recently the day Tito 
was read out of the Cominform which, if it were not for western support, 
would have had dire consequences for Yugoslavia. 
126 
was unable to meet all the terms and within one-half hour 
after having received the Serbian reply, the Austrian minister 
in Belgrade quit his post and left for Austria. On the same 
afternoon Serbia mobilized her army which was countered by 
Austria's mobilization, and Russia, having previously announced 
that she would not permit Austria to "devour" Serbia, now 
assured Serbia, with France's backing, that if all efforts 
to avoid war failed, Russia "would not remain independent to 
the fate of Serbia." Thus, the Russian pronouncement reduced 
the Sarajevo crisis to its real import--a conflict between 
Austria and Russia. The following day, July 28, seizing upon 
the pretext that the ultimatum had not been compiled with 
fully Austria declared war on Serbia, thereby igniting a 
"third Balkan War" and World War r. 60 Whereas, "None of 
the Powers wanted a European War,u61 Austria was determined 
,a priori to make war on Serbia and the "War was the result 
60 Apart from the mass of "colored" and White Books and the collec-
tions of British, French, Russian, Austrian, and German documents, the 
follo~~ng less detached works on the coming of the war should be noted: 
L. Albertini The Origins of the War of 1914, 2 vols., trans. 
and ed. by I. M. Mass~y, (London, 1952), from the Italian Le origini 
della guerra del 1914, 3 vols., (Milano, 1942). 
1928). 
1930 ). 
Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols., (New York, 
H. Lutz, Die euroRaische Politik in der Julikrise, 1914, (Berlin, 
P. Renouvin, Les origines immediates de la guerra, (Paris, 1937). 
B. E. Sch~itt, The Coming of the War, 1914, 2 vols. (New York, 1930). 
Finally there is R. W. Seton-Watson, Sarejevo, (London, 1928), 
which is valuable for the Yugoslav national govern~ent movement and presents 
the Serbian position. 
61s. B. Fay, Vol. II, P• 547. 
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of an insoluble crisis, which diplomacy had postponed in 1909 
and 1913 and could postpone no longer"; 62 and "The war began 
essentially as another manifestation of that "Eastern Question" 
which in the previcus hundred years had been the cause of a 
dozen international crises, with five wars. The Question was 
that of the succession to the declining power of the Ottoman 
Empire, for which there were two chief rivals, the Habsburg 
Empire of Austria and the Romanoffs of Russia, but in which, 
directly or indirectly, all the Powers were concerned;63 or 
simply the time had come when Balkan crises were both serious 
and acute and could no longer be quarantined in the Balkans. 
GREECE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-1923 
The First World War did not start for Greece until 1917, 
but it was felt in Greece immediately after Sarajevo. It had 
two pronounced effects upon Greece. First, it destroyed the 
political unity of Greece which Venizelos had laboriously 
effected from 1910-1914; second, the War initiated the "time 
of troubles" in Greek politics between "monarchists" and 
"republicans" which paved the way for the ruination of the 
Great Idea. 
The First World War came to Greece first on the political 
62 H. Seton-Watson, P• 358. 
6 3 Maurice Bruce, The Shaping of The Modern World, 1870-1914, 
(New York, 1958), p. 98. 
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homefront, and within one month it split the Government into 
two factions--one under the sway of King Constantine, the other 
under the influence of Venizelos. The former faction became 
known as monarchists or royalists--or more appropriately, 
neutralists and Constantinists--because the dynastic ties of 
the monarch and his palace retinue tended to have Germanophil 
tendencies,64 but, in order to avoid any collision with the 
Allied Powers, favored neutrality as the best means of insuring 
Greece's security in the greater European conflict. The 
Constantinist position was made clear on August 7, 1914 when, 
in reply to an appeal from his brother-in-law the German 
Kaiser at the outbreak of the war "to march together hand in 
hand against the common enemy, Slavism," King Constantine 
stated, 
"The Emperor knows that my perscnal sympathies 
and political views draw me to his side •••• 
After mature reflection, however, it is im-
possible for me to see how I could be useful 
to him, if I mobilized an army immediately. 
6 ~ Crown Prince Constantine, as previously noted, was married to 
Kaiser Wilhelm II 1s sister Sophia. Upon Constantine's ascension to the 
Greek throne in 1913, the new King under the influence of her German wife, 
had removed from Court and mi~itary circles the Austrophil and Russophil 
retinue of his father, and encouraged by his wife, patterned himself after 
his brother-in-law in Germany. Constantine proved especialiy conducive 
to this "Germanization" for he had received his military education at the 
Kriegsakadamie in Berlin, had married a forceful and po~itically resourceful 
Prussian Princess, admired his brother-in-law who iost no opportunity to 
cultivate Constantine's German inclinations even. to the extent that after 
the Balkan War, the Kaiser had decorated the Greek monarch with the baton of 
a German Field Marshal for Greece's military successes in the Ba~kan Wars 
which were popularly, although somewhat erroneously, attributed so~ely 
to Constantine. 
The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the 
united fleets of England and France •••• 
Without being able to be useful to him 
in anything, we should be wiped off the 
map. I am compelled to think that 
neutrality is forced upon us •••••• u6 5 
The Venizelists or interventionists, otherwise better 
known as republicans or liberals, were the second faction. 
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They were under the leadership of Venizelos who favored inter-
vention on the side of the Entente as the means by which 
Greece would profit most from the war. Venizelos had made his 
position clear on the morrow of the war when in July, in a 
reply to a communique from the Serbian Premier Pashich as to 
which attitude Greece would adopt in the impending conflict, 
he stated, that with regard to war with Austria fuller informa-
tion would have to be forthcoming before a decision could be 
made; but in the case of war with Bulgaria, Greece would join 
Serbia as provided by the Serbo-Greek treaty of alliance. On 
August 2 Venizelos reiterated his position in a second 
communique to Serbia which stated that Greece could best serve 
Greek and Serbian interests by observing benevolent neutrality 
and keeping her forces intact in order to neutralize any rash 
acts by Bulgaria and, of course, Turkey. 
In foreign affairs Turkey had always been foremost in 
the mind of the Greek Premier, and once Turkey committed herself 
6 5 Cited in B. E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War 1914, (New York, 
1930), vol. II, p. 454. 
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to the Central Powers by an alliance with Germany on August 4, 
Venizelos' position in regard to the Triple Entente v. the 
Triple Alliance was clarified further. On August 18, 1914 in 
words which left little to the imagination and with the 
apparent approval of King Constantine, Venizelos offered the 
Entente Greek aid if Turkey went to war against them. 
Venizelps announced: 
"I asked for and obtained authorization to 
declare that Greece not merely in the consciousness 
of her indebtedness to' the Protecting Powers 
but from a clear perception of her vital 
interests as a nation, understood that her 
place was at the side of the Entente Powers; 
and that, whereas in the war that was being 
waged it was not possible for her to take a 
military part, since she could not, owing to 
the danger from Bulgaria, reinforce the 
Serbians ••• nevertheless, she thought it her 
duty to declare to the Powers of the Entente 
that, if Turkey went to war against them, she 
placed all her military and naval forces at 
their disposal for war against Turkey, provided 
that Gree~e was guaranteed against the Bulgarian 
danger.tt6t5 
Thus Venizelos cast the die by which he would intervene in the 
war and laid the groundwork for the ensuing struggle between 
two directly opposed positions--Constantinist neutrality and 
Venizelists intervention. 
On September 7, 1914 Venizelos presented his first re-
signation to the King over the intervention neutrality issue, 
thereby officially marking the begilli1ing of the crises of 
Greek neutrality in World War I. 
66 E. s. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece, (New Xork, 
J058), p. 78. 
131 
The King did not accept his first minister's resignation, 
for within the letter to his monarch, Venizelos strongly in-
ferred that Palace circles were intent on keeping Greece neutral 
for the sake of helping Germany and protested indirectly the 
pro-Germanism of his sovereign by asking pointedly: 
"Why should we have so much regard for the 
Power whose aim is to strengthen by every 
possible means the two principle enemies of 
Hellenism--Turkey and Buigaria? And why 
should we show ourselves indifferent toward 
the very Powers who revived the Greek states, 
who have defended Greece in every emergency, 
and who are today again prepared, if6Turkey falls upon us, to stand by our side? 7 
Besides, Venizelos had a powerful weapon in his arsenal to use 
against the King should the Palace come out openly in favor of 
Germany, for in April 1914 after Britain promised to enforce 
the decision of the Conference of London regarding the cession 
of the Aegean Islands to Greece, the German Chancellor 
Bethmann von Hollweg had told Venizelos at Corfu during the 
Kaiser's annual visit to his Achilleian estate that Greece 
could not under any circumstances count on German support 
against Turkey. A year earlier the German Kaiser had similarly 
notified his brother-in-law, upon Constantine's ascension to 
the Greek throne, when asked by the new King as to whether 
Greece could count on the lasting friendship of Germany, he 
replied, "Unfortunately Germany can do nothing for Greece. All 
the interests of the Empire push her towards those states 
67 Cited b,y Gibbons, p. 206. 
whose views do not accord with those of Hellenism."68 While 
the crisis did not result in the resignation of Venizelos, 
it did reach an anti-climax in the dismissal of the Greek 
minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Streit, who had repeatedly 
proposed stratagems favorable to Germany and "diametrically 
opposed to that of the Cabinet." 
Venizelos' victory against the "neutralists" was soon 
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wasted. The Triple Entente declined the cooperation of Greece 
proposed by Venizelos because of, as afterwards explained by 
a member of the Asquith Cabinet, 
"a sincere desire to limit the area of conflict, 
a profound reluctance to involve another state 
in the perils of this struggle, and the hope, 
the vain hope as it has proved, of achieving at 
a later st~ge unity of action among the Balkan 
peoples. u6 ~ 
Venizelos' declared allegiance to the cause of the Entente 
was suspected by the Entente as a Greek maneuver, at a time 
when the Entente was diplomatically engaged in winning Turkey 
and Bulgaria to the Allied cause, to gain Allied support for 
a new Venizelist war against Turkey. 'l'hese suspicions were 
only removed after Turkey had entered the war in November, 
only 
and/then did the Allies begin to warm up to Greece. Their 
first move in this direction was made in December when the 
Entente Powers with the approval of Italy consented to the 
provisional reoccupation of "Northern Epirus" by Greece until 
68 Cited by Forster, p. 71. 
69 Cited b,y Gibbons, p. 206. 
the final question was settled at the Peace Conference. 'I'he 
second move carne early in 1915 when Greece was offered 
territory in Asia Hinor (the first official acknowledgement 
by the Entente of the claims of Greece to the Smyrna region) 
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by the famous "Grey proposal" of January 23, 1917 which offered 
"important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor" 
in return for which Greece should cede some parts of Macedonia 
to Bulgaria in order to prevent that country from joining the 
Central Powers.70 Venizelos took the question to his monarch 
in the form of his famous memorandum of January 24, 1915 in 
which he recommended that Greece 
"participate in the war, no longer only to fulfill 
moral obligations, but in view of compensations, 
which, if realized, will create a great and power-
ful Greece, such as the boldest optimist could not 
have imagined a few years ago. To obtain these 
compensations great dangers will have to be faced 
•••• we must seek the cooperation of Rumania and, 
if possible, of Bulgaria •••• In order to bring 
this about •••• make adequate concessions to 
Bulgaria •••• however painful the severance, to 
recommend the sacrifice of Kavalla, if only to 
save the Ottoman Greeks and so ensure the 
foundation of a really big Greece where Hellenism 
flourished through the long periods of its history. 11 71 
In a later memorandum Venizelos pointed out the cold poten-
tialities which the proposition afforded--that the concession 
of Kavalla involved a Greek population of 30,000 and an area 
of 2,000 square kilometers whereas there were approximately 
300,000 Hellenes and 120,000 square kilometers in the proposed 
territory in Asia Minor, and appealed to Constantine to accept 
·79 Cited b.r A. A. Fallis, Greece's Anato~ian Adventure--and After, 
(London, 1937), p. 18. 
7t Ibid. 
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the proposal in order to achieve the reunion of the Greek 
nation, "a task such as few kings had even had the opportunity 
of undertaking." After nmch vaeilla tion Venizelos received 
the approval of the Council of Ministers and the lukewarm 
consent of Constantine to the proposed concessions to Hulgaria. 
In the end, however, the proposition fell through for 
Constantine preferred the bird in the hand to the one in the 
bush and Bulgaria, under the vagary of the spectre of San 
Stephano, shunned Greece and the Allies and verred towards the 
Central Powers whose promises were more in line with Bulgarian 
aspirations, especially when sweetened by a promised Austro-
German loan of 200 million francs, and the failure of the 
Allies to breach the Straits in order to relieve pressure on 
Russia--a failure which can be in part attributed to Russia's 
refusal to permit Greek participation in the campaign. 
During the planning phases of the impending Dardanelles 
campaign, Venizelos seized upon the favorable atmosphere in 
Greece created by the Entente's concession to Greece of 
"Northern Epirus" and the promise of territory in Asia Minor 
to offer the allies military and naval support for the opera-
tions. The Allies, however, turned down the Greek offer under 
the influence of Russia who feared that Greek participation 
at the Straits would revive Greek aspirations for a Greek 
Empire to the detriment of Tsarist designs for Constantinople. 
Greece's military support to the Dardanelles actions would 
have been singular for the Allied attack was limited to an 
unsuccessful naval operation as England and France could not 
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spare troops from the ether fronts, and especially in "Flanders" 
where the "Westerners 11 72 of the Allied planning staffs be-
lieved the war would be won or lost. 
Venizelos·again proffered Greek assistance to the Entente 
on March 5, 1915 during the Gallipoli campaign only to be re-
buffed again by the Allies as a result of Russian influence. 
This time Russia had already proposed to France and Britain 
on February 19 her desire to annex Constantinople, the Straits, 
and the adjoining territory in the event of an Entente victory 
and would not permit Greek interference in the apportionment 
of the spoils to the detriment of Russia which Greek partici-
pation was sure to invite. Russia's obstinacy against Greece 
was again disastrous for the Gallipoli campaign; the British 
and French still lacked the necessary land forces for an 
effective operation, and whereas England and France had to 
come to an agreement as early as February 18, 1915 to support 
their naval attack against the Straits with a military land-
ing operation, they were not able to effect the long expected 
invasion until April 25 due to their inability to muster 
sufficient troops for the landing. This forced the Allies to 
scrape up forces and material from the Ottoman fronts and 
even then, at the cost of a long delay, they were able to muster 
only 95,000 troops to face approximately the same number of 
72 For some of the turmoil and indecision connected with the 
Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns see the recent works: Sir Philip 
Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperia~ist, (New York, 1959), and 
Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli, (New York, 1956). 
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entrenched Turks on the peninsula. Attempts by the Allies 
to break out of their initial positions after the landings re-
sulted in failure before the newly reinforced Turkish entrench-
ments and the ~sault bogged down to position warfare. An 
attempt to push the drive home in August after the reinforce-
ment of the Allied forces resulted in a second failure. This 
time the Allies were able to muster only 100,000 troops 
against approximately 110,000 entrenched Turks. 
While it is uncertain whether Venizelos could have made 
good his offer to reinforce the Dardanelles expedition, it 
is near certain that Greek intervention in the Dardanelles 
would have made the difference between defeat and victory. 
First Greek participation would have given the Entente a 
ready-made striking force early in the campaign at a time when 
the first Allied naval action silenced the forts in February 
and there were only approximately 11,000 Turkish troops in 
possession of the Straits and then later during the Gallipoli 
operation would have provided the Allies with a decisive force 
to unbalance the balance of forces when 
"the whole Ottoman state, on that eighteenth 
day of Narch 1915, when the Allied fleet 
abandoned the attack, was on the brink of 
dissolution •••• Among the subject races, the 
spirit of revolt was rapidly spreading •••• 
the Turks themselves were praying that the 
British and French would take the city, for 
this would relieve them of the controlling 
gang, emancipate them from the hated Germans, 
bring about peace and end their miseries. 11 73 
?3 H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, (New York, 1918), 
p. 225. 
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Besides, Greek intervention in the Dardanelles would have 
given the Entente the numerical superiority which it lacked 
throughout the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign and especially 
during the crucial moments so necessary to effect a landing, 
attack a fortified position, and finally force the campaign to 
its successful conclusion. This seems to be substantiated by 
Winston Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty and 
the chief architect of the Dardanelles campaign, who in 1918 
admitted to the importance of Greece's proposed participation, 
and the disservice of Russia in preventing it. Churchill 
stated that 
11When the collapse of Turkish resistance 
appeared to be imminent, the second chance of 
Greek intervention was thrown away, rendering 
unavailing through the delays introduced by 
the Russian autocracy who at this critical mo-
ment, when hours counted, were occupying them-
selves in disputing whether Greek troops 
should or should not be allowed to participate 
in the triumphal entry into Constantinople."74 
It is interesting to speculate what might have happened 
if Tsarist Russia had not opposed Greek intervention in the 
Dardanelles campaign. First, it is generally conceded that 
Greek participation may well have made the difference between 
defeat and victory and victory would have knocked Turkey out 
of the war. This would have opened the Straits to Russia and 
would have been a particular godsend to Russia, with her meager 
74cited by Gibbons, p. 229 from a Mansion House dinner, June 7, 
1918. 
industrial development to turn out sufficient war material 
for her huge armies. Heretofore, the Allies could reach 
Russia only with the greatest difficulty through the White 
Sea, frozen most of the year, to Archangel and thence by 
narrow single-track railroad to the Eastern front, or by way 
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of North America and across the Pacific to Vladivostok and by 
the way of the Trans-Siberian Railway tortuously across 
Russia to the Eastern front. With the forcing of the Straits 
the Allies would have been able to supply Russia directly with 
the badly needed war supplies, and in turn pick up Russian 
wheat equally needed by Britain and France. Free access to the 
Black Sea may well have averted the Bolshevik revolution, or 
at least prevented many of the factors which brought Russia 
to the brink of revolution in 1917. Next, an Entente victory 
at the Straits may have prevented Bulgaria's drift towards the 
Central Powers and saved Serbia much grief and the Allies from 
many setbacks on the Balkan front. Finally, it would have 
nipped the illustrious career of Mustapha Kemal in the bud and 
saved Greece from much grief later on. It was the legend of 
Gallipoli which made Kemal, and it was Kemal who remade 
Turkey and destroyed the Great Idea. 
Venizelos' second proffer of aid to the Entente on 
March 5 had been unanimously approved by a "Crown Council," 
consisting of former Premiers and Venizelos under the 
Presidency of the King. Even the King gave his reluctant 
consent over the advice of his "personal" advisers.75- The 
Par+.icularly a Colonel John Me+axas, ac+ing Chief of St.aff of 
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aid envisaged the dispatch of the Greek fleet reinforced with 
a division of troops to take part in the Dardanelles campaign. 
The act would have forced the issue of Greek neutrality. At 
first, Venizelos had proposed the commitment of an Army Corps 
but narrowed it down to one division to counter the opposi-
tion of the Greek General Staff that a larger force would 
leave Greece vulnerable to attack by Bulgaria. The following 
day, however, the King changed his mind and rejected the 
Council's decision. It is not known exactly what influenced 
the Greek monarch to withdraw his assent and upset Venizelos' 
plans, but it has been speculated that the King's decision was 
influenced to a great extent by two factors: first, Tsarist 
opposition to Greek participation in the Dardanelles and 
Gallipoli campaign and Greek aspirations in Turkey; and second, 
Anglo-French procrastination and the muddling and disjointed 
policy of the anglo-French army and navy chiefs in charge of 
the operations. Whereas the 11 
"bombardment of the forts in the narrows 
LStraitiT was begun on March 5, ••••• 
after having announced that the strait 
would be forced, the British and French 
contended themselves with further bom-
bardment, and retired for another period 
of mine-sweeping,"76 
+.he General S+.aff, who insis-ted t.hat an a++.ack upon Cons+.ant.inople and the 
Strait,s would leave Greece open to attack from Bulgaria. Meta:xas tendered 
his resignat,ion +.o Venizelos after the Crown Council decided to go ahead 
and dispatch a Greek Expeditionary Force to the Straits. 
6 7 
Ci+ed by Gibbons, p. 229 from a Mansion House dinner, June 27, 
1918. 
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since it was announced that the army could not be ready be-
fore the middle of April to land on Gallipoli. Thus Constan-
tine was given time to succumb to certain military advisors,77 
an opportunity to reconsider his decision, and an excuse to 
change his mind. 
On March 6, 1915, Venizelos, incited by his monarch's 
refusal to adopt the Crown Council's unanimous policy to in-
tervene at the Dardanelles in support of the Anglo-French 
Gallipoli campaign, tendered his second resignation to King 
Constantine. This time it was accepted, and the King's 
action provoked much excitment throughout Greece and enhanced 
the suspicion that the Greek monarch was secretly bound to 
the Central Powers. The suspicion was increased when the 
King appointed M. Gounaris, a personal rival of Venizelos 
and one of the Palace guard, with instructions to carry out 
a policy of maintaining strict neutrality to succeed Venizelos. 
The Constantinist victory over Venizelos lasted just ninety-
nine days for on June 13, 1915 Venizelos' Liberal Party was 
returned to power by the electorate, despite attempts to 
picture Venizelos as a traitor who wished to abandon national 
territory (Kavalla) to the enemies of Greece and the King 
as defender of national rights and to represent the electoral 
issue as being one of King Constantine and peace against 
n Gibbons, p. 223. 
Venizelos and war which forced Venizelos against the King 
and not Gounaris, the Constantinist candidate. Finally, the 
Constantinists attempted to rig the elections against the 
Venizelists by flagrant corruption and fraud. Venizelos' 
triumph against all these forceful obstacles was especially 
significant for it was a victory over the King, Court, and 
the General Staff, and in effect, was an endorsement of 
Venizelos' pro-Entente policy. 
For seventy days the repudiated Gounaris Government 
attempted to stay in power by hiding behind the facade of the 
King's illness, insisting that the disposition of the King 
made it impractical for a change in government. Tpe 
Venizelists forced the false front of the defunct Gounaris 
government by responding that the Constitution provided for 
such an emergency and, accordingly insisted that a regency 
be constituted to replace the "ailing" King. The Venizelist 
regency argument shattered the pretext of the King's illness, 
and on August 23, 1915 the Crown reluctantly called upon 
Venizel6s to form a new government. 
On assuming office again Venizelos made it clear to 
Constantine that Greece must return to the original policy and 
principles laid down at the beginning of the war, chief of 
which was never to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia. The Premier 
received his monarch's consent to the resumption of the old 
policy, and informed both the Entente Powers and the Central 
Alliance that this was the policy which Greece would follow. 
The Greek King's acquiescense to the comeback to the original 
policy and principles, however, only proved the first of 
142 
many tactical maneuvers designed to tolerate Venizelos and 
later repudiate him, for after March 6, 1915 lines were clearly 
drawn between the monarch and his first minister and there as 
much as hung an invisible sign before the grand entrance of 
the Palace reading "Venizelists need not apply." 
On September 22 a general mobilization was announced in 
Bulgaria, and Venizelos, realizing what Bulgaria mobilization 
meant, moved to obtain his monarch's signature to a decree 
ordering general mobilization in Greece to counter the announced 
mobilization by Bulgaria as the first step in putting his 
program into operation to aid Serbia. After keeping Venizelos 
waiting all morning and afternoon, the King received the Prime 
Minister at five in the afternoon, and immediately proceeded 
to lecture Venizelos upon the invincibility of Germany and 
the folly of aiding Serbia. The old Cretan revolutionary, 
respectful of the throne since his advent to Athenian politics 
in 1910 returned to his old self and proceeded to lecture 
Constantine on the meaning of constitutional government. 
"Your Majesty," Venizelos said, "having failed 
to persuade you, I am sorry, but it is my duty, 
as representing at the present moment the 
sovereignty of the people, to tell you that this 
time you have no right to differ with me. By 
the election of June 13 the people have approved 
my policy and given me their confidence: and 
the electorate knew that the foundation of my 
policy was that we should not allow Bulgaria to 
crush Serbia and expand overmuch so as to 
crush us tomorrow. If you are determined 
to set aside the Constitution, you must say 
so clearly, abrogating the constitution 
and assuming full responsibility b.y a 
royal decree."78 
Before concluding, the old revolutionary returned to his for-
mer self as Venizelos the politician, stating that he had no 
desire to provoke a Constitutional issue, offering to resign 
and leave the entire responsibility of the mobilization 
question to the King. Venizelos' bluff worked. The king 
signed the mobilization decree as there was little else he 
could do since Venizelos had maneuvered the situation adroitly. 
If Constantine had accepted Venizelos' resignation, it would 
infer that the King refused to respond to the challenge of 
Bulgarian mobilization. 
In addition to affixing his signature to the mobilization 
decree, the King agreed to allow Venizelos to sound out the 
Entente to see if the Allies could furnish the 150,000 which 
according to the Serbo-Greek Treaty Serbia was required to 
contribute in case of a war with Bulgaria and to permit an 
allied expeditionary force to land at Saloniki but under 
"formal protest." The next day the King repeated his vacilla-
tion and countermanded the feeler to the Entente; but Venizelos 
proceeded to seek out the Ministers of the Entente in Athens 
in order to concert strategic plans for the future. 
78 Cit,ed in Gibbons, p. 242. 
On September 24 the Allies informed Venizelos that they 
could make good the troop quota in question. 
The actual protest against the landing by force majeure 
was made on October 2, 1915, the day before the first Allied 
troops debarked at Saloniki. It soon turned out, however, 
that the allied expeditionary force amounted to only 13,000 
men, a mere drop in the bucket when compared to the original 
contingent agreed upon by the ministerial pourparlers in 
Athens. This breach of faith by the Entente led to Venizelos' 
downfall. 
On October 4 a stormy meeting of the Greek parliament 
took place, and Venizelos faced the opposition under the 
leadership of no less than four ex-Premiers whom he found 
arrayed against him on the question of the Allied landings. 
Venizelos took the floor and called for Greece to fulfill her 
obligations to Serbia, insisting that Bulgarian mobilization 
and political maneuvering with the Central Alliance was tanta-
mount to calling forth the casus foederis of the Treaty of 
Alliance with Serbia. After the exchange of violent words 
the question was put to a vote. Venizelos carried the chamber 
by a vote of 147 to 110, only to be met by the stubborn de-
fiance of the King who announced that he was in disagreement 
with intervention. The King's pronouncement, in effect, 
meant that he chose to oppose the mandate given Venizelos and 
would pursue his own course. This time the King's blUff worked. 
Venizelos tendered his resignation rather than incite civil 
war and provoke a national crisis at a time when Bulgaria had 
mobilized and was threatening Serbia and Greece in Macedonia. 
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On October 5 Venizelos resigned in the face of accusations 
of being party to an Entente trick to involve Greece in the 
war without the Entente meeting the 150,000 troop condition 
as was stipulated in the treaty with Serbia and agreed upon 
as a condition of the Saloniki landings. He was succeeded by 
M. Alexander Zaimis who formed a Cabinet consisting of no 
less than four ex-Premiers, Theotokis, Rallis, Dragoumis, and 
Gournaris--all of whom had served previously in one capacity 
or another to make the decade following the Greco-Turkish war 
one of demoralization in Greece until swept aside by the 
Leaguers and Venizelos.79 
79A. Zaimis, a conservative politician served as Premier at the 
time of the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish War, and later succeeded 
Prince George as High Commissioner of Crete in 1906. It was under 
Zaimis' administration on Crete that Venizelos became the leading states-
man of Crete. 
N. Theotokis, a prominent politician and sometime Premier who 
served in the Constantinist Cabinets during the war, with the particular 
misfortune of being Minister of War during the Asia Minor disaster for 
which he paid with his life. 
D. Rallis, served his political apprenticeship under the ultra-
nationalist, and some would say jingoist politician, and many times 
Premier Theodore Deligiannes. Deligiannes was the Greek foreign minister 
during the Russo-Ottoman War and Premier at the time of the Eastern 
Rumelian Crisis, Greco-Turkish War, and the long drawn out Cretan crisis 
until assasinated in 1905. Rallis succeeded to Deligiannes' mantle 
after the assasination and became premier in 1909 for a brief period until 
forced from office by the Military League. Rallis assumed office again 
briefly in December 1920 upon the recall of King Constantine from exile. 
s. Dragoumis, the veteran Greek Premier who resigned his office 
for the last time in September 1910 under the fire of Venizelos who was 
making his advent in Greek politics in the National Assembly. 
D. Gounaris, Venizelos' personal adversary in the question of 
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On October 8 Zaimis announced that his policy would 
"rest on the same essential basis as that followed by Greece 
since the beginning of the European War"; however, when asked 
by the Serbian Government on October 11, in the face of the 
impending attack from Bulgaria, if the Greek Government would 
issue orders to the Greek General Staff to corunence cooperation 
with Serbian military authorities in order to formulate a 
plan of joint action by the two armies, Zaimis refused claim-
ing that the casus foederis of the Treaty of Alliance provided 
only for attack by Bulgaria alone, and not a joint attack by 
Germany and Austro-Hungary. Three days later Bulgaria de-
clared war on Serbia, and, hereafter, relations between 
Greece and the Entente deteriorated rapidly as did the Entente's 
overall political and military position in the Balkans.80 
Attempts by the Entente and Serbia to involve Greece in 
intervention v. neutrality, Constantinist functionary, and often times 
Premier during the War, with the particular misfortune to be Premier 
during the major portion of the Greek adventure in Asia Minor in 1921-22 
for which he paid with his life before a revolutionary firing squad 
following the "Trial of ex-Ministers" in November 1922. Gournaris' 
excution received particular attention outside Greece because he was the 
most:prominent politician of the six ministers executed and being seriously 
ill had not appeared at the trial to plead his case. Nevertheless, he was 
summarily convicted at the star studded "War Crimes Trial" and literally 
dragged from his bed and shot. The others executed with Gounaris included 
two ex-Premiers, Protopapadakis and Stratos, two ex-Ministers, Baltazis and 
Theotokis, and the Commander in Chief of the Greek Army of Asia Minor, 
General Hadjianestis. 
80 Bulgaria declared war against Serbia on October 14, and eight days 
later joined Austria and Germany in the conquest of Serbia. Two operations, 
(a) Strumitsa,ovember 3-2] and Cerna .LRovember 1?] and (b) lower Vardar 
l5ecember 4-10 by the French and British forces out of Saloniki to rescue 
the Serbian position resulted in failure, and finally on January 15, 1916 
the fleeing remnants of the Serbian army were swept from the Balkan main-
land and took refuge, under the protection of the French and British 
the war, insisting that the declaration of war by Bulgaria 
on Serbia invoked the "casus foederis" proved to no avail. 
Charges and countercharges by the Lntente impugning Greece's 
integrity in regard to the treaty obligation of Greece to-
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ward Serbia deepened the crises. On October 21 Greece countered 
in an official communique wherein the Zaimis cabinet laid bare 
the opinion of the Greek Government in the matter. The note 
said, 
"the interpretation of the alliance with Serbia 
was not in the Entente Powers, because Greece was 
an independent nation disposing of her fate in 
full sovereignty. The Austro-German attack re-
leased Greece from the obligation of armed inter-
vention, since the treaty was conceived only as 
a document to provide against a renewed attempt 
of Bulgaria to win the hegemony of the Balkans. 
Even if it were argued that the treaty became 
operative after the intervention of Bulgaria, 
it must be remembered that Greek aid to Serbia 
against Bulgaria was contingent upon Serbia 
putting 150,000 men immediately in the fi.eld 
against Bulgaria. The Entente Powers had 
failed to furnish an equivalent contingent. 
The General Staff thought that unless there 
were 4oo,ooo men for the Balkan joint expedi-
tion, Greece would be ruined without saving 
Serbia. Greece would aid Serbia best by 
allowing the Allies to pass through her terri-
tory! maintaining all the while her own 
mobi ization.?'81 
Mediterranean naval units on the Greek island of Corfu. 
The declarations of war involving Bulgaria were as follows: 
October 14, Serbia and Bulgaria; October 15, England and Montenegro on 
Bulgaria; October 16, France on Bulgaria; October 19, Russian and Italy 
on Bulgaria. 
81 Gibbons, P• 260. 
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At the same time, the note thanked Great Britain for the offer 
of Cyprus in return for Greece's intervention in the conflict 
but stated that Greece would not abandon "Her neutrality, 
which, however, was of the most benevolent character towards 
the Entente." 
The cold war between the Entente and Greece over Greece's 
treaty obligations to Serbia had its effect upon Greece's 
internal politics. Venizelos who had resigned the premier-
ship on October 5, maintained his leadership of the Parliamen-
tary majority. He practised restraint in directing the 
Liberal Party in the parliamentary debates, until a relatively 
minor discussion in the Parliament Lon the matter of extra 
pay due army officers during the period of mobilization? blew 
up into a full scale debate on the pros and cons of the 
neutrality policy of the Palace. On the night of November 3-
4, the issue reached a climax as Venizelos delivered one of 
his most powerful speeches in support of his national policy. 
The wily Cretan side-tracked the pay problem; he even set 
aside the neutrality versus intervention issue, and while 
it was the real issue at hand, the problem itself was turned 
into a constitutional question. Stealthily, Venizelos the 
constitutionalist proceeded to make his point: first, he 
decried the idea of dragging the King's name into a purely 
political discussion--convention and courtesy demanded that; 
next, he implied the Anglo-Saxon idea of the loyal opposition 
to his position, an ideal so prevalent in British parliamentary 
government but solely lacking in its Greek counterpart, and 
denied that his opposition to Crown policy insinuated or 
·implied unpatriotic motives by the King who was "a distinguished 
general, but not equally experienced in things political"; 
finally, in order to place before the whole Parliament and 
nation the real point at issue, Venizelos lectured his sovereign 
and the Constantinists in the ways of constitutional govern-
ment. He said: 
"Our state is a democracy presided over by the 
King, and the whole responsibility in the 
Government rests with the Cabinet, which de-
pends upon the majority of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. In a constitutional 
government, the Crown has no share in respon-
sibilities. If foolish political leaders 
admit that in this Chamber there can be such a 
thing as a Crown policy, they are unworthy to 
represent a free and sovereign people. 1182 
Upon concluding, Venizelos challenged a vote of confidence in 
the Government, md by a vote of 147 against 114 Venizelos 
carried the Chamber and the Minister of War, General Yannikitsas 
who had provoked the initial issue was censured by the 
Parliament. 
The Zaimis government fell; but if the Venizelists had 
any idea that the King was going to call upon Venizelos to 
form a new cabinet, it was quickly dispelled. Constantine 
replied to the Venizelos victory by appointing Yannikitsas 
his aide-de-camp, and on November 5, dissolved the Chamber 
82 Cited by Gibbons, P• 262. 
of Deputies. With no regard for the political sensibilities 
of the nation or the dissolved parliament, Constantine in-
vested Stephanos Skouloudis, a political favorite, with the 
power to form a new government to replace Zaimis; and 
Skouloudis, in turn, appointed well know:n anti-Venizelists and 
avid pro-neutralists such a Gounaris, Michaelarakis and 
Yannikitsas to his cabinet.83 
From November 6, 1915 to his abdication on June 12, 1917 
Constantine, alone ruled Greece through such puppet Govern-
ments as Skouloudis', substituting 11divine guidance in place 
of the-will of the people." A semblance of legality was 
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given to Constantinian rule when the national elections of 
December 19 elected a Constantinist government, but the victory 
was a hollow one, for approximately four-fifths of the Greek 
electorate abstained from taking part in the election on 
orders of Venizelos. The Venizelists insisted that the 
November 5 dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies by the King 
had been illegal; and, therefore, the deputies elected on 
June 13 still made up the only legally constituted legislative 
assembly in Greece. 
83M. Skouloudis was an octogenerian banker who having become a 
millionaire, aspired to crown his financial success by becoming Premier. 
He had neither the sense or sensibility for the Premiership, and, devoid 
of any qualifications for such a high position, merely served as a front 
for the operations of the "shadow'' Government exercising political 
power from the Palace. In the elections of December 19, 1915, all the 
Cabinet members of Skouloudis' first ministry were reelected, except 
Skouloudis himself, who nevertheless was retained in office as a ready 
tool of the Constantinists. 
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The Entente seized upon this technicality to override 
the protests of the Greek Government when Skouloudis sought 
to protest the transfer of the rehabilitated remnants of the 
Serbian army across Greek territory from Corfu to Saloniki. 
The Entente insisted that Greece also provide the troop trains 
and the right-of-way across Patras-Attica-Saloniki in order 
to effect the transfer from Corfu in the least amount of 
time. To excuse this gross violation of Greek neutrality and 
sovereignty the Entente insisted that, 
(1) The Skouloudis Government (a) did not have legal 
standing on the basis of the Greek Constitution 
and (b) did not represent the will of the Greek 
people; 
(2) The treaties which created modern Greece gave 
Great Britain, France and Russia the right to 
intervene in Greece in order to maintain Greece's 
independence and to secure for her people their 
constitutional rights. LAs noted previously in 
Chapter I, the Kingdom of Greece was first 
created by an article in the 1'reaty of Adrianople, 
September 14, 1829, between Russia and Turkey, 
and as subsequently modified by the London 
Protocols of-February 3, 1830 and May 7, 1832 
wherein Greece was placed under the protection 
of Russia, Britain, and France who were also 
made guarantors of the Greek Constitution1; and 
(3) That Greece's failure to keep the treaty pledge 
to Serbia under the Serbo-Greek Treaty made it 
morally incumbent upon Greece to redress the 
consequent damage to Serbia. 
After the "deposition" of legal government in Greece in 
November -December 1915, the above theses governed the 
Entente's actions in all relations with the Constantinist 
government. And, whenever any situation was not covered in 
the above, justification was readily found in Notwendigkeit, -
the necessity by Great Powers, all other things notwithstand-
ing, to promote their personal policies and welfare. 
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The Skouloudis Cabinet did not, of course, help the plight 
of the Greek Government by certain nefarious acts as for 
example, when on May 26, 1916 it "notoriously" yielded to 
German pressure and surrendered Fort Rupel to the Bulgarians 
after minimal opposition and thereby opened to the Central 
Powers the entrance to the Struma Plain and the way to Greek 
Macedonia and Saloniki. 
After the Rupel surrender, it was felt in Greece and 
abroad that Greece had abandoned in favor of the Central Powers 
her policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Entente. Be-
cause of that, Greece more than ever before, was held suspect 
by the Entente and on June 6, 1916 as a countermeasure for 
its Rupel treachery Greece was made to suffer its first 
"pacific blockade" at the hands of France and Britain during 
World War I. The blockade was lifted on June 22. The Greek 
Government agreed to comply with an Entente ultimatum, dated 
June 21, which demanded that Greece (a) replace the Skouloudis 
Cabinet, (b) undergo demobilization, (c) replace certain un-
favorable high ranking police officials, (d) plan for new 
elections, and "to beef up" their ultimatum, the Entente landed 
a force nearby on the island of Salamis, the site of the 
ancient battle by the same name which commands the harbor of 
Athens. 
The King yielded to the Entente ultimatum and replaced 
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Skouloudis on June 23 with Zaimis who was again sun~oned to 
form a new government. The Army, having been on a war footing 
since the Balkan Wars, was quickly reverted to a peace basis 
on June 27, 1916 and the desired replacements were made within 
the police forces, but the inauguration of "responsible 
government" and the plan for new elections proved a most 
difficult problem. It brought into focus Greece's geographic 
and historic dilemma, and the beginning of a series of events 
that made Greece a "public place" in which each side felt 
free to act as it wished. 
In the last week of July and the first week of August 
1916 the Allied forces on the Balkan front, reinforced by 
fresh Russian contingents from France and a newly reconstituted 
Serbian army recently arrived from Corfu, went over to the 
offensive. The line of advance extended from Florina to 
Doiran and was directed against the Bulgarians as a first step 
in the liberation of Serbia. After some initial success, the 
Entente advance was halted by combined German-Bulgarian 
armies and then forced to retreat behind the original Saloniki 
defense perimeter. In the sequel, the Serres and Drama area 
of Eastern Greek }.1acedonia was abandoned on August 26, 1916 
by the Anglo-French forces who had occupied the region after 
the Rupel surrender to the Bulgarians, and four days later 
there occurred an event which foreshadowed the new course which 
Greek politics were going to take. On August 30 a pro-Ally 
movement, fostered by General Sarrail the commandant of allied 
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forces on the Balkan front, took place in Saloniki which after 
its occupation by the Entente on Greek "invitation" had be-
come the center for pro-Venizelist and interventionist agitation. 
In September 1916 there occurred a second Greek act which 
in importance approached the surrender of Rupel. On 
September 18, the Fourth Greek Army Corps surrender Kavalla 
to the Bulgarian forces which had occupied the area and surround-
ing heights after their victory against the Saloniki forces. 
The Kavalla surrender proved especially ignominious, for 
approximately 8000 troops of its garrison were dispatched to 
Germany for internment. 
While the wisdom of the Kavalla surrender is beyond the 
pale of this study, it should be noted that militarily the 
Kavalla position was made tenuous by the occupation of Eastern 
Macedonia by the Bulgarian army following its success against 
the Saloniki forces of the Entente. The Bulgarian victory 
had isolated Kavalla from Greece. At the same time the Bulgars 
had occupied the heights which dominated the city; and for all 
practical purposes, Kavalla was theirs for the taking. Kavalla 
was one more example of the historic plight in which Greece 
found itself by its geographic and historic position. To some 
the Kavalla incident was an unpardonable sin committed against 
Greek "honor" and for others a sin committed understandably 
under mitigating circumstances. 
The Venizelists insisted that the Kavalla surrender was 
especially inexcusable, since Rumanian intervention on the 
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side of the Entente had taken place from August 27 to September 1 
which removed a long standing pretext of the Greek General 
Staff that the flexing of its military muscle was inadvisable 
due to the uncertainty of the Rumanian position.8~ The General 
Staff had insisted almost as a sine~ non of Greece's inter-
vention on the side of the Entente that Rumania be brought 
into the war against the Central Powers to cause Bulgaria to 
divert northwards some of its forces on the Greek frontier to 
meet the threat from Rumania. The Venizelists insisted that 
this now had been done, and the surrender of Kavalla wreaked 
of the betrayal of the best interests of Greece. The 
Constantinists could counterclaim, with some justification, 
that if it was a sin, it was one committed under extenuating 
circumstances. 
The immediate results of the Kavalla surrender were two: 
first, it provoked the open break between Venizelos and the 
Greek Government which resulted in the creation of a 
Venizelist Provisional Government in Saloniki; second, it 
caused new Allied pressures upon Greece which eventually led 
to the abdication of King Constantine and Greece's intervention 
in the war on the side of the Entente. 
On August 27, at a public rally in Athens the Liberal 
Party adopted by acclamation a forceful speech directed against 
~ Rumaniadeclared war on Austria on August 27, 1916. On 
August 28, 1916 Germany declared war on Rumania, and Turkey and Bulgaria 
followed suit on August 30 and September 1, respectively. 
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the King and his "neutralist" policy. The speech delivered 
by Venizelos on the anniversary of the military revolt of 1909 
exhorted eonstantine to mend his ways. Before considering the 
speech, it might be helpful to take stock of the man who served 
the ultimatum upon the Government which clearly announced the 
new course that the King must take in the war. 
Six years before, Venizelos had been a political unknown 
in Athenian politics and Greece was in political chaos until 
the "Young Greeks"--the Military Leaguers--, impressed by 
Venizelos' exploits on Crete, invited Venizelos to give their 
movement political direction which was the beginning of his 
meteoric climb in Greek politics. At the same time, however, 
Venizelos did not abandon his fight for Crete and soon re-
turned to the island to lead the struggle for enosis against 
the Powers. He became a member of the first Cretan Assembly 
which opened "in the name of George I, King of the Hellenes 11 
on May 9, 1910 and on May 17 he was made President of the 
Cretan Assembly which under his direction was transformed 
into a Constituent Assembly in a move directed to promulgate 
union with Greece. When enosis was frustrated by a threat 
from the Powers warning that the Powers would reoccupy Crete 
if the Cretans proceeded to unite themselves with Greece, 
Venizelos realized the futility of his position on Crete and 
decided to work for enosis from Greece. 
Venizelos was elected to the Greek Chamber of Deputies 
as a candidate of the Military League in an Athens constituency 
on August 21, 1910, and on October18, 1910 became Premier of 
Greece for the first time. In order to free himself from 
the mirror of being a creature of the Military League, 
Venizelos challenged the Leaguers in the dispute over whether 
the newly elected Chamber of Deputies was a Constituent 
Assembly, elected to endow Greece with a new Constitution 
transforming Greece into a Republic as insisted upon by the 
League, or elected merely to revise the Constitution as in-
sisted upon by Venizelos. To overcome the obstruction of the 
old politicos who boycotted the Assembly in order to prevent 
a quorum in the Assembly, Venizelos called for new elections 
in order to give the people of Greece at large a chance to 
choose between him and his opposition. The elections were 
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held in December and the results represented an overwhelming 
personal triumph for Venizelos and his policy. With this 
mandate in hand, Venizelos proceeded to the political, economic, 
and military regeneration of Greece and effected the revolution 
in diplomacy leading to the Balkan Wars. Consequently, in 
less than three years Venizelos had uprooted the Athenian 
political oligarchy that had ruled Greek politics for so long, 
revised an outmoded Constitution, modernized the archaic 
economic structure of the country, spurred agricultural pro-
duction, accelerated industrial development, enlarged the 
territory of Greece by 68 percent which increased Greece's 
population by 67 percent, and, most important of all, within 
this brief period of time had made Greece a nation to be 
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considered in the Balkans and respected in Burope. This was 
the man who for two years had struggled to insure these 
advances by allying Greece with the Entente against the better 
wishes of his King and whose persistence brought him to the 
Rubicon in August to lecture his monarch one last time in 
which he said, 
"You are the prey of advisers of a purely 
military outlook and of oligarchical ideas, who 
have persuaded you that Germany must be 
victorious, and who, trading upon your admira-
tion of the Germans whose victory you believe 
in and have desired, hope by Germany's victory 
to be able to set aside the liberal Constitution 
of Greece and to concentrate in the Royal hands 
the power of absolutism. As a result of these 
warped ideas, instead of an extension of the 
territory of Greece to Asia Minor, Thrace, and 
Cyprus, we see to-day Macedonia invaded by the 
Bulgarians, military supplies worth hundreds of 
thousands of drachmae surrendered to the invaders, 
and northern Epirus in danger of being permanently 
lost. 
·~e, the people of this demonstration, declare 
that we disapprove the course recently followed, 
And insist upon the dismissal from the entourage 
of the King of his present sinister advisers. The 
interjection of the King's name into the electoral 
contest constitutes an internal revolution against 
the Liberal Party. The national unity has been 
destroyed by thrusting the Royal prestige into 
politics."85 
Afterwards Greece hovered on the brink of revolution, and the 
revolution itself hung on an act of omission or commission of 
the King. In the end, Constantine did both. For one month 
the Greek monarch dabbled, first promising to enter the conflict 
and then failing to make good his promise; then the surrender 
8, Cited in Gibbons, pp. 276-277. 
of Kavalla occurred wtich caused Venizelos to make this final 
appeal. Venizelos informed the Zaimis Government that he 
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could no longer remain passive to the dishonor of his country 
and to the betrayal of the interests of Greece, and authorized 
the Prime Minister to inform the King that if, under the new 
situation created by Rumanian intervention, the policy of non-
intervention were continued, he would not hesitate to divide the 
country by calling upon the people to follow him into war in 
order to save the nation and "to combat the pro-German policy 
of the King." Accordingly, after no action proved forthcoming 
from the Palace, on September 27, one month to the day after 
Venizelos had delivered the last public warning to King 
Constantine at the seventh anniversary of the Military League, 
Venizelos landed on Crete and proclaimed a revolutionary 
movement. On October 9, after a triumphant tour of the Aegean 
islands, Venizelos established a Provisional Government at 
Saloniki and prepared for intervention. On November 23 
Venizelos, as President of the Provisional Government, de-
clared war on Germany and Bulgaria. 
The second upshot of the Kavalla episode took place on 
October 10 when the Entente Powers, incensed by the surrender 
of Kavalla and the devious and dilatory tactics of the Greek 
King, demanded the sur-render of the Greek navy which proved 
the first of a new series of humiliating Entente demands 
upon Greece designed to neutralize the war-making ability of 
the Greek Government, if not to embroil it in the war. 
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In order to escape its possible destruction by the Allied 
Mediterranean fleets, the new Greek Premier Lambros, who had 
replaced Zaimis on October 10, surrendered the Greek fleet to 
the Entente on October 11.86 This surrender was followed on 
November 19 by a second ultimatum whicb demanded that Athens 
dismiss the representatives of the Central Powers and surrender 
all war material in Greece. The Greek Government declined 
the new Entente ultimatum. On November 30 British and French 
troops debarked at Piraeus to force compliance, and joined 
by Venizelists, attempted unsuccessfully to march on Athens. 
The intervention met with resistance on December 1 and 2, and 
the Allied troops suffered numerous casualties and withdrew 
to their ships in the harbor of Piraeus, abandoning their 
Venizelist supporters to their abject fate. In the aftermath 
of the Allied landing at Piraeus, the folly resulted in the 
wholesale persecution and incarceration of Venizelists through-
out Greece. 
The Entente, exasperated by the defiance of the Greek 
Government and its refusal to comply with the November 8 
ultimatum, imposed a second blockade on Greece on December 8, 
86 The Lambros Ministry remained in office from October 19, 1916 
to April 22, 1917. A university professor and expert palaeographer, 
Premier Spyridion Lambros' only qualification for the high office of 
Government which he assumed was his repute as a scholar and his willing-
ness to accept the post. He had not been schooled in the political 
sciences nor had he had any experience in Government and public affairs--
and reportedly remarked once that had he not been a professo~he would 
liked to have been a monk at Mt. Athos, for which he would have been 
better suited than the stormy atmosphere of Greek politics, let alone 
politics in 1916-1917. 
and on December 14 submitted a third ultimatum wtich called 
upon Athens to make reparations for the events of December 1 
and 2 and to withdraw its forces from the whole of Thessaly 
to the Peloponnesus, and in effect, surrender the territory 
to the Entente. The next day, December 15, the Lambros 
Government capitulated to these Allied demands, but steadfastly 
refused to take the irrevocable step underlining all Entente 
treatment of Greece, the severing of relations with the Central 
Powers. As a result, without withdrawing its recognition of 
the Athens Goverr~ent and with Great Britain taking the lead, 
the Entente, on December 19, 1916, recognized the Provisional 
Government in Saloniki, an act which it had held in obeyance 
in the hope that the Athens Government would come around to 
the Entente way of thinking and join Venizelos' Provisional 
Government at Saloniki in the war against the Central Powers. 
The recognition of the Provisional Government and the 
accrediting of diplomatic representation from Britain and 
France officially split Greece in half, and marked the idea 
of two Greeces: "Old Greece" or Constantinist Greece in the 
South with its capital in Athens, and "New Greece" or 
Venizelist Greece to the North and including the Aegean islands 
and Crete with its headquarters at Saloniki. 
On December 26 the Church, strongly influence by the 
Athens Government, indirectly sanctified the division of 
Greece by singing a Te Deum and pronouncing anathema upon 
Venizelos. The Archbishop of Athens, standing on a cairn of 
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stones, surrounded by eight bishops who represented Constantin-
ist Greece, celebrated the medieval rite of excommunication. 
"Cursed be Eleutherios Venizelos who imprisons priests and 
who plots against his King and his country," the Archbishop 
chanted; and sixty thousand Athenians taking part in the 
"mystery" responded, "Cursed be he," as they came forth to 
throw their cursed stone upon the cairn and seal Venizelos off 
from God and Country. Venizelos, for his part, in repetition 
of 1910, busied himself with establishing an efficient admin-
istration for his Provisional Government and in building an 
army in preparation for taking part in future allied opera-
tions on the Saloniki front. 
The year 1916 did not end without a fourth Entente 
ultimatum delivered to Greece. This time Great Britain and 
France, with the consent of Russia, addressed a note to the 
Athens Government on December 31, 1916 which demanded (1) the 
reduction of Greek army strength to the minimal number 
necessary to maintain public order, (2) transfer of war material 
to the Peloponnesus, (3) prohibition of "Reservists" activity, 
(4) an Allied base at Itea on the Gulf of Corinth, (5) use 
of the Larissa-Saloniki railway for Allied troops and material, 
(6) a public apology for the December 1 and 2 incidents, and 
(7) the immediate release of the Venizelists imprisoned and the 
indemnification of the victims who, after inquiry, were judged 
to have suffered unjustly as a result of those events. On 
January 16 the Lambros Government accepted the conditions of 
the Note and formally apologized for the "regretable incidents" 
of De:ember, and at a solemn parade by the Greek armed forces, 
presided over by the King's brother Prince Andrew, saluted the 
colors of the Allies. Only in the "indemnification" clause 
did the Greek Government fall down in carrying out the provi-
siomof the December ultimatum, for while the Greek Government 
promised to cooperate in the investigation and provide just 
indemnification wherever adjudged, when the Mixed Commission 
of Indemnities was formed and empowered to operate, the 
Government, under the influence of the King, employed every 
possible subterfuge to prevent the meeting of the Hixed 
Tribunal which served to increase the rancor of the Allies 
against the King. The commission was unable to function until 
the deposition of Constantine and the return of Venizelos 
to Athens. In the interim, the indemnification question re-
mained one more thorny problem in the relations between the 
Athens Government and the Entente.8? 
During the winter 1916-1917, the Balkan front remained 
relatively quiet after the great Allied offensive of October 5--
December 11, 1916 under General Sarrail succeeded in recaptur-
ing Monastir and pushed on to new positions on Lake Okhrid. 
No advance, however, was made on the Bulgarian frontier even 
when a joint Bulgarian-German force under General von Nackensen 
was assembled in the area south of the Dobrudja in preparation 
87 See Appendix II for settlement of the question. 
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for operation against Rumania. Eventually, Allied inactivity 
on the Macedonian front permitted Bulgarian forces to play a 
significant role in von Mackensen's attack upon Rumania which 
commenced on September 26, in conjunction with an attack from 
Austria-Hungary by an Austro-German force under General von 
Falkenhayn that began on September 27, which for all practical 
purposes, knocked Humania out of the war with the fall of 
Bucharest on December 16, 1916.88 
The intervention of Rumania provided the Constantinists 
with much sauce for their neutralist position. Rumania served 
to point to the folly of the Balkan country that dared to oppose 
the German powers. Besides, right before the very eyes of the 
Greeks at Saloniki the invincibility of Germanic might had been 
demonstrated repeatedly for more than a year. Neither argument 
deterred Venizelos, who continued to strengthen his government 
and organize a national army, which included three fully equipped 
divisions--the Serres, the Cretan, and the Islands--whose very 
names describe the limits of Venizelos' Saloniki dominion. 
Venizelos, nevertheless, realized that the sixty thousand volun-
teer force which made up the army of the Provisional Government, 
88 After the fall of Bucharest, the Austro-German forces continued 
their advance eastwards across Rumania and on January 5, 1917 captured 
Braila en the Danube near the Russo-Rumanian frontier. On January 8 they 
captureu Fiscane and by the middle of January forced the Rumanians into 
Moldavia beyond the Sereth River before calling their offensive to a halt. 
On August 6, 1917 the German and Austrian forces resumed the offensive 
against Moldavia, and the hostilities between Rumania and the Central 
Powers ceased on December 6 with the Truce of Foscani. A temporary peace 
was signed on March 5, 1918, and Rumania formally withdrew from the war 
on May 7. 
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while a miracle in itself, would not enable Greece to be a 
military factor in the victory of tbe Entente Powers. He there-
fore called upon the Powers either to allow his Provisional 
Government to come to a trial of strength with Constantinist 
Athens and restore the national unity of Greece, or permit the 
Saloniki Government to occupy Thessaly in order to have its 
rich crops and cereals fall to the Provisional Government forces 
and to recruit volunteers for the Saloniki army. The Powers 
refused both requests. They had occupied Thessaly themselves 
essentially to establish a buffer zone between the Athens and 
Saloniki Governments and prevent the extension of Venizelos' 
Nationalist Movement to Epirus and Thessaly in the unwaning hope 
that Constantine might "voluntarily" be induced to abandon his 
policy of neutrality and join the Entente. They continued to 
refuse Venizelos unlimited support until a series of military 
and political events within the Allied camp permitted the Entente 
to force the intervention issue upon Constantine. These in-
eluded the following: first, the Russian revolution of March 
1917 which deposed Tsar Nicholas II who had repeatedly opposed a 
strong line against Constantine for fear of establishing an anti-
monarchial precedent and the overthrow of a dynasty so closely 
allied to the House of Romanoff;89 second, after the St. Jean 
de Maurienne Agreement of April 1917 which insured Italy 
89constantine's mother was the Grand Duchess Olga of Russia; Tsar 
Nicholas' uncle Prince Paul, the son of Alexander III, had married 
Alexandra of Gr~ece; Nicholas' first cousin Princess Helena had married 
Constantine's brother Prince Nicholas; and Constantine's sister Princess 
Maria had married George of Russia. 
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greater liberty of action along the Adriatic and pinned down 
Smyrna and Adana for Italy, Italy was inclined to permit a 
greater role for Venizelos in the ~ntente camp and accept the 
negation of Constantine; third, United States intervention in 
the conflict on the side of the Entente in April removed any 
criticism from that quarter to strong Entente measures against 
Greece; finally, the inconclusive Allied operations in the 
Monastir-Presba sector from March 11 - 19, 1917 and in the 
Vardar from May 5 - 19 about Doiran made it readily apparent 
that only the quick intervention of the whole of Greece would 
give them the numerical superiority needed to turn the tide 
against the combined forces of the Central Powers on the Balkan 
front. The Entente therefore increased its pressured to bring 
the Athens Government into the war. 
In June 1917, Britain and France decided to go the full 
measure to invoke their "obligation" as Greece's 11protectors" 
and "guarantors of the Greek Constitution" in order to bring 
Greece into the war. They demanded the abdication of King 
Constantine. 
On June 11, M. Charles Jonnart, the newly arrived French 
envoy to Athens and former Councilor-General of Algeria, act-
ing ~s the High Commissioner of the Protecting Powers to 
Greece, formally presented the Athens Government an Entente 
ultimatum which, under pain of bombardment of Athens, demanded: 
(1) the abdication of King Constantine, 
(2) the renunciation of claims to the Greek throne 
by "pro-German11 Greek Crown Prince George in 
favor of his brother Alexander, and 
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(3) the establishment in Athens of a Greek 
Ministry headed by Venizelos. 
The Entente poured troops into Thessaly in the North while 
French forces occupied the Isthmus of Corinth on the South to 
back up the ultimatum and insure Royal compliance. The threat 
worked. On June 12 Constantine abdicated in favor of his second 
son Alexander. Two weeks later Venizelos became Premier and 
the next day, June 27, 1917 Greece with Venizelos at the helm 
once again officially declared war on the Central Powers.9° 
Why had Greece refrained for so long from joining in the 
conflict? The reasons are many and varied and as perplexing 
as the situation caused by the series of degrading ultimatums 
and humiliating surrenders forced upon the Greeks by the Power 
blocs and especially the Entente in its cold war against 
Greece. Briefly, two periods can be marked: an early period--
1914-1915--which was controlled almost wholly by an existing 
situation in Greece; and a later period--since 1915--conditioned 
in the main by the repeated reversals inflicted upon the Allies 
by the Central Powers on the Balkan Front, the many ultimatums 
served Greece and the violation of Greece's sovereignty, and 
the conflicting Entente diplomatic promises and counter-promises 
which helped to induce a wait-and-see attitude on the part of 
the Greeks. 
90 Venizelos became Prime Minister on June 26, replacing Zaimis who 
had succeeded Lambros on May 3. Lambros had resigned on April 22, in the 
face of an Allied blockade induced by the Government's inability to re-
solve the crisis over the "indemnification" issue of the Allied Note of 
December 31. 
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First, there is little question that at the outset of the 
war, the Greek monarch's sentiments were with the German powers; 
but Entente suspicion that King Constantine was secretly 
bound to the Central Powers was never proved. Equally true 
was the fact that Greece, like the other Balkan States, was 
more or less exhausted by the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. In 
addition, Greece's sole commitment, the Greco-Serbian alliance 
treaty, was in turn directed against Bulgaria and not Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria, for its part, did not officially 
enter the conflict until October 14, 1915, after the great 
Austro-German campaign under General von Mackensen had swept 
Serbia and captured Belgrade. England and France declared 
war on Bulgaria on October 15 and 16 respectively, and Russia 
and Italy did likewise on October 19. \t:ith Rumania's 
entrance into the war on the side of the Allies against 
Austria, Germany, and Turkey in August 1916 and Bulgaria's 
declaration on Septe; .ber 1 , all the Balkan nations had entered 
the conflict except Greece. The Greek Government maintained 
that before it could consider entering the war, the Entente 
under the Serbo-Greek Alliance, must make good the ~ qua n2n 
of the military convention, the 150,000 troops which Serbia 
was committed to supply against Bulgaria and which Serbia 
could no longer furnish. The Entente had promised to furnish 
the necessary troops but did not make good its promise and, 
as a consequence, forced the third and final resignation of 
Venizelos. Helations between the Entente and Greece deteriorated 
rapidly and degenerated into diplomacy by ultimatum after 
Venizelos' first resignation on October 5, 1915 which not 
only failed to make Greece abandon its neutrality, but 
strengthened and repeatedly saved Constantine and his neutral-
ist policy. 'I'he failure of the Allies to effect a decisive 
victory against the Garman-Bulgarian forces on the Balkan 
front served to enhance the military wisdom of Constantine's 
position. The Greek General Staff opposed intervention on 
military grounds and insisted, as a sina qua nQU of Greece's 
intervention, that either the Entente neutralize the Bulgarian 
position or bring Rumania into the conflict in order to divert 
some of the Bulgarian forces from the Greek frontier. The 
Constantinists seized upon the occasion of Rumania'sinter-
vention and subsequent quick defeat to point out the reckless-
ness of the Balkan nation that bid defiance to the Central 
Powers. The King's decision revoking the decision of the Crown 
Council on the Gallipoli issue provoked much excitement through-
out Greece but to be unfortunately for the interventionists, 
proved wise, for the Allied fleet met with defeat when it 
attempted to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The sink-
ing of the British battleships Irresistible and Ocean and the 
French battleship Bouvet in the operation proved the military 
wisdom of the King's decision for these might have been Greek 
men-of-war which could not have been readily replaced. Whereas 
the loss of three capital ships by the Entente Powers was 
considered a naval reversal by Britain and France, a similar 
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loss by Greece would have been a naval disaster since Greek 
naval strategy historically has had but one chief aim--to keep 
the Turks from achieving naval superiority in the Aegean. In 
the Aegean, Greece has had to contend traditionally with one 
enemy alone, Turkey; and Greek naval strategy was accordingly 
planned. Greece's naval supremacy against Turkey was evident 
in the First Balkan War to the detriment of the Turkish 
position in Europe. The Young Turks were determined to redress 
the unbalance of naval power in the Aegean as a step towards 
reoccupying the Aegean Islands lost to Greece and insure 
Turkey's remaining European possessions. As early as 1911 
they had contracted with England for the construction of the 
battleship "Reschadier" and later the battleship "Sultan Oman," 
whereupon, in turn, Greece purchased the American battleships 
"Idaho" and"Mississippi" to maintain Greek naval supremacy 
against 'l'urkey in the Aegean. The acquisition by Turkey of 
the German battleships Goeben and Breslau at the beginning of 
the war had threatened Greek naval supremacy in the Aegean 
and only served to increase Greek anxiety over the need to 
retain the fleet intact in case of a resumption of the historic 
Greco-Turkish conflict. Regardless of what the world conflict 
entailed, the Greeks always had to keep in mind the historic 
conflict with Turkey in which, its navy was her greatest asset. 
It was the Greek navy, more than anything else, that made 
Greece a factor to be reckoned with in Balkan diplomacy and 
strategy against Turkey. And while the greater Europen conflict 
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would be terminated one day, the Greeks still had to be 
prepared for small wars and the ever-present threat from 
Turkey. Therefore each Greek naval craft was literally worth 
its weight in gold, and possibly even more, for the limitations 
of Greece's wealth made the replacement of war vessels prohi-
bitive. 
Whether King Constantine was playing a game of cat and 
mouse with the Allies when he repeatedly insisted that Greece 
was willing to join the Entente but only in "an enterprise 
that had a reasonable chance of success," is a matter of con-
jecture. But one thing is certain, for Greece the economic 
consequence of a new war coming upon tte heels of the Greco-
Ottoman War of 1897 and the two Balkan Wars was a matter not 
to be taken lightly especially when compounded by the uncer-
tainty of the post-war period and the "double dealing" diplo-
macy of the Entente which was inimical to the interests of 
Greece. At the risk of anticipating the forthcoming discussion 
of the questionable diplomacy of the Entente and its effect 
on Greece, it should be noted that the Venizelists insisted 
that it was precisely because of these conflicting promises 
that Greece's participation in the war on the side of the 
Entente was necessary so as to give Greece a say in the final 
disposition of the spoils. In effect, was this not a repeat 
of the situation leading to the Balkan alliances and the First 
Balkan War? Unlike the negative policy of King Constantine, 
Venizelos' diplomacy was positive and could be narrowed down 
into a formula which might read as follows: 
(1) Make the necessary sacrifices, even to the 
extent of disclaiming any future rewards, 
in order to mold or participate in an 
alliance which stood a good chance of win-
ning a war against an implacable foe. 
(2) While prosecuting the war, occupy and re-
tain the spoils which are to be divided 
later. 
(3) At tte Peace Conference, present any 
additional claims regardless of the fact 
that these may be in conflict with prior 
"awards" resulting from secret diplomacy 
and manipulate the conference and conferees 
to achieve these aims. 
Perhaps, in a sense, Venizelos had the conflicting 
attributes of being a visionary and a realist. But, on the 
other hand, King Constantine could be considered a realist 
with little vision. Both agreed, however, that Turkey was 
Greece's greatest enemy, and both men agreed on Greece's 
susceptibility to pressures because of her geographic loca-
tion. It has already been noted how King Constantine, in 
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a communique to the German Kaiser, looked upon the Mediterranean 
and its effect on Greece. Venizelos went one step further, 
clearly stating his position on the matter in a speech at 
Saloniki on November 25, 1916 in which his Provisional Govern-
ment declared war on the Central Powers. 
91 
"We wish to emphasize in a tangible and 
complete manner our absolute conviction that 
Greece can never progress, nor even exist, as 
a free and independent state except by con-
tinued maintenance of the closest contact 
with those Powers that rule the Mediterranean."91 
Cited in Gibbons, p. 202. 
On at least two occasions Greece voluntarily made advances 
to join in the war on the side of the Entente only to be re-
buffed by the Entente under the influence of Russia, and later 
by the failure of the Entente to make good the condition of its 
Saloniki landings. So much has been said about Greek indeci-
sion .to enter the war, that sight is lost of the times that 
Greece offered to join the Entente in the war against the 
Central Powers. At the same time the deeper components of 
Greece's political, diplomatic, and strategic thinking have 
been more or less glossed over, whereas the actions of the 
Allies who rode roughshod over Greek neutrality have been 
generally accepted at face value and, if nothing else, justi-
fied by necessity. When the intervention-neutrality question 
is reduced to its basic factors, it revolves about two seem-
ingly simple positions: first, the Constantinists' stand 
that they wanted to keep Greece neutral for . patriotic motives 
but were deceived by a palace clique that believed and possibly 
hoped that Germany was going to win the war; second, the 
Venizelists who preferred intervention to neutrality and 
believed that the Entente was going to win the war, and who 
encouraged, if not induced, Anglo-French intrigues in Athens 
to coerce Greece into the conflict. But there were extra-
ordinary circumstances which embarrassed both positions, 
and the Entente which screamed the loudest against Greece did 
not come to Greece with clean hands. From the outset of the 
war the Entente had hoped to win all the Balkan States to its 
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side, but when Turkey sided with Germany the Entente Powers 
particularly were in need of Bulgaria's friendship. Territori-
ally, the Bulgars were in a position to isolate Turkey from 
its confederates in Europe, and strategy dictated that once 
Turkey had committed itself it was far more important for the 
Entente (and for the Alliance for that matter) to win over 
Bulgaria than to have Greece as an ally. Consequently, Greece 
held a second priority in the Entente's Balkan calculations 
until the Entente lost Turkey and Bulgaria to the Central 
Powers. And even then Greece had to take a back seat to Italy 
whose greater power made her more important to any alliance 
and gave her first choice in the conflicting Balkan and Near-
Eastern Greco-Italian claims. Besides, the quandary in which 
Greece found herself becomes further apparent when it is 
remembered that Greece was almost wholly at the mercy of 
those Powers that rule the Mediterranean, but at the same 
time Greece's northern boundary was at the mercy of the land 
might of the Central Powers. 
Another tragedy of the Greek question in world War I 
was the fact that when Greece was ready for intervention, the 
Entente had more pressing problems to face and when the Entente 
did seek Greece's intervention in the conflict, the opportunity 
had passed and it met with reversal upon reveral making inter-
vention impractical for Greece. It must be admitted to 
Venizelos' credit that he alone fervently believed in the 
ultimate victory of the Entente and throughout the conflict 
unswervingly insisted upon Greece's intervention on the side 
of the Allies. But it would have been equally to his dis-
credit and the disaster of Greece if the Central Powers had 
emerged victorious. 
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In 1915 and 1916 the action of the Entente was instru-
mental in causing the rise and fall of no less than five Greek 
Prime Ministers--Messrs. Venizelos, Gounaris, Zaimis, Skouloudis, 
and Lambros with Venizelos and Zaimis serving on two different 
occasions. In 1915 and 1916 the Allies wrested concession 
after concession from Venizelos, Zaimis, and Lambros but were 
unable to exact the all important one of bringing Greece into 
the war against the Central Powers. There is little doubt 
that the humiliating surrenders forced upon the Greeks by the 
Entente, especially early in the conflict, repeatedly saved 
King Constantine from the consequences of his neutralist policy 
by drawing forth the resentment of the Greeks. The blockades, 
the seizure, detention, and inspection of Greek merchant ships, 
the forced demobilization of the Greek army, the coercive 
surrender of the Greek navy, the invasion and occupation of 
Greek territory which came so soon after the Anglo-French-
Russian policy opposing enosis for Crete, not to mention con-
flicting Entente territorial premises worked adversely upon 
the Entente, aided Constantine, and made Venizelos' task to 
align Greece with the Bntente much more difficult than it 
should have been. It may be said in extenuation that Allied 
actions, however, were conceived in fits of desperation 
against a policy which, while professing to be neutral, had 
at least the outward appearance of being pro-German. At the 
same time, the Allies vented their fury upon Greece in 1915-
1916 to excuse the inability of their own resources to rescue 
the situation on the Balkan Front and attempted to save their 
failing position by forcefully calling upon resources of 
Greece. 
Cursed by her geographic position, Greece found herself 
caught in a vise between the Alliance and the ~ntente in 
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World War I, and regardless of the policy the Greeks might 
adopt in the conflict, even when made with good intentions, 
they were subjected to criticism and castigation by one side 
or the other. Greece suffered humiliating treatment from both 
the Central Powers and the Allies. Both sides violated either 
Greece's territorial integrity or her political independence. 
Greece, squeezed from the north by the Triple Alliance and 
squeezed in the south by the Triple Entente reverted to her 
classical status and became a no man's land for machtpolitik 
which helped to destroy the unity of the Greek nation recently 
achieved during the Balkan Wars. 
The Entente squeezed Greece especially hard since by their 
command of the Mediterranean they were in an excellent posi-
tion to apply military or economic pressure against the Greek 
mainland, the Greek mercantile fleet, and Greek commercial 
enterprises, and the repeated reversal suffered by the Allies 
on the Balkan front made tte Entente more prone to blame the 
Greek position for their failures and to force Greece into 
the war. More important, but often overlooked, is the fact 
that the defeats suffered by the Entente Balkan forces did 
not go without effect upon Greece's ability to face up to 
threats from the Central Powers. In fact, each set-back 
suffered by the Allies incited a new surrender to the Central 
Powers by Greece which, in turn, deepened the crisis between 
the neutralist and interventionists. This is not to say that 
the Greeks were not at least partially guilty for dividing 
their country on the neutrality issue in World War I, for to 
absolve them of all guilt would display a striking ignorance 
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of Greek nature since total unity by Greeks on nearly any 
question is a near impossibility and a Greek would be the first 
to admit it. If by chance he did not, it would belie Greek 
history and disavow a cherished feature of Greece's heritage--
the right to disagree which is an inseparable part of the 
political make-up of every Greek. But too often the Greeks 
have been criticized for their "inability to unite" or their 
"proneness to split into factions" as if they were solely to 
blame for these "shortcomings" and as if Greece was isolated 
from the historic Great Power struggle. Such unreserved 
criticism of the Greeks shows a misunderstanding of the Great 
Power conflict in the Balkans and the Near East. It displays 
ignorance of an important aspect of the Eastern Question, for 
it places the Greeks outside that historic crisis whereas 
Greece has always been an integral part of that dispute, and, 
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next to Turkey, has served as the principal Western bulwark 
against the expansion of Slavdom and hussia to the Mediterranean. 
Finally, it shows a total lack of understanding of Greece's 
strategic position since it seemed to infer that Greece exists 
in a geopolitical .vacuum which permits her to carry out her 
internal and external policies without interference from the 
outside. 
·A factor which prompted a policy of neutrality rather than 
intervention was the complex diplomatic and military situation 
in the Balkans and Near East, and made doubly difficult by 
conflicting offers of territorial acquisitions from the outset 
of the war. 
At the outbreak of World War I, Greece had to be watchful 
of the policies of Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, and Italy which 
had ambitions which ran counter to Greek aspirations. Only 
Rumania, which remained uncommitted until August 1916, seemed 
to have no claims which conflicted with Greek aspirations and 
therefore was in a position to aid Greece and facilitate its 
entry into the war. 
From the outset of the war Rumania, wedged among Russia, 
Austria, Serbia, and Bulgaria, was wooed by the Entente and by 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Both sides entertained high hopes 
of securing immediate Rumanian aid for their position. The 
Entente offered Rumania Transylvania, Hungarian territory in 
which Rumanians were in a majority, and, in order to counter 
the Entente bid, the Central Powers proffered Bessarabia, 
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Russian territory in which Rumanians were numerous. The 
Rumanians were not to be persuaded by these offers for they 
also aspired to the Bukovina and the Banat of Temesvar, Hunga-
rian territory north of Belgrade, which the Allies were un-
willing to pledge to Rumania since the Banat was desired by 
Serbia; whereas Bukovina was coveted by Russia. 
The Central Powers were no more successful in their effort 
to gain the support of Rumania. The Banat and Bukovina were 
integral parts of the Hung.ar..ian nation which held no love for 
Rumania, an historic enemy. Despite suggestions from Berlin 
and Vienna, Hungary resolutely refused to cede any territory 
to Rumania, and in the face of this determined Hungarian 
obstinacy, Rumania tended to lean more and more toward the 
Entente as the war progressed. 
In December 1914, the Rumanian Prime Minister, Ionel 
Bratianu, refused to entertain an Entente suggestion that 
Rumania make concessions to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja in order 
to secure Bulgarian support for the Entente. At the same 
time Bratianu also rejected an Entente request that Rumania 
guarantee Greece against attack by Bulgaria, even though in 
1915 the Entente had come around to add Bukovina and the Banat 
to the Transylvania package as added inducements for Rumanian 
intervention. At the same time the Rumanian Prime Minister 
declined a bid from Venizelos to join Greece in support of 
Serbia. ~ben Venizelos quarried Rumania further on her 
position, he was told that the Rt~anian Government believed 
that military cooperation by Rumania with Greece and Serbia 
could not be envisaged unless Bulgaria was also included in 
the arrangement. When both Greece and Serbia offered to make 
territorial sacrifices in Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to 
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induce the Bulgarians to join a new "Pan-Balkan Alliance" to 
save the Serbian position and the Balkans from the consequences 
of a victory by the Central Powers and Turkey, Rumania refused 
to grant Bulgaria any concessions in the Dobrudja which, if 
added to the Serbian and Greek territorial sacrifices, might 
have induced Bulgaria to maintain at least a benevolent neu-
trality towards Serbia and possibly even entice Bulgaria into 
a "Pan Balkan Alliance." 
Rumanian entrance into the war on the side of the Entente 
did not come until August 27, 1916, nearly a year after 
Bulgaria had declared war on Serbia, and Bulgaria's declaration 
of war on Rumania on September 1 indirectly accomplished for 
Greece that which the Entente had been unable to achieve 
directly with Rumania.92 · With Bulgaria now threatened by a 
second front along its Rumanian border, the full might of the 
Bulgarian army could no longer threaten Greece; but by this 
time, as already seen, the Balkan military situation had 
drastically changed to the detriment of the Entente position 
and Venizelos, Greece's champion for intervention, was no 
92 The Rumanian intervention was facilitated by the successful 
Brusilov summer offensive of June - August 1916, and the Russo-Rumania 
Agreement of August 18 which recognized Rumania's claims to Bukovina, 
Transylvania, and the Banat. 
longer at the helm of the Greek Government. 
Turkey's entry into the war in November 1914 had made 
Bulgaria's position in the war of utmost importance to all 
belligerents. Bulgaria provided the land connection between 
the German Powers and their Turkish ally. Consequently, 
neither the Triple Alliance nor the Triple Entente could re-
frain from courting Bulgaria. This factor plus Bulgaria's 
feeling for revanche for her "defeats" in the First and 
Second Balkan Wars caused grave ccncern to Serbia, Rumania, 
and Greece. 
Throughout 1914-1915, Bulgaria listened attentively to 
offers from both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. 
Unlike the rather favorable position which they enjoyed in 
dealing with Bucharest, the Entente were considerably hampered 
at Sofia by the fact that the territories Bulgaria desired be-
longed to either an Entente ally such as Serbia or prespective 
allies such as Rumania and Greece. Nevertheless, the Entente 
was willing to risk the feelings and friendship of these three 
Balkan nations in order to win Bulgaria's which fact indicated 
the strategic importance attached to the Bulgarian position. 
On November 13, 1914, just twelve days after Turkey 
entered the war, Entente emissaries at Sofia offered the 
Bulgarians, in addition to financial aid, the following lands: 
(1) Turkey's Enos-Midia territory of Eastern Thrace, (2) the 
1912 uncontested zone of Macedonia lost by Bulgaria to Serbia 
during the Second Balkan War, (3) the Kavalla, Drama, and 
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Serres region of Eastern Macedonia in the possession of Greece, 
and (4) the Southern Dobrudja ceded to Rumania by Bulgaria in 
the Treaty of Bucharest. While Eastern Thr·ace was to be taken 
from Turkey and given to Bulgaria as war booty after the war, 
the Serbian, Greek, and Rumanian territories were to be 
immediate cessions and were even offered initially against the 
official knowledge of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania respectively. 
At the time it seemed to make little difference to the Entente 
that the Serbian Macedonian recompense offered Bulgaria had 
to be at the expense of Serbia whose territorial integrity 
allegedly was a cause of the war. When the extensive con-
cessions preferred Bulgaria became known, the Entente moved 
to sooth Serbian, Greek, and Rumanian ill feelings by proposing 
the following compensations: It offered Serbia, in exchange 
for the proposed loss of Macedonia, the right to acquire 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and "a wide access to the adriatic" 
at the expense of Austria upon the successful conclusion 
of ~ ~; in return for her Macedonian cession, Greece 
was promised Smyrna and environs in yet to be conquered Asia 
Minor; and Rumania, for its cession of the Southern Dobrudja, 
was to receive Transylvania from still to be vanquished 
Hungary. Of the three Prime Ministers, Venizelos of Greece, 
Pashich of Serbia, and Bratianu of Rumania,in return for 
a promise of future compensation, Venizelos alone, as 
already noted, did not hesitate--painful as the act would 
. t 
be--to advise the sacrifice of Kavalla to save Hellenism in 
Turkey and to assure the creation of a really great Greece. 
Venizelos, always mindful of the necessity of a strong anti-
Turkish Balkan bloc was receptive to the "Kavalla for Smyrna 
deal," even though it would be "a very painful sacrifice and 
my wbole being suffers profoundly in advising against it," but 
as he also advised Constantine, "Bulgaria was the key to the 
impending situation in the Balkans." 
While the Entente attempted to entice Bulgaria to its 
side, the Central Powers also made the Bulgarians extensive 
offers. The German powers were in an extremely favorable 
position to do so, for they did not need to concern themselves 
with the fact that Bulgarian aspirations were directed mainly 
against Serbia and to lesser degrees, against Rumania and 
Greece; in addition, Austria for one wanted nothing more than 
to find a partner in the Balkans with complementary anti-
Serbian aspirations in order to devour Serbia in toto and once 
and for all rid the Habsburg Empire of the Serbian scourge. 
The Central Powers, therefore, found it relatively easy to 
outbid the Entente in the auction held at Sofia, and, in the 
end in exchange for Bulgaria's participation in the war on the 
side of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria promised 
Bulgaria, in addition to a sizeable loan, Eastern Macedonia, 
the Dobrudja, almost tbe whole of Macedonia annexed by Serbia 
in 1913 after the First and Second Balkan Wars, and, as if to 
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firm up the pending deal, Germany prevailed upon Turkey on 
July 22, 1915 to cede immediately a sizeable portion of Eastern 
Thrace to Bulgaria. These extensive concessions to Bulgaria 
made by the Central Powers proved too enticing to resist, for 
they were reminiscent of "San Stephano.11 
The formal acceptance of the offer came on September 6, 
1915 when Bulgaria signed an alliance and military convention 
with the Central Powers which laid the groundwork for an 
attack on Serbia within thirty days and Bulgaria's intervention 
"' 
five days later. The great Austro-German campaign against 
Serbia and Bulgarian intervention began on schedule and caused 
the total collapse of the Serbian position, sending the Serbian 
army reeling eastward in search of refuge on the Greek island 
of Corfu. 
The participation of Bulgaria in the war on the side of 
the Central Powers resulted not only from the fact that the 
Bulgarians, like the Italians before them and the Rumanians 
after them, had sold themselves to the highest bidder, but 
because the Bulgar monarch King Ferdinand like the Greek King 
Constantine had kept a finger on the ~ulse of events in the 
Balkans which indicated that the Central Powers would be 
victorious in the war. Had not the German and Austro-Hungarian 
armies in the spring and summer of 1915 inflicted disastrous 
defeats upon Russia which caused the Tsarist army to suffer 
two million casualties and abandon Galicia? Had not the 
armies of the Central Powers forced Russia to evacuate the 
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whole of "Russian Poland" and a part of Lithuania? Had not the 
British and French failed in their attempt at the Dardanelles 
to rescue their Russian ally from an impending collapse on 
the Eastern front? The Russian defeat along the entire Eastern 
front and the Allied setback at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli 
affected not only the Russian position, but because of their 
peripheral proximity to the Balkans, they influenced appreciably 
the entire diplomatic and military situation on Southeastern 
Europe and the Near East, and the Bulgars, like the Greeks, 
were especially sensitive to events which occurred in their 
own "backyard." 
Turkey's participation in the war on the side of the 
German powers precluded Greece's active participation in the 
conflict on the side of the Central Powers, for they were 
traditional enemies. This did not mean, however, that Greece 
could achieve her aspirations by mere membership in the Entente. 
In addition to making the conflicting territorial promises to 
the Bulgars, the Entente Powers had engaged in a rivalry over 
the partition the Ottoman Empire indicated by the four celebrated 
"secret" Entente agreements--the Constantinople Agreement, the 
London Agreement, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and tree Tripartite 
(Saint-Jean de Maurienne) Agreement for tte Partition of the 
Ottoman Empire--which were far from conduciveto Greek 
aspirations.93 
93 Complete texts of the four wartime agreements are found in E. L. 
Woodward and R. Butler, eds. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. 
The Constantinople Agreement, March 4 - April 10, 1915, 
between Russia and Britain and France was the first of the 
four wartime agreements among the Entente Powers to partition 
the Ottoman Empire. While putting forward their own counter-
claims, wtich, in the case of Britain, embraced Persia and 
the Arabian Peninsula, and, in the case of France, a desire 
"to annex Syria together with the Gulf of Alexandretta up to 
the Taurus (mountain) range," the British and French Govern-
ments acceded to the time-honored aspirations.of Russia that 
"Every solution will be inadequate and pre-
carious if the city of. Constantinople, the 
western bank of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of 
Marmara and of the Dardanelles, as well as 
southern Thrace to the Enez-Midge line, should 
henceforth not be incorporated into the Russian 
Empire. Sliailarly, and by strategic necessity ••• 
the islands of the Sea of Marmara, the Imbros 
Islands and the Tenedos Islands must be in-
corporated into the Russian Ernpire. 1194 
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Though the details of the Constantinople agreement generally 
remained secret, the Greeks were suspicious of Russian designs, 
for the Russian Government had registered repeated opposition 
to offers by Venizelos of Greek support for contemplated 
(London, 1952) 1st ser., vol. 4; and J. Polonsky, trans., Documents 
di lomati ues secrets russes 1914-1 17 d'a res les archives du m1nistere 
des affairs estrangeres a Petrograd, Paris, 1928 • A handy reference 
work entitled Di lomac in the Near and Middle East A Documentar Record, 
1535-1956, 2 vols., Princeton, 195 by J. C. Hurewitz was published in 
1956 and contains in English translation the documents and extracts of 
agreements, concessions, and decisions affecting Near Eastern diplomacy. 
9~urewitz, Diplomacy, II, p. 7. 
Allied action against the Dardanelles and 1Urkey. Russia's 
historic designs on Byzantium were no secret. 
Closely upon the heels of the Constantinople agreements 
came the Secret (London) Agreement of April 26, 1915 between 
Italy and the Entente Powers. At the start of the war Italy 
had been a member of the Triple Alliance but had refused to 
honor its treaty obligations on the plea that Austrian action 
against Serbia was offensive and not defensive and thus did 
not bring into operation the casus foederis of the Triple 
Alliance. At the same time, however, the Italians took the 
rather incongruous position that under Article VII of the 
same alliance treaty they were entitled to compensation to 
counterbalance Austrian gains in the Balkans. Hence, neutra-
list Italy, like neutralist Bulgaria, had placed herself in a 
position of being courted by both the Alliance and the Entente. 
Austrian opposition to Italian claims in 1914 voiced by Count 
Berchtold, and the limited concessions proposed by his 
successor Count Burian in 1915 caused the Italians to veer 
towards the Entente which was in an extremely favorable posi-
tion to curry Italian favor, for it needed to feel little 
embarassment in satisfying Italy's demands which, in the main, 
to be 
were/ gained directly at the expense of Austria and Turkey. 
In an effort to bring Italy into the war on their side, 
the Entente had expressed a willingness to recognize Italy's 
extensive claims against Austria and the Ottoman Empire, and 
whereas Germany and Austria had reluctantly agreed to cede 
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Italy only the South Tyrol, the Allies offered far more to 
secure Italy's support. In Europe, the Entente offered the 
South Tyrol and Trentino along Italy's northern frontier, the 
city of Trieste, a large part of the Istrian peninsula and 
Dalmatia, the Dalmatian Islands, and extensive concessions in 
Albania. In the Near East the Allies agreed that, "Italy shall 
receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which 
she is at present occupying, and 
" ••• in the event of the total partition of 
Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share 
of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the 
province of Adalia, where Italy has already 
acquired rights and interests which formed the 
subject of an Italo-British convention. The 
zone which shall be delimited, at the proper 
time, due account be taken of the existing 
interests of France and Great Britain. 
"The interests of Italy shall also be taken 
into consideration in the event of the territorial 
integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained 
and of alterations being made in the zones of 
interests of the Powers. 
"If France, Great Britain, and Hussia, occupy 
any territories in Turkey in Asia during the 
course of the war, the Mediterranean region border-
ing on the Province of Adalia within the limits 
indicated above shall be reserved5to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it."9 
Finally, in the event that ~ngland and France enlarge 
their empires by the addition of the German colonies in Africa, 
Italy, by Article 13 of the Secret (London) Agreement, might 
"claim some equitable compensation, particularly 
as regards the settlement in her favor of the 
95Articles 8, 9 of the Secret (London) Agreements: The Entente 
Powers and Italy, 26, April 1915. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, pp. 11-12. 
questions relative to the frontiers of the 
Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, 
and Libya and the neighboring colonies be-
longing to France and Great Britain." 
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There is little question that the Entente was willing to 
pay a high price for Italian intervention, but most important 
for this study, England and France once again agreed to veto 
Greek promises and claims. The concessions in Albania ran 
counter to Greece's aspirations in "Northern Epirus," the 
Adalia award encroached dangerously upon Greece's desires for 
the Smyrna vilayet and placed Italy in a position to challenge 
Greek ambitions in Asia Minor; lastly, and possibly most 
important from the immediate standpoint, England and France had 
agreed to allow Italy to retain the Dodecanese Islands considered 
by many Greeks and the islanders themselves as the most "Greek" 
of all the islands in the Eastern Aegean. Even the Italians 
themselves came around to recognize the Greek "character" 
of the Dodecanese by the end of the war in the Venizelos-
Tittoni Agreement, July 29, 1919, under which Italy promised 
to cede the islands to Greece. But like all the other un-
redeemed territories of Greece, the road towards enosis for 
the Dodecanese proved tortuous and was not accomplished by 
diplomacy and promises. The islanders, liberated from the 
Ottoman yoke, were forced to endure forty-five more years of 
"foreign" rule which proved more grievous than that of Turkey 
under whose rule they had enjoyed virtual freedom of action 
and self-government in return for a small tribute. Enosis for 
the Dodecanese was only accomplished after the islands were 
made into a new Crete, became a needle in the side of Italy, 
and a sore which prevented amicable relations between Greece 
and Italy from 1912-1947.96 
The Tripartite Agreement of April 26, 1916 - October 25, 
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1916 between Britain, France, and Russia, more commonly known 
as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was the third contract concluded 
by the Entente Powers for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. 
While the Sykes-Picot Agreement did not directly concern 
Greek aspirations, its judgments set in motion new Russian and 
especially Italian claims which did effect Greek aspirations, 
and the agreement had been in the making since the Constantinople 
accord of March 1915 wherein France and lngland, while agreeing 
to Russia's Ottoman aspirations, had put forth their own 
counterclaims in the Ottoman Empire. 
The details for working out Anglo-French aspirations had 
been entrusted to Sir Mark Sykes and Charles Francois Georges-
Picot who, by February 1916, worked out a provisional Anglo-
French formula for the division of the Arab Ottoman provinces 
which Russia approved in return for anew Anglo-French endorse-
ment of Tsarist territorial claims in northeastern Anatolia, 
including Armenia and a part of Kurdistan, and a strip of 
territory of northern Anatolia extending westward from Trebizond 
along the southern Black Sea archipelago which included a 
96 See APPENDIX III The Dodecanese Islands, for more on the 
Dodecanese question. 
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sizeable Greek population.97 
When the Sykes-Picot agreement became known at Rome, the 
Quirinal pressed Britain and France for a clarification of 
Italian awards in the Ottoman territories stipulated in the 
secret treaty of London which now overlapped grants in the 
southwest Anatolia district of Mersina and Adana recently 
assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot agreement. The conflict 
was resolved in the 'I'riparti te (Saint-Jean de iviaurienne) 
Agreement, April 19 - September 26, 1917, the fourth and last 
of the inter-Allied wartime agreements concerning the partition 
of Ottoman territory. 
The Saint-Jean de Maurienne agreement as approved in 
London on August 18, 1917 by Britain, France, and Italy, 
subject to Russia's assent, provided:98 
1. "The Italian Government adheres to the 
stipulations contained in artilces 1 and 2 of 
the Franco-British LSykes-Pico11 agreements of 
May 9 and 16, 1916. For their part, the 
governments of France and of Great Britain cede 
to Italy, under the same conditions of adminis-
tration and of interests, the green and "C" 
zones as marked on the attached map (which 
included the Turkish territory of southwestern 
Anatolia composed of the vilayet and city of 
S~yrna, the sanjaks of Menteshe, Adalia, and 
Itchili, and the greater part of the vilayet 
of Konia). 
2. "Italy undertakes to make Smyrna a free port 
for the commerce of France, its colonies and its 
97see APPENDIX IV Trebizond and Other Historic Greek Settlements 
In Asia Minor. 
98Text in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, pp. 24-25. 
protectorates, and for the commerce of the 
British Empire and its dependencies. Italy 
shall enjoy the rights and privileges that 
France and Great Britain have reciprocally 
granted themselves in the ports of 
Alexandretta, of Haifa, and of St. Jean d' 
Acre, in accordance with article 5 of the 
said agreements. Mersina shall be a free 
port for the commerce of Italy, its 
colonies and its protectorates, and there 
shall be neither difference of treatment 
nor advantages in port rights which may be 
refused to the navy or the merchandise of 
Italy. There shall be free transit through 
Mersina, and by railroad across the vilayet 
of Adana, for Italian merchandise bound to 
and from the Italian zone. There shall be 
no difference of treatment, direct or in-
direct at the expense of Italian merchandise 
or ships in any port along the coast of 
Cilicia serving the Italian zone. 
3· "It is understood that if, at the conclu-
sion of peace, the advantages embodied in the 
agreements contracted among the allied Powers 
regarding the allocation to each of a part of 
the Ottoman Empire cannot be entirely assured 
to one or more of the said Powers, then in what-
ever alteration or arrangement of provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire resulting from the war the 
maintenance of equilibrium in the Mediterranean 
shall be given equitable_consideration, in con-
formity with article 9 Lwhich provided that 
Italy, 'in the event of the total or partial 
partition of TUrkey in Asia, she ought to obtain 
a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent 
to the province of Adalia, •••• 
'The interests of Italy shall also be taken 
into consideration in the event of the territorial 
integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained 
and of alterations being made in the zones of 
interests of the powers. 
'If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy 
any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course 
of war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the 
Province of Adalia within the limits indicated 
above shall be reserved to Ital who shall be 
entitle to occup~ it... on on agreement 
of 26 April 1915. 
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Russian approval of the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement 
was never received because of the revolutionary change of 
government in Russia. The Bolsheviks, after seizing control 
of the Russian government on November 7, 1917, unilaterally 
repudiated all Tsarist wartime agreements. The publication 
by the Bolshevik regime of the Entente wartime agreements 
laid bare for the world to see that which had long been 
strongly suspected, if not known, about the "secret" Allied 
agreements to partition the Ottoman Empire. 
By the secret inter-Allied wartime agreements to partition 
the Ottoman Empire Greece found herself in a position not un-
like the one in which she found herself after the Bulgaro-
Serbian treaty of 1912 at which time Bulgaria and Serbia had 
already partitioned Turkey in Europe between themselves, and 
yet it was strategically imperative that Bulgaria and Serbia, 
like the Powers in v:orld War I, bring Greece into any con-
flagration in the Balkans and the Near East. In dealing with 
Bulgaria and Serbia as allies in the First Balkan War, however, 
Greece could chance a grab at territory without a prior treaty 
commitment; but in an association with great powers, Greece 
would be a very junior partner, and reality dictated that this 
strategy could not be applied well here. Besides, as already 
noted, Greece's position in the matter was very difficult. 
Before the spread of the war to the Aegean and Mediterranean 
littoral, Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey held a higher priority 
than Greece in the general strategy of the Dual Alliance and 
the Triple Entente; and after the spread of the war to the 
Eastern Mediterranean, Greece could expect little from the 
Triple Alliance for Bulgaria and Turkey were more important 
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to the cause of the Central Powers. Greece could gain much 
from the Triple Entente, but the duplicity of the Entente 
agreements and conflicting promises strongly negated any hopes 
of achieving from that quarter Greek aspirations in the Balkans 
or Asia Minor. The Entente, under the guise that they labored 
only for the "independence, the greatness, and the prosperity 
of Greece and her deliverance from her hereditary enemies," 
and that "they would reestablish Constitutional Government 
and the t•_ni ty of the Greek nation, 11 sought to bring Greece 
into war on its side mainly by periodic displays of naked 
force and intimidation using the historic mantilla of being 
Greece's "Protectors" in order to justify their actions against 
Greece and force Greece to comply with their interventionist 
policy. And yet, while Entente mettods to involve Greece in 
the conflict by repeated blockades and stow of strength were 
morally reprehensible, it was not difficult to understand the 
Entente dilemma. Once the war started, it had to be won at 
all costs and Greece, militarily and strategically, was in a 
position to make a substantial contribution to the Entente 
war effort regardless of Greece's interests. Historically, 
where questions of power politics are at stake between Great 
Powers, little attention is paid to the opinions, needs and 
aspirations of small states, and nowhere is this more evident 
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than in the affairs of Greece during World War I. The history 
of Greece in the three years between the outbreak of the war 
and her entrance into the conflict in June 1917 provides an 
excellent example of a small nation caught in a vise between 
two opposing Power blocs which claim to have the best interests 
of the small power at heart. 
The military situation was another factor which conditioned 
Greek indecision. At best, the conflicting Entente territorial 
promises notwithstanding, the political and geographic situation 
dictated that if Greece should enter the conflict it must be 
on the side of the Allies; but militarily the Entente position 
was weak throughout much of the war. At sea, German submarines 
preyed almost at will upon Allied shipping over much of the 
sea lanes of the world; on the western front, the Germans had 
swept across Belgium and remained in occupation of French 
territory, even to the extent of threatening Paris for most of 
the war, and for the most part, the conflict on the western 
front had become stabilized as a "war of position" inside 
France. The Entente position was no better on the southern, 
eastern, Balkan, and Ottoman fronts. 
Before Greece entered the war, the Italians on the southern 
front were busy fighting ten successive indecisive battles on 
the Isonzo in the direction of Trieste against Austrian and 
then Austro-German forces; the eleventh battle fought after 
Greece entered the war was no more successful and in the 
"twelfth battle of Izonzo" or Caporetto, October 24 - December 26, 
1917, the Italians broke and their army collapsed.99 The 
Italian front was finally stabilized by Anglo-French forces 
sent to buttress the remnants of the Italian army but after-
wards it never amounted to anymore than a defensive position 
to prevent Italy from being knocked out of the war. It rnust 
be admitted that the Italian failure to effect a decision on 
the southern front was not only due to the inadequacy of 
Italian soldiery, as has often been derisively asserted, but 
equally to blame was the inability of England and France to 
support Italy adequately witt supplies and reinforcements 
since top priority was given to the western frcnt, a factor 
which wasn't lost sight of in Greece. If the Allies could 
not reinforce the Italians on the southern front, it was even 
less likely that they would be in a position to reinforce the 
Greeks on a Greek or Balkan front. 
On the easteTnfront the war had initially been a see-saw 
conflict between Austrian and Russian forces, but soon it 
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swung in favor of the Central Powers following the great German 
victories over the Russians in the Battles of Tannenburg and 
the Masurian Lakes. During the winter of 1914 the war on the 
eastern front developed into a series of indecisive engagements 
around Warsaw and Cracow in the direction of Przemysl in the 
Galician sector of the front until the great Austro-German 
offensives of May 2 and July 1, 1915 which caused the Russians 
99The successive battles of the Izonzo were: 1915-- (1) June 29-
July 7 (2) July 18-August 10, (3) October 18-November 13, (4) November 10-
Dec~mb~r 10; 1916-- (5) February 15-March 17, (6) August 6-17, (7) 
September 14-18, (8) October 9-12, (9) October 31-November 4; 1917-- (10) 
May 12-June 8, (11) August 17-September 12. 
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to suffer one million casualities and lose all of Poland, 
Lithuania and Courland. On September 5 the Grand Duke Nicholas 
Nicolaievich was relieved of the supreme command on the eastern 
front and the supreme command was taken over by none other than 
the Tsar himself indicating the seriousness of the situation. 
In 1916 the Russian offensive under General Brusilov, against 
the Austrians proved only a temporary success and at most a 
Pyrrhic victory. Falling short of the goals of Kovel in 
Volhynia and Lemberg in Galicia, the Brusilov offensive incurred 
enormous casualties wtich left the Russian army demoralized 
and increased the anti-war agitation on the Russian home front. 
Thereafter the Russian position went steadily downhill and in 
1917 the military situation was dominated by the developments 
of the Russian Revolution which destroyed the effectiveness 
of the eastern front. 
The Balkan front witnessed a situation very similar to 
the see-saw conflict waged on the eastern front. A decision 
very unfavorable to the Entente was reached on October 1915 
with the great Austro-German campaign against Serbia and 
Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers. 
Attempts by Entente forces to break out of their Saloniki-
Macedonian bridgehead during 1916 and 1917 resulted in incon-
clusive and limited successes. It was not until one year after 
Greece's official entrance that the Entente was able to build 
up its forces and liberate Serbia and knock Bulgaria out of 
the war. 
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On the Ottoman front initial Russian successes against the 
Turks were soon reversed, and on January 2, 1915 the Russians 
appealed to Britain for a diversion to relieve the pressure of 
the Turks on the Caucasian front. On February 19, 1915 the 
British began the naval action against the Dardanelles prepara-
tory to the landings on Gallipoli, but the Dardanelles campaign 
(April 25, 1915-January 9, 1916) ended in a dismal failure. 
The Straits remained closed to Russia, and Russia through most 
of the war remained pretty much out off from supplies which 
her allies might have furnished her. The route to Archangel 
and Vladivostok not only proved long and tortuous to reach but 
both ports were far removed from the centers of troop concen-
tration and operations. Besides, these two chief ports of 
entry could not handle the volume of freight which arrived 
and often arms and ammunitions wasted away on the wharves for 
the lack of transport into the interior. At the same time 
the completion of the railroad to Hurmansk, Russia's other 
open port, was not ready for use until early in 1917 but by 
that time the sun had come to set for the Entente cause in 
Russia. Elsewhere on the Ottoman fronts initial British 
advances in the Mesopotamian campaign were halted early in the 
war to meet repeated Turkish threats to the Suez Canal, and 
the first major .Oritish victory against ;.Lurkey did not take 
place until March 11, 1917 as British forces, following up 
their victory against the Turks at the Battle of Kut (January 9-
February 24, 1917), occupied Baghdad. After the capture of 
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Baghdad the British advanced eighty miles northwards reaching 
the Mosul-Samara region by April 23, while hussian forces in 
western Persia aiming at linking up with British forces in 
Mesopotamia scored a series of victories in March and April in 
the direction of Baghdad. The Russian advance, however, was 
soon ground to a halt by the deteriorating political situation 
on the Russian home front, and by July the nussians began to 
disengage their units on the Turkish front. The Russian retreat 
from western Persia left the British alone to face the Turks 
on the long Asiatic-Turkish front. 
While the situation began to look up for the British in 
Mesopotamia during the first quarter of 1917, British forces 
moving from Egypt in the direction of Sinai and Palestine, 
suffered a heavy set-back in the Second Battle of Gaza (April 
17-19) at the hands of Turkish forces strongly reinforced by 
the German Asienkorps under General von Falkenhayn, the former 
chief of staff of the German field armies and the conqueror 
of Rumania. Once more it appeared that whereas the Entente 
could not appreciably reinforce its forces on fronts other 
than the western, it seemed that with Germany it was never a 
question of unfulfilled promises when it came to reinforcing 
an ally with men, arms, and munitions. Throughout the war 
Germany could and did reinforce her Austrian ally on the Italian, 
Balkan and eastern fronts and reinforced her Turkish ally on 
the Near Eastern front. It must be kept in mind that the Balkan 
and Near Eastern fronts, and even the Eastern front, were the 
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fronts closest to Greece, and on none of these was the Entente 
able to appreciably reinforce its forces let alone inflict a 
decisive or disastrous defeat upon the Central Powers. If any-
thing, Entente victories on the Eastern, Balkan, and Near 
Eastern fronts, were at best spasmodic; and the most that could 
be hoped for was that the allies might be able to hold their 
own in the south and in the east until a decision could be 
reached on the western front where the major allied effort was 
being carried out. Even then, however, it must be remembered 
that by 1917 the Italian front had become precarious and the 
Tsarist Government plagued by repeated military defeats and 
large casualties, widespread strikes, and mutinies, rumors of 
treason and malfeasance in high places, and a grave economic 
problem which caused food, fuel, and war material shortages 
found it arduous to say the least to supply its large armies 
early in the war and then later even to keep its decimated 
units in the field against the continually reinforced Austro-
Hungarian and German armies. A collapse on the Russian 
military and home fronts, short of a military miracle, seemed 
inevitable if the war continued for any length of time for 
Russia, like Italy, was succumbing to the war of attrition 
fought on the Eastern front. The loss of Russia would be a 
catastrophe of first importance for the £ntente cause as it 
would release hundreds of thousands of German troops, not to 
mention the large numbers of Austrian and Hungarian forces, 
for action on the other fronts; yet after the failure of the 
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Gallipoli campaign and certainly following the breakdown of the 
Brusilov offensive the collapse of the Eastern front had 
developed into a definite possibility. This thought alone was 
enough to chill the spine of the coldest calculating Entente 
strategist. It is not surprising then that the allies even 
after the overthrow of the Tsar insisted that the Provisional 
Government keep Russia in the war at all costs even though the 
Russian political, economic, and military situation would not 
permit Russia to remain in the war. In the end the Entente's 
insistence that the Provisional uovern~ent continue the war on 
the Eastern front at all costs not only failed to keep Russia 
in the war, but it eventually aided the Bolsheviks with their 
peace, bread, and land program to undermind that Government, 
seize power, and consolidate their revolutionary position. 
Thereafter, not only was Russia lost to the Entente, but the 
Allies soon found themselves fighting Red Russian forces on 
Russian soil in a losing cause. 
The early part of 1917 was indeed bleak for the Entente 
and while the United States declaration of war on Germany on 
April 6 did much to raise the morale of the Entente Powers, 
American power was untested and unproven. Besides Germany 
believed that the Central Powers could knock out the major 
Anglo-French armies on the western front and inflict a final 
defeat upon the remnant Russian armies on the eastern front 
before American aid and reinforcement in sufficient quantities 
could be landed in Europe to alter the course of the war. And 
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then the Germans also gambled that the resumption of unrestricted 
submarine warfare in 1917 would decide the battle of the Atlantic 
and cause the Allied home fronts to succumb to the starvation 
and the deprivation caused by the German blockade. Finally, 
the United States declaration of war against Germany in April 
1917 did not boost Greece's inclination to enter the war on 
the side of the Entente since the United States did not follow 
up the action with a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, 
and Greece's chief enemies, Turkey and Bulgaria. Like most 
small powers, Greece was more immediately concerned with events 
being played within its own regional area than with the larger 
activities taking place on the western fronts; and the Greeks, 
characteristically provincial in outlook when it came to 
international affairs, would not see further than the Balkan 
·and Near Eastern theatres of operations.100 
Little more can be added to the overall military history 
of the war and the history of diplomatic inducements offered 
by the two Power blocs, the ~ntente and the Alliance, to win 
new allies during the war. It is not difficult to see that 
for Greece, on the surface at least, throughout much of the 
conflict a wait-and-see policy and neutrality was preferable 
to outright intervention. 
In the light of the diplomatic and military situation 
100The United States did not declare war against Austria until 
December 7 1917. While Turkey severed relations with the United States 
on April 2j, war was never declared against Turke~.and Bulg~r~a by the 
United States, or vice versa. For more on the "un.1que" pos1t1on of the 
United States in the war see PP• 272-273. 
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just reviewed, one question remains--setting aside the advantages 
or disadvantages to the Greeks, would Greece's participation 
in the war at an early date have been advantageous for the 
Entente, or, for that matter, to the Central Powers? Or still, 
would Greece's early participation in the conflict alter materi-
ally the course of events and outcome of the war? The answer 
to both questions is of course conjectural; but drawing upon 
the light of later events, an answer may be attempted. First, 
since the little and poverty stricken kingdom had been con-
stantly in a state of war or emergency for approximately sixty 
years since the Crimean war, it was doubtful that Greece could 
have long endured economically in a prolonged conflict. The 
demands required by the conflagration of 1914, so soon upon 
the heels of the Balkan Wars, were certain to cause an economic 
collapse in Greece. Besides, there was little to indicate 
that the Bntente, at the beginning of the war, was in a posi-
tion to supply Greece with sufficient aid to prevent collapse, 
and, as the war dragged on, the possibility for Allied aid 
became more remote as the Entente found itself in a struggle 
to maintain and supply the war fronts in France and Russia 
and their own home fronts. Cnce embroiled in the war, Greece 
of necessity would have had to provide for herself the major 
portion of economic assistance for the home and battle fronts 
necessary to keep her in the war. This Greece was incapable 
of doing. 
There is little to indicate that Greece intervention in 
the conflict at an early date would have strategically assisted 
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the position of the Entente in the war; the Greek army, while 
sufficient to participate in a Balkan-type war, was in no 
position to assist Serbia appreciably against the forces of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. And then, by participating in the 
conflict, Greece might have left herself open to possible 
attack by Bulgaria and Turkey, both smarting from defeats suf-
fered at the hands of Greece and Serbia just a year before in 
the Balkan Wars which was almost certain to result in Greece 
quick elimination from the war. Consequently, the Greek 
position would have been lost early in the war and the bntente 
would have lost their later Balkan foothold of Saloniki. Both 
the Venizelists and Constantinists were insistent upon two 
conditions: first, at least the neutralization of the position 
of Bulgaria, and second, before Greece's intervention the 
Allies be in a position to transport sufficient troops to 
bolster the Greek position and force a decision on the Balkan 
peninsula. lhe first was accomplished in 1915, 1916 with 
BulgariB;'s declaration of war against Serbia and Rumania 
respectively; the second was still not accomplished before 
Greece's involvement in the war in 1917 witness the repeated 
Entente failure to effect a decision on the Balkan front in 
the inconclusive battles of Second Monastir and lake Prespa, 
.t-'.Larch 11-19, 1917, and the battle of Vardar, May 5-19, 1917. 
It is true that the Greek government held out repeatedly after 
Entente promises to effect the necessary build-up of forces on 
the Balkan front, but the Greeks, especially in the light of 
the conflicting diplomatic promises and Entente inabilities 
to effect a decision on any front, can hardly be criticized 
~ / 
for insisting upon the fact rather than tLe promise. The 
Greek government finally entered the war formally on July 2, 
1917, but, by this time, Constantine had abdicated, Venizelos 
had become Premier, and the entry into the war by the United 
States'had restored at least theoretically the balance of 
'· 
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power which ~ad been disrupted by the repeated defeats of 
Italv and Russia. It is true that even after the United 
Sta.tes entered the war the Greek Government attempted to keep 
out of the war for American power was still unproven. 
The aforementioned review of the diplomatic and military 
situation in the Near East during the First World War may not 
fully justify the Greek position, but it helps point out some 
of the realities of the Greek dilemma of neutrality v.' 
intervention,and makes Greek indeciveness to enter the war 
better understood. 
The similarity of Greece's position in regard to joining 
the war on the side of the .t!intente during \rJorld War I and 
Turkey's position in World War II is striking; and equally 
striking are the different approaches taken by the Entente 
to involve Greece in the First World War. In the effort to 
force Greece into the First World \\Tar, the Entente rode 
roughshod over Greek neutrality but in the Second World War, 
the Allies not only refused to force Turkish neutrality and 
thus bring Turkey into the war, but through the crucial years 
of the war frcm 1941-43 they did little (1) to discourage 
Turkish-German tra~e in strategic war materials, (2) to 
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protest the apparent reticence of Turkey to ban the passage 
through the Straits to the Black Sea of thinly disguised German 
naval craft in violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention and 
Turkey's 1939 Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and 
France, and (3) to counter the Treaty of Nonaggression between 
Germany and Turkey concluded on June 18, 1941, just three days 
before Hitler's invasion of Soviet Russia and while Britain 
was locked in a life and death struggle with Nazi Germany. 
While Greece was criticized during and after World War I by 
the ~ntente for her indecision to enter the war early, and 
for the "pro-German policy" of the Greek monarchy, 1'urkey 
escaped with little if any criticism for a comparable position 
in World War II. In fact, at the end of tbe Second ~.Jorld War, 
Turkey was praised for her political astuteness in staying 
neutral, admittedly a diplomatic feat in and of itself; but 
whether a nation is to remain neutral or not depends much 
more on the wishes of those who intend to violate this neutrality 
than on the country which desires to observe it--especially 
when the former is a Great Power and the latter is a small 
nation as shown by the Greek question in World War I. Claims 
by Turks and Turcophiles that Turkey's neutrality in World 
War II served the Allies well since the Turks by remaining 
neutral did not give Germany an opportunity to invade Turkey 
and consequently spread over into the Middle East and outflank 
the Suez Canal should be taken with a grain of salt for it is, 
at best, a post-war fabrication in an attempt to justify 
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Turkey's neutrality during the Second vJorld War. During World 
War II the Allies appealed repeatedly to Turkey to enter the 
war against Germany as they had appealed to Greece in v:orld 
War I, or at least place at the disposition of the Allies the 
air fields in the region of Smyrna and Badrun which had been 
constructed by the British during the war and would have (1) 
given the Allies air bases from which to challenge German 
supremacy in the Aegean and threaten the German hold on the 
German occupied Greek island of the Aegean and possibly Greece 
itself; (2) threatened German shipping using the Straits from 
the Black Sea and Rommel's chief supply route to North Africa 
from Greece and the Aegean; (3) neutralized the Axis land and 
aerial threat to the Suez Canal; and (4) caused the Germans 
to face up early to the threat of an invasion of Greece and 
the Balkans which was negated by Turkey's inaction which even 
as late as the summer of 1944, in the words of Churchill, 
'~ould have had a potent influence on the future of Southeast 
Europe." The Turks of course cannot be criticized for taking 
a one hundred percent Turkish point of view during World 
War II on the problem "what's best for Turkey, neutrality or 
war," but it raises the interesting question why Greece did 
• 
not receive from the Allies a similar understanding for her 
position during the First World War. For in the last analysis, 
all other things being equal, if Turkey feared her historic 
enemy Russia more than she feared Germany, during the Second 
World War then similarly, Greece feared Turkey and Bulgaria 
------
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more than Germany and Austro-Hungary during the First World 
War. 
In 1918 Turkey lost an Empire but gained a nation, and 
Bolshevik renunciation of the treaties of partition of the 
Ottoman Empire limited the spoils to Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and eventually Greece; much of Turkey's loss on the 
Aegean littoral appeared to be Greece's gain, or at least so 
it seemed at the Paris Peace Ccnference which convened to end 
the war. 
By the Mudros Armistice a defeated Ottoman Empire withdrew 
from the First \IJorld War and in twenty-five articles agreed to 
do the following: 








Open the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and permit 
their occupation by the Allies. 
Cease all relations with the Central Powers and 
evacuate their personnel. 
Surrender all garrisons in the Empire and all war 
vessels in 1urKish waters or waters occupied by 
Turkey. 
Demobilize the Turkish Army except for those troops 
necessary for the surveillance of frontiers and the 
maintenance of internal order. 
Unconditionally hand over to the Allies allied 
prisoners of war and interned Armenian persons. 
Place under Allied control the Turkish wireless 
cable, tunnel, and railway systems. 
Grant free usage to Allied ships of all Turkish 
~orts and anchorages, the use of all ship repair 
facilities, and permlt the purchase in Turkey of 
coal, fuel, and naval stores. 
v!ithdraw Turkish troops (from Persia) to behind 
the pre-war frontier. 
-(9) 
( 10) 
Give the Allies the right to occupy the six 
Armenian vilayets in case of disorder therein. 
Permit the Allies "to occupy any strategic 
points in the event of a situation arising 
which threatens the security of the Allies" 
under the all important (or "notorious") 
Article 7 of the armistice. 
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Turkish antipathy for the Greeks was made readily apparent 
at the outset of the armistice. In order to make the Mudros 
terms more palatable to the Ottoman representative the British 
representatives at the deliberations agreed secretly to 
"recommend to their Government that no Greek 
troops should be sent to Constantinople or 
Smyrna (both cities having large indigenous 
Greek populations), and that Greek warships 
bound for the Black Sea should pass through 
the Straits only by night. 11 101 
Among the victorious Entente powers Turkey was obviously most 
sensitive about Greece, and history gave Turkey much cause to 
be on guard against Greece. Greece, with a historically 
indigenous population along the eastern Aegean littoral and 
the Black Sea coasts, was sure to be received not only as an 
ally of the victorious Entente but more important the Greek 
forces would be received as liberators by the many Greek 
communities and enclaves in Asia Minor and the victorious 
Greeks would be tempted to make good their claims against 
Turkey. Of all the Balkan nations, only Greece aspired historic-
ally to territory ruled by Turkey in both Europe and Asia, and 
next to Tsarist Russia with its Pan-Slavism and Muscovite schemes 
for the restoration of Byzantium under Russian Tsars, Greece, 
101Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey, (New York, 1955), P• 46. 
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haunted by the Great Idea and the spectre of Byzantium, was 
the greatest enemy of Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia. 
Like Russia, Greece's historic aspirations against Turkey un-
like those of Britain in Mesopotamia and Arabia, France in 
Syria, and Italy in ~unis and Albania, were in the main directed 
against Turkey in Europe and the Turkish "homeland" in Western 
Turkey. It was not surprising then that with .H.ussia out of 
the picture Turkey directed her attention to Greece at the 
armistice negotiations and the forthcoming peace treaty. For 
the Turk, like most conquerors and especially Asiatic overlords, 
submission to a people which they had ruled and despoiled for 
centuries was the basest form of surrender. And then any 
occupation of Turkish territory by Greece could never be a 
temporary arrangement regardless of Entente promises to the 
contrary by the armistice or peace treaty. If the Greeks were 
allowed to occupy Turkey in Europe and to come to Asia Minor, 
they would come to stay since a strong Greece, and that had 
been historically the aim of Greek nationalists, could only 
be had at the expense of a weak Turkey. Furthermore, a strong 
Greece would face both East and West and it would force Turkey 
to face eastward and retrench into the desolate Anatolian 
hinterland. Finally, Greece's rule in western Asia Minor 
meant either despicable Greek rule and rule by former rayahs 
over millions of Turks, or the forced migration by many Turks 
from the "Turkish homeland" in western Turkey to the desolate 
eastern hinterland whence they had come centuries ago. This 
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geographic isolation from the west by a "Greece in Asia Minor" 
would have doomed Turkey to a desolate middle eastern region 
much as the Turks had geographically isolated the interior 
non-Turkish middle eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire from 
contact with the West and civilization and progress. A Greece 
in Asia Minor literally stood to block Turkey from its only 
window on civilization, much in the manner that the Ottoman 
sash was thrust across Greece's northern frontier and prohibited 
modern Greece from geographical contact with Europe from 1830 
to 1912. A Greek victory at the armistice table and later at 
the peace conference was certain to set back Turkish history 
more than five hundred years. 
For the Greek, no matter where he was, the year nineteen 
hundred and eighteen could be described in on~ sentence: It 
was the year of redemption, the year selected by God to expunge 
the scourge of 1453.1°2 
With Turkey as one of the defeated nations, it ap1Jeared 
that finally and once and for all, the age-old question of 
when and how to divide up the Ottoman Empire was on the verge 
1°2 One of the ever present weaknesses of the present Western 
Alliance System has been the desperate attempt by the Western Powers to 
forge effective alliances out of historic rivals and enemies, and nowhere 
is this more evident than in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. 
In the Eastern Mediterranean and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
includes Italians, Greeks, and Turks. The Balkan Tripartite Pact included 
Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks; and in the Near East the Baghdad Pact in-
cluded Turks, Iranis, Iraquis and Britishers and furthermore, attempts 
were even made to include Jordanians and Egyptians--an historic incon-
gruous lot if there ever was one--the justification of which can only be 
found in the desperate post World War II struggle between East and West 
and "Pactomania" by the Powers. 
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of becoming a reality. In the past the Powers had opposed 
the partition of the Sultan's domain essentially because of 
indecision over the question of (1) Constantinople and (2) 
because the West refused to take a course of action which would 
weaken Turkey and place Russian Power or a Russian puppet 
astride Constantinople and the Straits. However, this had 
all been changed during the second decade of the twentieth 
century by the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The former 
had caused the final demise of Ottoman power in Balkania; and 
during the latter, the West found itself siding with Russia 
against the very forces it had itself encouraged against 
Russia. At least three factors indicated that the Allies would 
preside handsomely over the partition of the Ottoman Empire at 
Paris. First, as already noted, the diplomacy and rivalry 
leading to the war had split the Western position on the 
"Eastern Question" causing Britain to cool toward Turkey and 
decide upon the partition of the Ottoman Empire even to the 
extent of ceding Constantinople and the Straits to Russia, 
long tre most dreaded "untoward act" of the "Eastern Question." 
Second, militarily, Turkey lay prostrate in defeat, the war 
had caused the demise of Austro-Hungary, long an important 
factor in the "Eastern Question," and more important, the 
defeat of Imperial Germany, the Power which· after the Congress 
of Berlin had emerged steadily as Turkey's friend in Europe 
and became the bite behind the Sultan's bark in the affairs 
of the "Eastern Question." Although Germany's aims towards 
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Turkey were ostensibly economic and commercial in purport, 
Germany eventually supplanted Britain as Turkey's benefactor. 
Finally, Russia's defeat in the war and the Russian revolutions 
culminated in a fratricidal civil war and tte fcreign interven-
tions which engulfed the totality of Russia's power at home 
and for some time to come removed the threat of a Russia 
astride Constantinople and the Straits. Russia's refusal to 
attend the Peace Conference made fewer the Powers that would 
deal with the dismemberment proceedings, and Bolshevik repu-
diation of the secret treaties set aside the extensive terri-
torial concessions granted Russia in Turkey and increased the 
Ottoman spoils to be divided at Paris by tr~e victors. On the 
eve of the Peace Conference everything indicated that the 
Allies could preside with an unsparing hand at the final dis-
solution of the Ottoman Empire. 
On January 18, 1919 the Peace Conference of World War I 
was formally convened in Paris; there were seventy delegates 
in attendance at the Conference representing twenty-seven of 
the victorious nations. The fact that it was called a 
conference instead of a congress was significant for unlike 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the representatives of the 
vanquished countries in 1919 were expressly excluded from the 
deliberations at Paris until the peace treaties were ready for 
their signature. 
All the Great Powers attending the Peace Conference with 
the exception of the United States had previously bound themselves 
by the secret treaties wtich they had undertaken during the 
course of the war or, as in the case of Italy, conditioned 
their entrance into the conflict. When Greece entered the 
war in 1917 she had been promised nothing by the Entente, nor 
was Greece in a position to ask for anything at the time, 
considering the circ~mstances by which she had entered the 
war and the fact that the areas which Greece coveted had been 
already divided up. The situation, however, was substantially 
changed by Russia's withdrawal from the war and Bolshevik 
repudiation of the secret partition treaties which threw open 
from 
to new negotiations the Ottoman territorie~which Greece had 
been previously excluded by the secret treaties. These 
included the important awards of the Constantinople treaty and 
the important Smyrna concession to Italy which had been con-
ditioned on Hussia's acceptance of the St. Jean de Maurienne 
Agreement and which lapsed for want of Russian ratification. 
At the close of the First World War only two territories to 
wtich Greece aspired appeared to lay beyond the reach of Greece. 
These were Epirus and the Dodecanese: the first had been in-
eluded as part of theindepenaent Albania state established by 
the Powers by the London Protocol of August 5, 1913 and had 
come steadily under the sway of Italy by the Secret London 
Treaty of 1915 and Italian occupation during the war;103 the 
103 Italy's pre-eminent interests in Albania were formally recognized 
by the Geneva Declaration of November 3, 1921 signed by the British, French, 
and Italian Governments, since "••• any violation of the Albanian frontiers 
constitutes a menace to the strategical security of Italy, and ••• any 
intervention ••• for the purpose of restoring the territorial frontiers 
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second had been occupied by Italy during the Tripolitan War 
and was promised Italy by the Entente by the same London 
treaty. 1o4 While the Greek delegation at Paris might have 
conceivably challenged the secret London Agreement and Italy's 
occupation of Albania and the Dodecanese, Greece was in no 
position to meet militarily the Italian occupation of these 
territories. Besides there were other prizes to be had with 
less "legal" and military complications. It was to the long 
dreamed of spoils of Byzantium on the littoral of Asia Minor, 
inhabited by thousands of Greeks that Venizelos turned to at 
Paris, and it was not long before a prophesy made by Clemenceau, 
the future "tiger of France," after his visit to Crete as a 
newspaperman during the Cretan revolution of 1896 echoed true 
in the mirrored halls of Versailles and the chancellories of 
Europe. On his return to Paris at that time Clemenceau had 
said that 
11 In Crete I have discovered a phenomenon 
much more interesting than the excavations. 
It is a young advocate, Mr. Venizuelos--
Mr. Venizelos? Frankly, I cannot quite re-
call his name, but the whole of EuroQe will 
be speaking of him in a few years~~O) 
of Albania should be relegated to Italian troops ••• " Thus, Italy assumed 
a protectorate over Albania; obviously, Italy sought to "protect" Albania 
from Yugoslavia and Greece who aspired to extend their boundaries at the 
expense of Albania in the Kossovo and "Northern Epirus" areas. 
104By the Treaty of Lausanne of 1912 which ended the Tripolitan War, 
Turkey ceded Tripoli to Italy, and in return for the Tripoli cession 
Italy agreed to withdraw from the Dodecanese once Tripoli was pacified 
of Anti-Italian nationalist elements. However, the Italian promise proved 
only a polite gesture for Italy used the pretext of any little disturbance 
in Tripoli as evidence that pacification had not been completed, and there-
fore remained in occupation of the Dodecanese. For more on Dodecanese see 
APPENDIX III. 
105s. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos, (London, 1921), P• 5. 
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Among the "god-like gentlemen sitting at the Peace 
Conference," Venizelos enjoyed prestige and influence, and 
assumed a position of importance in the negotiations at Paris 
far out of proportion to the power of the nation which he 
represented. His revolutionary exploits on Crete, his re-
juvenation of Greece after the Greek-'l'urkish War of 1897, and 
Greece's victories in the Balkan Wars had already made him 
legend; but more important at Paris he had won the respect of 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau for his unrelenting belief in the 
ultimate victory of the Allies side and his untiring efforts 
to involve Greece in the war on the side of the Entente. 
At the Peace Conference of Versailles, Venizelos became 
a member of the committee that worked up the Covenant of the 
League of Nations; this brought him into close association 
with the Ame1·ican delegation and President 'vJilson and his 
advisor Colonel House, the .oritish delegation and Lord Cecil 
and the able Premier of South Africa General Smuts, and the 
French delegation and M. Bourgeoise, who with Lloyd George 
and Clemenceau were the most important personages assembled 
at Paris. Venizelos secured for Greece one of the four 
initial elective seats on the all-important League Council, 
the quasi-executive body of the League of Nations, which gave 
Greece representation on the important League body made up 
under the permanent directorship of the five Great Powers 
and which placed Greece in the forefront of any important 
discussion which afterwards could effect the peace settlements. 
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Finally, Venizelos, supported increasingly by Lloyd George 
who saw (1) in Venizelos, with his ambition of a big Greece, 
an agent to impose upon the Turks the peace settlement and (2) 
in Greece an instrument to fill the void in the Near East 
created by the vanquishment of Turkey, became a prime-mover 
behind the territorial clauses of the Turkish settlement. Be-
sides, alone of all the statesmen assembled at Paris, Venizelos 
had been the historic and mortal enemy of the Ottoman Empire. 
What Clemenceau and France meant for Imperial Germany, Venizelos 
and Greece meant for Ottoman Turkey. Militarily, unlike the 
Allies who were rapidly demobilizing their forces to a peace 
time basis, Venizelos not only kept the Greek armed forces in-
tact but the Greek Premier increased the size of the Greek 
army to back up Greek claims. Diplomatically, Venizelos soon 
made the Big Four into a Big Five, and when the Italian 
Premier Orlando boycotted the Paris Peace Conference during the 
Flume crises, the Greek statesman seized the opportunity of 
Italy's absence to obtain the Allied Supreme Council's per-
mission for Greece to occupy Smyrna which Italy had repeatedly 
opposed on grounds that the region had already been promised 
her by the Saint-Jean de Maurienne agreement. Venizelos 
quickly followed up the Supreme Council's permission to occupy 
Smyrna with an actual occupation of the city and its hinterland 
on May 15, 1919 which, de bono et malo, gave the delegates 
arranging the Ottoman peace settlement a de facto situation 
when it came to the discussions on Smyrna. Thus Venizelos was 
218 
able to circumvent Italian opposition to Greece's claim to 
Smyrna. Lastly, Venizelos held the confidence of David Lloyd 
George who favored a strong Greece to replace Turkey as guardian 
of the Straits and saw in the Greeks an instrument to force the 
peace terms on the Turks. At last, it appeared that British 
and Greek aspirations as regards Turkey and the Eastern Question 
were complementary, and that Britain was now prepared to re-
place Turkey with Greece and accept Greece as a participating 
ally in British Near Eastern policy--even to the extent of 
supporting Greece's aspirations in Asia Minor. In less than 
a decade, Venizelos had risen from an obscure Cretan revolution-
ary to European statesman and had accomplished two near miracles 
in international affairs: first, by the Balkan Wars he had 
made Greece a power to be reckoned with in Balkan politics; 
second, by Lloyd George's countenance of Greek aspirations as 
regards Turkey, he made Greece a power to be considered when 
it came to the politics of the Near Eastern Question, hereto-
fore strictly a preserve of the Great Powers. In 1919-1920 
because of Venizelos, Greece reached the pinnacle of power and 
prestige in her modern history, a position which in all proba-
bility she is never destined to achieve again. 
On August 10, 1920, after three months of deliberation, 
the Ottoman delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, influenced 
by Greek military successes against Turkish nationalist elements 
in Thrace and Asia Minor, reluctantly signed the Ottoman peace 
settlement at Sevres. Briefly, the Sevres treaty included 
four important provisions on Constantinople, the Straits, the 
Capitulations, and the non-Turkish provinces of the Empire as 
follows: 
(1) The High Contracting Parties agreed that the 
rights and title of the Turkish Government 
over Constantinople should not be affected 
providing that Turkey observed faithfully the 
provisions of the present Treaty, or of any 
treaties or conventions supplementary thereto. 
In the event Turkey failed to observe the 
treaty provisions, the Allied powers reserved 
the right to modify the above provision on 
Constantinople and Turkey agreed to accept any 
change which might be taken in this connection. 
(2) The Turkish Government acquiesced to the 
internationalization of the Straits and the 
demilitarization of the surrounding territories. 
(3) The Turkish Government acceded to the re-
establishment of the Capitulations and to the 
restoration of traditional minority rights. 
(4) The Turkish Government renounced all claims 
to the non-Turkish provinces of the Empire and 
much of western Anatolia, and agreed with the 
following disposition of these territories: 
(a) Autonomy and eventual independence 
for Kurdistan. 
(b) The independence of the Kingdom of 
the Hedjaz. 
(c) The cession of the Dodecanese and 
Rhodes to Italy, and to Greece the 
remainder of the Aegean Islands in-
cluding Imbros and Tenedos at the 
entrance to the Dardanelles. 
(d) The creation of an independent 
Armenia, and the arbitration of the 
President of the United States of 
America of the frontier to be fixed 
between Turkey and Armenia Lit being 
hoped that the United States would 
assume responsibility for Armenia 
as a mandate under the League of 
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Nation~. The frontiers between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia 
respectively to be determined by 
direct agreement between the States 
concerned. 
(e) Mandate status for Syria, Mesopotamia 
and Palestine "until such time they 
are able to stand alone." 
Continuing, Turkey recognized: 
Finally, 
(f) The protectorate proclaimed by Great 
Britain over Egypt on December 18, 
1914. 
(g) The convention between Great Britain 
and Egypt defining the status, and 
regulation of the administration of 
the Sudan. 
(h) The annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by 
the British Government on November 5, 
1914. 
(i) A French protectorate over Morocco and 
Tunis. 
(j) And definitely renounced all rights and 
privileges which had been left to the 
Sultan under the Treaty of Lausanne of 
1912. 
(k) Greece was extended eastward in Thrace 
to include Eastern Thrace with Adrianople, 
and was also accorded Smyrna and its 
hinterland on condition that Greece 
administer the Smyrna territory for five 
years following which the inhabitants 
through the local parliament and/or a 
plebiscite under conditions laid down 
by the Council of the League of Nations 
might opt for incorporation in the 
Kingdom of Greece. In the event such 
incorporation is indicated, Turkey 
agreed to renounce in favor of Greece 
all rights and title over the city of 
Smyrna and territory. 
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At the time of the signature of the Ottoman Peace Treaty 
of Sevres, the three major European Powers, Great Britain, 
France, and Italy concluded the separate Tripartite (Sevres) 
Agreement on Anatolia of August 10, 1920 which rested on the 
ratification of the Ottoman peace treaty. Under this separate 
agreement the southern coast of Anatolia in the region of 
Adalia was recognized as the area of Italian interests and 
Cilicia and the western part of Kurdistan bordering on Syria 
were recognized as the area of French special interests. 
The Treaty of Sevres was the high point of the Megale 
Idea. The acquisition of Eastern Thrace by the treaty of 
Sevres and the acquisition of Western Thrace from Bulgaria by 
the Treaty of Neuilly gave Greece complete occupation of the 
entire Aegean coast bordering on Europe. The Smyrna award 
gave Greece a choice part of the western littoral of Asia Minor 
with its all important port of Smyrna. Finally, the Dodecanese 
were to be ceded to Greece under three separate bilateral 
agreements between Italy and Greece, 
(1) The Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement of July 29, 
1919, when the Ottoman peace treaty was ratified 
by the nations concerned.106 
(2) The Greco-Italian Agreement of May 14, 1920 
which provided for the immediate cession of 
the Dodecanses except Rhodes which was to 
have a plebiscite at the end of fifteen 
years; and subsequently, 
106 In additon, under the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement Italy agreed 
to support Greece's claims in Thrace and Epirus; and Greece.agr~ed to . 
support an Italian protectorate for Albania and Italy's cla1ms 1n Anatol1a. 
(3) The Greco-Italian Agreement of August 10, 
1920 L~he same day the Turkish delegation _ 
at Paris ratified the Ottoman peace treatl/ 
confirmed the cession of the Dodecanese to 
Greece except the largest island of Rhodes 
unless England agreed to cede Cyprus to 
Greece. 
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These three settlements, the Treaty of Neuilly with 
Bulgaria, the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey, and the Italo-Greek 
understandings on the Dodecanese, effected a veritable revolu-
tion in the Near East, and for Greece climaxed a one hundred 
year struggle to break out of the shell in whichshe had been 
contained by the Powers and to create a Greater Greece based 
essentially on the Great Idea. 
The most significant of Greece's acquisitions at Paris 
was the Smyrna concession which next to Constantinople, was 
the second prize of the Great Idea and attested to the 
diplomatic skill of Venizelos. Venizelos' Smyrna coup at 
Paris falls into three clearly distinguishable phases. These 
were as follows: 
(1) Present to the Peace Conference Greece's 
claim to Smyrna. 
(2) Obtain the Conference's permission for 
Greece to occupy Smyrna. 
(3) Have the Conference insert a clause in 
the treaty awarding Smyrna to Greece. 
Early in February 1919 Venizelos, supported by Lloyd 
George and backed by Clemenceau, presented to the Peace 
Conference at Paris a formal claim to possession of Smyrna; 
and taking advantage of Italy's boycott of the Peace Conference 
during the Fiume crisis secured the Supreme Council's permission 
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to occupy Smyrna. On May 15, 1919 in accordance with Article 7 
of the Armistice Agreement of Mudros and under the protecting 
guns of an Allied fleet Greek troops were landed at Smyrna to 
take up their occupation duties1°7Finally, having the advantage 
of actual possession of Smyrna, Venizelos was able to secure in 
the Sevres settlement that emerged on April 26, 1920 from the 
deliberations of the Supreme Council at San Remo a clause provid-
ing that Smyrna and its environs should come under the adminis-
tration of Greece. 
Venizelos' skill, paramountcy, and success at the Peace 
Conference had become anathema to Turkey. His omnipresence in 
Near Eastern affairs at Paris hung over Turkey like a new phoenix 
rising from the long smoldering ashes of Byzantium; and, as al-
ready noted, from the very beginning of the proceedings leading 
to the Armistice Agreement of Mudros Turkey had worked to under-
cut the Greek position in the Ottoman Settlement when, e.g., the 
Ottoman representative at the armistice's table insisted secretly 
that the British delegate recommend secretly to His Majesty's 
Government that no Greek troops be sent to Constantinople or 
Smyrna and that Greek naval forces destined for· the Black Sea 
pass the Straits at night only. 
Nearly two years passed after the conclusion of the 
armistice at Mudros before the terms of the Ottoman peace 
treaty were settled upon by the Allies, and contrary to 
popular accepted beliefs, Kemal was not the only Turkish 
107 Contrary to general belief, the Greeks landing at Smyrna were not 
the first troops to take up the occupation of the Turkish "homeland" and 
raise the ire of Turkish nationalist elements; nearly a month earlier on 
April 29, Italian troops had taken up the occupation of Adalia. 
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leader or soldier that opposed the prospective Ottoman settle-
ment that had been so long in the making at Paris and San 
Remo. While it was true that the Sultan's Government had 
capitulated to the Allies, equally true was the fact that a 
major part of the Ottoman army in Turkey proper and Thrace 
had not been defeated and the Turks beyond the immediate 
confines of the Porte had not been humbled by the defeat of 
the Turkish armies on the far flung Near Eastern fronts. These 
facts the Allies, except possibly the Greeks, failed to 
correlate fully in their victory over the Ottoman Empire. 
Hence, a Turkish army in being may account for the official 
Turkish delegation to Paris, Kemal, and other nationalists 
in Turkey opposing proposals for the partition of the 
"Turkish homeland 11--whether it were Smyrna, Armenia, Adalia, 
or Adana--throughout the deliberations leading to the Sevres 
treaty. These nationalists included many Ottoman military 
field commanders other than Kemal and other nationalist 
guerrilla leaders who also opposed the partition of Turkey. 
The former included Kiazim Kara Bekir, commanding the 
Diyarbekir Army Corps at Angora; the Turkish commander at 
Konya, and Jaffar Tayar commanding Adrianople. The guerrillas 
included within their ranks such insurgent leaders as Yoruk 
Ali, an avowed bandit and an army deserter who assembled a 
guerrilla band with the connivance of the Turkish authorities 
at Constantinople and wiped out a Greekftontier post on the 
Menderes river which inspired a large-scale uprising in the 
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Aydin province against the Greek invader; and Cerkez Edhem 
whose "Green Army" headquartered at Kutayha, 160 miles north-
west of Smyrna, was for awhile the only nationalist force which 
resisted the Greeks in Asia Minor successfully. Edhem's 
"Green Army" in 1920 repulsed the Greek army before Ismit, 
saving Angora and the Kemalist movement from possible extinction 
in infancy. At the time Mustapha Kemal was busy organizing his 
nationalist forces in eastern Anatolia at Sivas, Balikshehir, 
Erzerum, and Angora. All these Ottoman coiiDnanders and 
guerrilla leaders opposed a partition of Turkey and supported 
the Sultan against the Allies as long as the Porte was able 
to hold out against the Allies and the anticipated Ottoman 
peace settlement. In fact, the Turkish delegation to Paris 
under the leadership of the much maligned Damad Ferid Pasha, 
Grand Vizier and brother-in-law of the ruling Sultan Mohammed VI, 
and the "captive" Sultan himself were themselves not susceptible 
initially to a partition of the Ottoman Empire, let alone the 
Turkey proper. In this direction in June 1919 the Ottoman 
delegation to Paris, following a special hearing before the 
supreme Council, placed a memorandum before the Peace Conference 
which made clear the territorial conditions which the Porte 
would accept in a treaty. The Ottoman memorandum stated that 
' A. Turkey was willing to enter into negotiations as 
regards a new organization of the Ottoman Empire, 
and 
(1) "If the Armenian Republican established 
at Erivan is recognized by the Powers of 
the Entente, the Ottoman delegation will 
consent to discuss ad referendum the 
frontier line which is to separate 
the new republic from the Ottoman 
State, and 
(2) "The Ottoman Government is quite 
willing to enter into negotiations at 
the proper moment with the Government 
of His Britannic Majesty with a view 
to define clearly the political status 
of Egypt and the island of Cyprus." 
B. But " ••• the question which concerns Turkey presents 
three points ••• 
(1) "Thrace in Europe,u to include Adrianople 
and ttthe districts situated to the north 
and west of the vilayet of Adrianople, 
including Western Thrace ••• 
(2) "The Turkish parts of Asia," to include 
(a) "Asia Minor. In Asia the Turkish lands 
are bounded on the north by the ~lack 
Sea, on the East by the Turco-Russian 
and Turco-Persian frontiers as they 
were before the war, including on the 
south the vilayets of Mosul and 
Diabekir, as well as part of the province 
of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean. 
(b) 11The islands near the coast, which belong 
to Asia Minor from an historical and 
economic point of view.~.and ensure the 
safety of the coast. 
(c) "Arabia. The Arab provinces lying to 
the south of Turkish countries, and 
including Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz, 
the Asyr, the Yemen, Irak, and all the 
other regions which were recognized as 
forming an integral part of the 
Ottoman Empire before the war, would 
have a large measure of administrative 
autonomy, under the sovereignty of His 
Imperial Majesty the Sultan." 
Which are indivisible." And furthermore, "it will 
not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its 
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division under different mandates.u108 
The Porte continued to oppose the dismemberment of Turkey 
being devised at Paris as it later protested the partition 
proceeding at San Remo and the resultant Treaty of Sevres. The 
Allied occupation of Constantinople in March 1920 did little 
to sway the Sultan or induce the Turks into accepting partition; 
if anything, the Allied occupation which was calculated to give 
the Sultan military backing and make it easier for the Porte 
to accept the peace treaty, misfired greatly. The Sultan not 
only continued to refuse the Sevres settlement but the occupa-
tion of Constantinople caused him to lose face and lose all 
support and the respect of his people. It seemed to sub-
stantiate nationalist charges that the Sultan was a prisoner 
of the Allies and that the Porte was no longer in a position 
to represent Turkey unconditionally. Hereafter, the nationalists 
charged that there were two Turkey's: a "free Turkey" repre-
sented by the nationalists in Anatolia and a "kept Turkey" 
represented by the Sultan in occupied Constantinople. Never-
theless, the Porte gibed at the proffered settlement and 
refused to sign the Sevres treaty for three months from May, 
when the San Remo instrument was first presented to the 
108 The Ottoman Memorandum to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace 
Conference, June 23, 1919, is reproduced in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in 
the Near and Middle East, val. II, PP• 59-61. The best account of the 
diplomacy leading to the Ottoman peace settlement is H. N. Howard, The 
Partition of Turke : A Di lomatic Risto 1913-1923, (Norman, Okla.--,--
1931 • For events surrounding the Ottoman Memorandum see Howard, above 
ch. 7 and K. Ziemke, Die neue Turkei (1914-1928), (Stuttgart, 1930), 
PP• 101-123. 
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Ottoman delegation in Paris, until the combination of success-
ful Greek military operations against Turkish nationalists 
in Thrace and Asia Minor during June-July 1920 and the ever 
present threat of renewed and more extensive Greek operations 
made the Porte pliable to Allied persuasions and compelled the 
Sultan Mohammed VI in August to instruct the Ottoman delegation 
to Paris to sign the peace terms. 
It was no secret that Greece and Venizelos backed by Great 
Britain were at the root of the problem facing Turkey. The 
Sultan and the Sublime Porte knew it, but imprisoned in 
Constantinople they could do little, especially following the 
Turkish defeats in June-July 1920. After the signature of the 
Sevres treaty, the Sublime Porte lost all influence and 
authority in Turkey to the Kemalists in the interior who had 
entrenched themselves at Ankara. 
Mustapha Kemal, the only Turkish hero to emerge from the 
war, possibly more than any other single leader in Turkey was 
aware of the gravity of the moments leading to the San Remo 
settlement. In short, for Kemal Turkey had been brought to 
the crossroads 9f history, and Greece, or more correctly 
Venizelos Lsupported by Lloyd Georgg/ more than anyone else, 
had influenced the course of events just passed. To Kemal 
ensconced in Anatolia, Venizelos was the bitterest foe of 
Turkey who 
"For twenty years ••• dreamed of this moment 
••• created a Balkan League with the rebellous 
Serbs and the Bulgarians and seven years 
ago attacked Turkey ••• in the big war, tiba 
war just finished just two years ago." J'7 
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While the victorious Entente deliberated over the parti-
tion of the Ottoman Empire at Paris and San Remo for more than 
a year, 11° Kemal seize the opportunity afforded by his enemies 
preoccupation with diplomacy to organize a nationalist force 
in the sanctuary of Anatolia with which to challenge and 
eventually revise the Ottoman settlement. 
Interestingly enough, only the Greeks were to be condemned 
for inciting the wrath of Kemal by their "imperialism" in 
Asia Minor, even though among the allies (1) only Greece could 
claim a national element of a sort in the territory ceded by 
Turkey to the allies by the Sevres Treaty, (2) Anglo-French 
forces had commenced occupation of their respective territorial 
awards under the Sevres treaty, while earlier, on November 13, 
1918, the first Allied occupation troops had been disembarked 
at Constantinople and additional Allied troops were later 
landed at Constantinople to support these forces, the allied 
naval forces anchored in the Bosporus, and the resident 
1°9Ray Brock, Ghost On Horseback, The Incredible Ataturk, p. 219. 
llOrt took more than a year to draw up the territorial clauses of 
Sevres for it was only after Britain and France settled betwenn them-
selves their differences over the projected mandates in the Near East 
and the oil concessions in the Mosul territory in particular by the 
Anglo-French Oil Agreement of April 25, 1920 that the Supreme Council 
at San Remo on April 26, 1920 passed on the definitive clauses of the 
Ottoman treaty. For a-discussion of the problems which held up the 
Near East settlement see APPENDIX VI. 
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Allied commissioners at Constantinople;111 (3) Italian troops 
had been landed in southwestern Asia Minor to occupy the 
territory ceded Italy under the Sevres treaty~ month before 
Greek troops landed in the Smyrna enclave allotted to Greece; (4) 
the Greek expeditionary force at Smyrna was landed under the 
protection of naval guns of the allied powers that they might 
occupy the ceded territory and enforce upon the Turks an 
armistice and the proposed treaty; (5) during the period in 
question Greece's allies, Great Britain, France, and Italy had 
themselves become divided over the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the cleavage between these former allies was 
further sharpened by the Anglo-French differences over the 
Rhine territory and Italian dismay over its failure to receive 
the unqualified support of its former allies to realize fully 
the gains which she was "promised" in the Balkans, Near East, 
and Africa by the secret treaty of London. Unfortunately for 
Greece, these discordant allies vented their differences in 
the Near East, and Greece, a jackal among wolves, was made the 
scapegoat of the abortive Turkish settlement and became the 
victim of the growing dissension among her former allies and 
the renewal of Great Power rivalry in the Near East. This 
lllFor example--on February 8, 1919 French troops were landed at 
Constantinople and Franchet d'Esperey, their commander, entered the city 
upon a white horse in imitation of the way Mohammed II, the Conqueror 
had first entered the Byzantium upon its fall to his Ottoman Turks. 
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rivalry coupled with Greek aspirations played no mean part 
in the disastrous defeat suffered by Greece in Turkey and 
ruined the historical idea of a Greater Greece which astride 
the Aegean into Asia Minor. Once again, as after the First 
Balkan War, Turkey was to be saved by the growing jealousy 
among the Powers over the spoils of war. Consequently, Turkey 
was able to accomplish what none of the other Central Powers 
had dared even to try--the repudiation of one of the dictated 
treaties which ended the First World War. 112 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE GREAT IDEA 
Upon the cessation of hostilities the powers of Europe 
in a position to influence the outcome of the Ottoman peace 
settlement were four--the victors Great Britain, }Tance, and 
Italy, and, although defeated in war, a Bolshevik Russia that 
displayed sufficient power to eliminate the counter-revolutionary 
White forces, defeat the Allied interventionist armies and 
keep a zealous eye on similar events brewing across its border 
in Turkey. 
The pro-Greek policy of Great Britain in her effort to 
utilize Greece in the politics of the Near East aroused the 
rivalry of Italy and France. The French and Italians, already 
vexed by Britain's refusal to support their policies in the 
112on March 16, 1935 Hitler established conscription in Germany 
in his first open defiance of the Diktat of Versailles for which 
Germany was condemned on April 17, 1935 by the League of Nations. 
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Rhine and Fiume, were disquieted further by Britain's seizure 
of the lion's share of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, and, 
most important for Greece, they feared that a strong Greece 
would become an instrument of British policy in the Near 
East and a formidable menace to their own aspirations in 
Western Anatolia. Initially, as long as there was no pro-
nounced Turkish opposition, France and Italy were willing, 
although somewhat reluctantly, to go along with the Near East 
settlement being devised at Paris, but as the Turks rose in 
opposition to the Sevres treaty France and Italy backed down 
from enforcing the treaty and entered into negotiations with 
the revolutionary forces of Kemal that ended in an early 
Munich which spelled the ruin of the Ottoman settlement. 
Russia was the other Power that played a decisive role in 
Kemal's defiance of the Allies and successful repudiation of 
the Ottoman peace treaty. In the end, the combination of Kemal's 
superb military leadership and astute diplomacy, based upon 
both inter-Allied suspicions and Bolshevik opportunism, caused 
the nationalist forces to win out over all opponents and 
bring ruin to the idea of a Greater Greece. Before this happened, 
however, much uncommendable history, remained to be written 
between former allies and enemies, and even the United States 
does not emerge with clean hands from the ensuing Allied 
abomination in the Near East between 1919-1922. 
The Allied fiasco in Asia Minor, born in glory on October 30, 
1918 by the Porte's capitulation under the Mudros armistice, 
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ended as a trag·icomedy on July 24, 1923 as the British Empire, 
France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey 
signed the Lausanne Treaty of Peace--the only "negotiated" 
peace of World War I. The story began for Greece on May 15, 
1919 as Greek troops under Article 7 of the Armistice of Mudros 
and supported by Allied naval craft returned to Asia Minor, 
landing at Smyrna almost five hundred years after the fall 
of Constantinople to the Ottomans. This study is not concerned 
directly with the justification or legality of the Greek land-
ing, sanctioned as it was beforehand under Article 7 of Mudros 
by the Allies. Similarly, whether Greek action after the 
landing was justifiable is also a matter of conjecture. For 
the moment suffice it to say here that even two recent pro-
Turkish studies are in conflict. The first, Turkey by Geoffrey 
Lewis published in 1955 states that, 
"This act was declared by the Allies to be in 
accordance with Article 7 of the Armistice 
agreement; without real justification, for, 
as was conclusively shown later, there was no 
threat to Allied Security. ullJ 
Lewis, however, does not offer much proof to support his 
condemnation of the landings, but what can be indicated con-
clusively is the fact that except for some Anglophile sentiment 
among Turkish political and military circles in the immediate 
vicinity of Constantinople, Turkish units and ex-Turkish 
soldiery and deserters had already formed marauding bands to 
challenge the terms of the Mudros settlement and the Allied 
11Jtewis, P• 50. 
occupation of Turkey. Ray Brock, in a most recent favorable 
biography of Kemal Ataturk, aptly describes the emerging 
nationalist agitation against the victors immediately before 
the convocation of the peace conference at which time Kemal, 
in command of the Seventh Ottoman Army headquartered at 
Alexandretta, had vehemently "forbade an English move on 
Alexandretta, the port of the Sandjak." "Never!" wired 
Kemal to Constantinople. "We shall not cringe, lest we be 
annihilated!" Kemal's was no empty threat for, 
"He had already dispatched patrols into the 
Taurus to collect men and form guerrilla 
bands. He sent every available pack of 
supplies to the mountain troops, with 
instructions to lie low. 11 114 
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While no single individual can be considered a threat to Allied 
security, Kemal's threats were no empty boasts as events soon 
proved. They were not made by an unknown officer but by the 
only Turkish hero to emerge from the war just over with an 
unblemished record from the start to the end of the war. After 
Gallipoli Kemal had been lionized in Constantinople newspapers 
as "the Savior of the Dardanelles and of the Capital." His 
leadership provided Turkey with similar victories on the 
Caucasian front against the Russians and on the Syrian and 
desert fronts against the British. To the chagrin of many 
Turks he had not risen above the rank of Army Commander to 
Chief of the Turkish General Staff or Minister of War principally 
for two reasons: first, Kemal, notoriously outspoken, repeatedly 
114Brock, p. 186. 
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challenged the military wisdom of Turkey's ruinous Middle 
East campaigns which he condemned for "sucking the last ounce 
of blood from the corpse of the Ottoman Empire" and as products 
of the German General Staff. Second, Kemal, "a soldier's 
soldier" and not "a political soldier," showed none of the 
niceties and diplomacy necessary to cultivate the Sultan's 
graces and overcome the fear and jealousies of the Young Turk 
Triumvirate--Enver Pasha, the Minister of War and Generalissimo 
who ruled Turkey as a virtual dictator, Talaat Pasha, onetime 
Minister of the Interior and Grand Vizier during much of the 
war, and Jemal Pasha, military governor of Syria and leader of 
the abortive Turkish Expedition against Suez in February 1915. 
They were Kamal's former associates in the Committee of Union 
and Progress who jealously reigned over Constantinople and the 
Sultan during the war. 
Lastly, after relinquishing his Seventh Army command in 
Syria Kemal retired to Constantinople in February 1919, nurtured 
his conspiracy against the Allied occupation of Turkey and the 
impending Ottoman settlement. Through agents he remained in 
constant touch with isolated resistance movements in Anatolia; 
elsewhere he employed gun runners who were busily stealing or 
buying arms and ammunication from the Constantinople depots 
under enemy control. The depth of Kemal's conspiracy in 
Constantinople is attested to by the fact that in these illegal 
operations Kemal received the assistance of key personages 
of the Sultan Government. These included Ismet Pasha, the 
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Undersecretary of State for War; Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of 
Staff, Ali Fethi Bey, Minister for the Interior, and Rauf Bey, 
who had risen to the rank of Minister of Marine, and the 
conspiracy itself had been well developed before the Greek 
landings at Smyrna. As already noted the conspirators, in-
cluded among themselves the number two man in the Ministry 
of War, the Chief of the Armed Forces, the Minister in control 
of the interior police network and communications system, and 
the Minister in charge of coastal communications. The physical 
occupation of Smyrna did not provoke Kemal into organizing an 
illegal apparatus to challenge the Allies, as often charged, 
for this he had already done; if anything, it only cloaked 
Kemalist action with a new raison d'etre and gave it further 
dignity. For its part the Greek landing in Smyrna in 1919 and 
the later police action and the general Greek advance in 
Anatolia and Thrace against insurgent Turks in the summer of 
1920 were well calculated to remove these obstructionists to 
the peace. Unfortunately ttey achieved only the limited 
objective of subduing the nationalist that remained within 
reach of Greek arms. Subsequent Greek army operations in 
1921-22, were calculated to eliminate the nationalist movement 
entirely, but were ill-planne~ for they could only be accom-
plished with the support of all the participants in the 
division of the Ottoman spoils, including the United States 
with its "responsibility" for Armenia. A policy of vigorous 
enforcement of the Ottoman armistice and the treaty of Sevres 
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upon the Turks was needed but neither proved forthcoming. The 
United States turned its back on Greece and Armenia; and, 
except for much encouragement but little material support from 
Britain, Greece's allies, France and Italy, not only abandoned 
their responsibility in Asia Minor and thereby exposed the 
entire Allied situation in the Near East, but refused to 
supply the Greek forces with arms and equipment at a time when 
the Kemalist forces were able to receive much needed supplies 
and money from Bolshevik Russia with which to obtain additional 
arms and equipment from any and all sources, including Italy 
and France, in order to equip fully their growing strength in 
Anatolia. 
Before going further, it might be wise to explain the 
role played by Russia in the Kemalist victory over Greece be-
cause revolutionary Russia helped to lay the groundwork for 
the totality of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor. After World 
War I events made strange bedfellows of Turks and Russians 
long considered "historic" enemies. At least four occurrences 
of common interest to both had forced this unheralded trans-
formation in the "Eastern Question." These were as follows: 
first, both were revolutionary and each had overthrown or 
were in the process of overthrowing governments that had the 
support of the Allies; second, both were chafing from and 
being threatened by new Allied interventions and invasions 
of their territories; third, both were hostile to "Sevres 
Armenia" and had a common interest in preventing the successful 
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emergence of the much heralded independent Armenian republic 
to be created from the Turkish vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, 
Van, and Bitlis near the Russo-Turkish frontier but whose 
northern boundary with Russia remained to be delimited. Be-
sides, Russia historically had an Armenian problem of her own 
and the Bolsheviks presently were facing a new Armenian prob-
lem since Russian Armenia, along with the other rebellious 
Russian Caucasian states of Georgia and Azerbaijan which 
bordered on the proposed Armenian republic, had declared their 
independence of Russia on April 22, 1918. 115 Finally, the 
Kemalists and Bolsheviks held a common hatred and had a 
mutual desire for vengeance against Greece since Greek forces 
had taken part in the Allied intervention in the Odessa area 
of the Ukraine and were now bearing the brunt of the foreign 
intervention against the national struggle in Turkey. With 
Tsarist Russia out of the picture, the Greeks for the first 
time in their modern history soon found no aid forthcoming 
from any quarter, East or West, in their struggle against 
Turkey. The Near East picture had changed completely, for 
now Turkey and not Greece could look to Russia for assistance 
in their fratricidal conflict and should events not work out 
well, Greece, like her other Balkan neighbors, could no longer 
count on Russia. Indeed, Russia now was to assist Turkey 
115Georgia declared its independence on the same day and Azerbaijan 
followed suit on May 26, 1918. These rebellious Russian provinces were 
wedged in the Caucasus between Bolshevik Russia, the proposed Armenian 
Republic, and Kemal's Provisional Government in Anatolia. 
materially in preserving its identity as a nation. 
The revolutionary Kemalists and the revolutionary 
Bolsheviks found a rapprochement or at least the detente 
cordiale to be mutually advantageous; and on August 24, 1920 
Russia and the Provisional Government of Turkey agreed to 
establish diplomatic relations. The first Kemalist diplomat 
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to represent the new Turkey in Russia arrived in Moscow on 
November 8, 1920. In the interim a Nationalist army under the 
command of Kazim Karabekir marching hand in hand with Bolshevik 
Caucasian forces took Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin in October 1910, 
and by the Turco-Armenian peace treaty of December 3, 1920 
Sevres Armenia became extinct. 116 Turkey took back Kars and 
Ardahan while the remainder of "Wilsonian Armenia" fell to 
Russia and was reduced to the Soviet province of Erivan. On 
March 16, 1921 Turkey and Russia bolstered their friendship 
by concluding a treaty of friendship wherein they reaffirmed 
their common struggle against imperialism and agreed "not to 
recognize any peace treaty or other international agreement 
imposed upon the other against its will." Furthermore, Russia 
agreed 
"not to recognize any international agreement 
relating to Turkey which is not recognized by 
the l[emalis!!National Government of Turkey, 
at present r~resented by the Grand National 
Assembly. 11 11 T 
116Article I, Treaty of Friendship: Turkey and Russia 16 March 1921, 
reproduced in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, P• 95. 
117The treaty is also known as the Treaty of Alexandropol which was 
signed for the Bolsheviks by the Communist Government which they had 
installed at Erivan after the Bolshevik conquest of Russian Armenia. 
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Finally on October 13, 1921 Kemalist Turkey formally recognized 
the new Armenian Soviet Republic in the Treaty of Kars, thus 
placing a lid on the coffin of an independent Armenia and con-
cluding the history of Bolshevik-Kemalist diplomacy during 
the ordeal of the Greco-Turkish conflict under consideration. 
Russo-Turkish diplomacy during the immediate post World War I 
period is an excellent example of that dictum first pronounced 
by Lord Palmerston that, "Nations do not have permanent 
friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests." 
It is not difficult to envision the service rendered by 
Russia to the Kemalist cause. The elimination of the Armenian 
threat with the assistance of the Red Army and the friendship 
of Bolshevik Russia secured Turkey from attack from the east; 
Russo-Turkish rapprochement allowed Kemal to receive Bolshevik 
arms and equipment across the Caucasus; and it permitted 
Kemal to strip the Russo-Turkish frontier of men and supplies 
and appreciably reinforce his western front against the 
Greek menace which bore fruit on January 10, 1921 when the 
Nationalist forces under the command of Kemal's lieutenant 
Ismet, reinforced by troops transferred from the eastern front 
in the Caucasus, scored their first success against the Greeks 
at Inonu. 118 
118Hereafter, Ismet was to be known as Ismet Inonu and later be-
came Prime Minister of Turkey from 1925-1937, and upon the death of Kemal 
Ataturk on November 10, 1938, Inonu succeeded Kemal to the presidency and 
served until May 22, 1950 when Kemal's Republican People's Party, after 
a quarter of a century of rule, was defeated by the Democratic Party in 
what was generally conceded to be the first and possibly only free 
election in Turkish history and Turkey's transition from authoritarianism 
The Kemalist victory at Inonu is not only important as 
the first significant success of Nationalist arms against 
Greece but equally important for the reason that it stirred 
Greece's Allies into making an effort to end the hostilities 
between Greece and the Nationalists. The Allies, however, 
did not resort to force of arms to uphold their treaty 
commitments but attempted to resolve the Sevres problem 
through diplomacy. To this end, Britain, France, and Italy 
called a conference in London in February 1921 to which 
representatives of the Allies, the Porte, Kemal, and the 
Greek Government were invited to attend. At the conference 
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the Allies offered Turkey some modification of the terms of 
Sevres, but the conference ended in a dismal failure. Greece 
refused to countenance any compromise which threatened her 
newly attained pre-eminent position in Asia Hinor--the near 
fulfillment of a 500 year old dream. Greece refused to be 
robbed of the millenium which appeared to be within reach and 
before which only a single revolutionary--Kemal--stood to 
prevent its attainment. The Turks came to the conference with 
an immovable object of their own to meet the irresistible 
to democracy. The national election was held on May 14 and elected to 
the National Assembly 408 Democrats, 69 Republicans, National Party 1, and 
9 Independents. The Democrats have been in office ever since, having been 
reelected in 1954 and 1958 but under repeated incriminations by the oppo-
sition Republican Party that the elections were not fair. Ever since com-
ing into power Premier Adnan. Menderes' ruling Democrats have increasingly 
attempted to place a muzzle on the Republican opposition and especially 
Ismet Inonu who has repeatedly attempted to stump the countryside only to 
be rebuffed by Menderes mobs and rowdies, freight trains backed into the 
main line between him and the crowd when he attempted to speak from a train, 
and watch club swinging policemen and bayonet wielding soldiers disperse 
Inonu crowds assembled to listen to modern Turkey's senior soldier after 
Kemal Ataturk and Ataturk's personal heir designate and long time ex-Pri¢e 
Minister and President. 
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force offered by the Greeks. A simple modification of the 
Ottoman treaty would not suffice; the Kemalist delegation 
insisted upon a revision of the entire Sevres settlement and 
especially the clauses which pertained to the Turkish home-
land. Their position can be boiled down to one terse phrase--
Revision not modification and the Greeks must gol The 
Kemalists clung tenaciously to this proposition and with ample 
reason. Kemal had already settled the Armenian question by 
force of arms and had met no opposition from the Allies; 
similarly, the Greek question could be settled in the same 
manner as long as he did not challenge the position of Greece's 
Allies in the non-Turkish segments of the Empire. Moreove~ by 
calling a conference, the Allies had indicated that they 
preferred to settle the dispute by words and not by -war. It 
was no secret that the Allied coalition was divided regarding 
the value of a prolonged conflict with the Nationalists; 
except possibly for the Greeks, it had neither the desire nor 
stomach to fight a prolonged guerrilla war. The British, 
French, and Italians had only a handful of troops in 
Constantinople; Britain and France haQ. deployed the ma.jor 
portion of their forces in the Near East in the Arab provinces 
of the Empire such as Mesopotamia and Syria, and except for 
the Italian troops in the Adalia area and the Greek troops in 
the Smyrna region there were none of consequence in Turkey 
itself. Besides France and Italy, and England to a lesser 
degree, had been sapped of vitality in the late war. Italy 
was plagued by internal dissension at home and engulfed by 
the Fiume crisis; France, with a watch on the Rhine, was 
knee deep in trouble with the Arabs over the Syrian question; 
and it was doubted with Britain fighting reb-ellions almost 
everywhere--in Ireland, Mesopotamia, Afghanistan, and in 
India--that she would risk sending British soldiers into 
Turkey to suppress the Turks in their own country. England 
had already witnessed the unwisdom of such folly from the 
recent experience of the Allied intervention in Russia. 
These were solid factors which favored Kemal's calculated 
risk at London to hold out for a new Ottoman treaty and one 
which incorporated a "Greeks go home" condition, rather 
than a modification of the old settlement. Consequently, 
the Turkish and Greek positions at London were poles apart; 
and the Allies took the opportunity accorded by the impasse 
to wash their hands of the entire matter. Greece's senior 
allies announced their neutrality in the Graeco-Turkish war, 
but not before safeguarding Constantinople and the Straits by 
designating a neutral zone on either side of the Dardanelles 
into which neither side, Greek nor Turk, was to trespass. 
Thus the conflict over the Treaty of Sevres was resumed after 
February, 1921 for what it had been from the outset for Turkey. 
Stated Kemal nearly a year before the London conference, 
"Nark you, our battle is firmly joined now. It is a battle 
to the death with the Greeks. ull9 
119 Brock, p. 222. 
244 
What happened turned out to be a tragedy for Greece. 
Once more in 1921, as they had done previously in 1919 and 
1920, the Greeks went over to the offensive and swept every-
thing before them until they were stopped just short of the 
Kemalist capital of Ankara in the Battle of the Sakkaria 
River, August 24-September 16, which proved the turning point 
of the war. On this same spot six centurjes before the 
Osmanli State had been founded by the Sultan Osman (Othman) 
who gave his name to the Turks, henceforth called the Ottoman 
Turks, and from whom descended the Ottoman dynasty which 
ruled Turkey until 1923. 
The Battle of Sakkaria should rate in importance in Near 
Eastern history with the Battle of Manzikert (1071), for like 
Manzikert, Sakkaria foretold the future of the Greek dream in 
Asia. At Manzikert the Selj_uk Turks under Alp Arslan, the 
brilliant nephew of Ertogrul who earlier had become the first 
of the Turkish sultans receiving the title King of the East 
and the West upon his entry into Baghdad in 1053-1055, 
decisively defeated the Byzantine Emperior Romanus IV and 
virtually destroyed Byzantine power in Anatolia. But more 
important, 
"Though Asiatic conquests have usually been of 
the transient kind, the Seljuk conquest of Asia 
Minor was permanent. Before the disaster of 
Manzikert Asia Minor was essentially a European 
country, largely Greek in culture and wholly 
Christian in religion ••• the invading Turks now 
systematically oppressed or exterminated the 
native Christian population, but behind the 
victorious army poured in a steady stream of 
nomad tribes of Turkish stock who repeopled 
the inner table-land, ••• this race movement 
which, by replacing white with yellow people, 
Christian with Mohammedans, makes Manzikert 
so memorable in the annals of the Near East." 120 
Eight hundred and fifty years later and almost in the same 
fashion, Sakkaria called to a halt a series of events by 
which Asia Minor might have again become predominantly 
Christian, especially Greek and Armenian. Sakkaria foretold 
disaster of a new Greek "empire" in Asia Minor. The Greeks--
the twentieth century forces of Romanus IV--like the forces 
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of Romanus of old, had pursued their prey inadvertently into 
the depths of Anatolia only to come upon them arrayed as a 
single force, drawn up in battle at the Sakkaria. And Kemal, 
like Alp Arslan at Manzikert, fought at Sakkaria what for him 
and for modern day Turkey proved to be the most decisive battle 
of recent Turkish history. After Sakkaria the Greek position 
in Asia Minor, militarily and politically, declined while 
Turkish Nationalism prospered. 
After Sakkaria the Greeks retired to defensive positions 
north and west of Afiun-Karahissar (the name means Opium-
they 
Black-Forest).· For a ye{lr I held on doggedly to these exposed 
positions against repeated sorties by the Turks and in spite 
of their dwindling supplies, the deprivations caused by the 
sparseness of vegetation of the Anatolian hinterland, the 
Anatolian heat and cold, an over extended supply line which, 
in addition, ran through hostile territory and made it 
12Cferdinand Schevill, The History of the Balkan Peninsula,(New York, 1922), 
Chapter X, p. 127. 
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extremely vulnerable to guerrilla forays, and the irrational 
hope that the Allies would come around to support the Greek 
position on the Turkish question. The Greeks foolishly defied 
the hopelessness of the political and military situation until 
August 26, 1922 when the inevitable happened as the rested, 
resupplied, and reinforced Turkish National Army, after 
crushing the war weary and badly supplied Greek troops with 
an intense artillery bombardment, sallied forth and captured 
the Greek positions before Dumlupinar and Afium-Karahissar. 
At Kutayha and Ushak the Turks captured the Greek Commander 
in Chief and his entire staff. The Greek defeat soon developed 
into a complete rout when the battered Greek army, robbed of 
its senior commander and officers, streamed headlong for the 
coast. "Thalassa! Thalassa!," shouted the "Ten Thousand" in 
Xenophon's Anabasis twenty three centuries earlier upon 
finally fighting their way from Cunaxa through the breadth 
of the Persian Empire across rivers, over mountains, and through 
the deep snows of Armenia, ever harassed by the enemy and 
in want of food and clothing to the Greek colonized shores 
of the Black Sea; and again in 1922 the world was to record 
a modern Anabasis as Greek soldiers went streaming westward 
in a new Anabasis. But this time they fled inglor·iously in 
confusion and, in instances, even outrunning the fleeing 
refugees before them in order to escape the victorious Turkish 
army and reach the Thalassa of the Aegean, Mamora, and the 
Bosporus. The route became a total disaster when the advancing 
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Turks took vengeance indiscriminately upon the exposed Christian 
populations in their path, reaching its zenith during the week 
of September 9-14 in the wanton annihilation of the Greek 
populace in the Smyrna area.l21 
After Smyrna, the victorious Turks marched northward to 
deal with the only remaining Greek forces on Turkish territory,They 
soon found the cross-over into Europe barred by a sole British 
force defending the neutral zone of the Straits at Chanak and 
which had been left "holding the bag" after the French and 
Italian government had discreetly withdrawn their contingents 
from the neutral zone just prior to the arrival of the 
victorious Kemalist forces. Appeals by Lloyd George on 
September 15 to the Allies and the Dominions to defend 
Straits fell on deaf ears; France and Italy refused to 
associate themselves with a new intervention in 'l'urkey 
of the Dominions only Australia and New Zealand showed 





the British agreed to enter into armistice negotiations with 
the Kemalists, and on September 23, 1922 M. Franklin-Bouillon, 
representing England, France, and Italy, entrained for Ankara 
121The question of who burned Smyrna has remained shrouded in 
mystery, the Turks blaming the retreating Greek Army, the Greek blaming 
the pillaging Turks. However, the willful and terrible vengeance and 
atrocities visited upon non-combatant citizens, especially women and 
children, in the Greek-Turkish War in Asia Minor cannot be condoned. 
Here again, it is not a question of who or what provoked the atrocities 
or worked them afterwards, for both acts are reprehensible to any nation 
that lays claim to civilization. For an on the spot descriptive account 
by a third party of the Smyrna holocaust see George Horton, The Blight of 
Asia, (Indianapolis, 1926), Mr. Horton was a U. S. Consul General in the 
Near East for thirty years. 
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to make the necessary arrangements towards a general armistice 
agreement preparatory to a definitive peace treaty. On 
September 29, 1922 Britain undertook to disarm and send home 
the Greek Army in Eastern Thrace; and on October 11, 1922 the 
Allies and Ismet Pasha, representing the Turkish Nationalists, 
concluded the Armistice and the Convention of Mudania by which 
the Allies agreed to return Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to 
Turkey and to evacuate Constantinople and the Straits at the 
time of the definitive peace treaty. Turkey, in return, 
agreed to accept the neutralization of the Straits under 
international control. Thus, Turkey was saved from partition 
and the story closed on Greece's misadventure into Asia Minor, 
but not before the Greek disaster came to roost in Britain 
upon Lloyd George whose policy of encouraging the Greeks had 
set aside the historic British policy of friendship with 
Turkey as the cornerstone of British Near East policy. One 
week after Mudania the Conservative members of the Lloyd 
George Coalition withdrew their support from that historic 
coalition which since December 1916 had governed Britain and 
Lloyd George resigned from office closing the book on a brief 
revolution in British Near Eastern diplomacy. Nevertheless, 
as Professor Yale aptly observes, "The European imperialists 
had met with a prophetic set back to their power in the Near 
East," and Mudania not only spelled the end of the Great Idea 
but dated "The beginning of the recession of British and 
French predominance in the Near East."l22 
122 William Yale, The Near East, (Ann Arbor, 1958),p. 287. 
,. 
249 
What caused the Greek disaster in Asia Minor which tumbled 
the Allied Sevres position? There is little doubt that many 
factors contributed to the situation and Greece's allies and 
friends were as much to blame as the venturous Greeks, the 
opportunist Bolsheviks, or the crusading Kemalists. While it 
is true that in the end Greece was caught in the middle of 
her own folly, equally true is. the fact that ( 1 ) the folly was 
not entirely of Greece's making as generally believed, (2) 
the trap that sprang on Greece in 1922 was greased as much by 
Greece's friends as by her own chauvinistic ambitions or the 
acts of Russia or Nationalist Turkey and, as a review of the 
matter reveals clearly, much blame for the entire fiasco can 
be placed squarely at the doorsteps of Greece's allies, 
Britain, France, and Italy, and even the United States, 
supposedly, at most, a quasi-disinterested party in the whole 
affair. What were some of the commissions or omissions 
which influenced or brought on the Greek disaster in Asia 
Minor? 
INSIGHT FROM THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON ANATOLIA 
While the Tripartite (Sevres) Agreement on Anatolia of 
August 10, 1920 between Britain, France, and Italy did not 
go into effect since the Ottoman peace treaty was never 
ratified, an inspection of its articles read in conjunction 
with the Treaty of Sevres reveals the special interests 
of France, Italy, and Britain in the defunct Ottoman Empire 
and the commitments assumed by the Contracting Powers to 
execute the Ottoman Treaty of Peace. 
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In paragraph two of the Tripartite Agreement, the 
Contracting Powers unveiled an enlightened desire of "being 
anxious to help Turkey, to develop her resources, and to avoid 
the international rivalries which have obstructed these objects 
in the past," and they recognized "the respective special 
interests of Italy in Southern Anatolia and of France in 
Cilicia and the western part of Kurdistan bordering on Syria, 
up to Jesireh ibn Omar," as defined in Article 5. Under 
Article 4, the three powers agreed to operate jointly the 
Anatolian railway, the Mersena-Tarsus-Adana railway, and that 
part of the Baghdad railway which was in Turkish territory 
as defined by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Article 7 
assigned to Italy, "All concessions for exploiting the coal 
basis of Heraclea, as well as the means of transport and load-
ing connecting with these concessions." f'inally, having 
established southwestern Anatolia as an Italian sphere of 
interest and Cilicia as an area of French special interest, 
the signatories by Articles 8 and 9 indicated their responsi-
bility in executing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Since 
these articles contained the crux of Allied commitments to 
enforce the Ottoman peace treaty they are quoted below in 
their entirety from Hurewitz, Diplomacy II, p. 89 Litalics are 
those of the authoi/. 
Art. 8. The French and Italian Governments ~ 
withdraw from the respective areas where 
their special interests are recognized 
when the Contracting Powers are agreed 
in considering that the said TreatY of 
Peace is being executed and that the 
measures accepted by Turkey for the 
protection of Christian minorities have 
been put into force and their execution 
effectively guaranteed. 
Art. 9. Each of the Contracting Powers whose 
special interests are recognized in any 
area in Turkish territory shall accept 
therewith the responsibility for 
supervision the execution of the Treaty 
of Peace ·with Turkey with regard to the 
protection of minorities in such area. 
KEMAL AND 'l'HE TURKISH CESSIONS 
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Except for the special-interest concessions granted 
Britain, France, and Italy in Turkey, Greece was the only nation 
that received a territorial award in Turkey proper by the 
Sevres Treaty. The territorial concessions made Britain, France, 
and Italy in the Sevres Treaty were essentially in the non-
Turkish portions of the Empire, and were relatively safe and 
beyond the immediate reach of the Nationalist forces. Besides, 
Kemal had repeatedly insisted that the non-Turkish provinces 
of the empire would be permitted to go their own way but that 
he opposed unconditionally the emasculation of Turkey proper 
and Anatclia which was another way of saying that he was opposed 
to the Smyrna, Armenian, and Kurdistan cessions. The Kemalists 
reiterated this position at the Erzerum Congress, July 23-
August 17, 1919; the Congress of Balikhissar, July 26, 1919; 
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and the Ccngress of Sivas, September 4, 1919 from which emerged 
the Declaration of Sivas of September 9 that announced in six 
points the inviolability of the Turkish homeland and affirmed 
the unity of Turkish territory but accepted the loss of the 
Arab provinces. The Sivas declaration became the basis for 
the Turkish National Pact adopted by the Ottoman Parliament 
on January 28, 1920 which served as the guide of Kemalist 
policy up to and through the Lausanne Conference.123 Further-
more Kemal had repeatedly insisted that for the Turk it was 
primarily a battle to the death with the Greeks and not with 
France or Italy or even the British although he frowned upon 
all of them for their support of Greece. 
Kemal was a realist. He knew that he could not take on 
the Allies together. Hence, to enhance his strategy he played 
fully upon allied jealousies and rivalries to divide the 
Western camp in the Near East by dangling before them economic 
concessions in Turkey and territorial concessions in the non-
Turkish parts of the Empire. He made it clear repeatedly that 
he had no quarrel with Greece's allies. On the contrary, he 
had no desire to challenge their Sevres awards and, as far as 
the commercial concessions under the Tripartite accord on 
Anatolia were concerned, they could be worked out amicably. 
For that reason the Allies had nothing to gain by aiding Greece 
123The six principles of the National Pact were as follows: The 
Turkish land, except for the Arab provinces, was inviolable,self-determination, 
security of Constantinople, opening of the Straits, guaranteed rights of 
minorities, and the abolition of the Capitulations. 
in Turkey and nothing to gain by warring against Nationalist 
Turkey. For his part, Nationalist Turkey could never be made 
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to accept the Greek portion of the Ottoman settlement, and 
Kemal made his feelings clear on the matter. He, like all Turks, 
held an ingrained hate for the Greeks; a hate which had been 
the result of centuries of bitter history as evinced by one of 
his typical anti-Greek declarations used to remonstrate the 
derisive deputies of his own Grand National Assembly when they 
wavered before the initial Greek victories. "You are Turks!", 
Kemal shouted, "Will you crawl on your knees to these Greeks 
who, yesterday, were your slaves, your vassals?" 124 As far as 
Greece's allies and friends were concerned Kemal's views were 
equally prophetic~ The Italians were to be "discounted"; the 
French were "practical"; the British were "perfidious ••• who 
will abandon them Lthe Greek§/ to their ghoulish adventure here 
in our Anatolia when we have driven them into the sea!"; and 
the United States, "these extraordinary Americans have alr·eady 
gone home, or they are going as fast as their ships will carry 
them." 125 It is not difficult to see that Kemal was certain 
of one thing, above all others; the Allies would abandon Greece 
to her fate once they realized where their interests lay; and 
he, Kemal, was going to do his utmost to show them who held 
their interests. 
124Brock, P• 223. 
125 Ibid. P• 214. 
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ITALY 
Of the Allies, Italy, the "discounted" and the weakest 
member of the Allied coalition against Kemal, was the first to 
succumb to Kemal's prophesy to the detriment of the Greek 
position in Asia Minor. Next to Turkey, the growing pre-
dominance of Greece in Near Eastern affairs greatly disturbed 
Italy, for Italy like Turkey had been similarly opposed to the 
growth of Greek influence in the Balkans and the Levant. The 
Italians who had entered the war to wrest control of the 
Adriatic from Austro-Hungary and to annex the rich Smyrna 
vilayet and the port of Smyrna from Turkey now found their 
ambitions frustrated by their historic Balkan rivals, the Greeks 
and the Serbs, since 1912-13 forged in alliance by Venizelos, 
the same pillar of the Balkan alliance system which eliminated 
Turkey as a power in Europe and who now challenged Italy's 
aspirations in the Balkans and the Levant. The traditional 
Italo-Serb rivalry in the Balkans rose to challenge Italian 
domination of Fiume and Dalmatia and the creation of the 
Adriatic as an Italian Mare Nostrum. The historic Italo-Greek 
rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean challenged Italy's claims 
to Smyrna, the off-shore islands of the Dodecanese which guard 
the eastern approaches to the Aegean and begird the southern 
coast of Turkey and Italy's share in the Turkish spoils in the 
Adalia award and especially within the immediate environs of 
the city of Adalia itself. The difficulties engendered by this 
situation were not lost to Italy for Italy had experienced 
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troubles with Greek irredentism in "Northern Epirus" and the 
Dodecanese, and only Greece stood in the way of the outright 
execution of these Italian aspirations which, next to the 
Adriatic, would have made the Levantine Aegean and Mediterranean 
waters lapping the eastern Aegean Greek islands and the eastern 
and southern shores of Turkey a second Italian ~ Nostrum. 
For her part, Italy had nothing to gain by contributing to the 
creation of a Greece in Asia Minor. If anything, Italy stood 
to lose greatly since a Greater Greece stood an excellent 
chance of achieving parity with Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
As if being challenged by her Balkan rivals, Greece and 
Serbia at Paris was not enough, Italy found herself also plagued 
by "the un-ally-like behavior" of her wartime allies Britain 
and France, and especially the United States which looked with 
disfavor towards the Italian demand for the incorporation of 
Fiume into Italy--a demand not based on the secret Treaty of 
London which had left Fiume for the Yugoslavs, but founded on 
President Wilson's own principle of self-determination. The 
Italians now witnessed their claim to Fiume wither away when 
none other than the American President himself challenged 
Italy's claim to the former port of Hungary, stating that 
Italy could not have it both ways: on the one hand, gaining 
certain territories (the upper Tyrol, Istrian Peninsula, and 
the annexed regions of Dalmatia on the east coast of the 
Adriatic) because of secret treaties, and yet other territory 
because they invoked his principles--and even then Italy had 
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no claim to Fiume if the populous suburbs where the Slavs 
predominated were counted in the population. 126 The Italian 
position on Fiume to Wilson was contrary to the principles of 
his Fourteen Points, and especially Number 9 which stipulated 
clearly that Italy's frontiers should be drawn "along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality.~ vfuile the American 
President tended to waive the above condition in favor of 
Italy in the Upper Tyrol and Dalmatia under pressure from the 
British and the French, he remained adamant on the position 
of Fiume, even to the point of going over the head of the 
Italian Prime Minister and journeying to Rome to make his 
famous appeal against Italian territorial claims directly to 
the Italian people. 
The best France and Britain did for Italy on the matter 
of Italian territorial claims in conflict with President 
Wilson's principles was to claim that they were honor-bound 
to keep their word given under the secret treaty only and 
could not justly make representation on behalf of Italy for 
Fiume since Fiume had been previously pledged to Serbia by the 
same secret treaty. 127 
The position of the American President and the attitude 
126see A. E. Moodie, The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, (London, 1945), 
for a most authoritative account of the complicated racial problems of 
Triest and Fiume, the Istrian peninsula and the regions to the immediate 
north in Italy and Yugoslavia. 
127For a brief discussion of the Fiume problem and its effects on 
Italian politics and its settlement see APPENDIX V Fiume. 
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taken by Britain and France in the Fiume matter embittered 
the Italians immensely, especially since, besides Fiume, 
there loomed the prospective loss of Italian aspirations in 
the Near East and Africa. First the Dodecanese Islands, 
previously promised Italy by the secret London agreement, were 
to fall to Greece by a treaty signed between Italy and Greece 
on July 29, 1919. Second, the Smyrna territory previously 
promised Italy by the abortive Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne 
was now promised to Greece. Third, at San Remo Italy received 
no mandates in the Near East. Fourth, crowning these three 
setbacks, the Italians felt that their gains in the African 
settlement fell far short of Italian aspirations and Allied 
war promises. In tre secret London treaty the Entente Powers 
promised Italy that should they increase their African terri-
tories at the expense of Imperial Germany, 
"Italy may claim some equitable compensation, 
particularly as regards the settlement in her 
favour of the questions relative to the 
frontiers of the Italian colort!s belonging to 
France and Great Britain ••• " 
but the best Italy could do in this connection was to receive 
some territory conceded by Britain along the frontier of the 
Italian Somaliland. 
Italy's statesmen and people reacted violently to the 
peace settlement. In exchange for nearly one and one-half 
million casualties, a huge war debt, run away inflation, and 
128 
-Secret (London Agreement: The Entente Powers and Italy, 
26 April 1915, Article 1.3. 
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a restless, listless, and discontented population torn by 
communist and fascist riots, they claimed Italian participation 
in the war had been for nought for Italy had been able to re-
ceive only an additional 9000 square miles of territory Lwith 
a population of 1.6 million~ and no mandates; Italy had been 
much maligned and betrayed by her allies at the peace con-
ference--a charge which is more falsethan true when measured 
against definitive Allied wartime promises. First, Italy was 
able to secure most of the gains specificallY promised her in 
Europe by the secret treaty which included Italia Irredenta--
Trieste, Goritzia, Gradisca, Istria, the Tyrol to the Brenner 
Pass, and the province of Dalmatia--Italy remained in occupation 
of the naval base of Valona in Albania which, except for Fiume, 
gave Italy the best harbors in the Adriatic. Second, in the 
Near East Italy received recognition of southwestern Anatolia 
as an area of special Italian interest. Third, in Africa 
Italy obtained rectification of the Somaliland frontier and 
in her favor Turkey's renunciation of all rights and privileges 
which had been left to the Porte in Libya under the 1912 Treaty 
of Lausanne. These substantial gains in Europe, the Balkans, 
the Near East, and Africa, however, apparently made little 
difference to the Italians for they were less concerned with 
redeeming Italia Irredenta about the Adriatic and more concerned 
with building a grandiose colonial empire and not one that 
simple hovered off the Italian boot. Consequently, the 
Italians became more concerned with counting their "losses" 
than counting their gains, and the Fiume issue clouded the 
windfall of Italia Irredenta; Greece's Smyrna coup over-
shadowed the recognition of southwestern Anatolia as an area 
259 
of special Italian interest, and the Anglo-French coup ·of the 
German colonies in Africa blurred the rectification of Jubaland 
from British Kenya, the retention of Italy's protectorate over 
Abyssinia, and the definitive acquisition of Libya which, when 
all told, was no mean empire for a nation whose contribution 
to the war just won never measured up to Entente expectations. 
Nevertheless after Paris Italy was fed up with the war and 
her Allies, and considering the historic Italo-Greek rivalry 
it is not surprising then that the Italians should vent their 
forward policy in Asia Minor after Sevres. 
On March 13, 1921 Italy and the Kemalist Government signed 
an agreement wherein, in return for economic concessions 
similar to those granted Italy under the 1'riparti te Agreement 
on Anatolia, Italy agreed to abandon Adalia and Southwest 
Anatolia to Nationalist Turkey!29 
The signing of the Italo-Turkish agreement of 1921 proved 
a diplomati~military, and political bonanza for Kemal. 
Diplomatically, tenuous as it may seem, the Quirinal had 
accorded recognition to Kemal's Provisional Government, and, 
in effect, by not withdrawing its recognition of the Ottoman 
Government at Constantinople acknowledged the existence of 
two Turkeys. Thus Italy broke the Entente "quarantine" 
125fhe Italians ended their occupation of the Adalia zone on 
July 5, 1921. 
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against revolutionary Turkey. Militarily, the agreed withdrawal 
of Italian troops from Adalia under the treaty was a boon to 
the Nationalists since no longer did they have to concern them-
selves with an Italian threat to their southern flank, and, 
at the same time, Italian action exposed the Greek position 
at Smyrna and forced the Greeks to concern themselves with a 
potential new front which taxed and further weakened their 
already over-extended front in Anatolia. As if this wasn't 
enough, the Italians soon sold arms and military supplies to 
Kemal's insur,gent forces. Finally, politically the Italian 
"surrender" to the Nationalists gave substance to Kemal's 
belief that he collld split the allies. With Italy out of the 
picture Kemal turned to France whom he considered, with much 
reason, the second weakest link in the Allied coalition facing 
Nationalist Turkey. The French previously, fearing a rumored 
pro-British coup in Constantinople by the Grand Vizier Damad 
Pasha in September 1919, had sent Georges Picot to feel out 
Kemal as to whether an arrangement could be worked out awarding 
France exclusive economic privileges in the region; and after-
wards, following the acrid battle of Bozanti between French 
troops and Turkish insurgents, the French had even hinted 
strongly that they desired an armistice. While these initial 
Kemalist-French pourparlers in 1919-20 came to nought, they 
were an omen of the new trend emerging in the Allied French 
camp in the Near East. 
261 
FRANCE 
After the Paris Peace Settlements, France had become 
bitterly resentful of the privileged position Mr. Lloyd George 
had carved out for Britain in the Middle East. In addition, 
the French disapproved of the British for not supporting 
France's German policy and for giving only latent support to 
the French position in Syria and the Lebanon, not to mention 
the British coup of the oil rich Mosul region. France, there-
fore, felt little obligation to support British policy in 
Turkey especially since she, like Italy, began to feel that 
Britain, having carved out the lion's share of Ottoman spoils 
for herself, was now establishing Greece as the new instrument 
of British policy in the Near East and the culmination of a 
Greek victory in the north against the Nationalist Turks 
coupled with Britain's pre-eminent position in the south 
among the Arabs would sandwich France's position in the Near 
East between these two prominent pro-British forces. Finally, 
after Britain, the ubiquitous "Greek Idea," like the "Arab 
Idea, 11 stood to endanger ,rising French preeminence in the Near 
East. 
It is difficult to believe that before France signed the 
Treaty of Sevres French foreign policy was not conscious of 
Greek aspirations and Arab ambitions; and after Sevres it 
appears that more and more it hardly occurred to the Quai d'Orsay, 
as it occurred even less to the Quirinal, that France, like 
Italy, along with Britain and Greece, had acquired along with 
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their San Remo awards certain obligations of enforcement under 
the Sevres settlement. While special considerations or events 
since San Remo might be used to rationalize a new situation, 
it did not remove the obligation which they had assumed under 
the treaty; nor did it empower them to treat with the 
Nationalist Turks who were in open rebellion against the treaty, 
and finally, as provided for under the Tripartite Agreement, 
did it permit unilateral abandonment of their position in 
Turkey without prior consultation among the Allies. 
Unlike the Italians, the French at times made an attempt 
to take the field seriously against the insurgent Turkish 
forces; but strangely from the outset, French forces suffered 
repeated defeats at the hands of marauding nationalist bands. 
French failures are especially noteworthy for the Greeks had 
repeatedly engaged a sizeable part of the Kemalist forces in 
Anatolia. Why the French forces in the Near East should suffer 
repeated reversals at the hands of the insurgent Turks is 
unknown; however, one or two assumptions may be reasonably 
ventured. First, the French soldier in Anatolia had lost 
the esprit, determination, and staying power which he had 
displayed in Flanders; second, the French had no desire to 
undertake an extensive offensive against the Nationalist Turks. 
Incidents such as the success of a Kemalist raid on the French 
supply depot at Akbas on the night of February 26, 1920 
netting the Turkish insurgents 8000 rifles, 40 machine-guns, 
and 20,000 boxes of ammunition, or the special clause in the 
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Franklin-Bouillon Agreement by which France abandoned to the 
Nationalist forces war material to equip some 4o,ooo men, only 
adds to the suspicion of the duplicity of French diplomacy in 
Asia Minor. Apparently, the Quai d'Orsay, already disillusioned 
by Whitehall's postwar German, Greek, and Arab policies, wavered 
after the reversals suffered by the French military in Cilicia 
at the hands of Nationalist forces, losing what desire it 
might have had for the enforcement articles of the Sevres 
settlement, and then succumbed totally when Kemal dangled 
before it extensive economic concessions, even to the extent 
that France could have Syria and Arabia if she could hold them. 
'I'he Kemalist-French issue came to a head in the Franklin-
Bouillon agreement. 
On October 19, 1921 a secret French envoy, M. Franklin-
Bouillon arrived at Ankara and within twenty-four hours signed 
the unpublicized pact of peace known as the Ankara-Agreement For 
the Promotion of Peace, or otherwise known as the Franklin-
Bouillon Agreement13°--the second such agreement between the 
provisional Turkish nationalist government and a member of the 
allied coalition in occupation of Turkish territory. Under 
the Ankara Agreement Turkey agreed to cede Syria and Lebanon 
to France and to grant France extensive concessions on the 
roads and railways of Eastern Anatolia linking up with the 
lJOYusuf Kemal Bey, the Turkish nationalist Foreign Minister signed 
for the Ankara government; Henri Franklin-Bouillon signed for the Quai 
d'Orsay, thereby giving his name to the accord by which it is more commcnly 
known. 
communications network in Syria; France, in return, agreed to 
evacuate Cilicia which she had occupied under the Tripartite 
Agreement on Anatolia. 
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The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement was particularly dis-
astrous for Greece and the Sevres cause. First, by treating 
with the Kemalists the French brought into the open the grave 
difference between the major allies, Britain and France, over 
the Turkish settlement. Britain had refused repeatedly to deal 
with Kemal whom she considered no better than a rebel and an 
outlaw, and insisted that the Sultan's Government in Constan-
tinople was the only recognized government of Turkey. Hereto-
fore, France had similarly refused to add respectibility to 
the Kemalist cause, but by dealing with the Ankara government 
in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement France, like Italy, had now 
indicated at least tacit de facto recognition of the Provisional 
Nationalist Government. Without withdrawing its recognition 
of the Porte, France, in effect, had also recognized the 
existence of the two Turkeys, the "kept 11 one under the aegis 
of the Allies and circumscribed to Constantinople, and the 
"free" one at Ankara which was now allowed to add Cilicia to 
its province by France; second, under the Ankara Agreement the 
French abandoned to the Nationalists sufficient military stores 
to equip 40,000 troops, and the evacuation of the French posi-
tion in Cilicia freed approximately Bo,ooo Turkish troops for 
operations against the Greeks who were now forcing the main 
Kemalist army before the Sakkaria on the sole remaining Allied 
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front in Turkey. 
GREAT BRITAIN 
In the aftermath of World War I, Great Britain, and 
especially Lloyd George favored a strcng Greece astride the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor to replace a vanquished 
Turkey as the historic guardian of the Straits against Russia 
which now had the added scarlet sin of being Bolshevik. Be-
sides, in Greece, ever haunted by the spectre of Byzantium, 
Britain found a ready instrument to force upon the Turks the 
Ottoman settlement, and particularly upon the insurrectionary 
Kemalists who were receiving aid and comfort from Red Russia, 
itself at war with the Allies. Moreover, what would guarantee 
that if the Kemalists succeeded in overthrowing the weak 
Sultan and the Ottoman settlement they would not contiue their 
collaboration with the Soviets afterwards? Were not the 
Bolsheviks and Kemalists both revolutionary in character? Were 
they not in the throes of a violent revolution? Hadn't the 
Allies intervened in both Turkey and Russia? Were they not 
both fighting for their existence against a common enemy? Why 
would tLey not continue to conjoin their interests? Consequently, 
everything indicated that a strong Greece was the logical 
successor to a vanquished Turkey in the Near East; the post-war 
climate in Britain, however, neither supported a prolonged 
struggle in the Near East nor did it prove especially favorable 
to the position entrusted to Greece by Britain in the Ottoman 
settlement. 
The British people had become weary of the war drum and 
interventions, Throughout 1920 and 1921 Britain had been 
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131 plagued at home by the sanguinary struggle in Ireland, and, 
similarly, but to varying degrees, exasperated further by dis-
cordant voices from India, Persia, Iraq, and Egypt, and the 
ugly dilemma of Palestine, Jews, Arabs, and conflicting promises. 
In addition, for fear of stirring up reaction among Britain's 
Muslim subjects in India and elsewhere in the Empire, Britain 
was reluctant to give open support to the Greeks against Turkey 
whose ruler was still the Caliph of Islam. After the dismal 
failure of the Allied intervention in Russia, many British were 
openly skeptical of the wisdom of sending British troops into 
Turkey to suppress the Turks in their own country. Of the 
Dominions, only Australia and New Zealand, whose ANZACS had 
carried a heavy share of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire 
in the Near East, had shown an active interest in Lloyd George's 
Near East policy and intervention in Turkey. All these factors 
prevented a more direct British policy backed with a military 
punch against the Kemalists which worked to the detriment of 
the Greek position in Asia Minor; but there was still one more 
factor which acted perniciously to the Greek position and 
131For example the demand by British liberal opinion for conciliation 
in order to put an end to the Irish question proved strong enough in 1920 
to pass the Government of Ireland Act on December 23, 1920 to induce the 
British government to call a conference in 1921 and sign a treaty on 
December 6, 1921 which granted Ireland Dominion status as the Irish Free 
State. 
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historically had favored Turkey over Greece. After the war 
the historic Turcophile element of the British Government that 
had been temporarily out of influence since Turkey's advent in 
the war on the side of the Central Powers again began to raise 
its voice for a return to the British policy of friendship 
with Turkey as a counterbalancing factor to Russia whom they 
still feared in spite of her comparative weakness. They in-
creasingly cautioned against Lloyd George's "pro-Greek" policy 
and Kemalist diplomacy which had succeeded in the short span of 
three years in promoting friendship between Russia and Turkey 
contrary to the history and long-time strategy of British 
diplomacy in the Eastern Question. They looked aghast at the 
increasing Russo-Turkish amity which after Sevres loomed higher 
than it ever had since the husso-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi of 1833. Apprehensively they watched while Russia 
emerged for a second time within ninety years as Turkey's sole 
benefactor and ally. 
The movement for a return to a pro-Turkish policy increased 
in stature as Britain's Allies one by one succumbed to Kemal. 
It reached its peak with "The Chanak Affair" and the celebrated 
Carlton Club meeting which caused the memorable collapse of 
Lloyd George 's Six-year Coalition Ministry and reset British 
Near Eastern foreign policy on its historic true course from 
which it has not deviated since. 
While Lloyd George's diplomacy against Turkey may have been 
opportunely contrived during and immediately after World War r, 
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nothing short of a complete reversal in either British military 
policy or British foreign policy could rescue the disastrous 
situation in which Britain found itself after the abandonment 
of the Sevres position by Italy and France in 1921 and the 
collapse of the Greek army in 1922. Seemingly, thereafter, 
two courses lay open for Britain. The British could have either 
taken the field against the Nationalist Turks and unilaterally 
continued the war; or Britain could take the more simple way 
out by negotiating an armistice with Kemal and joining her 
other allies in a new general Near East settlement. As already 
noted, the former was a near impossibility for surely if it 
had not been expeditious for Britain to join in the action 
against the Kemalists during the heyday of Greek successes in 
1919, 1920, and 1921 and when French and Italian forces were 
also ensconced in position in the south and when the Kemalists 
suffered notoriety it would be sheer madness now for Britain 
to go it alone without the ambitious Greek army, without France 
and Italy, and now that the Kemalists had acquired respectibility 
and proved that they and not the cringing Porte were worthy of 
governing Turkey. The British, therefore, took the latter 
course, but only after insisting that the Kemalists guarantee 
the ''international" character of the Straits. 
The British position in the Asia Minor conflict is put into 
better light when it is remembered that the British, ever 9bsessed 
by the Straits• question, the common denominator in all British 
thinking in the Eastern Question, were stirred into positive 
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action against the Kemalist forces only after the Turks, having 
routed the Greeks, marched on the Dardanelles. Only then (on 
September 15, 1922), did Lloyd George issue his appeal to the 
Allied Powers and the British Dominions to join in defense of 
the Straits and take up the struggle against the Turks; however, 
the appeal proved hollow for Kemal had disrupted the coalition 
against him, using diplomacy against the Franco-Italian segments 
and destructive force against the Greeks. Not only did France 
and Italy turn aside the British appeal but they withdrew their 
component units of the Allied Army of Occupation in the Straits 
and left the British force to face the Turks alone at the 
climactic moment. Thus isolated Britain agreed to enter into 
negotiations leading to the Armistice of Mudania, but refused 
to budge from the Straits, even in the face of intimidation by 
the cantankerous Turks wbo swaggered before the British lines 
at Cannakale (Chanak), until the Straits issue was settled by 
an international conference which would guarantee the inter-
national character of the Straits. It appears that the British 
believed that the "international character of the Straits" 
could best be defended at the Straits, and with Britain sitting 
astride both Constantinople and the Straits she held the key 
to the Eastern Question which insured for Britain, Adalias, 
Cilicias, and Smyrnas notwithstanding, a leading place at any 
conference on the Straits. 
While one might argue the many rights and wrongs of such 
a position, it cannot be denied that because the British remained 
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in possession of the Straits at the time of the Mudania Armistice 
and later at the deflnitive treaty of Lausanne, they accomplished 
for themselves and without the necessary sacrifices of war 
essentially their aim in enccuraging a forward Greek policy 
against Turkey after World War I and the cardinal principle upon 
which 19th and 20th century British diplomacy in the Near East 
Lexcept for the brief interlude in the Constantinople Agreement 
of 1915, which, in any case, never went into effec1/, had been 
based; the prevention of any Russian unilateral action, 
occupation, or exclusive privilege in the Straits. To their 
credit it must be admitted that the British in the Eastern 
Question have known when to fight, and where to take a determined 
stand. Nowhere was this better demonstrated than in the Kemalist 
question. By unilaterally taking a determined stand astride 
the Straits at Chanak, Britain signified clearly the importance 
it attached to the problem of the Straits and by refusing to be 
intimidated by the Kemalist forces as the French and Italians 
had been, Britain not only insured the international character 
of the Straits, but1 equally important for the British position, 
Britain retained the respect of the peoples of the Near East, 
a most important factor in treating with the oriental mind and 
a factor which the United States has been slow to learn in 
dealing with Near Eastern peoples today.l32 
132Britain in the Near East, unlike its present day "successor" the 
United States, may not be liked or has it ever laid any claim to being liked, 
but it is res_Eected. America, on the other hand, may be "liked" but is not 
respected. Ironic as it may seem, being liked and being respected are not 
synonomous nor does one follow the other, and historically nowhere in this 
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All of this, of course, did not help Greece in her venture 
in Anatolia for by her "go it alone" policy in Turkey she 
suffered a catastrophic defeat in Asia Minor, and, by the final 
desertion of Britain of the Sevres position after Chanak, the 
curtain came down on a Greece in Asia Minor. Alone, Greece 
could never have gone to Asia Minor in the first place, and 
it was precisely because of this fact that the viorld War I 
Allied coalition, as Venizelos correctly realized, was tailor-
made for Greece's Balkan and Near Eastern aspirations. The 
coalition consisted of major powers and not merely Balkan 
states. All the powers were committed in the war and there 
was no power, as had been the case in the past, that could 
interfere and call a halt to the total defeat of Turkey, i.e., 
if the Central Powers lost the war which Venizelos was certain 
they would do. No longer was Great Britain the guardian of 
the Straits and the guardian of Turkey. Turkey was no longer 
Britain's "fair haired boy" in the Near East as she had been 
in the past; Greece now had merely to heed Great Britain and 
follow in the vanguard of the coalition against Turkey in order 
more evident than in the Near East. As "successors" to the British mantle 
in the Near East, Americans, rather than being most concerned as to whether 
they are liked or not, should take a page out of British history and con-
cern themselves with gaining the respect of these nations and peoples. There 
must be something 11Chanaks11 and the typically British tradition of abandon-
ing a position only after such "formalities" as a full dress parade with 
flags flying, regimental colors and battle streamers and to the tune of 
bagpipes which Americans seem to scoff at. The author witnessed such a 
demonstration when British forces "evacuated" Greece in 1949-50 and when 
the British Military Mission, Greece was "withdrawn" from Athens in 1952 
during which time these British units displayed two typical British 
characteristics of being unassuming in victory and defiant in defeat. 
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to achieve her aspirations. Greece had merged the Greek Idea 
with the Allied cause, and Great Britain had carried for the 
Allies the major share of the war against Turkey. But afterwards 
in Asia Minor Greece had neither the manpower nor the resources 
to stay in Turkey, especially after Italy and France pulled the 
rug from under the Greek position by treating with the Kemalists, 
and Britain refused to engage in military operations against 
the Kernalist insurrectionary forces. When Britain agreed to 
the Mudania armistice she served the coup de grace to the Greek 
Sevres position and when Britain returned to her old policy of 
friendship with Turkey as a counterbalancing factor to Russia, 
Greece lost what very well may have been her last chance and 
best opportunity to return to Asia Minor and to achieve the 
Great Idea. 
THE UNI'l'ED STATES 
The official American position in the war and especially 
the war in the Balkans and in the Near East was unique and 
complicated. First, when the United States declared war against 
Imperial Germany and the Porte and Austria-Hungary severed 
relations with the United States, the United States never 
declared war on Ottoman Turkey and only declared war on Austria-
Hungary on December 7, 1917 upon advice from its "Allies" that 
such action would rescue Italian morale from the depths of 
despair after the Itaian disaster at Caporetto; second, during 
the war, Bulgaria never severed relations with the United States 
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nor did the United States break off relations with Bulgaria, 
let alone declare war on Bulgaria; third, the United States, 
never having entered into a formal treaty of alliance with the 
Triple Entente, considered itself at best an "associated power'' 
in the war against the Central Powers and was so accepted by 
the Entente in a gesture made almost solely to soothe historic 
American antipathy towards entangling alliances. This dis-
tinction between an "associated" power and an "allied" power 
is even less important for this study since once having entered 
the conflict against Germany and later Austria-Hungary the 
United States gave it fullest support and cooperation to the 
defeat of all the Central Powers, including Bulgaria and 
Turkey. Finally, lest the reader believe that the United 
States displayed no concern in Near Eastern affairs and the 
defunct Ottoman Empire after the armistices, it raight be prudent 
to note American participation in Near Eastern affairs at about 
the time in question before attempting a discussion of America's 
role in the Greek disaster in Asia Minor. 
American interest in Western Asia traveled the full 
spectum of the polity of the region, social, religious, economic, 
military, sti·a tegic, and diplomatic. It entailed: ( 1 ) continued 
interest in century-old social and religious activities of 
American Protestant missionaries; (2) concern for the economic 
interests of American oil companies which before and after Sevres 
actively sought the assistance of the u. s. State Department 
in the Near East, lest they be excluded frcm the petroleum 
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concessions and the exploitation of oil in the new mandates 
and former parts of the Ottoman Empire; (3) in the military 
and strategic sphere after the armistice (a) the United States 
as well as the other major Allied powers was represented at 
Constantinople by a High Commissioner, (b) American naval units 
were among the inter-Allied fleet in anchor at Constantinople 
and American ships took part in the Allied flotilla which 
supported the Greek landings at Smyrna; and (4) even though the 
United States was not officially represented in the confernce 
at San Remo leading to the abortive Treaty of Sevres, in the 
diplomatic arena the United States showed active concern in 
the disposition of the Ottoman territories as witnessed by the 
following: 
(1) "Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson 
by the Intellig~nce Section of the American 
Delegation to the Peace Conference," dated 
January 21, 1919~ LQiscussed below but otherwise 
see footnot,Y .13:, 
(2) "Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission on 
Szria and Palestine," dated August 28, 1919, 
/primarily a fact-finding commission to elucidate 
the state of opinion and the soil to be worked 
upon by any mandatory and to report their finding 
to the Paris Peace Conference by two Americans 
Henry c. King and Charles R. Crane. Initially 
the fact finding venture was envisioned as a 
Joint Allied Commission; however, France refused 
to participate in the commission, and Britain, 
after brief hesitation, similarly abstained from 
participating. On the basis of their six weeks' 
tour of the region, King and Crane recommended 
an American mandate for Syria, or an a second 
l33H. N. Howard, Partition of Turkey, 1913-1923, (Norman, 1931), 
Chp. 7. C. Seymour and E. M. House, What Really Happened at Paris, 
(New York, 1921), Chp. 8. 
alternative a British mandate; a British 
mandate for Mesopotamia, and opposed the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
which was to become part of a united Syrian 
state. In addition the two "commissioners" 
favored constitutional Arab monarchies for 
the two regions in question under the mandatory 
system and endorsed Faisal for the kingship fo 
Syria. The King-Crane report was never dis-
cussed by the Paris Peace Conference; it was 
pigeon-holed in the morass of the archives of 
the American delegation and not published until 
1922, long after the peace settlement. Obviously, 
the report was not in accord with Anglo-French 
promises and aspirations. Nevertheless this 
American adventure in international politics to 
get at the root of the wishes of the population 
of the "Fertile Crescent," naive as it may seem 
when compared with the traditional European 
methods, was indicative of American interest 
in the Near East at the time of the Ottoman 
Settlement. 134 
(3) The record of United States inter-v1ar oil policy 
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in the Near and Middle East, which demonstrated 
American foreign policy in the Middle East through-
out the 1920's and especially from May 12, 1920 -
November 3, 1923. LWherein the United States 
insisted that the mandatory powers should provide 
equal economic opportunity to the nationals of all 
nations through the strict application of the 
"open door" principle throughout the Near and 
Middle East which was primarily aimed to enable 
American firms to join in the development of the 
regions oil resource~l35 
134
see E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, (rev. ed.), 
(Cambridge, 1950). H. N. Howard, An American eriment in Peace-Makin 
The King-Crane Commission, The Moslem World, 32 April 1942 pp. 122-14 • 
J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas: The Back round of United States 1 licy, (New York, 1953 • Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq, 
n, 1935). Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 
(New York, 1922). Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine 
Relations, (Washington, 1949). George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 
(Philadelphia, 1939). 
l35B. Gerig, The Open Door and the Mandate System, (London, 1930). 
s. H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development, 
(New York, 1954). H. L. Hoskins, The Middle East, Problem Area in World 
Politics, (New York, 1954). B. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the 
Great Powers, (New York, 1955). D. H. Finnie, Desert Enterprise: The 
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The "Tentative Reconunendationsu drawn up for the guidance 
of President Wilson in dealing with the Near East problem at 
the peace conference is indicative of American concern at the 
time in Near Eastern affairs which found its way in the Ottoman 
settlement and contained many inconsistencies, considering the 
avowed American position under Articles XII and V of President 
Wilson's Fourteen Points which stated respectively that 
uThe Turkish portions of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, 
but the other nationalities whicb are now under 
Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a 
free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. 
"A free, open minded, and absolutely impartial 
adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon 
a strict observance of the principle that in 
determining all such questions of sovereignty 
the interests of the populations concerned must 
have equal weight with the equitable claims of 
the government whose title is to be determined." 
The principles enunciated in these articles were, in essence, 
eventually incorporated by the Allies in the Political Clauses 
of the Treaty of Sevres, inasmuch as a scheme of local autonomy 
was set up for the Kurdish areas, Armenia was to be recognized 
as a free and independent State, Smyrna with its strong Greek 
Middle East Oil Industry In Its Local Environment, (Cambridge, 1958). 
While Finnie's book does not treat to any extent the politics behind the 
oil concessions, the author treats well and brings up to date the develop-
ing pattern and conflicts emerging in this desert enterprise and the local, 
regional, and international problems involved in "one of the most remarkable 
partnerships in world history'' wherein "the oil man from the West and the 
Arabs of the Middle East join in an alliance as uneasy as it is profitable 
to both." 
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minority was to be incorporated into the Kingdom of Greece, and 
Turkey was divested of its Arab provinces. On the other hand, 
in regards to the prospective Greek settlement the Intelligence 
Section found it expedient in the "Tentative Recommendations," 
Article 22, section (1), to recommend that, 
"Although an alternative Greek area is shown 
in the Smyrna region, it is not part of this 
recommendation that it be assigned to Greece. 
The arguments for such assignment have been 
scrutinized with great care, and it is felt to 
be unsafe from every standpoint, commercial, 
strategic, and political, to give Greece a 
foothold upon the mainland of Asia Minor. 
The possession of the Dodecanese puts Greek 
people, Greek ships and Greek merchants, at 
the very doors of the new state. To give her 
a foothold upon the mainland would be to 
invite immediate trouble. Greece would press 
her claims for more territory; Turkey would feel 
that her new boundaries wereiUn so as to give 
her a great handicap at the very start. The 
harbor of Smyrna has been for centuries an outlet 
for the products of the cen ral Anatolian valleys 
and upland." 
That American thinking could witness such concern over the 
importance of Smyrna to Turkey, especially for the above reasons, 
and then,,even though the United States had not severed relations 
or declared war against Bulgaria, stand aside while her allies 
divested Bulgaria of Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis), Bulgaria's 
only Aegean outlet in favor of Greece, is indeed strange. It 
should be also noted that, among other things, the Recommendations 
made a point of the importance of Smyrna to the new Turkish 
state as a harbor; and yet, the importance of Constantinople as 
the first harbor of Turkey was conveniently overlooked since 
Turkey was to be divested of its first port under Article 21 
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of the recommendations which provided that "there be established 
in the Constantinople region an internationalized state," for 
the rather strange or, at least, optimistic reasoning that, 
"An internationalized state will, it is ttought, 
be most likely to be impartial justice to the 
various interests of the many states concerned 
in the commerce that will pass the Straits, and 
to diminish the keen historic jealousies that 
have obstructed the flow of trade. We understand 
that such a proposal is generally accepted." 
Next, under the "Tenative Recommendations" the Intelligence 
Section of the American delegation to Paris recommended that 
the new Turkish state be deprived of the city of Brussa in more 
solicitous rationalization that 
"Brussa, a former Turkish capital (1326-1453) 
with a population of 75,000, located about 
16 miles from the Sea of Marmora, is included 
in the new state (i.e., the internationalized 
state) in order to prevent the Turks from making 
it their capital. As such it might easily be-
come the center of international intrigues, dis-
turbing the large Turkish population in and about 
Constantinople and, therefore, the stability and 
smooth administration of the international state." 
Apparently the idea that Constantinople itself, the queen city 
of Turkey which had been rendered unto Allah by Mohammed II and 
only yesterday was its capital, and since 1453 historically and 
geographically the center of national and international intrigues 
in Turkey, might easily continue as the conspiratoral center 
and disturb the stability and smoothe administration oft he 
new state seemed to phase the Intelligence Section little. If 
it had, the above concern and absurdity as regards Brussa could 
never have been written. 
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Finally under Article 23, the "Tentative Recommendations" 
broached the Armenian question which points up the paradoxes in 
the thinking of the Intelligence Section. 
The report of the Section recommended that there be 
established an Armenian state.... The Armenian pro-
blem is a singularly difficult one from the stand-
point of the establishment of new states, because, 
except for a small area north of Lan Van and in Kars 
and Erivan, the Armenians are everywhere in the 
minority. They constitute not more than thirty or 
thirty-five percent of the population. 
The reasons why the Intelligence Section overrode majority 
considerations in favor of minority considerations in the 
Armenian question were noted in the "Tentative Recommendations." 
Since they point up some of the contradistinctions in the 
American position on the majority v. minority question in the 
Near East. They are included in their entirety below. 
"It is held that the principle of majorities 
should not apply in this case, because of the 
conditions under which the Pxmenian people have 
lived in the past. They have suffered from 
every handicap of nature and man; they have been 
massacred and deported by hundreds of thousands; 
they have been the subject of international 
political intrigue; and at thls moment, helpless 
and weak as they are, they are being pressed for 
the unfavorable settlement of their affairs by 
big Powers seeking to define spheres of future 
political and commercial interests. It would be 
a departure from the principle of fair dealing 
if at this time their every claim were not heard with 
patience, and their new state established under 
conditions that would in some manner right historic 
wrongs. 
"As for the non-Armenian elements included within 
the proposed stated, they could be adequately 
protected by international guarantees, according 
to the principle invoked in so many other cases of 
mixed nationalities in highly disputed and 
critical zones. 
"The singular configuration of the new state, 
as defined on the map, is fixed by nature. The 
Anti-Taurus and Taurus mountains are topographical 
features of the first rank. They are natural 
barriers. The boundaries would run for the most 
part through thinly populated regions. Although 
remote from the main currents of the world's 
trade, Armenia's two outlets on the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean would ensure that vitalizing 
contract needed for economic security. Topo-
graphically and commercially the Cilician region 
of Adana belongs to the Armenian highlands, and 
not to Turkish Anatolia or Syria on either side. 
"The inclusion of the former Russian provinces 
of Kars and Erivan, with the Sub-districts of 
Akhalkalki and Akhaltsikh, is determined by the 
fact that they contain the largest block of 
Armenian peoples. The delimitation on the map 
is both ethnographic and topographic in character, 
and is based upon the expressed desire of the 
leaders of the present Armenian Republic in the 
Caucasus. 
To Armenia has been assigned a good harbor 
at Trebizond, which has the additional advantage 
of uniting with the Armenians about one-half of 
the strong minority of Greeks in this area. 
(2) It is recommended that the Armenian 
state be placed under the supervision of a 
mandatory of the League of Nations. 
This recommendation is all but axiomatic, 
because of the inexperience and defects of the 
population, its mixed character, and its 
weakness. 11 136 
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A cursory reading of the above position of the Intelligence 
Section on the Armenian issue reveals the inconsistencies in 
the standards applied in arriving at their recommendations 
vis a vis the Smyrna question. These include the following: 
The Section, bending over backwards, conveniently set aside 
136Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, p. 42. 
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the principle of majorities in the Armenian question by, 
among other things, pointing up to the periodic deprivations 
of Armenians which also applied equally to the Greeks and 
the other Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire but were 
not given coxr~Jil.onding value in settling their claims. 
Continuing, the Section, setting up a rather novel "principle 
of fair dealing" in the Armenian question, recommended that 
every claim be heard with patience and the new state be 
established in some manner to right historic wrongs, two 
principles whose applicability were so generally widespread 
in the Near East to render them useless. And then, the 
Intelligence Section pointed up the fact that Armenians were 
being pressed for an unfavorable settlement of their affairs by 
big Powers, but so were the Greeks who under Venizelos at 
Paris were fighting Italian claims to Smyrna and the return 
of the Greek Smyrna minority to Turkish rule. Finally, 
the "Recommendations" found it to the advantage of Armenia 
to include the city of Trebizond and its immediate environs 
in the new Armenian State not only because it afforded the 
new republic a good harbor on the Black Sea but, in the words 
of the Intelligence Section, it had the added advantage of 
uniting with the Armenians about one-half of the strong 
minority of Greeks in this~· 137 
Except for the Cilician region and Adana, the Treaty of 
137Author 1s italics. 
Sevres included the Armenia as delimited by the "Tentative 
Recommendations," and under Article 89 
Tur·key and Armenia as well as the other High 
Contracting Par· ties agreed to submit to the 
arbitration of the President of the United States 
of America the question of the frontier to be 
fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets 
of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to 
accept his decision thereupon, as well as any 
stipulations he may prescribe as to access for 
Armenia to the sea and as to the demilitarization 
of any portion of tur·key terri tory adjacent to the 
said frontier. 
Thus it was that the United States of America more than the 
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other victorious powers and President Wilson in particular, 
became known as the father of the abortive state of Armenia. 
The Armenian dream for an independent Armenia is with 
little parallel in history--and in more recent times finds 
its nearest counterpart in the creation of the new state of 
Israel. Interestingly enough the Intelligence Section, 
almost with the same reasoning used in its argument for an 
Armenian state, recornrnended also then that it was "right" 
that Palestine should become a Jewish state as soon as 
Palestine became a Jewish state in fact after migrations, 
since in the words of the "Recorrunendations," at "present the 
Jews formLe~ barely a sixth of the total population of 
700,000 in Palestine ••• " Unlike Israel today, however, Sevres 
Armenia then, created during a different time in history, 
proved only a passing mirage. The Armenians had to face the 
combined might of Turks and Russians and not disorganized 
Arabs, without even the benign support of their benefactors 
let alone the international support and influence of world 
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public opinion and the service which world Jewry was able to 
render the infant state of Israel. In the end, Sevres 
Armenia was snuffed out after a brief existence of only five 
months by the combination of Allied apathy and by the joint 
Kemalist-Soviet military operations and diplomacy that 
placed in oblivion the idea of an independent Armenia as 
envisaged in the treaty of Sevres. At no time during its 
all too brief existence was the republic of Armenia given 
military assistance of substance by the Allies or their 
American benefactors, and, as an omen of what later was to 
befall the Greeks in Asia Minor, in the end the Armenians 
were left to stew in their "own" juices. Indicative of the 
total sell-out of Armenia and the complete surrender of the 
Allies to Kemal Ataturk and the success of the Russo-Turkish 
rapprochement is the fact that later at Lausanne the Allies 
made no attempt to resurrect even the barest semblance of 
an independent Armenian state. 
At the risk of getting ahead of the story, this point 
accords an excellent opportunity to comple~the record of 
American interest in Near Eastern affairs during the period 
under review. When plans were announced for the Lausanne 
Conference following the Greek disaster in Asia Minor, the 
best the United States did in the Armenian matter was to 
inform the sponsoring governments Britain, France, and Italy 
in an Aide-Memoire, October 30, 1922, of America's desire to 
take part as an observer in the deliberations, at which time 
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the United States, along with her allies, sealed the doom of 
Armenia. At the Conference the Chief of the American delegation 
was instructed to make the following often repeated innocuous 
recommendations: 138 
11 (1) The maintenance of capitulations which may be 
essential to the approp~iate safeguarding of 
non-Moslem interests, Li.e., those essential 
to the protection of American Qitizens and 
American business enterprises~139 
"(2) The protection, under proper guarantees, of 
philanthropic, educational, and religious 
institutions, La measure no doubt well 
calculated to insure the continuity of the 
American missionary activities of the 
Congregational Church in Anatolia and 
especially amongst the war ravaged Greek and 
Armenian populations~ 
"(3) Appropriate undertakings in regard to the 
freedom of opportunity, without discrimination 
o~ special privilege, for commercial enterprise, 
Lan affirmation of the principle of the 
'Open Door.;_; 
"(4) Indemnity for losses suffered by Americans in 
Turkey ~s a resu11 of arbitrary and illegal 
acts, Lsince 191~ 
138see Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II pp. 114-119 for these instructions in 
(1) U.S. Aide-Memoire to Britain, France, and Italy, 
· 30 October 1922. 
(2) U.S. Secretary of State Hughes• Instructions to U.S. 
Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Rome, 30 October 
1922 defining U. S. position at Lausanne. 
139The U.S. delegation was instructed to throw the full weight of 
American influence in favor of the capitulations, but realized fully the 
difficulty of maintaining the capitulations in the face of Kemalist 
opposition and the divergent views of the Powers who were being tempted 
by the Turks to barter their rights under the capitulations for conces-
sions with no value to the United States. The American delegation, 
therefore, was instructed to insist upon only those capitulations 
essential to the protection of American citizens and American enterprise. 
"(5) Suitable prOVl,SJ.ons for the protection of 
minorities, Lan indirect coupe de g~ace to 
the idea of an independent Armenia~ 
"(6) Assurance touching the freedom of the Straits. 
11 (7) Reasonable opportunity for archaelogical 
research and study." 
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For their part, the American "observers" at Lausanne 
negotiated two separate treaties with Turkey, a general treaty 
I 
and'an extradition treaty. The U. s. Senate rejected the former 
treaty almost outright, owing chiefly to the clause reaffirm-
ing the abolition of the capitulations, and the extradition 
treaty was ratified twelve years later in 1934.140 
Whereas the u. s. government favored a scheme for the 
Straits analogous to that adopted by the conferees at Lausanne, 
the American delegation was instructed not to sign the 
Lausanne instruments or the accompanying conventions, notwith-
standing the fact that the General Board of the U. s. Navy had 
recommended that American interests demanded that 
"the United States should have representation on 
the int~rnational commission of control Lof the 
Strait§/ and in all positions subordinate to that 
commission of control, equal to that of any other 
foreign power. 11 141 
140
united States diplomatic and consular relations with Turkey were 
reestablished in 1927 by executive agreement, after repeated~leas from 
missionaries and businessmen directly interested in Turkey Lthe modus 
vi vendi was signed with th~ Ankara Government by Rear Admiral M. L. 
Bustol on 17 February 1921/. 
141see Hurewitz, Diplomacy II, pp. 117-119 for "Policy Recommendations 
On the Turkish Straits By the General Board of the U. S. Navy, 10 November 
1922." 
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Secretary of State Hughes, in his instructions of December 3, 
1922 to the American representative at the conference, upheld 
the principle of the freedom of the Straits but maintained 
that the United States was unprepared to assume any responsi-
bilities for enforcing the observance of the principle. In the 
end the United States never signed the Lausanne treaty nor any 
of the accompanying conventions--even after Article 12 was 
written into the Lausanne Convention for the Straits which 
provided that 
The United States of America, in the event 
of their acceding to the present Convention, 
will also be entitled to have one representa-
tive on the Commission. 
American foreign policy in the Near East in the imn1ediate 
aftermath of World War I was, to say the least, perplexing. 
On the one hand the United States desired to be present at 
Near Eastern conferences, but then only as an "observer" even 
though the United States placed its wishes before these 
assemblies and expected them to be respected fully and acted 
upon favorably. On the other hand, the United States refused 
to assume a share of the responsibility for enforcing these 
desires and principles which it so nobly enunciated in the 
first place. Of course there were extraordinary reasons for 
this seemingly peculiar American trait which were perpetrated 
by the American system of government, especially in the 
course of foreign affairs, and the electoral system which 
often times forces the American executive to deal with a 
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"hostile Congress." Possibly closer to the truth was the fact 
that, at the time, the United States was a young Goliath 
among diplomatic giants with less experience in international 
affairs and a parvenu in Near Eastern affairs. 
Interestingly enough, the United States' position as 
expounded by Wilson's Fourteen Points and the "Tentative 
Recommendations" displayed one American characteristic, an 
historic sense of sympathy for oppressed people--a carry-over 
from America's own colonial experience--which was indicated 
fully by American willingness to effect, at least on paper, 
the creation of an independent Armenia. President Wilson, 
however, added a new factor to this traditional sympathy 
which Americans held for oppressed people; he followed it 
through with deeds. Thus it was that President Wilson had 
viewed favorably the San Remo recommendations for an independ-
ent Armenia; and, on behalf of the United States, recognized 
the independence of Armenia on April 23, 1920. On May 29, 
1920 however, the Senate in isolationist reaction, rejected 
this action by President Wilson as it had the other Paris 
reco~Lendations of the American Chief Executive. Notwith-
standing this act by the u. s. Senate, it was felt strongly 
by many people that America had a responsibility, tenuous as 
it may have seemed, to "Wilsonian Armenia," and the final 
instrument of Sevres of August 10, 1920 retained the article 
making the President of the United States the international 
arbiter of the new state's problems. Sevres Armenia, however, 
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like Sevres Smyrna, could only have continued to exist if, 
and the United States was in the forefront, its creators had 
actively supported Armenia and especially Greece, the &ngle 
determined force behind the Sevres treaty that struggle to 
impose the San Remo decisions upon Turkey and to eliminate 
Mustapha Kemal and his nationalist Turkey, the chief 
opposition to the Ottoman settlement. 
Before the United States entered the war the Greek volunteer 
army which had been fighting on the side of the Entente in 
the Balkans had been supplied by an Anglo-French loan to 
Venizelos' provisional Saloniki government since, as already 
seen, the official Greek Government at Athens refused to be-
come embroiled in the war. After Greece's formal entry into 
the conflict in June 1917 the Allied loan was transferred to 
Greece; and on February 13, 1918, Oscar T. Crosby, after 
securing authority from Washington, made the United States 
party to a new Allied loan agreement to Greece calculated to 
sustain the Greek armed forces and the Greek home front in the 
war. 
Under the new tripartite loan, (1) approximately 50 million 
dollars was to be advanced to Greece by each of the three lend-
ing countries according to the war needs of the Greek Government; 
(2) an Inter-Allied Financial Commission was established in 
Athens to pass upon transactions and to set up credits for 
Greece in the three western capitals, and (3) the signatories 
agreed that all restrictions as to the use of these advances 
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was to be withdrawn~ month~ after the signing Qf the peace. 142 
For its part the United States set up in favor of 
Greece'a total of $48,236,629 in credits; in return for which, 
the United States accepted the notes of the Greek Government 
as collateral security.143 The total amount drawn by Greece 
against its u. s. credit was approximatley 15 million dollars, 
a last draft being drawn on September 24, 1920, approximately 
seven weeks before the defeat of the Venizelos ministry at 
the polls (November 20, 1920). Shortly thereafter, however, 
the United States again entered into full diplomatic relations 
with Greece. For their part France and Britain disavowed the 
December 5, 1920 plebiscite which returned King Constantine 
to the Greek throne, withdrew the financial assistance which 
Greece was receiving, but while refusing Constantine's 
recognition Britain and France continued "to do business as 
usual with the Minister representing the parliamentary 
majority." Previously, on December 2, in a more calculated 
to intimidate the Greek electorate against a favorable plebis-
cite, the Supreme Allied Council had warned Greece in vain 
of the consequences which the return of King Constantine would 
entail. 
142Author 1s italics. 
143The information relative to American monetary contractual delega-
tions to Greece during the war is taken from the substantive artice 
"33.000,000 Due to Greece on Loan. Held to be Our Debt of Honor," published 
in the New York Times, November 12, 1922 and written by Dr. Ed. Capps, 
appointed by President Wilson in 1920 as the United States Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Greece. 
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The withholding of approximately $33,000,000 from Greece 
by the United States in disregard of a contractual obligation 
was, in the wards of Dr. Capps, "a manifest violation of 
contract" and "especially disgraceful at a time when Greece, 
acting on behalf of the Allies was enforcing the terms of the 
armistice until a treaty of peace could be negotiated and 
ratified." Interestingly, when a representative of the Greek 
Government arrived in Washington carrying the interest check 
on the loan in question to discuss the matter, he found 
American government officials reluctant to discuss the question 
of further drafts but eager to accept the interest on the loan. 
Interestingly enough, at the time, Greece, the smallest debtor 
of all the "associates" of the United States in the war, was 
the only one that had paid regularly the interest on its u. s. 
contractual debt which, on the $15 million drawn by Venizelos 
amounted to $750,000 per year. After Venizelos' fall from 
power the United States continued to add to its questionable 
position on its loan to Greece by refusing to release the 
unused balance it held in Greek credits ($33 million) and at 
the same time refusing to grant Greece approval to contract 
for a loan elsewhere. This act by the United States was 
particularly biting for the Greek position since Greece was 
bound under the tripartite loan agreement not to opt for a 
new loan without the unanimous assent"of the three lending 
parties to the loan agreement and at least Britain is under-
stood to have proposed that this permission be granted but 
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the United States government refused to give its endorsement. 
Of the three lending powers in the Allied loan agreement to 
Greece only the United States refused continually to grant 
Greece permission to opt for a loan elsewhere; and without 
these credits Greece could not keep her armies in the field 
against Turkey, and, in the end, the lack of funds to purchase 
arms, ammunition, and other war material necessary for opera-
tions in Turkey proved a principle cause for the military 
defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor. If one accepts the 
statements of Dr. Capps as regards u. s. refusal to honor 
its war contractual obligation to Greece, then the United 
States played a significant role in the collapse of the 
Greek position in Asia Minor. Any attempt to relieve the 
United States of any responsibility in the Near East imbroglio 
by claiming that the United States had no part in the Ottoman 
settlement does not hold much water, considering American 
officiousness in the Near East settlements. Similarly, any 
attempt to acquit the United States of its contractual 
responsibility under the tripartite loan agreement by pointing 
up, among other things, the popular argument that the defeat 
of the Venizelos government in 1920 absolved the United States 
from any future obligations can be challenged quickly, since, 
for one thing, the loan was not made to Venizelos but to the 
Greek Government. Finally, while one may argue the merits of 
both positions with much apology, it would be difficult to 
justify the retention by the United States of the unused 
balance of collateral security deposited by Greece with the 
u. s. Treasury and America's tergiversation in granting 
Greece permission to opt for a loan elsewhere. 
GREECE 
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Greece has been criticized by many authors almost willy-
nilly for her behavior in Smyrna and for the resultant Greek 
advance into the interior, as if these acts were committed 
without provocations on the part of the 1urks. For example, 
Mr. Hurewitz in his Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 
volume II, p. 59 states, "Greek troops landed ••• with allied 
blessing at Izmir (Smyrna) ostensibly for police action, but 
unabashedly intent on conquest." While there is much truth 
in this often repeated cliche since there was little question 
that history and the recent Entente victory against the Central 
Powers in which Greece took part had already provided Greece 
with cause and much encouragement to drive horne "the task of 
1821," but equally true and often missing in criticisms of 
Greece's Smyrna policy is the fact that while the Greeks may 
have been intent on conquest, Greek forces in Asia Minor did 
receive from the brazen Turks more than the necessary provo-
cations to renew the historic Turco-Greek belligerency. Mr. G. 
Lewis Turkey, (New York, 1955), is typical of pro-Turkish 
authors who, on the one hand, extol the heroics and resistance 
offered by such Turks as Yoruk Ali and other guerrillas, 
irregulars, and army officers who first opposed the proposed 
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peace settlement, then opposed the Allied occupation armies 
garrisoned on Turkish soil and especially the Greek forces, 
and finally went on to free their nation of the invader; but, 
on the other hand, make much of the "systematic massacre of 
Turks in the city and province," charging that 
"As soon as the Greek forces had established 
themselves in Smyrna, they began a drive into 
the interior, and a trail of hanged men and 
smoking rubble marked their advance," 
and once more as if Greek action against the Turkish national-
ists was wanton and without ample provocation. 
Then there is the middle of the road attitude of such 
authors as Mr. William Yale, The Near East, (Ann Arbor, 1958) 
who show abhorrence of "the landing of the Greek forces 
(Smyrna) and the slaughter which followed," (p. 277)1 but 
temper their criticism of Greek action in Anatolia as one of 
"Greek imperialism backed by Great Britain" (p. 380), weighing 
their position heavily on the distinguished Count Carlo Sforza's, 
The Makers of Modern Europe, (London, 1931), the Italian High 
Commissioner at Constantinople at the time in question who 
opposed Britain's forward pro-Greek and anti-Turkish policy· 
and instead favored a policy of "an early and honorable 
peace" which excluded "any idea of 'l'urkish partition," as 
the best means to effect a Turkish settlement and as the best 
means to undercut the Turkish nationalist movement. Apparently, 
even at this late date, it did not occur to Dr. Yale, who 
at the time in question was a special agent of the State 
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Department in Cairo in 1917-1918, an observer with General 
Allenby's Army, and an adviser to the American in Versailles 
in 1919, as it did not occur to Count Sforza, that to conclude 
such a peace with Turkey was near impossible without rewriting 
the punitive judgments invoked upon Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and Bulgaria; besides, it is almost impossible to truck with 
a nationalist movement, especially one such as Kemalism. 
Experience has shown that there are only two ways to deal with 
the Kemalist-type of nationalism: either allow it to flower 
completely or obliterate it entirely. It would seem that the 
Greek action in Asia Minor could be put into its more proper 
light if these critics of Greek policy round-out more evenly 
their judgments of Greece's Smyrna policy rather than accept 
Turkish action as righteous and crucify Greek measures as 
unbridled and spurious. Finally, they be more prone to admit 
that Greek action while well conceived was foolishly executed, 
Greece having been let down by her friends and allies who 
found it more expedient to deal with Kemal at the expense of 
Greece and to abandon their responsibilities under the Sevres 
settlement. 
A good summary description of the cause, consequences, and 
correctness of Greek policing action in Smyrna can be found in 
the one paragraph offered by Edward s. Foster,144 A Short 
1~. Foster was a noted scholar and teacher who served from 1915-
1919 as an Allied Intelligence officer in Saloniki and Constantinople and 
was Professor of Greek at the University of Sheffield for firty years. 
He died in 1950. 
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HistorY of Modern Greece, 1821-1956, Revised and Enlarged by 
Douglas Dakin, (New York, 1957), p. 135, wherein is stated 
that, 
"In May 1919 ••• the Greek Government was granted 
permission to occupy Smyrna. Unfortunately 
disturbances occurred at the landing of the 
Greek troops and severe sentences were passed 
on those who had been responsible, Greeks as 
well as Turks and Armenians. A Greek 
administration was before long established 
under a High Commissioner, and by the end of 
the year British residents in Smyrna were able 
to report that the Greek authorities were 
carrying out their difficult task with strict justice towards the different elements in the 
population." 
There is little question that after Smyrna the Greeks 
overplayed their hand in Asia Minor in the light of develop-
ments after San Remo and the recreant diplomacy practised by 
Greece's allies. How much importance can be attributed to the 
popular Greek argument that Venizelos' colleagues at the Peace 
Conference had alterably effected the Cretan's popularity at 
home by refusing to award Greece further awards and especially 
Constantinople, and, thereby discredited the only Greek 
statesman in a position to effect for Greece the gains of the 
war to the detriment of Greece's position in Asia Minor later 
can be considered as more of an emotional defense that fact. 
Although Greek disappointment over this failure by Venizelos 
to gain this prize for Greece may have been severe, it is 
doubtful whether the Greeks ever really expected to receive 
the seat of Byzantium from the Powers. Greece could expect 
little support for the proposition at the peace conference, 
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and, afterwards, except possibly from the British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George, the last of the Britishers reportedly 
"under the influence of old-time Liberal ideas of Mr. Gladstone 
with emotions about Middle East Christians and prejudices 
about turning the Turk 'bag and baggage out of Europe•,u145 
no one championed Greece's claim to Constantinople. Surely 
if the celebrated personages at the Paris Peace Conference 
did not see fit to award Constantinople to Venizelos, a proven 
ally and a leading figure of that international gathering, 
then no Greek was in a position to secure Constantinople for 
Greece. 
After the Greek disaster in Asia Minor it became fashion-
able to attack the Greek position in Asia Minor, and Greece 
received much harsh criticism by former friends and enemies 
alike. Greece was accused of outright imperialism in 
Anatolia. ·~ 
While there is much truth to these charges, it should 
be noted that Greece's action in Asia Minor is not as black 
as it has been generally painted; one thing is certain, 
Greece's allies were in no position to attack Greece for 
imperialism since they too had practised imperialism against 
the Ottoman Empire in the Near East. There was little 
criticism of Greece by the Allies when the Greek armies in 
occupation at Smyrna and Thrace marched from their treaty 
145M. Philips Price, A History of Turkey, From Empire to Republic, 
(London, .1956), PP• 88-89. 
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encampments in 1919 and 1920 and defeated insurgent Turks 
in Eastern Thrace and Anatolia which rang Constantinople with 
Greek troops, made the Porte truly a prisoner of the Allies, 
and compelled the Sultan to instruct the Ottoman delegates in 
Paris to sign the Treaty of Sevres.146 There was no criticism 
because the Greeks were the Allied instrument to force on the 
Porte and the recalcitrant Turks the Sevres agreement; 
similarly, Greek operations in 1921-1922 were calculated to 
enforce the peace terms on vanquished Turkey. 
There was little difference behind the political calcula-
tion of Greek military operations in 1919-1920 and 1921-1922, 
except that by the latter date the frcnt against the Nationalist 
Turks had moved from the borders of the Smyrna vilayet and the 
environs of Constantinople to the interior of Anatolia, a 
fact which the Greeks and not the Allies had come to understand. 
If there was any difference between the earlier and later 
Greek offensives, it was that in the later offensives the 
Greeks displayed two of their characteristic weaknesses--first, 
an inability to relate the desirable to the possible, and 
second and more important, to evaluate correctly the reality 
of events as played on the world scene. In 1921-1922 the 
Greeks simply refused to recognize the changed world situation 
146Greek forces defeated the Turkish nationalists at Alashehr on 
June 24, 1920, captured Brussa on July 9, and encamped on the eastern 
frontier of Constantinople, thus ringing Constantinople in the east; in 
the west· Greek forces defeated similar insurgent nationalist forces in 
the vici~ty of Adrianople 'and forced the surrender of Adrianople on 
July 25 and went on to occupy Thrace to the Western gates of Constantinople. 
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and for this they can be blamed and condemned. The Greeks, 
characteristically long on stomach when it came to the Great 
Idea had now, in addition, become short on mind. Overzealous, 
they were politically and militarily unrealistic in pushing 
operations into Anatolia alone in search of the wolf in his 
own lair. Apparently, they had learned little from the 
disastrous experience of the Allied interventions in Russia; 
they refused to weigh properly attempts by the Allied Powers 
to effect an armistice with the Kemalists in 1921-1922; they 
refused to evaluate correctly growing Kemalist military might; 
but then again there were extra desiderata, chief of which 
was that the Greeks could not make themselves believe that 
they would be abandoned in Anatolia by their British ally. 
After all, British loans and M. Lloyd George, alone of all of 
Greece's allies, had encouraged Greece's adventure in Asia 
Minor. The Greeks simply refused to believe that the repeated 
encouragement of the British Prime Minister was not destined 
to be implemented in the form of active military assistance 
and that times had changed even for the British Prime Minister--
even when in the summer of 1922 repeated Greek pleas to London 
for arms and money to press home the Turkish campaign before 
the Sakkaria were shrugged off with elusive promises by Lord 
Curzon, the British Foreign Secretar~ who now even refused 
to give lip service to the Greek campaign in Asia Minor. 
Consequently, after the long stalemate before the Sakkaria, 
Greece already abandoned by Italy and France, turned away 
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by the United States, and now given a deaf ear by Britain, was 
able to procure war material of a fashion from only one .source, 
the Balkan mystery man Sir Basil Zaharoff, and left "to stew 
in her own juice" by her allies. 
It is hard to believe that the Greeks would have gained 
any more territory by a "personal" victory over the Turks. 
Visions of a sprawling Greece across western Asia were near 
impossible. Sevres had already partitioned the Ottoman Empire 
and whereas Greece might challenge the recalcitrant nationalist 
Turks, Greece was in no position to challenge the San Remo 
awards which had already delimited Kurdistan, Armenia, and 
the Sultan's new domain and the territories ceded Great 
Britain, Italy, and France. While it is easy to envision a 
new San Stephano-type treaty imposed by Greece on Turkey in 
the event of a Greek victory over the Kemalists, it is 
equally easy to envision a new settlement along the lines of 
the Treaty of Berlin. 
It is true that in the western part of Anatolia claimed 
by Venizelos there was a mixed Greek, Turkish, and Armenian 
population with the Turks in the majority; likewise, "Bulgarian" 
Western and "Turkish" Eastern Thrace received by Greece at 
Paris included an extremely mixed population, the more 
numerous being Greeks, Bulgarians, and Turks, none of whom 
constituted an exclusive majority; however, ethnic considera-
tions were assigned little weight by the Allies in the five 
separate treaties signed at Paris. All of the Paris treaties 
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violated the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination to a 
greater or lesser degree, very decidedly so in the treaties 
of St. Germain with Austria and the treaty of Trianon with 
Hungary but much less in the treaties with Germany, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey. Admittedly in that part of western Anatolia 
occupied by the Greeks there was a mixed Greek-Turkish-
Armenian population and Turks predominated, b~t interestingly 
enough, while it may not justify Greece's claims to the 
region, what is often forgotten by those who are too prone 
to criticize Greece's Asia Minor policy is the fact that the 
Turks themselves were once a minority people in the region 
and had themselves effected a claim to the area through 
conquest and not self-determination. And then, Greece's 
claim to Smyrna for example was more soundly based than Italy's 
claim, and whereas the Turks may have outnumbered the Greeks 
in the areas which Venizelos had claimed for Greece, Britain, 
France, and Italy laid claim and occupied regions under the 
Sevres treaty in which there were no British, French, or 
Italian populations. 
Greece's friends and enemies were too prone to judge 
Greece harshly for over-vaulting ambition in the Asia Minor 
calamity while they themselves had been guilty of similar 
acts. In the Near East the Turks had for centuries carved 
out for themselves a homeland and an empire through the 
exercise of brute force; while the Allies chose adroitly to 
camouflage their imperialism of the region after World War I 
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under the mandate system. That nations are not found existing 
spontaneously but made, more often than not, through the 
exercise of force is axiomatic and empires arecarved out of 
the remnants of conquered territories and peoples. History 
is replete with the crimes for which the Greeks in 1919-1922 
were called to judgment and castigated by world opinion, but 
the attacks upon Greece are particularly unreasonable, for so 
much has been made of Greece's role in the partition of the 
Ottoman ~pire and the Turkish intervention and so little of 
the part played by Greece's allies and even Russia. Whereas 
the Allies, on the one hand, could spend thousands of words 
to justify their actions against the Bolsheviks in the 
Russian intervention, in the Turkish intervention they 
attempted to cloud the fact that they had abandoned their 
responsibility to carry their share of the Near East peace 
settlement and in the process deserted Greece. If Greece was 
guilty of anything in Asia Minor, she was guilty of misjudg-
ing her abilities, misjudging her friends, misjudging world 
opinion, and, finally, for losing a war. The most that can 
be said about the whole affair was that the Greco-Turkish 
war of 1919-1922 was a crack-brained enterprise for which 
the idiocy of King Constantine Lsince contrary 
to all indications, after the fall of Venizelos 
he believed that Greece could go it alone in 
Turke.i7, 
the military incompetence of the Greek General 
staff Ldisplayed in pursuing the wolf into his 
lair without the necessary troops and needed 
resources for such an undertaking, and without 
the Greek colonies in Asia Minor strong 
enough to turn the balance in Greek favoi7, 
the optimism, for the_lack of a better term, 
of Mr. Lloyd George Lwho believed with little 
assistance and little ~ncouragement the Greeks 
could defeat the Turk~, 
the insane jealousy of France Lwho feared in 
Greece, a British satellite in the Near Easl/, 
the malevolence of Italy La result of an 
historic rivalri7, and finally, 
the opportunism of a Bolshevik Russia Lwho found 
in Turkey a strategic bed-fello~, 
were all to blame for the Greek disaster in Asia Minor. 
SOME FINAL WORDS BEFORE LAUSANNE 
302 
Not able to agree amongst themselves who should receive 
the pearl of the Ottoman Empire, under the Treaty of Sevres the 
Allies agreed to return the gem to Turkey subject to Turkey's 
observance of the 
"provisions of the present Treaty, or of any 
treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, 
particularly as regards the protection of the 
rights of racial, religious, or linguistic 
minorities." 147 
The Constantinople concession by the Allies neither strengthened 
the shaky position of the new twenty-five year old Sultan 
Mohammed VI (1918-1922) who, in the words of Mustafa Kemal's 
Great Six Day Apologia delivered to the Grand National 
Assembly in October 1927, was "a weak and mean creature, 
devoid of sensibility and perception," nor did it strengthen 
147 Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920, Part III, Political Clauses, 
Section I, Constantinople. 
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the defunct Sultanate. Before the joint meeting of the 
Assembly's Committee five years earlier on Norember 1, 1922 
Kemal had expounded correctly the tenuous position in history 
held by the Ottoman institution depicted by the Sultanate, 
especially following the successful revolt by the Young Turk 
Committee of Union and Progress in 1908 which restored the 
Constitution of 1876 and in 1909 deposed the Sultan Abdul 
Hamid, who dared to attempt a second counter-revolution and 
reestablish absolute rule as he had done in 1877.148 Kemal 
stated, 
"Sovereignty and Sultanate are not to anyone 
by anyone because scholarship says so; be-
cause of debate or discussion. They are taken 
by strength, by power, by force. By force the 
Ottoman dynasty seized the sovereignty and 
Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have 
maintained this usurpation for six hundred 
years. The Turkish nation has called a halt; 
it has rebelled and taken the sovereignty into 
its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. 
The question is not whether or not we are 
going to leave the sovereignty to the accom-
plished reality. This is going to be, come 
what may. If those who are present, and the 
Assembly and everybody see the problem in its 
natural light, I believe they will agree. If 
not, the truth will still be given proper 
expression. Only maybe some heads will be 
cut off. As for the academic slde of the 
matter, the learned gentlemen need be in no 
doubt or anxiety ••• " 
Thus did the Incredible Ataturk summarize the history of the 
Sultanate. On the same day that the Nationalists heard Kemal's 
lecture on "Sovereignty and Sultanate" the Grand National 
148 The Young Turks date from June 1865 when their movement was first 
initiated secretly in Constantinople as the "Society of New Ottomans." 
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Assembly passed a resolution which announced to the Turkish 
people that "the form of government in Constantinople, which 
is based on the sovereignty of an individual, as having for-
ever passed into history as from 16 March 1920."--the date 
of the Allies' official occupation of Constantinople. 149 
However, the truth of the matter is that the Sultanate was 
not murdered by the Allied occupation of Constantinople in 
1920 nor by Kemal in 1922. The Sultanate had lived precari-
ously on the verge of disaster ever since the steady demise 
of the Ottoman power in the 19th century despite the periodic 
rescues of Turkey by the Powers as a result of the East-West 
rivalry in the Eastern Question. If anything, while Sultan 
continued to succeed Sultan, right up to World War I the 
Sultanate had come into such disrepute at home and abroad 
that it was questionable whether it would survive another 
crisis in the body politic, and World War I afforded the 
Sultanate a last opportunity to prove itself; victory meant 
possible revival but a defeat could only mean dissolution 
and the Allied victory in the war inflicted upon the 
Sultanate its final and mortal wound. Attempts by the Allies 
to breathe life into the Sultante thereafter by permitting 
the Sultan to maintain the capital of the Turkish state at 
Constantinople were fruitless, for now, in addition to all 
the other ills which had plagued the Sultanate previously, it 
149a. Lewis, Turkey, pp. 70-71. 
acquired one which until that time it did not have. Kemal 
summed it up well in his great apologia when he stated 
"••• We Turks are a people who, throughout 
our history, have been a byword for free-
dom and independence. We have shown our-
selves capable of removing from the stage 
the puppet-show of Caliphs who regard as 
permissible any humiliation which enables 
their worthless lives to drag on in dis-
honor for two and a half days longer."150 
In other words the Allies had placed the Sultanate in a 
position to be accused of becoming an Allied puppet and an 
instrument of foreigners over Turks. This permitted Kemal, 
safe in his sanctuary in Anatolia, to retire the Sultanate 
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to history after one last post-mortem on that once celebrated 
Ottoman institution which since the close of the 18th century 
had become increasingly odious to both Muslims and Christians 
and the Turkish and non-Turkish inhabitants of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The political acu~en shown by the statesmen of the 
Congress of Vienna to unite in the Quadruple Alliance in 
order to secure their spoils and preserve the peace after the 
19th century world conflagration was totally lacking after 
the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I, and nowhere 
was this more evident than in the Ottoman settlement. The 
Allies who had just previously sat in judgment of the 
vanquished not only failed to unite to secure their spoils 
150 Lewis, p. 71. 
but fell openly to quarreling amongst themselves, and by 
their own personal myopias allowed Turkey to play one ally 
against the other even before the ink on the Ottoman treaty 
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had time to dry. The treaty of Sevres--"the porcelain treaty" 
--was correctly named for like Sevres china it was easily 
shattered; but shattered not so much by the power lust of the 
Greeks or the terrible Turk as by the lack of cohesion among 
its fnamers, and while the Turks never entered the Second 
World War, they had set a precedent which helped bring on a 
new world conflagration, not in one hundred years as in the 
case of the Congress of Vienna but within the short span of 
twenty years. By revising the Treaty of Sevres the Turks 
established a precedent and set in motion latent forces for 
the revision of the other World War I peace settlements. 
There is little question that unified Allied military and 
diplomatic participation against Kemal would have forced upon 
Turkey the San Remo agreement; if nothing else, the sheer 
preponderance of Allied force would have buried the Nationalist 
movement into history, and its passing would have insured 
for all the Allies, not to mention the successful establishment 
of an independent Kurdistan and an independent Armenia, the 
full treaty awards under the Ottoman peace settlement. But 
more important, a unified Allied policy and unified Allied 
action would have set a precedent to preserve the other peace 
settlements and combat the ominous and dark clouds which soon 
were to rise in the skies over Europe. 
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LAUSANNE 
The second Turkish Peace Conference opened at Lausanne on 
November 21, 1922. It closed on July 24, 1923 with the Allies 
surrendering to virtually all of Turkey's demands. 
The completeness of the Allies surrender at Lausanne is 
indicated by two facts: first, although the Allies on October 27, 
1922 issued invitations to both the Imperial Government in 
Constantinople and the Provisional Nationalist Government at 
Ankara to attend the Conference, only the Kemalists attended, 
the Allies accepting the unilateral action of the Kemalist 
Grand National Assembly dissolving the Ottoman Sultanate on 
November 1 and the Ottoman government on N0 vember 4; second, 
the Lausanne treaty and the accompanying instruments contained 
essentially the Kemalist principles and territorial aspirations 
embodied in the Turkish National Pact of January 20, 1920 which 
insisted upon the abolition of the capitulations, accepted the 
loss of the non-Turkish Ottoman provinces and the international 
character of the Straits but dedicated itself to the defense 
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Turkish 
homeland in Anatolia, Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.151 Lest 
the reader wonder why the repeated Turkish insistance for 
Eastern Thrace, it should be noted that it was not only because 
of its substantial Turkish population, the fertility of its 
soil, or its retention as a last Turkish foothold in Europe, 
l5lFor the Turkish National Pact see, Arnole J. Toynbee, The Western 
Question in Greece and Turkey, (London, 1922), pp. 209-210. 
but more important it gave to ~l'urkey 
"the totality of the shores around the Sea of 
Marmora and the two straits through which the 
sea communicates with other seas: the Dardanelles 
to the south leading into the Aegean, and the 
Bosporus to the north leading into the Black 
Sea •" 152 
At Lausanne, Turkey recovered Eastern Thrace to the 
Maritza River and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the 
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entrace to the Dardanelles but gave up its claims to the "non-
Turkish territories" of the Ottoman empire. Italy retained 
the DodPcanese, but the rest of the Aegean Islands went to 
Greece. Turkey renounced its rights, titles, and privileges 
in Egypt, the Soudan, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco and recognized 
"the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government 
on November 5, 1914." For the most part, the disposition of 
the Arab territories had already been settled by the projected 
mandate accords between the Allies; but the delimitation of 
the Turkish frontier with Iraq was left open to be settled 
by subsequent discussions with Britain. The Treaty of Lausanne 
abolished the capitulations in return for a promise of judicial 
reform and the acceptance of treaties protecting minorities; 
in effect, however, the capitulations had been abolished by the 
Sultan in August 1914, but the Allies had refused to recognize 
the unilateral action by the Sublime Porte. Lausanne now added 
legality to the fact. Finally, the Lausanne treaty contained 
two important annexes: first, the "Convention On the Regime of 
152Jean Gottman, A Geography of Europe, (New York, 1951), p. 562. 
the Straits" which provided for the establishment of an 
international supervisory commission under the permanent 
presidency of Turkey within an arrangement that represented 
"a compromise between the Black Sea Powers--
a misnomer1 for historically there has only been one, hussia--seeking preferential 
treatment, and the ambition of the Allies--
another misnomer, for in the main this was 
Great Britain--seeking complete freedom." 153 
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Second, a separate Turkish-Greek agreement which provided for 
the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and 
Turkey but excluded the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople 
and the Turks of Western Thrace from the arrangement. It 
appears now that this exception although well intentioned at 
the time now looms like a Sword of Damocles above the heads of 
the Turkish and Greek Governments as displayed by the 1955 
anti-Greek Turkish riots in Istanbul. It is to the credit of 
the Greeks that they took no reprisals against the 1'urkish rural 
residents in Western Thrace, but one cannot feel that the desire 
was not there and was restrained possibly for fear of the 
consequences upon the life and property of the 100,000 middle-
class Greek residents of Istanbul. It would not be too pre-
sumptious to assume that the Greeks of Istanbul, especially 
in the light of the heat generated by the Cyprus Issue between 
the Greeks and Turks, are enjoying their stay in Istanbul on 
borrowed time, notwithstanding the Greek Turkish Zurich Accords 
on Cyprus signed in London on February 19, 1959. It is no 
153J. T. Shotwell and F. Deak, Turkey at the Straits, (New York, 1940), 
P• 117. 
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secret that during the recent Greek Cypriot str·uggle for 11Enosis 11 
rumors were prevalent that Turkey might favor an exchange of 
Turkish Cypriots for the Greek Constantinopolites and that 
Turkey favors and the Greek Oecumenical Patriarchate at Istanbul 
is studying the advisability of eventually moving to Mount 
Athos. This would indicate that Lausanne, while being merciful 
to the Greek Constantinopolites and the Turks of Western Thrace 
in 1923, has left a festering sore which is a ready made cancer 
in the body politic and relations between Greece and Turkey. 
Eventually under the Lausanne settlement, approximately 35,000 
Turks in Greece were repatriated to Turkey and over one million 
Greeks were moved to Greece. 154 
The exchange of these populations placed upon Greece an 
almost unbearable burden, for it forced upon an impoverished 
Greece with its already war-ravished economy the added burden 
of providing for an additional one million refugee repatriates 
who now made up more than 20 percent of the entire population. 
The plight of these repatriates of Lausanne and the Smyrna 
catastrophe was a significant factor in evoking the republican 
experjment in government in Greece afterwards, replete with 
its temporary but troublesome dictatorships and coup d'etats 
in the turbulent 1920's and early 1930's, until the venture ran 
its course on August 4, 1936 with the advent of the dictatorship 
of strong-man General John Metaxas. 
l54For the principal work on the subject see s. P. Ladas, The Exchange 
:tvrinorities Between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey, (New York, 1932). 
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Although a discussion of the 'l'urkish-Iraqui boundary ques-
tion may appear to be beyond the realm of this study, further 
mention of the question is in order since many Greeks felt 
strongly that they were "sold out" finally by the British in 
Asia Minor because of the temptations offered by the Mosu1!55 
The Turkish-Iraqui frontier question which had been left 
open in the Lausanne treaty centered about whether Turkey 
would retain the Mosul region or whether the region would fall 
within the territorial boundary of the new Kingdom and British 
mandate of Iraq. The dispute was not settled until 
1) the Anglo-Turkish dispute over the boundary of the 
Mosul vilayet was submitted to the League of Nations 
on August 26, 1924, 
2) the League Council fixed the provisional "'Brussels" 
line assigning most of Mosul, with the territory 
containing most of the rich oil fields, to Iraq on 
December 16, 1925, 
3) and finally, by the Frontier Treaty between the 
United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey (Treaty of London), 
June 5, 1926, which disposed of the Mosul issue for 
most part in accordance with the earlier League's 
decision,_but O!ll.Y after it included "a sop to 
wounded LTurkis!JI nationalist sensitivity." 15o Under 
155Before the war, British, German, American, and Anglo-Dutch interests 
had been interested in securing concessions to develop the oil deposits in 
the Sultan's far flung dominions in the Near Fast. Eventually British and 
German interests centered on the oil deposits in the Mosul vilayet, and in 
1912 these interests formed the Turkish Petroleum Company to develop the 
petroleum resources of the Mosul region. At war's end, however, as noted 
previousl~ the French, as one of the spoils of war, took over the German 
interests by the San Remo oil agreement between Britain and France. 
156Bribes, or to use the more explicit Near Eastern expression for 
"palm greasing" the Turkish rusvet, have always played a key role in the 
external and internal affairs of the Near East. 
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Article 14, the treaty provided that 
" ••• the Iraq Government shall pay to the Turkish 
Government for a period of twenty-five years 
from the coming into force of the present Treaty 
ten percent on all royalties which it shall 
receive:--
(a) from the Turkish Petroleum Company 
under article 10 of its concession 
of the 14th of March 1925; 
(b) from such companies or persons as 
may exploit oil under the provisions 
of article 6 of the above-mentioned 
concession; 
(c) from such subsidiary companies as may 
be constituted under the provisions 
of article 33 of the above-mentioned 
concessions. 11 157 
The popular Greek argument that in the end they were sold 
out in Asia Minor by the British on account of the Mosul issue 
is hardly in accord with the known facts in the question. 
As has been previously noted, the British alone, of 
Greece's allies and friends had consistently supported the 
Greek position in Asia Minor, even for awhile when the Greek 
position in Anatolia had become militarily and diplomatically 
untenable. If anything, the opposite is true. Britain favored 
a strong Greece in the Near East, and it was precisely because 
of this fact that Britain lost the support of France and Italy 
who feared that Greece was emerging as a British 11satellite" 
in the Near East. Britain withdrew her unqualified support of 
the Greek position in Turkey as the Greek ship of state in 
157Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, P• 146. 
"Anatolia" hovered on the brink of military disaster and 
Britain herself had become isolated from her allies in the 
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Near East as a result of Kemalist diplomacy. While it is true 
that the British, and Lloyd George in particular, continued to 
egg the Greeks on against the recalcitrant Turks; equally true 
is the fact that as events worsened for Greece in the Near 
East Britain attempted to extract Greece from her precarious 
position in Anatolia and her "private war" witt the 1'urkish 
nationalists by counseling Greece on the necessity for a new 
Ottoman settlement. The Mosul issue between England and 
Turkey was not settled until almost four years after the final 
collapse of the Greek army in Anatolia and remained unsettled 
for almost three years after the conclusion of the treaty of 
Lausanne which would seem to belie the charge that Britain in 
1922 had sold Greece out for Mosul. Finally, the "Mosul sell-
out" is one of those things that much is said about, but little 
is really known; for, in the last analysis, seldom is there 
any real evidence to prove or disprove such charges, and even 
if there were it would be known only by a close-mouthed few. 
Possibly the most that can be made of the Greek 11Mosul sell-
out" argument is the fact that in the twentieth century Near 
Eastern problems cannot be discussed without "living" oil or 
"breathing 11 it. 
The Treaty of Lausanne has long been hailed as the only 
negotiated peace treaty of the First World War; but in reality, 
the second Turkish settlement when stripped of its diplomatic 
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fineries was just another dictated settlement. This time the 
Turkish settlement was dictated by Kemal's Provisional 
Government which presented the Allies with a fait accompli 
that made the major preoccupation of the Conference a "give 
and take" on the demands submitted by the 'I1urkish representa-
tive Ismet Pasha (Inonu). At Lausanne, unlike San Remo, the 
Allies mostly gave and the Turks mostly took from demands which 
they had substantially defined in the Turkish National Pact 
and which had been scoffed at three years earlier by the 
Allies at Paris. 158 Now Kemal made the Allies accept each of 
the provisos of the Turkish National Pact, and while Greece 
Land Armenis/ was the immediate loser by the Lausanne settle-
ment; the Powers sacrificed little, for it was their good 
fortune that their Sevres judgments had not been at the 
expense of the Turkish homeland; in the long run, however, 
all lost by succumbing to Kemal for they set a precedent for 
other nationalists to agitate for revision of the other World 
War I peace settlements. The surrender of Sevres at Lausanne 
prepared the way for new Kemals, Lausannes, and eventually 
the Second World War. 
158
rhe insignificance attached to the National Pact by one of the 
Allies, Great Britain, is attested to by the fact that the Pact had been 
sent to the British Foreign Office by British diplomatic circles in 
Turkey in "memorandum form" and was ignored as worthy of little considera-
tion when it arrived in London. · 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Viewed in retrospect, the period between the Treaty of 
London in 1830 and the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 was for Greece 
an era of progressive expansion which witnessed the rise of a 
people from enslavement to the near accomplishment of a dream 
personified in the "Great Idea." 
"It is not without reason that King George I 
assumed the title not of 'King of Greece,' 
which had been borne by his predecessor, but 
of 'King of the Hellenes.' This title 
embodies the aspirations of the Greeks for the 
incorporation in Free Bellas of all their un-
redeemed brethr~n, which is the keynote of 
Greek history L,especiallV'" from 1B64 onwards." 159 
In nineteen hundred and twenty the fortunes of the Ottoman 
Empire had reached their nadir; correspondingly the fortunes 
of the Greek Kingdom had reached their zenith, but three years 
later one man, Mustapha Kemal, a relative unknown in the field 
of international affairs and a neophyte in politics, 1) 
shattered that institution which had become known ignominiously 
as the "Sickman of Europe," 2) nullified the "infamous" Treaty 
of Sevres, 3) and obliterated the "Great Idea." Better known 
as Kemal Ataturk, father of all Turks and creator of modern 
Turkey, at the same time Kemal can also be known adversely 
as the father of modern Greece since, .more than any other 
individual and aided by the duplicity of the Great Powers, he 
struck down the ttGreat Idea" and made it any empty dream. 
Thereafter, the Greeks were forced to settle on Athens and not 
159 E. S. Forster, A Short History of Greece, 1821-1957, p. 20. 
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look towards Constantinople as the capital of modern Greece. 
Possibly the only remaining vestige of the "Great Idea" is found 
in the title of the Greek monarch who is still known as King 
of the Hellenes. 
During the middle period of her existence the position of 
Greece as a small state under the protection of Greater Powers 
forced Greece to fix her attention on international politics, 
and, in particular, the activities of the Powers in the 
Eastern Question. The Eastern Question was not only the issue 
geographically closest to Greece, but it was singularly the 
issue closest to the heart of Greece. 
In her drive to play upon the Eastern Question and break 
the shell into which she had been placed by the Great Powers 
in 1832 Greece was opposed by her neighbors but more often met 
with resistance from her "protectors"; any gains Greece acquired 
from the Powers most always were with territory over which she 
had the strongest claims--Central Greece, the Aegean and Ionians 
Islands, and, in all cases, except possibly the Ionian acquisi-
tions, resulted from Greece forcing the issue, either through 
the threat of war, outright war, or guerrilla war in which 
the Enosis ideal always played the leading idea. Elsewhere 
Greece employed shrewd and judicious diplomacy against her 
neighbors as was the case in the Balkan Wars and Venizelist 
diplomacy in World War I which inveigled the San Remo and 
Neuilly concessions for Greece. In all instances Greece found 
herself caught in the middle between the opposing desires of 
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the Powers and the rival aspirations of her neighbors; it was 
a wonder that under these conditions Greece was able to en-
large her territory to the extent she did from 1832 to 1923. 
Greece never enjoyed fully the whole-hearted support of 
one or more of the Great Powers, and no European Power made 
the cause of Greece its own. At best, Great Britain was 
"closest" to Greece but, in the light of the historic British 
position in the Eastern Question, she pursued an "on again 
and off again" favorable diplomacy towards Greece. 
Throughout the 19th Century the Greek monarchy was not 
associated with a majbr House of Europe which was so important 
at that time and especially during the formative years of a 
nation. It was not until World War I that the Greek Royal 
House was tied dynastically to a major Power; but this 
dynastic tie with Imperial Germany proved detrimental to 
Greece. It made Greece suspect in the eyes of the Triple 
Entente; and Greece could gain nothing by this strong dynastic 
tie with the Kaiser, since territories to which Greece aspired 
were controlled by Italy, Turkey and Bulgaria, who were more 
important to the designs of Germany and Austria-Hungary in 
the Balkans and were favored over Greece by the Dual Alliance. 
Similarly, after Italy abandoned the Dual Alliance for the 
Triple Entente in World War I, Greece found herself opposed 
in the Entente by Italy who was more important to the Allied 
cause than Greece; and Italy, like Greece, aspired to Albania, 
the Dodecanese, and Asia Minor. The Greco-Italian rivalry was 
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not fought out until 1940, but the conclusion cannot be 
escaped that the immediate roots of the Italian-Greek conflict 
in Albania in 1940-41 can be traced back to at least the World 
War I peace settlements. 
The Greeks can claim no 11big brother" among the four main 
racial groups of Europe--Slavs, Latins, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons. 
Possibly, the Greek position in this res~)ect is unique in 
Europe in that the Greeks cannot claim racial ties with any 
large racial group or any big Power. Consequently, Greek 
nationalism centered around Greece, and until the emergence 
of a small but strongly knitted Greek faction in the United 
States at the turn of the twentieth century, its only principal 
exponent had been the tiny kingdom of Hellas and "unredeemed 
Hellas 11 in Asia Minor, the two centers of Hellenism. Indeed, 
far from being aided by her "protectors," to the contrary 
Greece has been thwarted by exponents of Slav, Teuton, Latin, 
or Anglo-Saxon aspirations and as a creature of this antipathy 
was often forced to face Russian, Austro-German, Italian, 
French, and English hostility as well as that of the Balkan 
Slavs and Turkey. In this sense, how different her history 
has been from that of the other nations of Southeastern Europe 
behind whom repeatedly one or more of the Great Powers has 
loomed periodically as a "big brother." The Greek catastrophe 
in Asia Minor clearly portrays this situation. If any one of 
the Powers made even the slightest pretext to assist Greece 
against Turkey the dream of a Greater Greece would, more than 
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likely, have become reality. 
The sea, historically Greece's greatest asset, has at 
the same time been a great liability to Greece for in pursuing 
her aspirations Greece has had to consider her extreme vul-
nerability by sea which, combined with her unfavorable economy 
and trade, has placed her unavoidably at the mercy of any 
strong naval Power. This has meant Great Britain, France, 
and Italy; and recently with the United States' Sixth Fleet 
dominating the Mediterranean now includes the United States. 
Greece's vulnerability from the sea marked Great Britain 
especially as a natural ally for Greece, i.e., as long as 
Russia remained bottled up in the Black Sea. Consequently, a 
scrupulous regard for British susceptibilities should have 
become a leading principle in Greek foreign policy, since 
deviation from this principle were sure to result in immediate 
interventions and distasteful chastisements. Herein lay the 
Greek dilemma: in order to survive as a nation worthy of the 
name during the middle period of her modern existence, Greece 
had to expand and this growth could only be accomplished at 
the expense of Turkey. The difficulty becomes readily apparent 
when it is remembered that the question on which Great Britain 
was most sensitive throughout the nineteenth century was the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian 
southern expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Near East. Historically, British diplomacy was made subservient 
to this single axiom, often to the detriment of Greek aspirations, 
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and except for a brief deviation from this tenet during and in 
the immediate aftermath of World War I the principle has been 
continued into the twentieth century. At mid-twentieth century 
this axiom has been graphically adhered to by British diplomacy 
--witness the fact that Britain today considers 'J:urkey the 
anchor in the Western defense system in the Near East; there-
fore, Turkish susceptibilities in the Cyprus issue were 
considered fully and Greece, for its part, was advised by her 
Allies not to agitate for Cyprus for by so doing she disrupted 
the solidarity of the Western alliance in the Near East. 
During the formative stages of the Cyprus dispute Britain, 
for fear of arousing Turkish sensibilities,was willing to submit 
totally to Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue when she 
refused even to consider as the Greeks claimed that a "question" 
existed in Cyprus; and British treatment of the Cyprus question 
since, as has been the general Western position, was seriously 
impaired by the single overriding fear of weakening the Turkish 
rampart against the new expansion of Russia in the Near East. 
On the Cyprus issue, the West is the victim of what has come to 
be known today as "Blackmail Diplomacy"; it should be noted, 
however, that "Blackmail Diplomacy" is not new to the twentieth 
century or to the relations between Britain and Turkey, and 
Greece. In effect, it has always been normal procedure in 
Near Eastern territorial disputes for the "Eastern Question" 
has been a history of "Blackmail Diplomacy." 
Greece has never been chastised, short of war, by a land 
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power, History has proven that a naval blockade remains the 
surest and quickest way to force Greece "to mend her ways" 
and the British have used this means with significant results. 
In the Don Pacifico Affair in 1850 England seized Greek vessels 
in the port of Piraeus to force the Greeks to comply with 
demands arising from private British claims against the Greek 
Government.160 From 1854-1857 a Franco-British occupation 
of Piraeus prevented the Greeks from liberating Thessaly from 
the Turks and thereby permitted Thessaly to remain a Pandora's 
box for thirty more years. The situation in Thessaly again 
manifested itself in 1878 when the Greek government declared 
war on Turkey during the Russo-Turkish War of 1875. Subse-
quently, at San Stephano and at the Congress of Berlin which 
redivided the spoils of the conflict between East and ~lest 
and recast the map of the Balkan Peninsula, Greece received 
nothing. The Greeks were put off with promises for the future 
of Thessaly and a part of Epirus, for, in the words of 
Disraeli, Greece was "a country with a future and could afford 
to wait." Greece waited three years, and it was only after 
continued pressures by Greece and by the Greeks in Thessaly 
whlch threatened to erupt into a new Balkan war that the 
Western Pov1ers induced Turkey in 1881 to cede the major part 
of Thessaly to Greece. While it is true that "Good wine lures 
160Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, 
defended this action in his greatest parliamentary speech--civis Romanus 
sum--June 29, 1850 in which he appealed to British pride and nationalism. 
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back the wine bibber," equally true unfortunately is the fact 
that (1) subject peoples must use force not only against their 
"Occupiers" but often against their "benefactors" in order to 
achieve even legitimate aspirations, and (2) small Powers 
must await, often fruitlessly, hand-outs from Great Powers to 
redeem their Terre Irredenta--unless they are quick to seize 
the initiative and present the Powers with a fait accompli 
as the Balkan States did after the First Balkan War. 
In 1886 the Powers again presented Greece with an ultimatum 
to prevent Greece from seizing upon the Bulgarian revolution 
in Eastern Rumelia to achieve a settlement of her northern 
frontier against Turkey in Thessaly and the part of Epirus 
promised Greece at Berlin. Once again only a blockade of 
Greece by the Powers forced compliance upon Greece. Finally, 
the Powers, under one pretext or another, repeatedly violated 
Greece's territory during the First World War. As a result of 
their command of the Mediterranean the Entente Powers took 
exceptional liberty with Greece's sovereignty and neutrality 
that culminated in a joint Anglo-French occupation of Saloniki 
and other Greek territory which eventually inveigled Greece into 
the war. 
Possibly no issue is more representative of Greece's 
relations with her "protectors" and the struggle of exohellenes 
to achieve their national aspirations than the Cretan Question. 
The Cretan Question which ought to have been settled by the 
Treaty of Berlin was allowed by.the Great Powers to drag on 
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fruitlessly for a quarter of a century longer and cause much 
useless bloodshed before its final solution. E. c. Helmreich, 
on The Diplomacv of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, correctly re-
marks that "it was clear that meither Turkey nor the Powers 
would ever permit Crete to join Greece until forced to do so." 
This dangerous state of affairs lasted· until 1912 when the 
Cretans for the last time proclaimed Enosis with Greece, and 
Greece, against the threats of Turkey and repeated protesta-
tions of the Powers, formally announced the island's union 
with the "Mother Country." 
The Middle Period of Greek history is replete with 
instances of Great Power violations of Greece's sovereignty. 
lhese violations run the full gauntlet including coercive 
threats, the outright occupation of Greek territory, and the 
forceful acceptance of policies detrimental to Greece's pri-
mary interests and aspirations. These transgressions by 
Greece's "protectors" are only one-half the story since each 
exaction also had its effect on Greece's domestic politics 
as well--to mention one, the repudiation of Eleutherios 
Venizelos. Perhaps, as the Greeks of old grew tired of hearing 
Aristides called "the Just," so the modern Greek had grown 
weary hearing the praises of Venizelos at home and abroad. 
But in November 1920 Venizelos was as much damned by the 
company he kept at the Paris Peace Conference as he was sub-
sequently damned at home by his constituents who defeated him 
at the polls. 
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Could Venizelos have been reelected in 1920 if he had not 
been so closely associated with the war effort and the Entente? 
No one can be sure. It is difficult to account for this 
public rejection of the only great statesman in modern Greek 
history whose very name had become synonymous with the "Greek 
Idea," the very vision of which warmed the hearts of Greeks 
everywhere. It is true that Venizelos had made his full 
quota of mistakes in preparation for the election, not least 
of which was "his long absence of fighting his country's 
battle at the Conference table." National elections are not 
won abroad, they are won at home; and while it is true that 
other factors also entered into Venizelos' defeat, one stands 
out above all others. In 1920 a war-weary Greece felt that 
she had been wronged often by the ~ntente during the war and 
tricked by the Entente after the war in the post-war settlement. 
Venizelos had stood unswervingly by the side of the Lntente, 
and the Royalists missed no chance to make political capital 
out of this one dent in his armor. 
At Paris Venizelos assumed a role and achieved a stature, 
which far outweighed the importance and power of the nation 
which he represented in the historic "Eastern Question." In 
the Balkans, a minor league when it came to power politics, 
Greece was on a near par with its neighbors, and any difficiency 
in power which may have existed between Greece and her neighbors 
was made up by Venizelos' astute diplomacy; in Europe, how-
ever, Greece simply was not in the same league with Britain, 
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France and Italy, or even a Turkey which had been so recently 
vanquished. The "Turkish delightsu in the Great Power Garden 
of Eden known as the Ottoman Empire were ripe for picking 
after World War I; but, as even~soon proved, the historic 
Great Power jealousies and rivalries were not to permit the 
picking by any ambitious small power such as Greece and the 
division and duplicity generated by the scramble for the 
Ottoman spoils made the fall out and treachery after the First 
Balkan War between the members of the Balkan League appear as 
child's play. What brought this friction into full play was 
Venizelos' presentation of Greece's demands at the Paris 
Peace Conference, and Greece's attempt afterwards to carry 
them out. 
In 1922 the duplicity and historic fear of certain 
Western Powers and Russia of a Greater Greece came to the fore. 
The Greek army which entered Asia Minor was not only an agent 
of Greece as often charged, but an instrument of the Allies, 
and in particular the British who bethought themselves of 
the Greeks to enforce upon the 'lurks the Sevres Settlement 
and to replace Turkey as the new bulwark against Russian 
expansion into the Mediterranean. The Greeks were belatedly 
criticized for "over-bearing territorial ambitions" in the 
Near East, and while criticism of Greece's escapade in Asia 
Minor after World War I has been possibly well intentioned, 
it has not always been well directed. At San Remo Greece's 
allies, without the semblance of historic or racial claims, 
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seized for themselves the lion's share, quantitatively and 
qualitatively, of the Ottoman spoils and while Greece's Asia 
Minor award was shattered by Lausanne, Greece's allies retained 
the greater part of their spoils. Besides, the "Great Idea" 
was never held in any secret; it was not born in 1919; it was 
very much the inevitable consequences of 1832 and the result 
of the turbulent Greek-Turkish history since that earlier event-
ful date. And then no matter what may be said of Greece's 
action in Asia Minor the strategy behind the Greek move against 
the Kemalists after Sevres was well-taken. The center of 
Kemalist nationalism and force was not based at Snyrna or 
Constantinople, but in the interior; and this is where enforce-
ment was needed. In the final analysis, however, the Greek 
move proved unsound, for once commenced it was predicated upon 
one fact--that Greece had allies in Asia Minor. N9t only did 
this prove untrue, but it soon came to pass that the Turks 
were receiving armaments surreptitiously from Italy and France 
who now came to distrust the aims of the Greeks as a tool of 
Britain more than the Nationalist Turks who sought to over-
turn the Sevres treaty. At the same time, Great Britain, 
unlike France and Italy who had at least put up a semblance of 
engaging the Kemalists during the formative months of the 
Allied occupation of 1'urkey, permitted Greece to pull her 
Serves chestnuts out of the fire but would not risk operations 
against the insurgent Turks and alas turned her back on Greece 
in Turkey. The United States does not emerge unscathed from 
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the fiasco either, for it seized upon the change of government 
in Greece in 1920 as a pretext for refusing to permit Greece 
to draw further upon the credit granted her as a war measure. 
In this manner funds desperately needed by the Greeks to fight 
the war in Asia Minor were suddenly rendered unavailable. 
When all the facts are weighed in the Asia Minor dis-
aster and the period offers an excellent kaleidoscope of the 
Middle Period of Greek history, Greece was most guilty of the 
one thing alone, gullibility. Gullibility in believing that 
her "protectors" would permit her to fulfill her aspirations; 
gullibility in believing that unlike the hyena she had been 
in the past, Greece need no longer wait to gnaw on the bones 
of the Ottoman carcass; and gullibility in believing that 
Greece would be admitted to the Concert of Powers in the 
Eastern Question and permitted to enter into full play in the 
Near East. In the last analysis for this alone can Greece be 
condemned; and this, in and of itself, was the thing which 
had historically conditioned the successful completion of the 
never 
"Great Idea." But small powers have/been destined to play 
Great Power roles; they are only instruments, sometimes 
willingly and other times unwillingly, in the greater Power 
conflict wbich in essence describes the history of modern 
Greece during the Middle Period of her existence. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MODERN ERA: 1923-1949 
Three distinct periods are clearly discernible in the 
modern era of Greek history from 1923-1949. These are 
(1) The turbulent twenties. 
(2) The failure of the republican experiment 
and the search for security in the thirties. 
(3) The fight for survival against Fascism, 
Nazism and Communism in the forties out of 
which fhe United States of America emerged 
as Greece's new "protector." 
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For Greece the thirteen years following the Lausanne 
Treaty from 1923-1936 were not unlike the thirteen years which 
followed the Graeco-Turkish War in 1897; both were character-
ized by economic distress, political strife, and revolutions. 
The period after 1897 culminated in the ascension of Venizelos 
to the helm of the Greek state; the period after 1923 reached 
a climax with the dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas and 
whereas the renaissance of Greece under Venizelos proved 
itself in the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, the reconstruction of 
Greece under Metaxas from the morass of a twelve-year republic 
experiment, replete with chaos and dictatorships, proved itself 
when a united and victorious Greece held Italy at bay in 
Albania in 1940-41. In the end, however, the deference which 
Venizelos won for Greece in the Balkan Wars and by his close 
association with the Entente in World War I, and the respect 
which Metaxas won for Greece by the victory over Fascist Italy 
were both lost when the Greeks fell victim to international 
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rivalries and started quarreling amongst themselves. The first 
case resulted in the Asia Minor disaster and defeated the 
Greek dream for a Greater Greece; the second witnessed an 
on-and-off "civil war" which nearly finished Greece as a free 
state and well-nigh rendered unto Russia her long dreamed of 
Mediterranean outlet. In both cases, whether it was the 
historic "Eastern Question," or its more recent counterpart, 
the Communist "take-over" in Eastern Europe and the unsuc-
cessful Russian attempt to penetrate the Near East through 
Greece and Turkey after World War II, Greece became the 
shuttlecock of the greater Big Power rivalry, and in the end 
was rescued from the clutches of Communism only to fall more 
securely into the Western orbit. 
PART I: 1923-1939 
THE TURBULENT TWENTIES 
The Internal QUestions 
The period between 1923-1930 presents no striking inci-
dents as far as the external history of Greece is concerned. 
Although these years were speckled with incidents between 
Greece and her neighbors over unresolved issues of World War I 
which will be treated later in the chapter, in the main, for 
Greece, it was a period of reestablishing responsible govern-
ment and, in particular, laying the foundations for the 
Republic which emerged from the crucible of the Greek disaster 
in Asia Minor. The problems resolved included the amnesty . 
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question, the constitutional question, land reform and the 
refugee problem, and the subject of calendar reform which, 
while seemingly unimportant against the backdrop of the other 
reforms, had proven an inconvenience, particularly in the 
Greek business world. Briefly, the issues were settled as 
follows: On March 1, 1923 Greece adopted the Western calendar 
in place of the old style calendar of the Orthodox Church 
which was fourteen days in arrears; on January 22, 1925 the 
Revolutionary regime passed a Decree of Amnesty for all politi-
cal offenses; the Constitutional question was resolved on 
March 25, 1924 when the Chamber of Deputies voted the abolition 
of the monarchy in favor of a republic which was overwhelmingly 
approved in a nation-wide plebiscite on April 13; continuing 
land reform during the twenties resulted in the distribution 
of approximately 40% of the total cultivated area of Greece 
at that time, comprising 1,142,000 hectares (1 hectare equals 
10,000 square meters) of which approximately 592,000 were 
vacated by departing Turks and Bulgars under the exchanges 
and the remainder consisted of former church, state, and large 
private land holdings expropriated by the government to pro-
vide the incoming Greek refugee with a means of livelihood. 
the 
Finally, the settlement of the Greek refugees from/Asia Minor 
disaster and the Greek exchanges under the Neuilly and Lausanne 
treaties were finally concluded in 1930. 
Initially the task of resettling the more numerous hap-
less individuals from the Turkish territories was undertaken 
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by the Greek Government assisted greatly by generous aid from 
American charity and later by the League of Nations under the 
Geneva Protocol, September 29, 1923, which established the 
Refugees' Settlement Commission and sponsored two loans total-
ing 13 million pounds to finance the work of the resettlement. 
In the end, approximately 1.5 million Greek refugees from 
Bulgaria and Turkey, equal to one-fourth of the total popu-
lation of Greece, were thrust upon an already war ravished 
economy, creating a new social Greek class--a refugee class--
which became a new factor in Greek politics that served to 
increase the political instability which plagued Greece after 
the disastrous defeat in Asia Minor. 
The External Questions 
Four external problems in which Greece was vitally 
interested rapidly reached an acute stage during the turbulent 
twenties. These were the historic Epirus question with 
Albania and Italy, the difficulties emanating from the exchange 
of minorities and frontier incidents with Bulgaria; the 
difference between Greece and Turkey involving the "exchange" 
status of the Greek Patriarchate and the Greek minority in 
Constantinople and the liquidation of the property of the 
exchanged Greeks and Turks, and the question of port facilities 
at Saloniki and the Gevgeli-Saloniki Railway with Yugoslavia. 
Northern Epirus and Albania 
The basic.problem in Greek-Albanian relations from 1912 
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down to the present day has been that of "northern Epirus," or 
southern Albania as the region is known to the Albanians. 
Similarly, the major bone of contention between Greece and 
Italy in the Balkans was the Epirus question since the para-
mount position of Italy in Albania had been recognized by the 
Powers following World War I and Italy's Albanianaspirations 
conflicted with Greek nationalism. 
In December 1914, pending the final settlement of the 
Albanian question at the Peace Conference, Greek forces were 
permitted by the Entente Powers and Italy to reoccupy those 
parts of southern Albania which they had liberated from the 
Turks during the course of the First Balkan War and from which 
they had been ousted by the Powers in July 1914 after the 
Protocol of Florence, December 17, 1913 had delimited the Greek 
Albanian boundary and awarded the "northern Epirus" territory 
to Albania. 
The provisional reoccupation of "northern Epirus" by 
Greece proved short-lived. Italy, which had been allowed to 
occupy the Valona region of Albania on conditions similar to 
those granted Greece by the Allies, seized upon the question-
able policy of the Skouloudis Government in 1916 to urge the 
Entente powers tofi)rce the revocation of the Greek occupation 
of southern Albania and by the end of World War I had removed 
the Greek threat to her dominant position in Albania. 
The Albanian question came up for considerable discussion 
during the Paris Peace Conference as President Wilson refused 
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to recognize the validity of the secret Treaty of London which 
gave Italy "full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno 
(commanding the Valona harbor entrance) and surrounding terri-
tory of sufficient extent to assure defense of these points ••• u 
At the same time, the secret treaty stipulated that if Italy 
received the territories awarded her in the Alps and along 
the Adriatic, then she would "not oppose the division of 
Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro and Serbia 
and Greece should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire." 
And finally, central Albania was to become a "small autonomous 
neutral State," represented by Italy in its foreign affairs. 
The American President's unyielding stand against the secret 
London Treaty and the proposed partition of Albania at the 
Peace Conference by Great Britain, France, and Italy supported 
by Yugoslavia and Greece caused the conferees to shelve the 
Albanian issue by referring it to a Conference of Ambassadors. 
In the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement of July 29, 1919 
between Greece and Italy, Italy agreed to give full support 
to Greece's request regarding the annexation of "northern Epirus" 
in exchange for Greek support for Italian claims elsewhere; in 
the end, however, Italy, plagued by dissatisfaction and war 
weariness at home and in the face of attacks by Albanicnnation-
alists upon her positions in Albania, seized upon the abortive 
character of the Treaty of Sevres to renounce formally her 
support of the "northern Epirustt cession to Greece. Previously, 
on August 2, 1920 Italy had agreed to withdraw her troops from 
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Albania, and the last of the Italian troops evacuated their 
Valona positions one month later. On December 17, 1920 free 
of Italian troops, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations 
as a sovereign and independent nation; however, the question 
of Albania's southern boundary with Greece and Yugoslavia 
remained to be resolved and involved Albania in repeated 
incidents with her ambitious neighbors. 
On November 9, 1921 the Conference of Ambassadors called 
to settle the Albanian border question confirmed the frontier 
established in 1913 by the Protocol of Florence. A year later, 
Greece, following her disastrous defeat in Asia Minor, recog-
nized Albanian independence and withdrew her troops from 
"northern Epirus" but made certain reservations relative to a 
segment of the boundary line between the two nations. 
On August 27, 1923 General Tellini, the chief Italian 
delegate and chairman of an International Commission engaged 
in delimiting the disputed frontier between Greece and 
Albania, with members of his Italian staff were murdered on 
Greek soil just after they had decided to award the villages 
in question near Koritza (Korce) to Albania and which the 
Greeks still occupied. The Tellini murder had grave reper-
cussions. Even before responsibility for the crime was 
established, Mussolini presented Greece with a humiliating 
ultimatum, which Greece refused to accept in toto, whereupon 
Italian naval forces proceeded to bombard and occupy the 
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island of Corfu and some of the neighboring Greeks islands. 161 
Greece appealed the Italian action to the League of Nations; 
. 
Mussolini, however, initially rejected the League's "inter-
vention" in the Tellini-Corfu matter but gave way when rising 
protests against Italian action proved vehement and France, 
interested in garnering the support of Italy for her policies, 
soothed Il Duce's sensitivities by encouraging the League to 
turn the Corfu matter over to a Conference of Ambassadors in 
Paris, and Greece, beforehand, agreed to accept its adjudica-
tion in the matter. The Conference decided against Greece 
and awarded Italy a sizeable indemnity on the gounds that 
there had been negligence on the part of the Greek authorities. 
Although there was much question about the judgment of the 
Ambassadors' conference and despite the fact that the League 
Assembly itself protested the handling and the decision in 
the Corfu incident, nevertheless, the verdict against Greece 
stood proving early that the League was less influential than 
the exigencies of power politics especially when one of the 
parties to the dispute was a Great Power and the other a Small 
Power. 
161Mussolini's harsh twenty-four hour ultimatum to Greece involved 
an apology, a funeral service for the.General Tellini in Athens, a 
salute to the Italian flag, an Italian supervised inquiry into the matter, 
the summary execution of the guilty, and a fine of 50 million lire to be 
paid to Italy by Greece. Greece refused to accept Italian assistance in 
the investigation and the fine. 
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The Differences Between Greece and Turkey 
The difference between Greece and Turkey after the Graeco-
Turkish War of 1920-22 essentially revolved about the question 
of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Constantinople 
and the liquidation of property of the exchanged Greeks and 
Turks raised by the exchange of populations. 
At the Lausanne Conference in 1923 Turkey demanded the 
removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople. The Turks 
had claimed that the Patriarchate had become more and more an 
anachronism as the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire 
had gained their independence. Furthermore, they charged that 
the Patriarchate had no place in the new Turkey since its 
civil functions of marriage, wardship, and inheritance had 
become defunct and that it served more and more as an object 
of Greek political agitation rather than the religious head 
of the Eastern Orthodox Church. In the end, a compromise was 
agreed upon whereby the Patriarchate was to concern itself 
solely with religious matters, and eventually the Patriarch 
himself was to renounce his prior nationality, assume Turkish 
citizenship, and place himself under the jurisdiction of the 
Turkish Government upon his elevation to the Patriarchal seat 
of the Eastern Orthodox Church at Constantinople.l62 
162For example, the present Patriarch, Athenagoras, a naturalized 
A~erican citizen was forced to renounce his American citizenship and be-
come a Turkish subject at the time of his elevation to the chief seat of 
Eastern Orthodoxy. 
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Under the convention for the exchange of minorities between 
Greece and Turkey the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople who 
had been "established" before October 30, 1918 were made exempt 
from the exchange provisions of the treaty; however, consider-
able difficulty arose over the meaning of the term "established." 
The Greeks interpreted it to mean merely resident, whereas 
the Turks, maintaining that it implied the fulfillment of 
certain legal formalities, gave it a more narrow interpretation 
and on January 30, 1925 even ousted Constantine VI who was 
elected to the Patriarchate in December 1924 by the Holy Synod 
but who had not been resident in Constantinople before 
October 30, 1918 and therefore, according to the Turks, was 
"exchangeable." The Turkish Government urged that the Orthodox 
Hierarchy appoint a Patriarch from the ranks of the Orthodox 
clergy who was not "exchangeable" which was a near impossibility 
since the eligible candidates were equally "exchangeable." 
Eventually, the "established" issue was referred to the 
Permanent Court at the Hague which decided against the Turkish 
interpretation. On the other hand, Constantine VI who had 
fled to Saloniki abdicated as Patriarch and the Holy Synod 
of the Eastern Orthodox Church elected the Metropolitan of 
Nicaea, Basil Georgiadis who was favorable to Turkey, as the 
new Patriarch thus closing the book on the Patriarch issue 
at a most critical time in Greek-Turkish history. 
The case of the Greeks who had been expelled unlawfully 
from Constantinople and not allowed to return and the question 
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of the disposal of properties left behind by emigrants from 
Greece and Turkey remained the subject of direct negotiations 
between Greece and Turkey for five years until settled at the 
time of the Graeco-Turkish rapprochement in 1930. 
One other dispute during the decade under consideration 
threatened to add fuel to the already troubled relations be-
tween Greece and Turkey arising from the exchange of populations. 
In 1929 the Turkish Government reconditioned the ex-German 
dreadnought Goeben, thereby upsetting the naval parity existing 
between Greece and Turkey and giving Turkey a decided naval 
vantage over Greece whose only capital ship was the age-old 
battle-cruiser Averof which had done yeoman service during 
the First Balkan War. 
The new Goeben issue caused many Greeks to clamor for a 
restoration of naval parity by the purchase of a new capital 
warship in Germany; however, Venizelos counseled against a 
new naval arms race with Turkey and prevailed upon the Greek 
Chamber of Deputies to expend this money for lesser naval 
craft which were "more useful for defense than defiance." At 
the same time Venizelos declared that he was convinced that 
"Turkey was peacefully minded and had no designs against 
Greek territory." Besides, the Greek premier stated that a 
League of Nations existed to settle new conflicts and the 
interests of both Greece and Turkey could best be served if 
negotiations were resumed to settle their outstanding 
differences. To this end, on June 10, 1930 a convention was 
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signed between Greece and Turkey which settled (1) the value 
of properties left behind by the exchanged populations, (2) 
the disposal of properties left behind by the "non-exchangeables" 
who had nevertheless emigrated, and (3) finalized the status 
of the Greeks in Constantinople and the Turks in Thrace. More 
important, however, the Convention led to a visit to Ankara 
by Venizelos where on October 30, 1930 the Greek Premier signed 
three diplomatic agreements with Turkey which included a Treaty 
of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, a Protocol for 
the Limitation of Naval Armaments, and lastly a Commercial 
Convention. At the same time, Venizelos is said to have de-
clared that his presence in the Turkish capital signified the 
end of the historic conflict between Greece and Turkey, thus 
setting the stage for a total rapprochement, diplomatic, 
economic, and mill tary between Greece and !'urkey. 
Minority Problems and Frontier 
Incidents Between Greece and Bulgaria 
The exchange of minorities led to difficulties between 
Greece and Bulgaria. Generally speaking, the Bulgarians in 
Greek territory showed more eagerness to leave Greece than 
did the Greeks in Bulgaria to emigrate to Greece. In fact, 
many of the Bulgarians in Greece due for resettlement under 
the 1919 Graeco-Bulgarian Agreement for the exchange of 
minorities retired across the Bulgarian frontier where they 
hovered in destitution without waiting for the liquidation of 
their property in Greece, while their former abodes in Greece 
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were quickly occupied by Greek refugees from Asia Minor. 'I'his 
dangerous frontier situation led to numerous border incidents 
and in March 1923 an early appeal by the Bulgarian Government 
to the League of Nations protested the treatment of Bulgarian 
nationals by Greece in Western Thrace and Macedonia and urged 
the League to spur the Greek Government into settlement of 
the border problem. 
The most serious of the frontier incidents occurred at 
Tarlis on the Greek-Bulgarian border near Petrie in July 1924 
and in October 1925 at Demir Kapu, north of Saloniki. At 
Tarlis some sixty Bulgarian inhabitants were arrested on the 
grounds that they had cooperated with Bulgarian comitadjis 
by a Greek officer in charge of the local garrison and while 
the prisoners were being escorted to a neighboring village 
thirteen of their number were shot, allegedly for attempting 
to escape. A Commission of Inquiry appointed by the League 
of Nations to investigate the Tarlis incident exonerated the 
Greek Government but censured the local authorities; but more 
important, the attempt at a settlement drove a new wedge 
between Greek-Yugoslav unity at a time when Greece and 
Yugoslavia were at odds over the question of the Saloniki Free 
Zone since in the settlement of the Tarlis incident the Greek 
and Bulgarian representatives on the initiative of the League 
Council signed a Protocol by which a Mixed Commission--an 
Englishman and a Dutchman--were appointed to assist the Greeks 
and Bulgarians in the execution of the Minorities Treaty. This 
act found particular disfavor with the Yugoslav Government 
which had repeatedly denied the existence of Slavs of Bulgarian 
extraction in Yugoslav Macedonia and read into the Protocol 
an admission by Greece that the Slav element in Greek Macedonia 
was Bulgarian. Belgrade, therefore, brought pressure upon 
Athens--even to the extent of denouncing the Treaty of Alliance 
signed with Greece in 1913 on November 15, 1924 not to ratify 
the Protocol--and Greece, surrounded by the unfriendly states 
of Italy, Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey and desirous of the 
friendship of Yugoslavia, acquiesced to Yugoslav wishes. How-
ever, Greece attempted to mollify the rejection of the Protocol 
by an assurance that she was determined to carry out her 
obligations under the Minorities Treaty. 
At Demir Kapu volleys were exchanged between Bulgarian 
border guards and an unofficered Greek sentry-post and a 
Greek soldier was killed in the fracas. However, the real 
incident occurred when the Greek officer in charge of the 
frontier post arrived on the scene and after giving orders to 
his men to cease fire, advanced under a white flag to meet 
with his Bulgarian counterpart only to be shot down after 
which the Third Greek Army Corps at Saloniki, on orders from 
Athens, occupied 70 square miles of Bulgarian territory pre-
paratory to a major invasion of Bulgaria. 
The general offensive against Bulgaria never materialized 
for the Bulgarian Government appealed the Greek action to the 
League of Nations and the Council of the League ordered the 
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belligerents to withdraw their troops behind their respective 
frontiers and prevailed upon the disputants to accept a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident. The inquiry 
found no premeditation on either side; however, the Commission 
reco~~ended that Greece pay a heavy fine to Bulgaria for the 
violation of Bulgarian territory while the Bulgarian Govern-
ment was directed to pay damages for the shooting of the 
Greek officer. In addition, the Commission of Inquiry also 
made recommendations for the better organization of the frontier 
posts and their supervision by neutral officers (who were 
provided by the Swedish Government), one each to be assigned 
to the Bulgarian and Greek frontier forces. 
The Commission's findings and recommendations in the 
Demir Kapu incident were accepted by the League Council and 
Bulgaria but only reluctantly by Greece. The judgments did 
little to ease the explosive situation existing between Greece 
and Bulgaria, and in the end the real significance of the 
frontier incidents and minorities question lay in the fact 
that they severely strained the already uneasy relations 
which had existed between Greece and Bulgaria since the 
Second Balkan War and served to make cooperationbaween 
Bulgaria and Greece most difficult. Eventually, they were 
choice factors which set Bulgaria outside any alliance to 
which Greece adhered. 
Relations Between Greece and Yugoslavia 
The relations between Greece and Yugoslavia in the 
twenties involved protracted disputes over a Yugoslav outlet 
to the Aegean. They centered on (1) the port of Saloniki, 
the historic and natural outlet to the Mediterranean of the 
trade of southeast Balkania, and (2) control of the 48-mile 
Greek owned Gevgeli-Saloniki railroad spur from the Yugoslav 
border to Saloniki. The dispute continued for six years from 
1923-1929. 
On May 10, 1923 Greece and Yugoslavia signed a convention 
granting a Free Zone to Yugoslav customs administration in 
the port of Saloniki. The Free Zone, consisting of approxi-
mately 95,000 square meters, remained under Greek law and 
police administration. In addition, goods entering the zone 
destined for trans-shipment to Yugoslavia on the Gevgeli-
Saloniki were made exempt from Greek taxes. Albeit, before 
long, these arrangements proved unsatisfactory to Yugoslavia 
which charged that the Free Zone was too small to meet the 
expanding Yugoslav traffic and that the railway service from 
the Yugoslav border to Saloniki was slow and expensive. 
In January 1925 the Greek Government attempted to correct 
Yugoslav complaints by reducing freight charges substantially 
and promising to speed up service; however, Yugoslavia re-
quested that Greece consent not only to enlarging the Free 
Zone but that the new Free Zone and the Gevgeli-Saloniki rail-
way be placed virtually under direct Yugoslav administration 
and ownership. Greece turned down these wants as inconsistent 
with her sovereign rights and on June 1, 1925 negotiations in 
Belgrade to resolve the question were broken off indefinitely. 
Greek-Yugoslav relations had gone steadily downhill since 
November 1 5, 1924 when, as noted previously, Yugoslavia, pro-, 
testing the "unratified Protocol," formally renounced the 
1913 Serbo-Greek Treaty of Alliance. The uneasy situation 
existed until March 17, 1929 when, in view of the "forward 
policy" of Italy in Southeastern Europe and the rapprochement 
between Greece and Italy, Yugoslavia, isolated in the Balkans, 
settled in Greece's favor its long-outstanding differences 
as regards the Free Zone and the Gevgeli-Saloniki Railway and 
ten days later signed a new Pact of Friendship, Conciliation, 
and Judicial Settlement with Greece. Previously, on 
September 23, 1928 Venizelos, on a visit to Rome, had signed 
a friendship pact with Mussolini as the first step of re-
storing the international position of Greece and followed up 
his visit to Rome with a visit to Belgrade in October to 
quiet Yugoslav fears whence the Greek Premier signed a Protocol 
laying down the procedure for settling Greek-Yugoslav 
difficulties. 
Venizelos, out of power since February 3, 1924 when he 
had resigned the Premiership over disagreement with the 
Republican military junta on the plebiscite issue, had returned 
from his self-imposed exile in France on March 24 to resume 
the leadership of the Liberal Party and extract Greece from 
the mire of the political and dictatorial instability associated 
with the regimes of Admiral Kondouriotis and Generals Pangalos 
and Kondylis. 163 On July 3, 1928 Venizelos succeeded Zaimis 
as Prime Minister, and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies fix-
ing August 19 as the date for new elections. On that date 
Venizelos was swept into office for four years; however, unlike 
the Venizelos of 1910, he sidestepped the hurly-burly of every-
day Greek political life and the cancer in the internal body 
politic of Greece preferring to turn his major labor to foreign 
affairs and specifically to the task of improving Greece's 
relations with her Balkan and Mediterranean neighbors. Char-
acteristically a successful diplomatist, Venizelos had by 
1930 concluded the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and 
Conciliation with Italy, restored the traditional Yugoslav-
Greek amity, recognized Ahmed Bey Zogu as King of the Albanians 
and signed a Commercial Treaty and Neutrality Convention with 
Albania, and last but not least effected a complete rapproche-
ment with Turkey which helped to lay the foundations and pre-
pare the way for the forthcoming Balkan Pact between Greece, 
Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
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THE THIRTIES 
THE FAILURE OF TEE REPUBLICAN 
EXPERIMENT AND 'I' HE SEARCH FOR SEGUR ITY 
The End of the Republic 
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Greece's foreign affairs from 1930-1940 were characterized 
by an effort to improve relations with her Balkan neighbors 
and to remain neutral in the growing controversies between 
the Powers. On the home front Greece's major concern remained 
the solution of her grave internal political and economic 
problems arising from the Asia Minor disaster and the world 
depression. 
During the period of republican predominance from 1922-
1933 the country made considerable economic progress despite 
the political turmoil and the growing acrimonious attacks 
between the strong Liberal Party in power and the weak Populist 
Party out of power. When the depression of the early thirties 
came to the world the Greek economy was exposed to serious 
dislocation and suffered accordingly. Greece's imports--wheat, 
rice, etc.--were necessities; her exports--tobacco, olives, 
currants, and wines--were luxuries. Consequently, grave 
hardships resulted. Whereas the countries of Europe could do 
without Greece's luxuries during the depression, Greece could 
not do without the funds obtained from the sale of these 
exports so necessary for the purchase of cereals for her pop-
ulace. This situation continued until Germany made herself 
Greece's best customer. 
By 1938 the German economic "octopus" had tied the Greek 
merchant class and agriculture to the German market. In 
policy of 
addition, Germany'~bartering German construction material 
and armaments for Greek farm exports also made Greek industry 
and the Greek labor class increasingly dependent for its 
livelihood upon friendly relations between Greece and Germany 
and the Greek army dependent upon German weapons and military 
equipment. 
On the national political scene, the hardships brought 
on by the depression weakened the popularity of the Liberal 
Party. In the general election of 1933 the republicans lost 
their Parliamentary majority which they had held in the 
Chamber of Deputies for more than ten years. The growing 
numerical strength of the Populist Party and the Right served 
to sharpen the royalist and republican controversy and cul-
minated in two abortive coup d'etats--March 5, 1933 and 
March 1 , 1935-- "to save the republic" by republican officers, 
and a suspected Rightist assasination attempt against 
Venizelos on June 6, 1934. These incidents embittered the 
already strained relations between Venizelists and the 
Populists. 
Embroiled in prolonged parliamentary debate over the 
Republican coup d'etats and the reported attempt to assasinate 
Venizelos, both the Liberals and the Populists failed to come 
to grips with the economic crisis which afflicted the 
country. They occupied themselves principally by parrying 
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charges and recriminations in Parliament, rather than develop-
ing a non-partisan emergency program to meet the serious 
economic crisis. As a result, distraught Greek popular senti-
ment tended to look to the extreme right represented by the 
King and the extreme left represented by the Communists for 
a solution to the economic and political impasse; and on 
November 3, 1935 a plebiscite conducted by the Populist 
Government showed 97% of the vote in favor of restoration, 
whereas the Communist Party of Greece--Kommounistikon Komma 
Ellados (KKE), until then only a negligible factor in Greek 
politics, elected fifteen Communist deputies in the general 
election of January 26, 1936. But more important, the 
Communists now held the balance of power between the almost 
equally divided Populist-Royalist and Republican blocs in 
the new Chamber of Deputies. 
The elections of January 26, 1936 seemed to promise great 
influence for the Greek Communist Party. For the first time 
in history the KKE emerged as a force on the Greek political 
scene. Moreover, the bitter controversy between the Populists 
and Liberals gave the handful of elected communist deputies 
an importance far out of proportion to their numbers; however, 
the Communists were soon deprived of their key position. By 
a remarkable coincidence, the Prime Minister and the Deputy 
Prime Minister both died before the new Chamber of Deputies 
convened; and on April 13, 1936 the King appointed the leader 
of the small (7 seat) ultra-rightist Free Opinion Party 
General Ioannis Metaxas, a Deputy Premier and Minister of War, 
to head a new government, and the republican and populist-
royalist blocs, neither of which wished to be at the mercy 
of the Communist deputies, gave Metaxas a vote of confidence 
and voted to adjourn Parliament for five months during which 
time Metaxas was empowered to govern by decree. 
The KKE was not to be so easily deprived of its inchoate 
voice in Greek parliamentary affairs. It appealed to the 
republicans to unite with the Communists "in order to save 
the Republic," and when these exhortations failed, the 
Communists took up the struggle alone. They instigated political 
demonstrationsagainst the government and assisted in provoking 
widespread labor disorders such as the general strike in 
Saloniki on May 9 where thirty workers were killed and four 
hundred wounded. A new nation-wide general strike called for 
August 5, 1936 to protest the governments anti-labor policy 
failed to materialize when, in the face of growing disorder 
and labor tension, Metaxas moved quickly to save Greece from 
the example of Spain and a possible civil war. On the eve 
of the strike, Metaxas convinced King George II of the urgency 
that extra constitutional steps were necessary to combat the 
Communists and thwart the impending general strike designed 
"to overthrow the legal, political and social system of the 
country.u On August 4 the King conferred dictatorial powers 
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on Metaxas, thereby inaugurating the "Fourth of August Regime," 
as the Metaxas dictatorship became known in Greece. 
Greece and the Balkan Entente 
While Greece's internal affairs underwent various 
vicissitudes between 1930 and 1936, Greece's foreign relations 
showed no such tendency. After the agreements reached by 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in 1929-1930 removed the major 
sources of discord between these three important Balkan 
countries, Greece sought to improve her relations with the 
other Balkan States and impress upon the Powers that she wished 
to remain neutral in their disputes. 
Greece's insistence that she did not wish to become 
involved in Great Power disputes did not mean that Greece would 
isolate herself from developments in the Balkans. On the 
contrary, Greece had always insisted that she was an integral 
part of the geographic and political complex known as the 
Balkans and that the peace and general welfare of the region 
could be served best only by the establishment of a regional 
political and economic alliance comprising all the Balkan 
states. 
The Balkan Conferences 1930-34 
Greek initiative played a leading role in the formation 
of the 1912 Balkan League; similarly, Greek initiative pre-
pared the way for the organization of the 1934 Balkan Pact. 
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Briefly, the settlement of differences between Greece, 
Yugoslavia, and Turkey under the prompt dispatch of Venizelos 
in 1929 and 1930 was an important step in removing a major 
source of Balkan differences; elsewhere, Venizelos recognized 
the King Zog regime and concluded a Commercial Treaty and 
Neutrality Convention with Albania, and the Greek Premier 
attempted to mollify Bulgarian revisionism by continuing to 
extend an clive branch to Bulgaria in the form of promoting 
the Free Zone in the port of Saloniki to meet Bulgaria's 
clamor for an outlet to the Aegean Sea. 
Another key factor which aided in the organization of the 
Balkan Entente was the prevailing world-wide depression which 
hit the predominantly agrarian Balkan nations with extreme 
severity due in large part to the sharp drop in world 
agricultural prices and the precipitous decline in agrarian 
exports from the Balkans to Europe proper as a result of the 
agrarian protectionist principles adopted by the states of 
Central and Western Europe. This situation served to teach 
the agrarian states of eastern and southeastern Europe that 
national agrarian measures alone were ineffective against an 
economic crisis with international undertones. Hence, in 
order to cope with the exigency, representatives from the 
eight agrarian states of Eastern Europe--including Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria--met in Warsaw and DUcharest in 1930 to 
initiate an East Europe customs union to deal with the problem. 
However, these meetings came to naught and the idea was 
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gradually merged with that of the League of Nations Commission 
of Inquiry for European Union where it became lost in the 
abysmal pit of League problems. 
Similar attempts towards a federation in the Balkans pro-
per proved more successful. Alexandros Papanastassiou, leader 
of the small Greek Agrarian Party and a former premier of 
Greece, inspired by the conclusion of the Locarno Pact and the 
possibilities of a Balkan federation, proposed an unofficial 
Balkan conference to promote the peace and prosperity of the 
Balkan countries and to consider solutions of their various 
economic, political, and social problems. Papanastassiou's 
proposal received the support of the International Bureau of 
Peace at Geneva, and amidst an enthusiastic welcome the first 
Balkan Conference assembled in Athens October 5-13, 1930. 
Four such conferences were held between 1930-1933 during 
which the representatives of Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania attended to deal with political 
questions, economic problems, intellectual cooperation, 
communications, and social questions. The best description 
of the first Balkan Conference as well as the other three 
held in Istanbul (October 20-26, 1931 ), Bucharest (October 22-
29, 1932), and Saloniki (November 5-11, 1933), has been pro-
vided by Papanastassiou. 
"Though based on the national groups, composed 
of politicians, representatives of peace organiza-
tions, universities, and professional organizations, 
and thougb its decisions do not obligate the 
governments, this organization has nevertheless an 
official character, not only because the govern-
ments of the six countries support the activities 
of the na~ional groups, but also because the dele-
gations of each country to the Conferencesare 
chosen after consultation with the government, and 
these governments are represented at each Conference 
by their diplomatic officials (who follow the 
deliberations in the capacity of observefGJ in the 
country in which the Conference meets." 
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There was some prospect for a time that the Balkan 
Conferences would promote the peace and prosperity of the Balkan 
countries and lead to a solution of their various problems. 
In this direction a number of commissions such as the Balkan 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Balkan Medical Union, and 
an Agricultural Chamber were actually established by the con-
ferences, elsewhere, the conferees agreed to a program of social 
and cultural cooperation and exchange, adopted plans for a 
Balkan Labor Office and a Postal Union, and drafted a pact 
creating a Balkan Customs Unions. On political issues, however, 
the Balkan Conferences were less successful. It proved impos-
sible for the representatives of the Balkan countries to find 
common solutions to troublesome political issues such as the 
revision,of treaties and settlement of complex frontier and 
minority questions. In this matter the Balkan Political 
Relations Commission was charged with the herculean task of 
reconciling these sharply diverging interests and viewpoints. 
Bulgaria, for example, refused to entertain any proposition 
short of total revision of the infamous Neuilly diktat. More-
over; Bulgaria was greatly disturbed by the signing on 
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September 14, 1933 of the Pact of Entente Cordiale by which 
Turkey and Greece mutually guaranteed the inviolability of 
their common frontiers. In the end, Bulgaria did herself 
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and the Balkan Conferences much disservice. By refusing to 
modify her acerbic position and to join in the Balkan Pact of 
Nonaggression prepared by the Balkan Conference Commission on 
Political Relations, Bulgaria helped to make the later Balkan 
entente an anti-Bulgarian instrument. Nevertheless, the 
Balkan Conferences between 1930-33 were important, and the 
negative aspects in the realm of politics should not dim the 
positive accomplishments elsewhere. The Conferences brought 
together representatives of the six Balkan States in a friendly 
atmosphere between 1930 and 1933, and showed that, notwith-
standing the political setbacks, there were many matters in 
which fruitful cooperation was possible and profitable. More 
important, the conferences provided the prelude to the Four 
Power Balkan Pact which, in turn, was supplanted by the Balkan 
Entente. 
The Balkan Entente 
On February 9, 1934 Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and 
Rumania signed the Four Power Balkan Pact in Athens. Under 
the Pact and its accompanying Protocols the signatories agreed 
to guarantee respect for existing contractual agreements and 
the maintenance of the established territorial order and 
existing frontiers and consult one another on measures to be 
taken, if their interests were threatened. In addition, 
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they agreed not to undertake political action or assume 
political obligations with another Balkan nation which was 
not a signatory without mutual discussion, that the pact was 
open to any other Balkan countries LBulgaria and Albanis/ 
after "favorable examination" by the signatory Powers, and 
that the pact was defensive in nature, its object being to 
guarantee Balkan frontiers against a~ession by a Balkan 
state or against a Balkan state in league with another power 
in an act of aggression against a pact member. 
Between October 30 and November 2, 1934 representatives 
of Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia meeting in Ankara 
signed the Statutes of the Balkan Entente. The new Entente 
established a Permanent Council and an Advisory Economic 
Council, and whereas the earlier Conferences had been only 
authorized to make decisions, the Entente could take action 
towards their execution. Moreover, as it ultimately evolved 
it was designed (1) to preserve the territorial status guo 
in the Balkans and (2) to preserve the peace of the Balkans 
by placing the peninsula outside the pale of Europe's pro-
blems and those Powers that had heretofore made the Balkans 
a virulent no-mans land of power politics. The signatories 
hoped that such an entente composed of Balkan countries 
would weld their states into a bloc sufficiently strong to 
resist any outside pressure. In this respect the Balkan 
Entente during its formative years was like the Little Entente 
in its early stage. President Eanes defined the Little 
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Entente as "an organization of Central Europe in which our 
liberated countries have been their own masters, without the 
predominating influence or domination of any Great Power." ~65 
The Rumanian foreign minister Nicholas Titulescu, defined the 
Balkan Entente in similar terms when he stated that 
"thanks to the Balkan Entente the Great 
Powers would not be able to pit one of us 
against the other and thus plunge this part 
of the world into a war which means a greater 
conflagration than that of 1914." 166 
Though the members of the Entente took careful pains to 
declare that the entente was not directed against any nation, 
the fact remained that the only Balkan nation of consequence 
outside the pact was Bulgaria, Albania not having been in-
vited to become a signatory for fear of antagonizing Fasci-st 
Italy. The abstention of the Bulgarians from the Balkan 
Pact caused the Entente to be directed against them, especially 
after (1) the Entente absolved Turkey from aiding Rumania in 
a war against Russia and Bulgaria;l67 (2) Greece received the 
assurances that under no condition would the application of 
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l67Turkey charged that in the event of Russo-Rumanian hostilities 
which Bulgaria was sure to join on the side of Russia, Turkey would be 
required to support Rumania against Bulgaria and therefore against 
Russia in contravention of the 1925 Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship. 
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the pact involve Athens in hostilities with Italy under the 
/ 
obligations which Greece had undertaken in regard to the 
protection-of Yugoslavia's frontiers. When Bulgaria agreed 
to the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression with the States 
of the Balkan Entente on July 31, 1938, which seemed to 
promise much towards a general rapprochement between Bulgaria 
and her neighbors, the understanding proved unimportant. For 
one thing Bulgaria, like Hungary, was no longer alone in 
Europe and the Bulgarians, like the Hungarians, had found a 
sympathetic ear for their revisionist aims in Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy; for another thing, the Balkan Entente no 
longer marched~ masse. 
The Entente worked incessantly and ardently for a modus 
vivendi with Bulgaria whose steadfast and inflexible position 
offered an excellent foothold to any Great Power desirous of 
intervening in Balkan affairs. Rather than seek false friends 
as Italy, it would have been to Bulgaria's advantage if she 
had tempered her ambitions in order to come to an agreement 
with her Balkan neighbors and remain within the Balkan 
diplomatic complex from which to labor for future revision. 
Instead, Bulgaria sought friends outside the Balkans to 
champion her ambition which included an outlet to the Aegean 
at the expense of Greece, expansion into Macedonia at the 
expense of Yugoslavia, the exaction of the southern Dobrudja 
from Rumania, and rectification in her favor of the border 
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with Turkey. Unfortunately, Bulgaria had learned little from 
her falling out with the Balkan League in 1913, and that 
Bulgaria is only one of many Balkan States and that she must 
live within that complex rather than attempt to change it in 
order to suit her desires. If Bulgaria had learned these 
lessons then, more than likely modern Bulgarian history would 
not have been scarred by repeated military and political 
defeats and a Balkan federation by Balkan peoples might well 
have emerged early from either the Balkan Conference, the 
Balkan Pact, or the Balkan Entente, for Bulgaria was in a 
position to either save or undermine all three from the very 
beginning. 
The Balkan Entente functioned for six years; the last 
meeting was held in B~lgrade from February 2-4, 1940 shortly 
before war came to the Balkans and three of the four members 
were occupied and dismembered. While its life was sbortlived, 
like the Balkan Conferences, it scored a marked success in 
the non-political field. For example, the Entente established 
a Balkan marine commission, concluded a Balkan aviation agree-
ment, and took steps towards a central Balkan postal, tele-
graphic, and telephone system, in addition to reaching many 
commercial and financial understandings as steps towards a 
regional arrangement. It scored at least one important 
political success, for it is generally conceded that had not 
Yugoslavia been linked to both the Little Entente and especially 
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the Balkan Entente, the murder of King Alexander in 1934 might 
well have had serious repercussions for Yugoslavia, and might 
have precipitated Italian intervention in Southeast Europe 
which the Italian dictator Mussolini had hoped that the 
assasination would do. 
The Balkan Entente was finally destroyed by two factors, 
both enmeshed inextricably with each other. The first involved 
lack of political unity among the members of the Entente in 
dealing with the European powers and the menacing European 
situation. The second included the intervention of the Great 
Powers in Balkan affairs, the inability of the League of Nations 
to curb aggression, and the weakness and vacillation of France 
and Britain to contain Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. When 
Britain and France finally moved to halt Axis aggrandizement 
in East Europe and the Balkans by signing the guarantee of 
independence to Poland LMarch 31, 1932/ and a mutual assistance 
pact LApril 6, 19327, the unilateral guarantees of independence 
to Rumania and Greece and the Tripartite Pact with Turkey, 
the "French alliance system 11 in Europe had been effectively 
dismantled by Axis influence in East Europe and Balkania. 
In addition to the aforementioned agreements, omother 
pact supported the Anglo-French position in Europe. This was 
the ten-year 
"Supplementary Pact to the Greek-'Iurkish Pact 
of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and 
Arbitration of October 30, 1930 and the Greek 
Turkish Pact of Entente Cordiale of September 14, 
1933," 
dated April 27, 1938. 
On The Eve of War 
An examination of the various diplomatic arrangements 
which affected Greece's military and diplomatic position on 
the eve of World War II reveals the following situation: 
(1) The Balkan Entente as a force ceased to exist, 
and Greece could expect no assistance from 
that quarter. 
(2) Under the Supplementary Greek-Turkish Pact of 
1938, Turkey was treaty bound to render military 
assistance to Greece in the event of an attack 
affecting the common Greek-Turkish frontier in 
Eastern Thrace, but "in the event of any other 
war in which Greece or Turkey might become 
involved in self-defense, either of the two 
States would maintain its neutrality so that 
360 
its territory might not become a base of operations 
against the other." 168 
(3) Under the Anglo-French Guarantees, if Greece were 
attacked, Britain and France were obliged to come 
to Greece's assistance at once and with all means 
at their disposal. They did not base their 
assistance upon the principle of reciprocity, nor 
did they ask for any special privileges from Greece. 
(4) Under Article 3 of the Anglo-French-Turkish 
Agreement, Turkey was obliged to render Britain 
and France all aid and assistance in the event 
they engaged in hostilitles in support of their 
obligations to Greece under the Anglo-French 
guarantees. 
When war came to Greece in 1940 only Britain fulfilled 
her promises to Greece; France had capitulated to Germany 
before Italy attacked Greece; and Turkey refused to carry out 
her obligations when Italy declared war on England and France 
on June 10, 1940 and thereby brought the war to the Mediterranean 
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by invoking Protocol 2 of the Tripartite Pact that support 
of Britain and France might involve her in a war with Russia; 
and again failed to honor her obligation under Article 3 when 
Italy attacked Greece on October 28, 1940 and the British 
guarantee to Greece was implemented. Turkey not only failed 
to make her treaty obligations to Greece and Britain at the 
outbreak of the war in the Mediterranean but on February 17, 
1941 concluded a Non-aggression Pact with Bulgaria when Athens, 
London, and Ankara knew of the clandestine build-up of German 
officers, aircraft, and personnel on Bulgarian territory pre-
paratory to the full scale entry of the German army into the 
Balkans on March 1, 1941. More important, however, was the 
fact that the Bulgarian-Turkish Non-aggression Pact left Sofia 
with little doubt as to the attitude of the Turkish Government 
in the event Bulgaria opened her gates to Germany in prepara-
tion for the impending attack against Greece and Yugoslavia 
in order to rescue the Italian position in Albania. Finally, 
it served notice to Germany of Turkey's decision not to 
oppose the German occupation of Bulgaria and Turkey's desertion 
of Britain and Greece on the eve of the impending Nazi invasion 
of southern Balkania. 
PART II~ 1939-1949 
THE SOVIET UNION, NAZI GERMANY, AND 
OTHER POWERS AND THE BALKANS 1939-1942 
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On August 23, 1939 the Soviet and German Governments con-
cluded a non-aggression pact; however, there was little question 
that the understanding was dictated by expediency. Germany 
desired to secure herself from attack in the East; the Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, because of her military unprepared-
ness was only too willing to sign a treaty with Germany. 
However, the Nazi-Soviet 11marriage of convenience" was destined 
to end in conflict, for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Secret Protocol 
which accompanied the pact did not include the Balkans in its 
definition of spheres of influence "in the event of a territorial 
and political rearrangement of Eastern Europe. 11 The detente 
began within twelve months. In August 1940 Germany and Italy 
settled the territorial dispute between Rumania and Hungary 
by the Vienna Arbitration agreement without consulting Russia 
which the Soviets charged violated Article 3 of the Nazi-
Soviet Non-aggression Pact. The following month the Soviet 
Union lodged a second protest against an Italo-German unilateral 
act guaranteeing Rumania territorial integrity. The Germans 
not only failed to reply to the Russian protests but in 
October on 11invitation 11 of the Rumanian Government marched 
German troops into Rumania to protect the Rumanian oil fields 
against the British. When these German troops moved to 
Rumania's eastern frontier and looked across on Russian 
territory, there was little question that German action was 
unabashedly aimed at counteracting further Soviet moves 
• 
against Rumania. 
In November 1940, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 
proceeded to Berlin to reach an understanding with Hitler. 
During the conversations of November 12 and 13, Molotov 
expressed Soviet anguish over the Balkan situation and de-
nounced Axis guarantees given to Rumania as violations of the 
treaty between Germany and Russia. Foremost, however, the 
Soviets were displeased with Axis policy which had prevented 
Russia from chewing up Rumania and making further inroads 
into Balkania in the direction of Bulgaria, the Bosporus, and 
the Dardanelles from which to spread Soviet influence to the 
Mediterranean. Hitler's diplomatic reply to these Russian 
requests was sympathetic but non-committal. The German fuhrer 
stated that he fully appreciated Russia's need for warm water 
outlets and announced that Germany had no further motives 
towards eastern expansion. At the sam.e time, however, Hitler's 
evasion of Molotov's requests indicated that the Third Reich 
did not intend to relinquish any territory which it controlled 
or dominated, nor was Germany willing to facilitate Russia's 
advent into the Balkans. 
The Rumanian problem manifested itself again in January 
1941 when German reinforcements entered the country on the 
pretext of counteracting the "planned operations by the British 
in Greece"; however, contrary to the assurances that Hitler 
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had given Molotov that Germany had no further designs in the 
Balkans, it soon became evident that the new German move was 
directed against Bulgaria. In Moscow, Molotov curtly communi-
cated to the German Ambassador Kremlin anxiety over Nazi moves 
in Balkania and that the Soviet Government had repeatedly re-
ferred to Bulgaria and the Straits as "security zones of the 
U.s.s.R." Before concluding the Soviet Foreign Minister 
announced that the continued build-up of German troops in 
Southeastern Europe was a violation of the security interest 
of the Soviet Union and voiced astonishment that the Soviet 
requests of November 12 and 13 as well as a follow-up memo-
randum dated November 25 had gone unanswered. 
German-Soviet tension was heightened further by events in 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. On November 25, 1940 the Bulgarians 
had previously turned aside a Soviet proposal for a treaty 
of mutual assistance; and on January 3, 1941 Sofia agreed to 
permit German troops massed in Rumania to cross the Danube 
and enter Bulgaria. This permission became a fact on 
January 10. Finally, any Soviet hopes to establish control 
over Sofia were swept aside on March 1 with the announcement 
that Bulgaria had joined the Axis; but more important to this 
study, German troop concentrations soon proceeded to the 
Greek-Bulgar border. 
In the meantime, Germany had also pressed Yugoslavia to 
join the Axis and three weeks after Bulgaria's action, Russia's 
Balkan ambitions received a second blow by Yugoslavia's 
accession to the Tripartite Pact on March 25 even though two 
days later an anti-German faction effected the successful 
Simovich coup d'etat against the ruling pro-German Yugoslav 
Government. 
The new Yugoslav leadership attempted to assume a correct 
position of neutrality in order to avoid embroilment in the 
Nazi-Soviet Balkan rivalry and the war between Britain and 
Germany. General Simovich rejected British proposals for 
consultation and announced he would adhere to all previous 
pacts concluded by the ousted Yugoslav Government and expressed 
a desire to reestablish relations with the U.S.S.R. which 
heretofore, Yugoslavia had repeatedly refused for nearly a 
quarter of a century. On April 5, 1941 Belgrade crowned the 
Yugoslav-Russian rapprochement by entering into formal nego-
tiations toward arriving at a friendship and non-aggression 
pact with Moscow. As regards Britain, the Simovich Government 
turned aside renewed British overtures for consultation in 
order not to leave Yugoslavia open to German condemnation. 
On April 4 Molotov informed the German Ambassador to 
Moscow of Yugoslavia's overtures to the Soviet Union for a 
mutual treaty of non-aggression and friendship and of the 
Soviet decision to accept the Yugoslav proposal. The Russians, 
however, were never permitted to conclude the treaty with 
Yugoslavia for two days later, on April 6, German military 
units in Bulgaria, supported by Hungarian troops and additional 
~ German troops and Italian forces advancing on Zagreb in the 
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north, invaded Yugoslavia. One week later, April 13, Easter 
Sunday 1941, the Germans entered Belgrade; and by April 16, 
the last remnants of the Yugoslav armies capitulated. 
Yugoslavia, afterwards, was dismembered between the Axis 
powers, Germany and Italy, and their partners, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Albania, and what was left was erected into two 
puppet states, Croatia and Serbia. 
The German invasion of Yugoslavia occurred simultaneously 
with the Panzer attack on Greece and was followed on Nay 20 
by the airborne invasion of the island of Crete. The German 
attack against Greece was calculated to achieve three 
objectives: first, rescue the tenuous Italian position in 
Albania; second, remove the possibility of a British foothold 
in the Balkans in a repetition of the Saloniki front of 
World War I; and finally, eliminate an unfriendly Greece in 
the Balkans preliminary to the planned German attack on the 
Soviet Union. It accomplished all three. Attempts by British 
and Greek forces to stem the Nazi tide following the collapse 
of the Yugoslav front proved unsuccessful before the superior 
Axis troops, armaments, and air forces. The Germans entered 
Athens on April 27, 1941, and the last organized Greek re-
sistance ceased on Crete on June 1 after which a fate similar 
to Yugoslavia's befell Greece. The Germans occupied the key 
areas of Athens and Saloniki and the strategic Greek islands 
such as Crete and Leros. Epirus, Thessaly, Central and 
Southern Greece went to Italy with Albania sharing in the 
occupation of the Camuria territory, parts of Greek Macedonia 
and Epirus, thereby extending Albania's frontier east to the 
Ioannina region and south down the west coast of Sterea Hellas 
to the port of Preveza. Italy, in addition, occupied the 
Ionian Islands and most of the Aegean Islands which they 
attached to the Italian command at Rhodes. Finally, Bulgaria 
was awarded her 1913 frontier in Western Thrace, the districts 
of Florina and Kastoria in Greek Eastern Macedonia. 
Following the Axis conquest of Greece and Yugoslavia, 
two Powers with rival ambitions in the Balkans remained on 
the European Continent. Their problem narrowed to one simple 
fact: Germany, master of all the Balkans, was in a position 
to give the Soviet Union what it wanted; however, German 
concessions proved not forthcoming. On June 22, 1941, Hitler 
unleashed his forces against the Soviet Union, and it was 
not until the beginning of 1942 that the Communist elements 
in Southeastern Europe recovered sufficiently from the shock 
and confusion resulting from the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. 
to organize "national" resistance movements and conduct 
guerrilla operations against their former "ally." At the 
outset of 1942, the Soviets and their fellow travelers had 
to start anew in the conquest of Southeastern Europe, and 
nowhere were their efforts crowned with greater success than 
in Yugoslavia and Greece which alone of all the Balkan States 
suffered the full imprint of Axis occupation. 
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GREECE'S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL AGAINST FASCISM, 
NAZISM, AND CO~~NISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The Italian Phase 
World War II came to Greece on October 28, 1940. The 
Italian attack, the culmination of (1) an artful but success-
ful Italian propaganda campaign against Greece in the Balkans 
following the Italian occupation of Albania and (2) a series 
of incidents manufactured by Italy and calculated to incite 
Greece to war, was unprovoked and wanton. The provocations 
took place just inside the Greek-Albanian frontier and in 
the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, and became more reckless 
and belligerent following the collapse of France. Neverthe-
less, Greece continued to proclaim and observe neutrality 
in the war between the Great Powers; and contrary to the desires 
of Mussolini, Athens "turned the other cheek" in the face of 
repeated Italian insults and provocations. Consequently 
Mussolini, vexed by repeated Greek refusals to take the road 
to war and Hitler's omnipresent dramatic victories, issued 
his brazen ultimatum against Greece in order to restore 
Italian prestige. 
If any nation desired peace prior to becoming embroiled 
in World War II, it was Greece. Greece's military and political 
arrangements with the Balkan States of the Entente were defen-
sive and not directed against either Italy or Germany. Similarl~ 
the guarantees which she received from Britain and France in 
1939 were designed to preserve her integrity and independence, 
and when the war finally came to Europe, Greece continued to 
observe a strict neutrality between the opposing blocs. How-
ever, a correct neutrality has never pr-oven a sure defense 
against becoming involved in a war since the success or failure 
of such a policy depends more on the wishes of those who in-
tend to violate that neutrality than on the country that 
desires to observe it. And nowhere was this more evident than 
in Italy's treatment of Greece especially between 1939 and 
1940. 
The road to war for Italy in World War II can be traced 
directly to the final sitting of the Allied Supreme Council 
at San Remo and the Ottoman peace treaty. The Ottoman peace 
treaty proved to Italian ambitions what Versailles proved to 
Imperial Germany; for while Germany lost an empire at 
Versailles, Italy failed to gain an empire at San Remo and at 
a time when Italy's allies enlarged their empires in the Near 
East and Africa and brushed aside a big Italy in Europe and 
an extensive Italian Levantine Empire in favor of an enlarged 
Yugoslavia and a Greek "Empire" in Asia Minor. Feeling that 
they had been ravaged by spite and diplomacy at the conference 
table, the Italians, in turn, afterwards sought to repay 
their former allies in kind. In the aftermath of World War I, 
Italian nationalism spent its effort (1) to spoil Serbia's 
claim to Fiume an event which was five years in the making 
and caused Italy to undergo various vicissitudes and paved 
the way for the rise of Benito Mussolini and new tension in 
----
the Balkans. Against Greece Italy worked to disrupt Greek 
claims to "Northern Epirus," the Dodecanese, and Smyrna, and 
helped to precipitate Greece's defeat in Anatolia which, in 
addition, was Italy's revenge against Great Britain in the 
Near East. 
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The Italian elan for revanche did not stop with Greece 
and Yugoslavia. Italy next moved against France. Following 
Italy's Fiume coup and Greece's Smyrna disaster the Quirinal 
sought to fill the void in the Balkans created by the deposal 
of Austria-Hungary and developed a policy of rallying the re-
visionist states of the Balkans against the victors of 
Versailles as a cardinal principal of Italian foreign policy. 
This brought Italy into open conflict with France, the power 
that had emerged as the protectress of Versailles and the 
status guo in Europe. 
Italy was in a favorable political and geographic position 
to play the new role which she espoused for herself in Europe 
and the Balkans after World War I. Politically, her estrange-
ment from her allies over the peace settlements and her 
continued rivalry in the Balkans and in the Near East with 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey marked her as a natural ally 
of the revisionist states of Europe; geographically, her 
acquisition of Istria, with the star Adriatic ports of Trieste 
and Fiume, the Dalmatian islands, and the Valona naval base 
in Albania, gave her a strategic position and tangible stake 
in the Balkans. As a result, Italy assumed a leading role 
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in the age old game of Great Power Balkan power politics with 
disastrous results for both the Little and Balkan Ententes which 
represented the high point of French ascendancy in Europe after 
World War I against an embittered Italy as well as a malevolent 
Germany. Finally, Mussolini's vituperation against Italy's 
"defeat" in 'lt!orld War I and at the peace conference fed the 
clamor for revisionism in Europe during the period after Kemal's 
success at Lausanne in 1923 and before the emergence of Adolf 
Hitler to power in Germany in 1933· Mussolini's call to power 
in Italy on October 31, 1922 followed closely upon the heels of 
Kemal's successes in Turkey in 1922. And while Il Duce was 
number two in the line of revisionist leaders to emerge from the 
settlements of World War I, the Italian dictator was more cor-
rectly number one of the new line of revision-mongers who 
followed after Kemal but who unlike Kemal, while shedding tears 
for the injustices of the Paris Peace settlements, nurtured 
aspirations which went far beyond the realm of simple revisionism. 
Italy's revanche became complete when Mussolini avenged Italian 
honor in 1940. The knife which "stabbed France in the back" 
in June 1940 and struck out at Greece in October 1940 had been 
forged at the peace conferences of 1919-20; however, the blade 
received itssharpest temper in thea~ena of Franco Italian power 
politics in the Balkans in the years between the Wars and even 
earlier by the historic Italo-Greek rivalry. 
The Greek Communist Party 
The Kommounistikon Komma Ellados (KKE)--Communist Party 
of Greece--is the instrument of Soviet policy in Greece. 
Initially founded in November 1918 as the "Socialist Labor 
Party of Greece," the KKE was renamed the Greek Communist 
Party a year and a half later when it joined the Third 
International. 
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The communist vote in Greece is concentrated in four 
districts--Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Western Thrace. 
Within these four regions lie Greece's major cities--Athens, 
Piraeus, Volos, Larrisa, and Saloniki. In the remainder of 
Greece, with a few exceptions such as Lesbos (Mytilene), the 
Communist vote has always been insignificant. In 1936, just 
prior to the Metaxas coup, approximately 80% of the Communist 
vote was registered in the four aforementioned districts; and 
in the elections since 1950, approximately 75% has been 
registered in these same areas. 
The Communist vote is further concentrated within the 
above four areas along the principal lines of cummunication--
the railroad and the main highway running south from Athens 
to Saloniki in the north and east across Western 'I'hrace to 
Alexandroupolis. Concentration of Communism on the east 
coast of Sterea Hellas and along Greece's North-South lifeline 
is no accident. While the focalization of the Communist vote 
along the lines of communication can be attributed to the 
fact that doctrine spreads more easily along the lines of 
communication, it is also due to calculated Communist strategy 
which has concentrated on building its strength in these 
areas expressively referred to as "the spinal column" of 
Greece by N. Zachariades, the time-old leader of the KKE. 
Within this area lies Greece's only major railroad, her 
principal highways, the major ports of Piraeus, Volos, and 
Saloniki, the Greek bread basket of Thessaly and Macedonia, 
and Greece's industrial potential. Lastly, from a cold, 
calculated, military point of view, the area dominates the 
entrance to the Vardar River Valley, the major entrance and 
exit route of the Balkan hinterland. 
373 
Greek Communism finds its strength in three classes: the 
refugee and ethnic minorities, disillusioned members of the 
professional classes, and the single or cash-crop peasants. 
Until recently most Communist voters have not been native-
born Greeks. They were either "Greek" refugees from Asia 
Minor and Russia or members of dissatisfied ethnic minorities. 
The refugee elements were displaced persons whose forebears 
lived for centuries on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the 
Black Sea coastal regions of Turkey and Russia, and in 
Anatolia and the Caucasus. In 1922, following the Greek 
debacle in Asia Minor, approximately one and one-quarter 
million refugees from Turkey alone fled or were 11voluntarily" 
relocated in Greece. Approximately 85% of these refugees 
settled in the four regions previously mentioned. The influx 
of these destitute refugees upon a nation with limited re-
sources whose population of four and a half million persons 
had lived by sheer wit and frugality created a critical 
economic, political, and social problem. In 1'urkey and Russia 
these Greeks had for the most part constituted a prosperous 
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merchant and artisan middle class; in Greece, they became 
wards of the State and shamefully treated as second class 
citizens. Their districts and encampments became hot beds of 
political unrest and turmoil and any easy prey for Communist 
agitation. Socially, they were considered intruders and 
snubbed as inferiors, notwithstanding the fact that more often 
they were more literate and more steeped in Greek folklore and 
Classical and Byzantine culture than were the "Old Greeks" 
whom fate made their new neighbors. 
The resentment of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor at 
this change in their economic and social status remained one 
of the principal forces feeding the leftwing and Communist 
movement in Greece. Field Marshal Papagos clearly realized 
this situation and in 1952 the Field Marshal made the "refugee" 
question an important campaign issue in order to swing the 
traditional left or liberal refugee vote to the right. There 
is little question that by his impassioned appeal "to eliminate 
the term refugee from the Greek vocabulary" Papagos succeeded 
in gaining many refugee votes who had for years supported the 
left in protest of their treatment by "Athens," the "Old Greeks" 
and their political parties. 
Ethnic minorities in Greece number approximately 500,000, 
and while fewer in number than the "refugees" from Asia Minor, 
they are important since the Communists have also tried to 
curry their favor. 
Among the ethnic minorities the Communists have been most 
successful in winning over two peoples, (1) the Slavophones 
and (2) the Jews, most of whom were descendants of refugees 
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of the Inquisition expelled from Spain during the reign of 
Isabella and Philip II. These Jews, known as Sephardic Jews, 
settled mostly in Saloniki, and together with the resident 
Jews of Saloniki at one time constituted a large proportion 
of Saloniki; considered the second city of the Ottoman Empire. 
The JewiShsegment, for all political purposes no longer 
existed as a potential force in Greece after World War II since 
it was all but exterminated by the Nazis; however, the Jews 
are important because (1) the KKE originally stemmed from the 
Jewish colony of Saloniki and (2) it was through the Jewish 
colony of Saloniki that Marxist ideas first filtered into 
Greece. 
The Slavophones consist primarily of Yugoslav-Macedonians, 
Bulgarian-Macedonians, and Pomaks. It is sufficient to note 
that while the Slavophones constituted less than two percent 
of the population of Greece, they reportedly formed upwards of 
50 percent of the Communist "Greek Democratic Army" during 
the Guerrilla War, 1947-1949.169 
169 Professor R. V. Burks, Professor of Modern History, Wayne 
University, Detroit, Michigan, and Fulbright Professor to Greece 1952-
1953 stated in a lecture to officers of the Joint Military Aid Group, 
Greece attended by this author in Athens in August 1952 that his re-
search on the subject had revealed this fact. To the best knowledge 
of this author, Professor Burks has not published these findings. 
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The two remaining groups which help to make up the 
strength of the Communist Left consist of the disillusioned 
professional and student class and the single-crop peasants. 
In this respect, the ecology of the Greek Communist vote does 
not differ from other parts of the world. 
The KKE has succeeded in making a number of converts 
among the disillusioned members of the professional classes 
because its Marxist ideas appeal strongly to these professional 
trained men who are unable to make a success or earn a 
satisfactory living due to the limited resources of Greece, 
or otherwise since it helps to explain their personal failures 
on "scientific" grounds and proves "the fault" is not their 
own. 
The cash-crop peasant is concentrated in the Thessalian, 
Thracian, and Macedonian plains where they tend to specialize 
on the production of a single crop mostly either wheat or 
tobacco for market. Their prosperity is thus dependent on 
the vagaries of the world market whereas the peasants in the 
much poorer regions of Greece, Le.g., the Peloponesus with 
olive oil, citrus, some wheat, and rice, etc~ possess a 
semi-autarchical economy and thus are not as vulnerable to 
the world market situation. The difficulty with the cash-
crop peasant is not poverty for that exists in varying degrees 
throughout rural Greece; their real problem is the alternation 
between periods of extreme prosperity and deep depression, 
and the fact that it is near impossible for Greece with a 
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marginal State budget even during better times to single out 
any one agricultural crop for special consideration in hard 
times. This adds fuel to leftist charges that only the 
Communists care for the common people. 
Although Greek governments have repeatedly attempted to 
single out the tobacco growers for special economic (and 
political) attention, nevertheless, the tobacco workers of, 
Macedonia have proven an easy prey for Communism, especially 
since World War II as (1) East-West non-intercourse in trade 
has limited the sale of Greek tobacco in the East; (2) 
Western Europeans acquired a taste for American blends during 
the ten years of War, occupation and Guerrilla War which 
prevented the cultivation and export of Greek tobacco; and 
(3) American tobacco has priced Greece out of the West 
European markets, heretofore the chief customer for Greek 
tobacco. In the post-war period Communist propaganda has 
made much of the plight of Greek tobacco claiming that 
American capitalists and cigarette monopolies through the 
United States Government and u. s. economic assistance pro-
grams have foist American tobacco upon the former Greek markets 
in Europe. 
Although prevailing conditions in Greece during the 
nineteen twenties and early thirties were especially favorable 
for the development of Communism, the KKE remained and still 
remains a party with a hard core of leaders and very few con-
verts. Five important reasons, exclusive of popular arguments 
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that Greeks cannot make good Communists because of intense 
patriotism, a cherished history, individualism, etc., explain 
the failure of the Communist movement to make inroads in 
Greek political life during the forty years since its incep-
tion. First, the KKE has been continually plagued with 
internal strife and only once--the Stalin-Trotsky controversy--
did it reflect a crisis in international Communism. Secondly, 
it was unable to hold converts for prolonged periods of time. 
Thirdly, while it produced fanatics, it did not produce 
scholars of Marxism nor did it establish a tradition in Greece. 
Next, its blind submission to the directives of the Third 
International whether applicable to Greece or not and to the 
"Slav conspiracy" was too unsavory for the overwhelming 
majority of the Greek population. Finally, its inability to 
undermine secretly the opposition and covertly seek its 
objectives and select an appropriate time to seize power 
resulted in its being nearly liquidated on three separate 
occasions--by General Pangalos in 1925, by General Metaxas, 
1936-1941, and more recently during the Communist inspired 
"civil war," 1947-49. 
No one save possibly the leaders of the KKE can accurately 
state the number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in 
Greece. In the national elections of 1950 and 1951, generally 
conceded to be a fair weather vane of Communist voting strength, 
the left polled between approximately 10-15 percent of the 
electoral vote. In the 1956 elections Communism polled between 
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20-25 percent; however, this increase in Leftist strength was 
not because more Greeks became Communists but the result of 
the popular Greek disillusionment with Anglo-American policy 
towards the Cyprus question which at the time did much to 
discredit the Greek Right and middle of the road parties. 
While all the Greek political parties voiced the "union-of-
Cyprus" theme, only the L;ommunists could point to the fact 
that they had international friends who favored Enosis. In 
any case, the KKE and its fellow-travelers, whether they 
number 10-15 percent or 20-25 percent of the Greek electorate, 
constitute a grave danger for the Greek State. The continued 
economic plight of Greece, the confirmed convictions and 
superior organization of the KKE, and the firm support which 
it receives from Moscow make it disproportionately strong in 
relation to the poorly organized and disunited Greek parties 
of the Center and Right as proved during the Axis occupation 
of Greece and the years of civil and guerrilla war between 
1944 and 1949. 
A quick review of the policy line followed by the KKE 
between the Italian attack on Greece and Hitler's invasion 
of Russia indicates the subservience of the Greek Communists 
to Soviet foreign policy and is an excellent introduction to 
Soviet Diplomacy and Greece from 1942-1949 when the Communists 
attempted to impose their will upon Greece through the exercise 
of naked force. 
In view of the existing treaty of friendship between 
Germany and Russia at the outbreak of World War II, the KKE 
denounced the Anglo-French guarantees to Greece and took a 
stand hostile to the Western powers. On November 26, 1940 
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the imprisoned Secretary General of the KKE, Nikos Zachariades, 
who had called upon "all patriotic Greeks" to take up the 
defense of the motherland after the Italian invasion of 
Greece soon reversed his former position by attacking the 
Greek advance in Albania as "imperialistic" since the Italians 
had "evacuated" Greek territory. He now urged that Greece 
should sign a peace treaty with Italy with Russia acting as 
mediator. 
The KKE policy toward the Axis remained unchanged between 
the Nazi attack on Greece and Hitler's invasion of Russia. 
When the Germans entered Athens on April 27, 1941, not only 
were pro-German collaborators on the scene to greet them, 
but so were Communist elements who mixed freely with Axis 
authorities in Greece until the German attack on Russia. On 
the other hand, national Greek sabotage and intelligence 
elements, admittedly small, scattered, and disorganized, had 
commenced their operations almost immediately after the Axis 
occupation of Greece. 
The Greek Communists were bewildered by Hitler's in-
vasion of Russia and confusion spread amongst their ranks 
while awaiting the "new line" from abroad. The KKE-dominated 
resi.stance movement EA.L\1, was not formed until September 27, 
1941, a full six months after the Nazi occupation of Greece 
had begun, and its military arm, ELAS, was not formed until 
December of the same year. The Axis occupation forces and 
pro-German authorities were now the enemies of the people 
while the Western democracies and the British, in particular, 
were now singled out for conspicuous treatment. hussia was 
now undergoing difficult times and any assistance to the re-
sistance movements would of necessity have to come from Allied 
Mtddle East sources centered at Cairo. The British gave full 
support to the EAM forces which received approximately eighty 
percent of the Allied f~nds and supplies earmarked for the 
underground in Greece. The Allies pouredapproximately 
3,000,000 British gold sovereigns into Greece during the 
Occupation, and eventually over two-thirds of them made their 
way into the hands of the KKE controlled EAM - ELAS bloc. As 
a result, the KKE was one of the richest Communist Parties 
in Europe when Greece was liberated in 1944.170 
Soviet leadership entrusted the Greek Communist Party 
through its control of the EAM-ELAS underground resistance 
170wnile historian of the Joint United States Military Aid Group, 
Greece the author was witness to an official document, either British 
or American, which cited the above information. At this late date 
the author is unable to recall the office of origin of the document in 
question, and in his present status has no access to official Govern-
ment docu~ents. His attempts to locate the document in Washington 
through the Department of State Historical Office and the Office of 
the Chief of External Research of the Bureau of Intelligence Research 
between March 21-23, 1960 and the Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army between March 21-28, 1960 have been 
unsuccessful. At the Department of State search was instituted through 
Mr. Walter Cronin of the Office of the Chief of External Research. The 
result of the writer's search at the Department of the Army is included 
in a letter attached as Appendix XVI. 
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apparatus with the task of creating the proper political and 
military situation for the eventual Communist domination of 
Greece. The s t ory of the three unsuccessful Communist attempts 
--1943-1944, 1944-1945, 1947-1949--to seize control of Greece 
will be discussed later. Since 1949 the Communist struggle 
to take Greece behind the Iron Curtain was ~der the direction 
of the Union of the Democratic Left (EDA), a front organiza-
tion considered to be either the clandestine Greek Communist 
Party or its instrument. l71 
The Greek Communist internat i onal line, whether coming 
clandestinely from Radio Free Greece in Tirana, Sofia, Bucharest, 
or oscow, or its mouthpieces in Greece, the now defunct 
Communi s t newspapers Rizospastis, Machi, or currently Avghi, 
the spokesman for EDA, and the never ending crude mi meographed, 
typed, or written handout has not deviated from the signals 
flashed from Moscow. It has been vehemently anti-British and 
anti-Truman Doctrine; it has charged the Marshall Plan and its 
successor agencies, the Economic Cooperation Administration, 
1Wi th be i n.g tools of -~erican economic and military policy. 
17~ore re~ently in July 1959 seventeen persons, includi ng Manolis 
Glezos , the one-time resistance hero , later an avowed Commur;ist , and 
until his arrest editor-in- chief of the left- wing newspaper Avghi , went 
on trial accused of military espionage and ha•~ng abetted Communist spies 
in Greece . Eight of the accused were found guilty during this , the third 
major Communist spy trial in Gr eece since the conclusion of the Guerrilla 
War in August 1949. Included in their numbers was Glezos who had been 
previously convicted and imprisoned in 1949 for supporting the made-in-
Moscow Greek rebellion of 1947-49 , and escaped the gallows on the strength o 
of hi s wartime resistanc e exploits against the Nazis, including the strik-
ing down of the Nazi Swastika top of the Acropolis . This time, however, 
Glezos was sentenced to five years ' improsonment , four years ' deportation 
(i . e . , exile to an Aegean island) , and eight years ' deprivation of 
political rights . 
It has attacked the Tri-Partite Balkan Pacts between 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey as instruments of Anglo-
American Foreign Policy and a war-mongering alliance directed 
against the 11peaceloving Peoples Democracies" to their north. 
By its actions the Greek Communist Party has been an 
instrument of Soviet policy par excellence; nowhere in the 
history of the Greek Communist Party has there been an iota of 
deviationism, and without direction, guidance, and support 
from the Kremlin, it could not exist and would have died a 
premature death long ago. 
That it is determined regardless of the will of the 
majority and at any cost in suffering, to impose a Co~nunist 
regime on Greece is shown by its record of activity during 
the German occupation and the civil wars since the liberation. 
Soviet Diplomacy 1942-44 
A communist take-over of Greece between 1942 and 1944 
hinged on the following: EAM-ELAS 172 monopolization of the 
172EAM- Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation 
Front) and ELAS - Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (National People's 
Liberation Army). The former was the political arm, the latter the mili-
tary arm of the Greek Communist resistance moveme~t. EAM leadership was 
concealed from the Greek public and both organizations were represented 
as organizations primarily interested in national resistance to the 
occupation authorities and "open to all freedom-loving and patriotic 
Greeks." For all practical purposes EAM and KKE proved to be the same 
thing although they wished to have the world believe that EAM was a 
coalition of five leftist parties among which KKE was one. However, KKE 
was the only party of any consequence in EAM. Next to KKE in importance 
in the EAM was the AKE - Agrotikon Komma Ellados (Agrarian Party of Greece) 
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resistance movement at home, the neutralization of the Greek 
Government-in-exile organized Greek Armed Forces in the Middle 
East, and astute Soviet diplomacy before the councils of "the 
Grand Alliance. 11 'I'he first two fell to the lot of the KKE; 
between 1941-43 the EAM-ELAS had either dominated, eliminated, 
or nemtralized its rival resistance movements in Greece and 
the Communist-inspired mutinies in the ranks of Greek Hiddle 
East forces during 1943-and 1944 made these elements militarily 
relatively impotent and politically suspect when and if they 
should return to Greece. 
During "the Grand Alliance" it became apparent to the 
Russians and to the British that an outside factor would be 
decisive in shaping the future destiny of Greece. Russia, 
on the one hand, although announcing a "hands-off" policy and 
feigning no interest in Greece, would have to make certain 
that Communist activities in Greece would be free of external 
intervention; Britain on the other hand, while professing no 
direct concern in Greece's internal affairs, realized the 
necessity of observing developments in Occupied Greece, and 
formulating her policy to meet these exigencies. 
The Soviet Union early revealed its real interest in the 
whose ranks consisted by KKE directive of Communist followers in the 
agricultural districts. The non-Communist parties consisted of the 
SKE - Socialistikon Komma Ellados (Socialist Party of Greece) and the 
inconsequential DE - Dimokratiki Enosis (Democratic or Republican Union) 
and the DRK - Kimodratikon Rizospastikon Komma (Democratic Radical Party). 
Finally, the Secretary-General of the EAM was Dimitrios Partsalidis, a 
Communist. 
Balkans in its opposition to a Balkan confederation, especially 
one outside the control of Moscow. Such a union has always 
caused the Kremlin grave concern. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Soviet Union opposed the Greco-Yugoslav Agree-
ment of January 5, 1942, negotiated with the sanction of the 
British Government but without the prior approval of Moscow, 
especially since the Greek and Yugoslav governments announced 
that "the fundamental principles of their policy must be the 
principle of the Balkans for the Balkans peoples ••• " 17~bviously, 
this concord was contra Russian interests and Soviet objection 
was immediate. While visiting London in the spring of 1942, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister vehemently registered a Soviet 
protest to the agreement; as a countermeasure to the proposed 
Greco-Yugoslav Union, Molotov suggested the conclusion of a 
new Soviet-Yugoslav agreement of friendship and non-aggression. 
Molotov's proposal failed to produce any definite results due 
primarily to British opposition. Nevertheless continued Soviet 
antipathy to the Greco-Yugoslav Agreement nullified any 
manifestations toward a Balkan Union. When the exiled Greek 
Premier Tsouderos visited the exiled Yugoslav Prime Minister 
in London on the anniversary of the Greek-Yugoslav Agreement 
in 1944, it was not surprising that the Yugoslav expressed 
suprise, stating he had "almost forgotten the occasion.n 
The Soviet Union revealed its opposition to a Balkan Union 
173Author's italics. 
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for a second time within five years. This time Harshal Tito 
took the leadership in proposing a Balkan Union to Georgi 
Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist leader, whereupon the 
Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders proceeded to sign a military 
alliance with Albania, Rumania, and Hungary as a first step 
towards a customs union and eventually a Balkan federation 
to include Greece. Soviet reaction to the Tito-Dimitrov pro-
posals was felt immediately. Under Soviet attack, Dimitrov 
publicly apologized for his ''mistake" and withdrew Bulgarian 
support for a Balkan Union. The Kremlin, however, was less 
successful in dealing with Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav refusal 
to do penance became a key issue in the dramatic Tito-Stalin 
breachof 1948. Obviously, the Soviet Union strongly opposed 
any Balkan arrangement that did not include Soviet leadership 
and which challenged its domination of the area. 
A second major tenet of Soviet Balkan policy apparent 
in the period 1942-1945 was Soviet opposition to an Allied 
invasion of the so-called "soft under-belly" of Europe, 
Balkania. 
During World War II the Balkans never developed beyond 
guerrilla warfare as a theatre of operations for (1) American 
leadership opposed a Balkan campaign on strategic grounds 
claiming that a Balkan operation would be a drain on operations 
in the Pacific, prove wasteful since Balkan operations would 
never develop beyond a secondary action; and weaken the build 
up for the planned invasion of Western Europe, the blow 
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calculated to knock Germany out of the war; and (2) Stalin 
never lost the opportunity to side with Roosevelt against 
Churchill, decrying the relative value of a Balkan front to 
the overall Allied war effort and emphasizing the importance 
of a second front in western Europe. 174 In contrast to American 
naivete both the Soviet Union and Britain realized that politi-
cal reasons play a prominent part in the formulation of war 
plans since European chancelleries have long accepted as doctrine 
that the spoils of war and political aims can be secured more 
easily at the peace conference if these objectives have been 
already achieved at the time of cessation of hostilities. 
Moreover by 1943 it became self-evident that the Naz~would 
be forced to retrench in the Balkans in order to consolidate 
the defense of Central Europe. And nowhere were the German 
positions more exposed than in Greece; at the same time Allied 
intelligence reports from Occupied Greece disclosed that the 
EAM-ELAS had political designs for a liberated Greece, and 
extraordinary measures were necessary to fill the political 
vacuum caused by a German withdrawal of Greece. 
At the Quebec Conference in August 1943 the combined 
Anglo-American Chiefs-of-Staff recorr~ended that the British 
"should prepare forces to occupy the Athens area and pave the 
way for the establishment of law and order and the beginning 
174For conflicting American views, cf., W. D. Leahy, I Was There, 
(New York, 1950), and M. Clark, Calculated Risk, (New York, 1950). 
General Clar~ estimation of the value of a Balkan invasion is especially 
interesting because it refutes the belief that all Americans opposed a 
Balkan invasion. 
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of relief ••• " The proposal was approved and initialed by 
both President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill, and on 
September 29, 1943, shortly before the all out ELAS attack 
against EDEs, 175the sole remaining national resistance move-
ment which represented the only challenge to Communist supremacy 
in Greece, Churchill ordered General Sir Hastings Ismay, his 
personal staff officer and Deputy Secretary (Military) to 
the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister's representative on the 
British Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
"to prepare five thousand British troops 
with armoured cars and Bren-gun carriers 
to be sent to Athens as soon as Germans 
evacuate ••• Langl The Greek troops in Egypt 
would accompany them ••• Langl Once a stable 
government is set up, we should take our 
departure. 11 176 
The explosive conditions which had developed in Greece during 
October as a result of the ELAS attack to eliminate EDES led 
Churchill to realize that his initial instructions to Ismay 
were far from adequate and that only a major British operation 
in the Balkans, subordinate to the Allied effort in Italy,. 
would prevent the EAM - ELAS domination of Greece. On October 20, 
1943, Churchill telegraphed Anthony Eden who was then at the 
Big Three Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, to sound out 
Soviet feelings toward a Balkan campaign and "what the Russians 
l?5EDES - Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos S desmos (Greek Democratic 
National League under the leadership of the republican officer General 
Zervos. 
l7hw. s. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols., (Boston, 1948-
1953), Vol. V, P• 538. 
really think about the Balkans... It may be that for political 
reasons the Russians would not want us to develop a large-scale 
Balkan strategy. 11 177Eden's reply was not surprising: "The 
Bussians were completely and blindly set on our invasion of 
N0 rthern France." 178 Subsequent British follow-ups concerning 
Soviet views on the Balkans revealed to the Kremlin that the 
British at the earliest 9PfOrtunity intended to press for an 
Allied invasion of the Balkans, and that the successful domina-
tion of Southeastern Europe by Communist partisans depended on 
Stalin's ability to check Churchill's moves. 'l'he forthcoming 
Big Three Conference in Teheran offered both leaders the 
opportunity to present their wares. 
At the first plenary meeting of the Teheran Conference on 
November 28, 1943, Churchill stressed the strategic merits of 
an operation in the Eastern Hediterranean and pressed President 
Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin for approval of British landings 
in the Balkans. Major opposition to Churchill's plan, however, 
did not come from Soviet leaders as the British Prime Minister 
expected, but from the Americans.l79 Stalin shrewdly limited 
Russian participation in the debate; the Russian leader merely 
questioned the wisdom of dispersing the Allied forces and 
refused to intervene in "Anglo-American difference of opinion." 
l77churchill, Vol. V, p. 286. 
l78churchill, Vol. V, p. 288. 
l79As late as 1950, Admiral W. D. Leahy noted in his book, I was 
There, that an Aegean operation was a mistaken plan to which the British 
"insisted stubbornly'' and with "bullbog tenacity." 
Disappointed, Churchill stated, 
"the President LRoosevelY ••• oppressed by the 
prejudices of his military advisors, ••• drifted 
to and fro in the arguments ••• Our American 
friends were comforted in their obstinacy by 
the reflection that 'at any rate we have stopped 
Churchill entangling us in the Balkans' ••• " 180 
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The Teheran Conference dispelled the question of an 
immediate invasion of the Balkans by the British. Thereafter, 
Allied and Soviet diplomacy settled upon the problem of creating 
mutually acceptable spheres of influence to meet the rapidly 
changing military situation in Eastern Europe. Although the 
acquisition of spheres of influence and the agitation for, or 
against, a Balkan invasion appeared to be two distinct and 
unrelated subjects, in many ways they were co-equal parts of 
the same issue, i.e., the Soviet attempt to withstand a 
Western penetration of the Balkan countries. Whereas the 
"under-belly" approach was a military solution to prevent the 
Soviets from engulfing all of Balkania the "spheres of influence" 
approach was a diplomatic resolve for the same problem. Once 
again the chief antagonists became the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain. The situation in Greece was a case in point. 
For one thing, Stalin had successfully opposed a British land-
ing in Greece; for another Efu~-ELAS had eliminated all its 
rivals save one, EDES, which it outnumbered four to one 
and had bottled up in unimportant Epirus while ELAS forces .. 
180
churchill, Vol. V, P• 346. 
391 
moved freely up and down the "spinal column''of Greece. 
In the light of developments following the Teheran 
Conference, the British considered it most imperative that 
they maintain a close contact with EDES and ELAS so as to keep 
a hand on the pulse of Communist activity and to prevent a 
major outbreak of fratricidal warfare between these bitter 
rivals and channel guerrilla efforts to operations against 
the Germans. The British liaison officers, however, were 
unsuccessful on both counts, and in December, following ELAS's 
all-out attack to eliminate EDES units and ELAS's increasing 
limited activity against the Occupation forces, British head-
quarters in Cairo suspended all shipments of arms to ELAS. 
British action, however, made little dent in ELAS armor; ELAS 
forces had been well equipped for present and future operations 
by 
"the Italian surrender in September 1943, Lwhich7 
affected the whole balance of forces in Greece. 
E.L.A.S. was able to acquire most of the Italian 
equipment, including the weapons of an entire 
division, and thus gained military supremacy. 
The danger of a Communist coup d'etat in the 
event of German withdrawal, which now became a 
practical possibility, needed careful attention."l81 
In February 1944 British Middle East Headquarters openly 
moved to counter the new strength of the ELAS forces. Cairo 
reproached the EAM-ELAS leadership for its attack on EDES 
and rushed much needed supplies, arms, and ammunition to EDES 
181. . 
Churchill, Vol. V, P• 532. 
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to counter ELAS strength; and on February 29, 1944 the British 
coerced ELAS to sign the Plaka Bridge LEpiru~ truce with 
EDES. By the Plaka agreement, EDES was isolated to the incon-
sequential area of Epirus while ELAS was assigned operations in 
the remainder of Greece. It is not strange that Soviets con-
tinued to play an almost inconspicuous role in the tempest 
brewing in Greece for Soviet interference in "internal 11 Greek 
affairs could in no way enhance the extremely favorable mili-
tary position which the Communist dominated resistance move-
ment found in Greece. Similarly, the military situation 
elsewhere in Southeast Europe had shifted in Soviet favor. In 
Yugoslavia Tito had come out on top over Mihailovich. On 
February 22, 1944 Prime Minister Churchilldescribed the situa-
tion in Yugoslavia as follows: 
"General Nihailovitch, I.must regret to say, 
drifted gradually into a position where some of 
his commanders made accommodations with Italian 
and German troops, which resulted in their being 
left alone in certain mountain areas and in re-
turn doing nothing or very little against the 
enemy ••• The Partisan movement soon outstripped 
in numbers the forces of General Mihailovitch. 
Not only Croats and Slovenes but large numbers 
of Serbians joined with Har shal 'l'i to, and he has 
at this moment more than a quarter of a million 
men with him ••• These forces are at this moment 
holding in check no fewer than fourteen out of 
twenty German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula 
••• Of course, the partisans of Marshal Tito are 
the only people who are doing any effective 
fighting against the Germans now." 182 
Elsewhere in the Balkans the Comrr.unist-controlled partisan 
182 Cited in Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, p. 782. 
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movement in Albania and the Communist underground in Bulgaria, 
Rumania, and Hungary stood in a favorable position to fill 
the political vacuum in the event of a German evacuation of 
these countries. Everywhere these Communist-run organizations 
had either eliminated the national patriotic opposition or 
anticipated no danger from those who had collaborated with 
Nazis, who, of their own initiative, would be forced either 
to flee with.the retreating Germans or go underground. Lastly 
the Red Army had crossed the Pruth River during April 1944 
and stood poised on Rumanian soil preparatory to an all out 
offensive into Eastern Europe. It was now certain that in 
order to avoid being trapped the German occupation forces in 
the Balkans would have to withdraw from the region faster 
than the impending Soviet advance; and the Nazi troops in 
Greece would have to be evacuated first since they were the 
most exposed. 
The impending Soviet onslaught on Europe and the near 
certain German evacuation of the Balkans set up an appropriate 
timetable from which the Greek Comn1unists as well as the 
Greek Government-in-exile could plan to take control of Greece. 
The EAM-ELAS realized that if they did not act quickly, the 
political vacuum caused by the German evacuation would be 
filled by the emigre Government supported by Greek troops 
in Egypt and British units from the Middle East. Consequently, 
in order to foil the Greek Government-in-exile, the Communists 
executed a twofold plan. First, on March 14, 1944, their 
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radio station in Greece announced the establishment by EAM-
ELAS of a new government known as the Political Committee for 
National Liberation, or PEEA (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis 
Apeleftherosis). Second, on March 31, 1944, EAM staged a 
mutiny in support of the PEEA in the Greek armed forces in 
Egypt in order to deprive the King of his military support. 
The revolt centered chiefly in the First Brigade of the 
Greek Middle East Army on orders to sail to Italy to take 
part in the Italian campaign, and ships of the Greek Navy 
anchored in Alexandria. The mutineers demanded that the 
Greek Government in Cairo (1) recognize the PEEA as the 
legitimate xepresentative of the Greek people; (2) accept 
PEEA officers into the Cabinet; (3) purge "fascists" from 
the Greek Army and the Greek Navy; (4) issue a statement that 
the King would not be permitted to return to Greece without 
a plebiscite. 
The revolt proved a dismal failure. The PEEA not only 
failed to gain overt support or recognition from international 
circles, but whereas the revolt simmered for twenty-three 
days, the British quelled the mutfnies without bloodshed, 
except for the loss of one British officer. The net result 
of the entire fiasco was that the prestige of Greece in the 
Allied camp sank to its lowest point in the war. In a telegram 
to Churchill on August 18, 1944, President Roosevelt chided 
the Greeks and approved the forceful suppression of the 
revolt by the British expressing the hope that it ·~ay succeed 
in bringing Greeks back into the Allied camp ••• and ••• Greeks 
everywhere will set aside pettiness and regain their sense 
of proportion." 183 But the tragic thing of the entire affair 
was that it need not have occurred in the first instance. 
On April 5, 1944, five days after the revolt commenced, 
Churchill had dispatched the following prophetic and reveal-
ing telegram to the Supreme Allied Commander in the 
Mediterranean: 
"It is now more than three months since we agreed 
that a Greek brigade, if necessary without its 
vehicular equipment, should be sent from Egypt to 
Italy to take part in the Allied offensive. I am 
told that one ccmpany has already got there, and 
that the others will be there during the month. Why 
is there all this delay and difficulty in moving this 
handful of men? They are very liable in Egypt to be 
contaminated by revolutionary and Communist elements 
there. Satan finds some mischief still for idle 
rands. Now do please try to get them shipped off 
out of Egypt as soon as possible and assembled in 
some suitable town in Southern Italy. I feel this 
small matter, which has Large political significance, 
ought not to have hung for so long. 11 184 
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During the revolt the British Government kept the Russians 
informed of events concerning the "Hutiny of March 31, 1944 11 
by direct messages to the Soviet Foreign Office in Noscow and 
timely dispatches to the Soviet Embassy in Cairo.18~he Kremlin, 
183churchill, Vol. V, P• 548. 
184churchil~ Vol. V, P• 541. 
185No evidence has been uncovered as to the complicity of the Soviet 
Embassy in Cairo in the aforementioned developments. In the light of 
present-day activities of Soviet legation, it is difficult to comprehend 
that the Russians had no role in the affair, or least of all needed to be 
informed of it. 
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however, displayed little interest in the revolt, and, on 
May 5, turned down a formal British request for cooperation 
in Greek affairs on the grounds that "it would be improper 
to join in any public pronouncements on political matters in 
Greece." Moreover, the Soviets left the impression that 
Greece was of no concern to them. This may have been the case 
but in the enigma of Greek international politics it is 
equally possible to Lelieve that the Kremlin had purposely 
shied away from an agreement with the British for at least 
four reasons: first, the KKE had been entrusted with the Greek 
coup and non-interference from all external forces was a 
prime prerequisite for the successful domination of Greece; 
second, the KKE instrument EAM-ELAS was doing as well as 
could be expected; third, open Russian participation in Greek 
political developments would unmask real Soviet hopes for 
Greece; and fourth, and probably most important, in the light 
of events after 1944, the Soviet Union could not be blamed 
for "the Greek torment." Instead, at anytime, it could claim 
to be a neutral and plead the cause for democracy in Greece 
with "clean hands" as it was later to do in the United Nations. 
The dangerous episodes of the spring of 1944 revealed 
that nothing short of direct Allied intervention could prevent 
the Communists from seizing control in Greece. Denied an 
invasion Britain embarked openly on a policy of spheres of 
influence as the second best means to rescue the remains of 
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the Western position and influence ;n the Balkans. T 
.... wo countries, 
Greece and Rumania, were immediately involved. 
On May 30, 1944 the British Ambassador to Washington, 
Lord Halifax, handed the American Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull, a communique requesting the American position on a 
proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement which relegated Humanian affairs 
to the Soviets, while Greek affairs would be the prime respon-
sibility of the British Government. 
Moscow's acceptance of the proposed Anglo-Soviet plan 
is perplexing since the British conceded nothing to the 
Russians for Soviet Armies were on the verge of "liberating" 
Rumania, why then should Russia relegate Greece to Britain, 
especially when the EAH-ELAS stood on the threshhold of 
"liberating" Greece? Various arguments have been put forward, 
and the one which continues to find wide appeal has been that 
"the launching of the Second Front was approaching and Stalin 
would not display too avaricious an attitude under the cir-
cumstances, and jeopardize allied cooperation."l86 In short, 
the Soviet would not sacrifice selfish Russian aims to 
benefit the Greek ~ommunists. While this Dcay have been a 
reason this author disagrees that it was the sole reason for 
from a political point of view, EAH-ELAS forces, next to the 
Germans, controlled Greece regardless of whether or not a 
cross-channel attack took place; and from a military point of 
view, a) it shows no understanding of the factors involved 
18f, 
D. G. KousouJ.as, The Price of Freedom, Greece in World 
Affairs, 1939-1953, (Syracuse, 1953), P• 108. 
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in the two years of planning and preparation which preceded 
the Allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944, b) or 
knowledge of the fact that the wheels propelling Operation 
"Overlord" 187 had already begun to move 188 when the Anglo-
Soviet proposal was made and nothing short of a major disaster 
or crisis could stop the invasion of France. This writer 
would like to suggest that possibly an added explanation of 
Soviet action was the fact that the Soviet agreement was pre-
dicated on American approval and the Soviets knew of the 
adverse American position on spheres of influence. In this 
manner, the Soviets could successfully continue their pre-
text of disinterest in Greece. 
In answer to the British note of May 30, 1944, Secretary 
of State Hull rejected the British proposal and announced 
that he "flatly 11 opposed ••• any division of Europe or sections 
of Europe into spheres of influence." 189 Hull's response was 
relayed to England and the following day Churchill wired 
Roosevelt urging approval of the proposed arrangement. On 
June 8, a message from the British Foreign Office directed 
its representative in Washington to inform American authori-
ties that a corollary to the original Anglo-Soviet proposal 
now included Bulgaria under Soviet direction and placed 
Yugoslavia within the British sphere. In his reply to 
187Allied code name for the invasion of France. 
188united States War Department, Historical Division, Omaha 
Beachhead, P• 35. 
189
cordell Hu1J, Memoirs, P• 1452. 
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Churchill on July 10 Roosevelt reiterated Hull's pronouncements 
but stated that the United States Government would prefer con-
sultative machinery for the Balkans rather than exclusive 
zones of influence. Churchill attacked the President's 
suggestion on grounds that consultative machinery was inadequate 
and incapable of coping with the urgent situation developing 
in the Balkans; he suggested instead that the proposed Anglo-
Soviet arrangement be given a three-months trial, following 
which time it would be reexamined by the Big Three Powers. 
President Roosevelt approved the agreement, as modified by 
the reexamination clause, as an ad interim arrangement but 
emphasized that care should be taken to insure that no post-
war spheres of influence were being established in the Balkans. 
On October 9, 1944, Churchill visited Stalin in Moscow and 
concluded the celebrated arbitrary "half sheet of paper" 
British-Soviet Balkan Understanding whereby the ratio of 
control between Britain and Hussia in the Balkan countries 
was to be as follows: Rumania 90 percent hussian control and 
10 percent British; Greece, 90 percent British control and 
10 percent Russian; Bulgaria, 75 percent Russian control and 
25 percent British. Soviet and British authority was to be 
evenly divided in the two countries of Yugoslavia and Hungary. 
A number of questions come to mind immediately after 
reading the British-Soviet Balkan Understanding. What moti-
vated the British to conclude such an agreement? Why did 
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the American President go along with the Understanding? What 
would entice Stalin to accept any division of the Balkan na-
tions? What were the alternatives, if any? 
The British position is the easiest to explain, for it 
was a question of realpolitik and an attempt by Britain to 
salvage for the West something from a desperate situation. 
On October 11, in a message to Congress President hoosevelt 
explained the American position this way: 
"It is absolutely necessary we should try to 
get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we 
may prevent civil war from breaking and in 
several countries, when probably you and_I would 
be in sympathy with one side and u. J. LStalin/ 
with the other." 190 
The answer to what enticed Stalin to accept a division 
of the Balkans is most difficult. The nearest thing to an 
answer, or what happened in Noscow, has been told by Churchill 
himself. The British leader stated, 
"1'he moment was apt for business, so I said, 
'Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans 
••• It was all settled in no more time than it 
takes to ~et down Lreferring to the percentage 
breakdown/. 
"Of course we had long and anxiously considered 
our point, and were only dealing with immediate 
wartime arrangements. All larger questions were 
reserved on both sides for what we then hoped 
would be a peace table when the war was won." 
More than likely, however, Stalin had agreed to the entire 
arrangement with tongue-in-cheek. 
l90Churchill, Vol. VI, P• 229. 
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Finally, no alternative to the Anglo-Russian Balkan 
Agreement seemed feasible for the West, considering the situa-
tion in Greece and the fact that during September Russian 
forces had entered Yugoslavia, concluded armistice terms with 
Rumania, invaded Hungary, and comrnenced negotiations with 
Bulgaria. 
The British gamble paid one dividend. It snatched Greece 
from the hands of the EAM-ELAS forces. Churchill's plan of 
maintaining a British foothold in the Balkans in Greece is 
readily apparent, but Soviet acquiescence in giving Britain 
almost absolute responsibility for Greece is strange. It 
cannot be explained except possibly that Stalin, realizing 
the historic British sensitivity for Greece and the vulner-
ability of Greece to naval action, was convinced that the 
British might fight over Greece; or the Kremlin believed that 
the Cornmunist movement in Greece was strong enough to play 
a decisive role, the agreement notwithstanding; or finally 
Stalin allowed Greece to fall within the British sphere of 
influence knowing full well that he could use the Greek tor-
ment and British countermeasures to excuse acts of suppression 
necessary to quell any disturbances in Hungary, Rumania, and 
Bulgaria. More than likely all three played some part in the 
hussian gamble to permit British predominance in Greece. In 
any case, the Soviet decision reversed the predominant 
position the Comwunist guerrillas had heretofore enjoyed in 
Greece and permitted the British to come to Athens in October 
as the representative of the Grand Alliance and subsequently 
support the "lawfully constituted Greek Government" in 
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quelling a new Communist attempt to seize power following the 
celebrated EAM demonstration on December 3, 1944. The violent 
one month war which followed in Athens and Piraeus and environs 
between the "ELAS-ites" and British forces induced Churchill's 
celebrated Christmas visit to Athens. 
On December 27, 1944, a meeting was held in Athens to re-
solve the differences between the British forces in Greece and 
the Greek Government and the EAM-ELAS. Those in attendance in-
cluded the chairman the Archbishop Damaskinos, Churchill, Eden, 
EAM-ELAS representatives, Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory Popov, 
the Soviet liaison officer to Athens, and the Greek Cabinet. 
The outcome of the rn.eeting was almost a foregone conclusion 
from the start, not only in the light of the recent British-
Soviet Balkan Agreement, but also because of the low military 
rank possessed by the Soviet representative and the lack 
of saber-rattling from the Kremlin. It was not noteworthy, 
therefore, that Popov, a mere lieutenant colonel, remained 
silent when Churchill arose to announce that the British had 
come to Greece "with the approval of President Roosevelt 
and Marshal Stalin." ~'he anti-climax to Churchill's Christmas 
visit' to Athens came three days later, on December 30, 1944, 
as the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky summoned 
the Greek Ambassador in Moscow and announced the appointment 
of a Soviet Ambassador to Athens. This announcement 
sealed the fate of the EAM-ELAS "December B.evolution," 
"Round Two" in the Communist attempt to take over Greece by 
force. l9l 
Soviet Diplomacy 1945-49 
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The dawning of 1945 found the Comrnunist forces frustrated 
in their second attempt to win control of Greece. The December 
(1944) Revolution, referred to as "Ta Dekembriaka," was con-
cluded by the Varkiza Agreement, February 12, 1945, between 
the EAM and the Greek Government. While the country remained 
within the British orbit, an uneasy truce settled over Greece 
between Communists and non-Communists. 
That the Varkiza agreement was merely a truce and not a 
final settlement of the Greek problem was made evident almost 
immediately in the years that followed. The bloody civil war 
of Round Two fame did much to sap the enthusiasm of the Greek 
people for their recent liberation from the Axis occupation. 
Relief from Hitler's yoke and his hated Albanian and Bulgarian 
servant had only meant a new and different kind of war which 
incited social and political hatred with no peer in Greek 
history. The Dekembriaka were destined to supplant even the 
historic Republic v. Monarchy question as the key issue in 
Greek politics; although, at the time, many in the West had 
191Round One: October 1943-February 1944, which resulted in the 
so-called Plaka Agreement. Hound Two: The 1944 December R-evolution which 
ended in the Varkiza Agreement of 1945. Hound Three: 1947-1949, the last 
all-out Communist Attempt to take over Greece, which resulted in Am~rican 
intervention on the side of Greek Government under the Truman Doctr1ne. 
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been lead to believe that this was the issue fought out in 
the streets and squares of Athens and Piraeus. The real issue 
in the Greek civil war of 1944-45, as was the issue in the 
forthcoming Greek guerrilla war of 1947-49, was not one between 
Monarchy and Republic or ~1onarcho-fascism'' and democracy, or 
reactionaries and radical social reformers, but whether Greece 
should or should not become a communist-dominated state. After 
Varkiza only "a precarious tranquility" Lin Churchill's wordi/ 
had been achieved between the Greek Government, supported by 
British forces, and the E.AN-ELAS. Nevertheless Greece had 
been saved from a fate similar to her Balkan neighbors to 
remain a Western beacon in the sea of communism which had 
engulfed the Balkan peninsula. 
On the international scene, Stalin continued to profess 
a Soviet policy of non-intervention in Greek affairs. During 
the February 8 meeting of the Yalta Conference, Stalin made 
the quip that he "would like to ask what is going on in 
Greece ••• ", but was quick to qualify his statement by assert-
ing that he "was not criticizing the British in Greece, but 
merely seeking information." 192 Churchill's response was 
immediate and pointed. He stated that he was hopeful that 
peace would come soon and added that the British were much 
obliged to Marshal Stalin for "not having taken too great Sill 
l92Ectward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The 
Yalta Conference, (New York, 1944), P• 217. 
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interest in Greek affairs.ul93 Stalin was quick to repeat that 
he had "no intention of criticism of British actions in Greece 
nor interfering in that country ••• " and that he had 11 complete 
confidence in British policy in Greece." 
The Kremlin policy of "neutrality 11 in Greek affairs as 
announced by Stalin at Yalta did not endure long. By the 
summer of 1945, Greece's Communist northern neighbors (while 
alleging moral support for the "democratic" elements within 
Greece) began to vilify the national authorities in Athens. 
On July 8, 1945, 'I'ito vehemently attacked the Greek "11onarcho-
fascist" regime of Athens, accusing it of persecuting 
11Democratic citizens 11 and 11Slav-minori ties" in Greek i'1acedonia; 
and at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin charged that "elements 
in Greece were stirring up trouble" and "spoke of Greek 
aggression on the Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers.ul94 When 
the Russians were accused by the United States of not carry-
ing out their obligations under the Yalta Declaration in 
Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, Stalin revealed to Churchill 
his dismay in finding that the "percentages agreement" had 
not been binding in the United States. The Russian leader 
stated that 
"he had been hurt by the American demand for 
193Author's italics. 
l94churchill, Vol. VI, P• 635. 
This author's italics. It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia 
has been omitted; possibly the Russians realized that it was necessary to 
discredit eventual Greek claims against these two former enemies who had 
occupied Greek territory under the Axis occupation and were now within 
the Soviet sphere of influence. 
a change of Government in Rumania and 
Bulgaria. He was not meddling in Gr~ek 
affairs, and it was unjust of them Lto 
interfe~e in Rumanian and Bulgarian 
matter.§/ 195 
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Subsequently, Molotov in turn attempted to counteract American 
accusations at the meeting of Foreign Ministers by condemning 
the Greek Government for fascist tendencies which incited the 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to charge Iviolotov with 
a "travesty of fact," pointing out that in contrast to what 
had happened in Rumania and Bulgaria, international observers, 
including representatives of the Soviet Union, had been 
invited to or.serve the forthcoming Greek elections. Neverthe-
less, these two Communist propaganda attacks against Greece--
Tito's attack early in July and the Soviet censures at 
Potsdam--presaged Soviet strategy for the forthcoming "third 
round 11 in the Comrnunis t attempt to win control in Greece. 
'l'he Soviet effort to provide a cover for the Communist 
seizure of Greece was a major diplomatic action preliminary to 
the opening of the "Third Round. ul96 'l'he aim of Soviet diplomacy 
was calculated to achieve the following: first, prevent or 
discredit the holding of free Greek elections; second, induce 
the withdrawal of the British army from Greece; third, discredit 
195 Churchill, VoL VI., P• 634. 
196This author takes direct issue with C. E. Black,'The role of 
Diplomacy in Soviet Imperialism!' p. 112 of The Threat of Soviet Imperial-
ism, edited by C. Grove Haines and published in 1954; still basing his 
opinion on 1947, 1948 sources, Mr. Black states that "the Soviet effort 
to provide a cover for the Communist seizure of Greece was undoubtedly 
not a diplomatic action of the first importance." 
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the official Government in Athens; and fourth, if necessary, 
secure an unassailable base for guerrilla operations as a 
counterbalance to Western (British) assistance to the Greek 
Government. The last point proved the easiest to accomplish. 
The Soviet satellites took care of this small matter of 
diplomacy at a secret conference among Yugoslav, Greek, and 
Bulgarian Communist leaders held in Bulgaria in May 1946. At 
the time it was decided that Yugoslavia would serve as the 
main base for the Greek guerrilla war while Greece's three 
northern neighbors would provide the Greek guerrillas with 
sanctuary whenever pressed by Nationalist Forces. As the 
price for these concessions, the KKE agreed to surrender Greek 
Macedonia with Saloniki into an independent Macedonia under 
the aegis of Yugoslavia at the conclusion of the war. 
The Communists next turned to the issue of free elections. 
The Yalta Agreement had provided that the Great Powers would 
unite to insure democratic and representative elections in the 
liberated countries of Europe; and the "Declaration on 
Liberated Europe" was reiterated in the Varkiza Agreement which 
called for a plebiscite and elections "conducted in complete 
freedom, and with every care for its genuineness," under the 
observation of an Allied monitoring mission. 
At the insistence of the KKE, the Varkiza Agreement has 
specified that a plebiscite on the monarchy would precede the 
elections for a Constituent Assembly; EAM however, soon 
discovered that popular reaction to the December holocaust 
had caused many Greeks to swing to the royalist camp and 
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therefore now agitated for a reversal of the order of the 
elections. The Left received the support of the anti-monarchist 
republican elements of the Center for their position. The 
Greek Government agreed to the transposition; after which 
the KKE demanded the postponement of the elections for an 
Assembly, even though the Varkiza Agreement had stipulated 
that they should take place "at the earliest possible date, 
and in any case within the current year ••• " Once again the 
Greek Government attempted to meet the Left. The date of the 
election was repeatedly postponed in the hope that EAM would 
participate in the voting; until finally the elections were 
set for March 31, 1946. In the interim, however, the KKE 
took full advantage of the freedom and civil Liberties of the 
Greek Constitution to agitate against the Greek Government and 
the British forces as a heinous occupation force without Legal 
basis for their presence in Greece .197 'l'he KKE, charged all 
the Greek governments since the Varkiza agreement with 
"violating" that pact and attacked Prime Minister Plastiras 
with being a fascist and the "service" ministry of Admiral 
Voulgaris as being 11monarcho-fascist." Both these governments 
fell under the pressure of Communist attacks between April-
August 1945; and when the aging leader of the Center wing of 
the Liberal Party, Themistocles Sophoulis, was selected by 
the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, as Prime Minister and a 
l97For the question of the Juridical Basis and the activities 
of the British Army in Greece see Appendix VIII. 
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safeguard against possible Rightist manipulation of the forth-
comi~g elections, EAM initially pledged its cooperation, only to 
break its word on December 11, 1945 after the Sophoulis cabinet 
announced amnesty for persons convicted of political crimes 
committed between April 6, 1941 (German attack on Greece) and 
February 12, 1945 (Varkiza Agreement) and cancelled proceed-
ings against another 69,000 persons for alleged political 
offenses connected with the resistance movement after the 
liberation. EAM condemned the Liberal Sophoulis Government 
as a "national danger," and while the KKE/EAM refrained from 
direct personal attacks on M. Sophoulis, they steadfastly 
refused to participate in the elections claiming that the pre-
requisites for "an unfettered and free election" did not 
exist in Greece since hightist elements would prevent the 
people from voting freely. This line was pressed with vigor 
by international Communism, finding receptive ears among 
liberal circles abroad, especially in Britain and the United 
States, although order prevailed in Athens and the other large 
population centers. However, incidents between the Right 
and the Left factions in the provinces and especially isolated 
villages were played up to emphasize the thesis that Greece 
was not yet ready for a "free" election. 
Although Prime Minister Sophoulis was impressed by the 
argument that an additional six months might provide a more 
favorable backdrop for electtons, he proceeded to carry 
out his firm commi tmen.t to hold the elections on March 31, 
1946 since repeated delays had already resulted in a series 
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of governments which had no constitutional sanction. Besides 
it was doubtful whether the Left would earnestly join in 
elections, for the KKE/EAM could hardly admit to losing popular 
support after its excesses during the civil war of 1944-45. 
After Varkiza, it was generally conceded that the Right or 
Center would have been voted into office; and, even the King's 
return, would have been voted upon favorably. Consequently, 
thereafter, the way to power in Greece for the Left was not 
by way of the ballot box, although the Communists clamored 
for "free" elections. The way to power was through force; 
and while ELAS had been disarmed by the Varkiza settlement its 
hard core members had already left Greece to find refuge in 
Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria where they were joined by 
other Communist members of the EAM to prepare for the new 
... 
Communist move against Greece. On March 25, 1946, just six 
days before elections, the Secretary-General of the KKE, during a 
visit to ELAS camps in Yugoslavia told the inhabitants of the 
Bulkes camp to hold themselves "in readiness for the day of 
liberation." 
In accordance with the stipulations of the Varkiza 
Agreement, the Greek Government sent invitations to Great 
Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, 
requesting their representatives to observe the forthcoming 
Greek parliamentary elections. When the proposal came up to 
organize the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections 
(AMFOGE), the Soviets were quick to excuse themselves from 
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participation and eventually the '~ulk of the ooservers were 
men of General Naloney's Ninety-fourth division (American) ••• 
after active service in the European Theatre. ul9B In his book, 
The Gre~k Dilemma, one of the two principal works on War and 
immediate Post-war Greece, 'William H. McNeil attributes Russia's 
abstention from ili~FOGE on the sole ground that, 
"probably fearing that a precedent might be 
set for elections in her own satellite 
countries, ••• declined the invitation on the 
ground that such a mission was an unjusti-
fiable intervention in the domestic affairs 
of an independent country." 199 
Russian abstention from ~1FOGE could be ascribable to at least 
three other reasons: first, Russian participation in M1FOGE 
was certain to accelerate the elections which the KKE/EM1 was 
seeking to prevent; second, the Russians take no part in any 
agency charged with the supervision of an activity which 
might return results unfavorable to their aims; third, partici-
pation in AMFOGE would indicate Soviet approval of results, 
and should the election prove unfavorable to the Communists, 
the Soviets could not convincingly condemn the elections as 
fraudulent. 
The refusal of the U.s.s.R. to join the Western Allies 
in sending observers to the elections seemed to be a signal 
for the KKE to sabotage them. When Radio Moscow announced 
198The Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, War and Post-
war Greece, P• 95. 
l99willian Hardy McNeil, The Greek Dilemma, (London, 1947), p. 177. 
in January 1946 that the Greek elections were destined to be 
"fraudulent," the KKE took up the cudgel and decried the 
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move for an immediate plebiscite and elections. APOHE Lthe 
Greek word for abstention/ became the new Communist cry 
against the forthcoming elections. In the end, however, an 
analysis of the election results showed that only 9.3 percent 
of the eligible voters had abstained for political reasons; 
and even if one doubts this figure as did some circles outside 
ill~FOGE there is little to indicate that no more than twice 
that number, or 20 percent, had abstained for political reasons. 
The larger figure would amply take into account the Greek 
habit, as is the wont of most peoples caught in the web of 
political crisis, to answer their interviewer not according 
to what they felt but as they believed their interlocutor 
desired, which was the major attack upon the AMFOGE sampling. 
'I'he elections took place as scheduled on March 31 , 1946, 
and the returns on April 1 showed that the Rightist Popular 
Party led by M. Tsaldaris had secured 213,316 votes; the Center 
bloc under the leadership of Messrs. Papandreo~ Venizelos, 
and Kannellopoulos 95,571; the Liberals under the venerable 
Premier Sophoulis 45,879; and the independent rightist 
faction of General Zervas of EDES fame 20,734. Out of 354 seats 
to be filled in the Parliament, the Populist and other Royal-
ists obtained 231; the Center parties which had straddled 
the Constitutional issue Lclaiming that they were prepared 
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to accept monarchy if the majority desired i!/ received 67; the 
"uncompromising Republicans 11 obtained 51 seats, consisting of 
48 seats for the Liberals and the Agrarian Party's three, which 
made up the total strength of the out-and-out republican group 
as opposed to monarchy. Of the electorate only 49 per cent of 
the persons whose names appeared on the registration lists voted, 
and the KKE attempted unsuccessfully to make political capital 
of this fact by naively claiming the 51 per cent which had 
abstained from voting while earlier it had loudly proclaimed 
the falsity of the election list. While EAM could not publicly 
admit that it had lost popular support, it continued to insist 
that the figures of the election represented a victory for the 
Left charging that the British and American members of the 
Mission had prepared their report in London and Washington 
before they came to Greece, and on April 19 went so far as to 
issue a manifesto declaring the elections false and stating 
that 11 the monstrous report" of the Allied mission was aimed 
at justifying the British policy of securing strategic bases 
in Greece against "the democratic Balkan States." But the last 
word on the elections lay with AMFOGE which accurately described 
the entire electoral situation in Greece at the time as follows: 
11The Mission finds that the proceedings of election 
day were orderly and satisfactory. The registration 
lists in large areas contained irregularities but 
there was no significant amount of illegal voting. 
Intimidation existed, in some degree, from both ex-
tremes and was even on occasions given countenance 
by members of the gendarmerie, but it was not exten-
sive enough to effect seriously the election. The 
practice of deliberate abstention did not reach 
large proportions. The Mission therefore con-
cludes that notwithstanding the present intensity 
of political emotions in Greece conditions were 
such as to warrant the holding of elections, that 
the election proceedings were on the whole free 
and fair and the general outcome represents a 
true and valid verdict of the Greek people.u200 
The new Populist Government under Prime Minister c. 
Tsaldaris was installed on April 17; but its leadership proved 
uninspiring. It was reluctant to promote adrrtinistrative re-
forms or undertake reconstruction programs, claiming that it 
could not do either until the Constitutional question was 
settled. At the same time, however, and against many absten-
tions in the Parliament, the 'Isaldaris Government passed a 
Security Law that suspended Habeas Corpus and permitted arrest 
without warrant. In its behalf, however, it should be noted 
that the government intended to apply the measure impartially, 
but more often than not, the law was invoked against political 
opponents, liberal university professors and clerics, and 
thousands of 11small fry ELAS-ites" who unexpectedly found 
themselves either deprived of their professional appointments 
or exiled to the Aegean islands while such star Communist 
personages as N. Zachariades and G. Siantos who represented 
the leadership of the KKE and the ELAS/EAM remained untouchedl01 
200Quoted from the Re art of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek 
Elections, Department of State Publication No. 2522, Washington, 194 • 
201see Appendix IX for a brief history of the career of these two 
key Greek Communist leaders. 
In the end, the cure, the Security Law, proved worse than 
the disease of Communism, and public disorder was worse than 
at anytime prior to the March elections. 
The ministry to which Tsaldaris succeeded had been formed 
earlier on April 4 under the chairmanship of a political 
neutral, M. Poulitsas, an obscure judge, pending the election 
of a leader of the Populist Party. This first freely Greek 
Government in ten years included such politicians of "the 
right of center" as Messrs. Venizelos, Papandreou, and 
Kanellopoulos who had previously stated that they were willing 
to accept monarchy if the majority of the Greek people voted 
it; however, Tsaldaris' rise to the helm of the Populist 
Party and consequently the premiership resulted in the whole-
sale restoration of Rightists and Royalists to all operative 
government posts and especially the armed forces which quickly 
alienated the right of Center politicians. 202 Within a fort-
night these Center party leaders resigned from the government 
and announced openly that they now preferred a republic to a 
monarchy thus bringing to the forefront the plebiscite 
question. Even the Left came out in favor of holding the 
plebiscite even though the prerequisites of stability and 
order claimed six months ago hardly existed now. Obviously 
Communist strength, or that of any other single political 
202Tsaldaris' election to the leadership of the Populist Party was 
not without opposition from his principal party rivals Messrs. Theotokis, 
Mavromikhalis, and Stephanopoulos, any one of whom was preferred by the 
Center. 
party, could not be detected in a plebiscite; and chances were 
good that Leftist votes conjoined with the votes of the Center 
and Liberal parties now united in favor of a Republic would 
defeat any proposition for the return of the Monarchy and 
bring the fall of the Tsaldaris Government. 
The plebiscite was duly carried out on September 1, 
1946 but to the dismay of the "republicans" 68.3 percent of 
the eligible voters cast ballots favoring the return of 
George II; however, it was generally acknowledged that the 
verdict of the Greek people was primarily a vote against 
Communism rather than an overwhelming majority for monarchy, 
for now, in addition to the ever-haunting spectre of the 
Dekembriaka, two new factors had damaged the Communist cause 
in Greece. These included Soviet favoritism expressed for 
Bulgarian and Albanian national claims in opposition to Greek 
claims at the Paris Peace Conference; and second, the Greek 
Communists themselves played into royalist hands by stepping 
up bandit activity. The armed clashes between Comn1unist 
bands and the Gendarmerie lent power to Government charges 
that only the King could establish a stable Government and 
save the people from the consequences of a Comrnunist take-over .203 
203nuring his stay in Greece between 1949-1954, this author found 
that a good number of the people who voted for the Monarchy in 1946 had 
previously and have since preferred a Republican form of government, but 
in 1946 they realized that the choice was not between a Republic and a 
Monarchy, but between Monarchy and a People's-type Democratic Republic 
that they had temporarily vlitnessed during the December Revolution whose 
horrors they did not forget. 
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In addition for the first time it was publicly announced that 
the marauding Communist bands were receiving weapons and 
supplies from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and even sanctuary there, 
facts which appreciably tarnished the patriotic claims of the 
"andartes" and excited the old and deep-seated Greek fear of 
a Slav invasion of their northern provinces. 
The plebiscite proved the second major political defeat 
for Communism in Greece within six months, and the Soviet's 
attempt to prevent the holding of elections in Greece erided 
in a dismal failure. 
Following the plebiscite, the Greek Communists stepped 
up their Guerrilla activities and increased their propaganda 
attacks against the Government and the British forces which 
after Varkiza had been placed in garrison and employed, in the 
main, on reconstruction projects. 
Government reports on the eve of the plebiscite that the 
ELAS guerrillas in ~~cedonia were receiving aid from across 
the frontiers were soon confirmed. From the border areas, the 
Co~nunist bands gradually worked their way south into Thessaly 
where they joined up with local Communist bands and seriously 
disrupted communications at Larissa, the hub between Athens 
and Saloniki. EM1, however, steadfastly continued to dis-
claim any responsibility for the activities of the guerrilla 
bands. Instead, Eili~ attributed the disorder in the provinces 
to the presence of British forces in Greece. 
On October 17, 1946 the EAM Central Committee sent a 
protest to the u. N. Security Council calling for the with-
drawal of British forces from Greece on the ground that 
British intervention in Greek internal affairs was tantamount 
to the suppression of the country's independence; at the same 
time, the news and articles from KKE's organ hiZOSPASTIS and 
EAM's mouthpiece ELEFTHERI ELLADA were picked up by interna-
tiona! Communism and given wide circulation abroad. The 
Communist propaganda attack against Greece increased as radio 
Moscow, Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Tirana vociferously attacked 
the Greek Government over the air waves, charging that Britain 
and America had engineered the reestablishment of ·~onarcho­
fascism" in Greece. 204 The world-wide Communist press and 
radio campagin did yeoman service in undermining world confi-
dence in British and American intentions and actions regard-
ing Greece and confusing the realities of the Greek situation 
in preparation for a new military attack upon the established 
Greek Government. 
204The United States and Britain had taken part in AMFOGE II 
which observed the revision of the electoral lists prior to the plebis-
cite of September 1, 1946. France declined on the ground of expense, 
but more likely "the pressure of French Communists in the Chamber of 
Deputies had more to do with the decision" (W. H. McNeill, The Greek 
Dilemma, p. 200). After having satisfied itself that the revised 
electoral lists were accurate, AMFOGE II was afterwards asked to remain 
in Greece by the Greek Government for an informal observation of the 
polling on the day of the plebiscite. Although there were unquestion-
ably some irregularities and instances where the Government resorted to 
unfair practices to influence results in favor of monarchy, nevertheless 
responsible observers of Greek politics felt that the outcome, though 
not to the extent that the official Greek figures indicated, represented 
the will of the majority of the Greek people. 
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'l'he preparations . for "hound 'I'hree 11 can be dated from the 
time Zachariades, the Moscow-trained Secretary General of the 
KKE, returned to Greece in June 1945 after imprisonment in 
Germany and announced his intention 11 to begin the armed 
struggle, wherever and under whatever circumstances. 11205 Shortly 
thereafter there appeared inflammatory articles and provoca-
tive manifestoes in RIZOSPASTIS and ELETHERI ELLADA calling 
upon the Greek people to mass in self-defense against the 
11Monarcho-fascists and the Anglo slaves of Athens." The 
Communist organs clamored for the establishment of a 
"democratic government, 11 and for the immediate withdrawal of 
British military forces from Greece. 
By the beginning of 1946 Zachariades had succeeded in 
creating major political disturbances and work stoppages in 
the larger cities of Greece. Zachairades' next move undoubtedly 
was meant for world consumption for in an address on New Year's 
Day to the Plenum of the KKE of Macedonia and 1hrace the 
Communist leader declared that Northern Greece had become a 
staging area for "Monarcho-fascist 11 bands of the Athens regime 
which, he claimed, were being readied for action against the 
People's hepublics of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In 
conclusion Zachariades said, "Comrades, we LGreeci/ are 
threatening international peace." 
Continuing attempts to discredit the Athens Government, 
205Quotes from T. P. Papakonstantinou, The Anatomy of Revolution, 
(Athens, 1952). 
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the KKE instigated a new series of strikes in Athens and the 
other major cities on January 8; and five days later BIZOSPASTIS 
published a lead article entitled "The Ferocious Persecution 
of Slavo-Hacedonian Peoples" which maintained that the 
"tyrannic Greek-English regime of Athens exerts an unimaginable 
terroristic oppression in the Slav-l>iacedonian minority." 
Finally, Zachariades' campaign of vilification reached a climax 
on January 21, the same day that the Soviet representative 
filed charges with the Security Council of the United Nations 
against Greece. On that day the KKE Politbureau released a 
manifesto which attributed "the principal and major responsi-
bility for the situation in Greece ••• to English occupation 
forces ••• " and included "a demand for the immediate withdrawal 
of British troops from Greece" and an appeal for the organiza-
tion "of a voluntary corps consisting of faithful democrats 
tested in national resistance who will clean up the Monarcho-
fascist dirt from the country ••• " 'These propaganda attacks 
and the tactical maneuvering of strikes and disturbances, 
culminated in the perfect timing and identical wording of the 
KKE manifesto against the British with the Soviet letter to 
the Security Council, were not only a remarkable display of 
Communist coordination, but revealed the excellent leadership 
that Greek Communism enjoyed under Zachariades. 
On the eve of Soviet charges in the United Nations against 
the Greek Government the political and military situation in 
Greece was to say the least most difficult. From the outset 
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the Greek Governments had been faced not only with a difficult 
reconstruction problem, but regular Leftist incursions on its 
authority as well. Within six weeks after the just Greek 
Government was set up in Athens it found itself fighting for 
its survival; and the Varkiza Agreement which followed the 
December revolt proved at most an uneasy truce. There was no 
doubt that the Government had at times employed extra-legal 
measures to deal with the worsening internal order, but 
government action was not without ample provocation. From 
the outset the Left under the leadership of KKE/EAH had been 
in open rebellion against any government in Athens except one 
which EAM could control. The Left had not only repeatedly 
attacked the ruling autt ori ties in Athens as "Honarcho-fascists" 
and "Anglo-American lackeys" but incited the Greek populace 
to rise in revolt against these "puppet governments." Never-
theless, it is interesting to note that until 1947 and the 
outbreak of the major hostilities of the "Third Round," the 
Communists in Greece enjoyed complete freedom of press, speech, 
election, and movement; and yet their contentions found wide 
support amongst unschooled observers and journalists of the 
Greek scene who never really understood the whole Greek pro-
blem but only saw deep enough to exaggerate "the ordeal of 
the Greek democratic citizenry" and the Government's inability 
to assert its authority over remote areas of the country which 
often times allowed anti•Corr~unists to become self-appointed 
and sometimes harsh protectors of civil order. The failure 
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of the Government to cope with this problem is not surprising 
since the Government even met difficulty in controlling the 
Communist-led pseudo-liberal uprising and manifestations with-
in the immediate environs of Athens itself which were designed 
to intensify disorder and show that reactionary Rightist 
elements acting as instruments of the "Nonarcho-fascist-Anglo-
regime" were persecuting innocent "democrats" and "liberals." 
In the North, the Communists found for their cause a ready-
made question in the Slavic minority who willingly attested 
to Red charges that minorities were being mercilessly persecuted. 
Indeed, thousands of these "refugees" had fled Greece to seek 
sanctuary in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and, accord-
ing to Soviet sources, they numbered approximately twenty-
five thousand in Albania, twe~ty thousand in Yugoslavia, and 
five thousand in Bulgaria?06 An analysis of the three elements 
that comprise these figures, however, quickly dispels any 
notions that the majority of these "refugees" were truly a 
persecuted minority. The first group consisted of the Chams, 
the Albanian speaking Moslems of Greek Epirus, who had collabo-
rated with the Italians against the Greeks during the recent 
war in the hope of enlisting Italian support for a boundary 
revision in Albania's favor. The second group consisted 
chiefly of Slavo-Hacedonians and ex-members of ELAS and 
206
united Nations Document S/360, Report of U.N. Commission of 
Investigation, Chap. II, Sec. G, Soviet Delegate's Conclusions. 
Department of State, Publication 2909, The Problems of Greece, 
p. 70. The figures range anywhere from c. 25,000 to c. 50,000. These do 
not include those later kidnapped or "recruited" by guerrilla units during 
"round three." 
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individuals who had fled Greece to escape revenge or prosecu-
tion for crimes comntitted during the Occupation and December 
hevolution and not covered by the Varkiza Agreement. The 
last group consisted mainly of Pomaks who had previously 
cooperated with Bulgarian occupation authorities in the 
territories of northern Greece. These three refugee groups 
had crossed into Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria after being 
persuaded by the Communists that persecution and mass torture 
would follow upon the return of the Greek Government to 
northern Greece. More important, however, than the reason 
for the presence of. these "refugees," in the Balkan People's 
Republics was the fact that while the KKE was busily reorganiz-
ing former "ELAS-ites" as a basis for a guerrilla force with-
in Greece, the refugees were forming the nucleus of a new 
Communist guerrilla army of liberation outside of Greece and 
eventually constituted a substantial part of Markos' so-called 
"Democratic Army" which took the field against the Greek 
Government during the 11 'l'hird Round. 11 
The Greek Question Before the U. N. 
During the year 1946 the Greek question figured prominently 
in discussions at the United Nations on no less than three 
separate occasions. The first, the Soviet charge on 
January 21, that the presence of British troops in Greece 
constituted a menace to world peace which was, in addition, 
apparently a Soviet move to offset the Iranian charges against 
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the Soviet Union~07 1'he second was initiated in August when 
the Ukrainian SSR filed a complaint with the Security Council 
condemning the continued presence of British troops in Greece 
and accused the Greek Government of unfriendly acts against 
Albania and persecution of minorities in Thrace, Macedonia, 
and Epirus. The third resulted from a complaint filed by the 
Greek Government charging that a situation had been created 
in the Balkans which was "leading to friction between Greece 
and her neighbors." The U.N. discussions on these three cases, 
for a time, provided the Communist conspiracy in Greece with 
an excellent cover until recriminations by Britain and the 
United States exposed the true casus belli in Greece as a 
continuation of the historic East-West struggle in the Balkans. 
No better proof of this fact can be found than in the actual 
history of the Greek question before the United Nations. 
On January 21 , 1946, -the same day Zachariades charged 
Britain with the major responsibility for the grave situation 
in Greece, the Soviet Union requested that the Security 
Council discuss the Greek situation under Article 35 of the 
United Nations' Charter. The Soviet note declared: 
••• the presence of British troops in Greece after 
207The Iranian case, like the Greek case, was one of the first 
questions thrust upon the Security Council. It ·involved Iranian charges 
filed with the Security Council on January 24, 1946 condemning the Soviet 
Union for aggressive interference in Iranian affairs and the Soviet Union's 
failure to withdraw its troops from Iran "not later than six months after 
the end of hostilities" as provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Alliance concluded between Britain, the USSR, and Iran on January 29, 1942. 
the termination of the war is not called for now 
in the interests of the protection of the communi-
cations of the British troops staying in the 
defeated countries. On the other hand, the pre-
sence of the British troops in Greece had turned 
into an instrument of pressure ••• by reactionary 
elements against the democratic forces of the 
country. Such a situation ••• caused extraordinary 
tension fraught with grave consequences both for 
the Greek people and for the maintenance of peace 
and security ••• 208 
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On February 1, 1946, the chief U.N. Soviet delegate 
Andrei Vyshinsky opened the Soviet case before the Security 
Council by stating that the Soviet Government had repeatedly 
expressed grave concern over the situation in Greece; however, 
Soviet admonitions had not received proper attention at 
Potsdam, London, or Hoscow, but now the Soviet Government 
could no longer remain impassive to the deteriorating situation 
in Greece. Vyshinsky stated: 
" ••• al,ihough it Lthe presence of British troops in 
Greecg/ is not necessitated by circumstances, be-
cause there is no need to protect these communica-
tions as in the case of troops in defeated countries 
••• it has become a means of pressure, and it has 
resulted very often in support of reactionary 
elements in the country against democratic elements ••• " 
and concluding his case, the Soviet delegate, admitted that 
his Government had agreed "once upon a time" to the presence 
of British forces in Greece in order to facilitate the war 
against the Germans, but now denied that their presence was 
" ••• still ••• in accordance with the views of the Allied Govern-
ments ••• " since Germany had been defeated and the war ended. 
208u.N. Publication, 1946-1949, U.N. Journal of the Security 
Councjl, No.2, P• 14. 
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Consequently, the Soviet Government insisted upon " ••• the 
quick and unconditional withdrawal of the British troops from 
Greece ••• 11209 
Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British representative on the 
Security Council, answered the Soviet attack with definite and 
pointed counter-charges. Bevin noted that 
" ••• it is significant that whenever the problem of 
Greece has arisen in any negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, it has always come about when we 
have been Ldiscussin~ Rumania, or Bulgaria, or 
Poland." 
The British representative categorically pointed out the many 
Soviet inconsistencies in the Greek question. Although the 
Soviets professed an interest in Greek affairs, they had 
refused to join the United States and Britain in observing 
the Greek elections. Bevin emphasized the case of Zachariades 
who had been flown back to Greece by the British and permitted 
by the Greek Government to agitate his cause. Continuing, 
stressed 
the British representative""the glorious inconsistency" of 
the local Greek Co~nunists' position on British troops in 
Greece by pointing out that whereas the Secretary General of 
the KKE condemned British interference in Greece, regional 
Comn1unist leaders complained of the failure of British troops 
to interfere in their behalf against acts by rightist bands 
as in the case of the extreme rightist organization "X" in 
Z09u.N. Publication, 1946-1949, U.N. Journal of the Security 
Council, No. 7, PP• 88-97. 
Kalamata on January 19, 1946 at which time Xianthos, the 
Comn1unist leader, complained to the British ambassador in 
Athens of the failure of local British troops to interfere 
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in the Kalamata incident!10 Mr. Bevin concluded his argument 
' 
by calling the Security Council's attention to the fact that 
in the countries bordering on Greece, 
" ••• there is not far short of seven to eight 
hundred thousand Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian 
troops within reasonable range of communication, 
from Hungary right down to the frontier of Greece • 
••• Can you imagine Greece, even with the aid of 
the British army there, which is a very small one, 
declaring war or attacking these countries? Where, 
then, are we endangering peace?" 
On the second day of the Security Council's discussion 
on the Greek question, Vyshinsky continued his attack against 
the British but placed primary emphasis on the internal con-
ditions in Greece. At the same time the Soviet delegate 
fused a new issue with the Greek problem: the recognition of 
the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland by the 
Western Powers which he claimed would relax existing tensions 
in those countries as well as Greece. The Soviet Union, in 
effect, was now willing to reaffirm the British position in 
Greece if the Western Powers recognized the Co.munist-
controlled regimes of Eastern Europe--a stratagem which was 
210The "X-ites" were able to hold Kalamata for a couple of days 
until pressed by reinforced Government forces. When they evacuated the 
town, the "X-ites" took with them many Leftists as hostages, fourteen of 
whom were reported to have been murdered. These murders naturally made 
excellent Communist propaganda; however, less publicized was the fact 
that fifteen months earlier the KKE/ELAS had executed no less than thirty 
persons when they had seized the town. 
to become a familiar feature of Cold War Soviet diplomacy. 
The Soviet stratagem linking the recognition of the 
Cownunist-dominated states of Eastern Europe with the Greek 
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question before the U.N. misfired. The Security Council re-
fused to support the Soviet proposal. At the same time Bevin 
won over the Security Council by his dramatic appeal calling 
-for either outright condemnation or unconditional acqui~tal 
of Britain and Greece. Consequently, on February 6 the Soviet 
Union wisely abandoned its case by proposing that 
"a formal resolution of the Security Council 
on the question of the situation in Greece 
in connection with the presence there of 
British troops ••• be dispensed with;" 
and the Council, in lieu of a resolution, agreed to accept 
the safe effacing statement made by its president that "in 
regard to the question of the presence of British troops in 
Greece, as recorded in the proceedings of the Council ••• 
consider the matter as closed." 
'l'he 11matter 11 did not remain closed for long, for at 
the same time Greek claims against Albania were scheduled for 
a hearing before the Paris Peace Conference a telegram from 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukranian SSR to the 
Security Council on August 21, 1946 charged that "the situation 
in the Balkans which has resulted from the policy of the 
Greek Government ••• endangers the maintenance of peace and 
security." The Ukraine requested an examination of the situation 
by the Security Council. There is little doubt that the timing 
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of the Ukrainian telegram was not without forethought since 
on September 6, just two days after debate comnenced on the 
Ukrainian complaint at Lake Success, the Soviet representative 
to the peace conference in Paris argued that Greece, having 
been satisfied with the acquisition of the Dodecanese, should 
the 
cede Western Thrace to Bulgaria. At the same timEY' Yugoslav 
representative presented his nation's claims against Greek 
Macedonia. In both instances, these claims approximated the 
territory which Hitler had promised Yugoslavia in 1941 and 
had awarded Bulgaria after his conquest of Greece. 
The Ukranian charge against GreGce except in one respect 
did not differ substantially from the earlier Soviet complaint. 
While it also accused Greece of fermenting border incidents, 
of seeking to annex by force the southern part of Albania, and 
of persecuting minorities, the note was aimed directly at 
the Greek uovernment and only by implication against the British. 
Hence, the Greek representative to the United Nations, Ambassa-
dor Vassili Dendramis, instead of Ernest Bevin, was invited 
to answer Communist charges. 
The discussion on the Ukrainian complaint turned into a 
fruitless debate over frontier incidents between Greek and 
Albanian border guards over cattle rustling, the alteration 
of frontier markers, and accusations that the Greeks, encouraged 
by the presence of British forces in their country, were bent 
on aggression which was heatedly denied by the Greek and 
British delegates to the U.N. Despite its heat, the debate 
generated little new light on the Greek question. It only 
rehashed old allegations and the same arguments with similar 
results. On September 18 the u.s. representative l'-1r. Hershel 
Johnson submitted an American resolution calling for an 
on-the-spot investigation on both sides of Greece's northern 
frontier by a subcommittee of inquiry to ascertain the facts 
surrounding the disturbed situation along Greece's northern 
borders failed to pass because of a Soviet veto. The 
Soviet representative, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, was quick to grasp 
the full impications of the American move for a U.N. committee 
investigating Greece's northern neighbors was almost certain 
to implicate Greece's northern neighbors in the guerrilla 
conspiracy. Henc~, the Soviet Union resorted to its veto 
power to prevent the adoption of the American resolution. On 
September 20 ~ Soviet-sponsored resolution condemning Greece 
was rejected by a vote of 9 to 2. 211 
Debate on the Greek question ended on September 20, and 
the Ukrainian item was removed from the agenda of the Security 
Council without a definite decision. However, the defeat of 
211p0 1and the other member of the Soviet bloc sitting on the 
Security Council,' voted in favor of the Soviet resolution. Those against 
the Soviet resolution included the U.S., Great Britain, France, China, 
Australia the Netherlands, Egypt, and Brazil. On the U.S. resolution, 
Australia' abstained, eight members voted for it, and the USSR together 
with Poland voted against the resolution. 
the Soviet-sponsored resolution condemning Greece was in it-
self a significant victory for Greece; but more important, 
the debate on the Ukrainian complaint had served to dramatize 
whether Greece, in the front line of the historic juncture of 
British (later American) and Russian spheres of influence, 
should or should not become a communist-dominated state. 
The continued disturbances in the northern Greek provinces 
along Greece's frontier induced the Greek Government on 
November 30 to appeal the Greek question to the Security 
Council. Without doubt, the Greek Government had also seized 
upon the fact that the Security Council had previously denied 
two Soviet charges and, that, in the interim, Greece had 
amassed sufficient evidence against her satellite neighbors 
with which to reopen the Greek question before the United 
Nations. Consequently, the Greek representative to the U.N. 
was instructed to request an on-the-spot investigation of the 
Greek frontier by a mixed commission; and none other than the 
Greek Prime Hinister arrived in New York to present the Greek 
case before the Security Council. 
The Greek Ivfemorandum dated December 3 and addressed to 
the Secretary General, requested that the Security Council 
give early consideration: 
••• to a situation which is leading to friction 
between Greece and her neighbors, by reason of 
the fact that the latter are lending their 
support to the violent guerrilla warfare now 
being raged in northern Greece against pgbli~ 
order and the territorial integrity of Lthal/ 
country. This situation if not promptly 
remedied is ••• likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security ••• 
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Possibly overestimating Soviet reluctance for an "on-the-spot 
investigation 11 exemplified during the previous debate on the 
Ukrainian charges before the Security Council, the Greek 
Government reaffirmed "the urgent necessity for an investiga-
tion to be undertaken on the spot in order that the causes of 
this situation may be brought to light." It came as a total 
surprise when the Soviet Union, in a complete turn about from 
previous behavior, appeared sympathetic to an on-the-spot 
investigation of Greek charges. While it is unknown what 
caused this change of heart on the part of the Soviets, several 
factors may have contributed to it. The following may be 
considered: first, past Soviet attitudes toward the Greek 
problem had resulted in two consecutive defeats; second, Soviet 
reluctance to go along with the majority feeling of the Council 
on the question of an investigation again could imply that the 
Soviet Union and the Balkan People's hepublics had something 
to hide; third, and most important as subsequent events 
proved, Communist preparations for "round three" in the 
struggle against Greece had been completed; and finally, all 
the others notwithstanding the Kremlin may have realized the 
necessity of participating in an investigation of Greek claims 
in order to be in a position to orient or mitigate the 
committee's findings in favor of the Corrununist cause. 
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The Communist defense against the Greek charges was 
similar to the arguments employed in the previous debates on 
the Greek problem; denying Communist implication in the dis-
orders in northern Greece, it lay primary blame for these 
disturbances upon the dissatisfaction of the ordinary Greek 
citizen with the ruling party Monarcho-fascist Government in 
Athens. Nevertheless, the Greek Government was able to argue 
its case with sufficient reasonableness to move the Security 
Council on December 19, to adopt an American resolution call-
ing for a Commission of Investigation "to ascertain the facts" 
and "the causes and nature" of the border violations agai~st 
Greece. The Commission was empowered 
'"to conduct its investigations in Northern 
Greece and in such places in other parts of 
Gree~e, in Albania, Bulgaria~ and Yugosl~via 
as the Commission considers should be in- ·· 
eluded in its investigations ••• "; 
but, as a quid pro guo of Russia's acceptance, the investiga-
tion was limited to "Greece; and ••• the frontier districts of 
Albania, BUlgaria, and Yugoslavia ..... The Soviet delegate 
argued that any other investigation into the interior of the 
People's Republics would be a violation of Article 2, para. 7 
of the U.N. Charter (an intervention 11in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction") although 
apparently a similar investigation conducted in Greece would 
not. Probably nearer to the truth was the fact that the major 
Communist training, supply, and mobilization installations 
formed or being formed in the neighboring countries to aid the 
Communist bands in Greece were not located in the frontier 
district but in the interior. For example, in Albania they 
were located at Shiak, Roubik, Tirana, and Elbasson; in 
Yugoslavia, they were to be found at Bulkes, Kouroanovo, 
Strumnica and Skoplje; and in Bulgaria, at Beccovitza, Klarmtza 
and Zagora. On or near the border there were only 11guerrilla 
bureaus," mobilization points, entrance and escape routes, 
and aid stations which could be quickly moved or camouflaged 
from the EVeS of observers. 212 
The Commission of Investigation, composed of representa-
tives from the eleven member-countries of the Security Council 
together with liaison officers from Albania, Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia arrived in Greece to begin its work on January 29, ' 
1947. The Commission concluded its assignment six months 
later and on June 27 submitted two reports: a majority report, 
and a minority report signed by the USSR and Poland. The 
majority report revealed the following: 213 
L-1_7 ••• that Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent 
Albania and Bulgaria have supported the guerrilla 
warfare in Greece. 
L-2_7 ••• there was in Yugoslavia an organization 
212This information was obtained by the author during his stay in 
Greece from two maps (no date) prepared by the intelligence section of 
the Greek General Staff entitled "Diagram showing the installations 
functioning for the aid of the Bandits in the neighboring countries" 
and "Entrance routes of Greek fugitives to the Northern Neighboring 
countries... Entrance routes of the Bandits from the northern neighboring 
Countries to Greece." 
213Report by the Commission of Investigation, Part III, op. cit., 
PP• 52-73. 
known as NOF (National Liberation Front) one of 
whose objectives was to detach Greek Macedonia 
from Greece and to incorpora1e 1t into the 
Federation of Yugoslavia ••• Lang/ that~.~ :tl:l_e, __ 
referericesnto-NOF 1s reiationship to the Macedonian 
movement was so numerous and so uniform as to 
leave little doubt on this point in the minds of 
the Commission ••• 
L-3_7 ••• the large number of incidents, the 
accusations and counter-accusations made by the 
governments against each other ••• is evidence of 
the strained relations between the countries • 
• 
L~_/ ••• there existed in Greece, especially in 
Athens and Saloniki, a considerable degree of 
political freedom, freedom of speech, press, and 
assembly, despite disturbed conditions. Indeed, 
of the four countries visited by the Commission, 
only in Greece did it hear witnesses_who criticized 
the policies of their government ••• Lthere wa~ ••• 
a considerable body of evidence to show that EAM had 
itself violated the Varkiza Agreement ••• Land that 
immediately after the liberation of Greece, the 
small Slav-speaking and Czamouriot minorities in 
Greek Macedonia and Epirus had been the victims 
of retaliatory excesses. As a result the members 
of these minorities who had not already left_ 
Greece with the Germans were forced to flee~ 
L-5_7 ••• the continued reiteration of Greece's 
claims against Bulgaria, and Bulgaria's claim 
to Western Thrace, after they had been rejected 
at the Peace.Conference, as well as Greece's 
claim against Albania, was a factor which tended 
to increase the tension between the countries. 
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The Soviet Union and Poland understandably refused to ~ 
sign the majority report which had es_sentially documented 
Greek charges. Instead, they submitted a minority report 
supporting their own conclusions, and even attempted, with 
limited success, to sway the members of the Commission who 
had agreed orally to the findings of the majority report. 
France, for one, especially plagued with a Communist problem 
of its own in the immediate post-war period, abstained from 
signing either report; and the Columbian and Belgian members 
of the Commission affixed their signatures to the majority 
report only after expressing the view that it was not for the 
Commission "to give any decision as to the possible responsi-
bility of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Y").lgoslav Governments." 
They emphasized, howeve·r, that "the numerous presumptions 
which fit with each other,~tend to substantiate the charges 
brought by Greece against her northern neighbors." Neverthe-
less, Soviet machinations and attempts to manipulate the 
Commission findings proved unsuccessful; the majority report 
~ad already revealed the true nature of the Greek problem, 
and the tie between the Greek guerrilla movement and the 
Balkan People's Republics now became a matter of record. Who 
now could deny the statement made by Ambassador Dendramis in 
rebutting the earlier Ukrainian charge that 
"if the representative of the Ukraine was as 
sincerely attached to the cause of peace as 
his words seem to indicate, all he had to do 
is to give some words of advice to the proper 
quarters. In that case I can assure him that 
incursions into Greek territory would stop 
immediately (and) order would be restored as if 
by magic and the concern of the Ukrainian 
representative for peace would be given complete 
satisfaction." 214 
During the summer of 1947 five Soviet vetoes muzzled dis-
cussions of the Greek question before the Security Council; 
this time, however, not only had the United States inherited 
British "responsibilities" in Greece as a result of the 
214u.N~Security Council Official Records, No.9, p. 239. 
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Truman Doctrine, but the United States now assumed leadership 
of the Greek problem in the United Nations and undertook to 
place the Greek question before the General Assembly where a 
simple majority rules and away from the power of the Soviet 
veto in the Security Council. 
On August 20, 1947 the United States representative filed 
a motion with the Secretariat requesting that 
"the Greek question be placedon the provi-
sional agenda of the next meeting of the 
Security Council in order that steps may be 
taken to enable the General Assembly to make 
recommendations with regard to that dispute.n215 
The Security Council, under the chairmanship of Gromyko began 
discussion of the American proposal one month later and put 
it to a vote on September 15, 1947. The vote was 9 to 2 in 
favor of the American motion, but the Chairman ruled that the 
question of asking the General Assembly to place a dispute on 
its agenda was "a matter of substance," and therefore could 
not be adopted since one of t~e permanent members (USSR) had 
voted against it. Mr. Johnson, the American representative, 
then proposed that the Greek question be "taken off the list 
of matters of which the Security Council is seized" and care-
fully choosing his words, added that "the Secretary-General 
be instructed to place all records and documents in the case 
215
rn accordance with Article 12 of the United Nations Charter, the 
General Assembly is forbidden to make recommendations with regard to a 
dispute which "the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dis-
pute or situation the functions assigned to it ••• unless the Security 
Council so requests." 
at the disposal of the General Assem?ly." Gromyko, failing 
to catch the implications of the American resolution, put the 
new American motion to a vote; once again the American pro-
posal received the same nine votes in favor and two against, 
but this time the vote had been taken on "a matter of procedure," 
and according to the rules of the Security Council the Soviet 
veto was ineffective. Thus the Greek question was taken off 
the agenda of the Security Council and moved to the General 
Assembly. 
The meaning of the American move was not fully understood 
until the opening day of the second session of the General 
Assembly when no less a person than the United States 
Secretary of State, George c. Marshall, placed the Greek 
question on its agenda. In his address to the Assembly on 
September 21, 1947 Secretary of State Marshall said: 
••• A supreme effort is required from us all if we 
are to succeed in breaking through the vicious 
circles of deepening political and economic crisis. 
That is why the United States has placed on the 
agenda of this Assembly the question of threats 
to the political independence and territorial 
integrity of Greece ••• 216 
The debate which followed lasted over a month. During the 
entire time the Soviet bloc continued its vilification of 
Greece, blaming Greece for the threatenting situation in the 
Balkans. Finally, on October 21 the General Assembly, by a 
vote of 40 to 6 (Soviet Bloc) with 11 abstentions, established 
216u.N.,Offjcjal Records of the Second Session of the General 
Assembly; Plenary Meetings, Vol. I, P• 20. 
the eleven nation Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) 
which included the Soviet Union and Poland. UNSCOB was 
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commissioned with the powers of "observation and conciliation" 
and the countries involved in the dispute were called upon 
to offer UNSCOB maximum cooperation and to settle their 
difference by peaceful means. 
Unlike their willingness to participate on the earlier 
Commission of Investigation, this time the Soviet bloc members 
refused to take any part in UNSCOB, obviously with ample 
reason. First, contrary to Communist maneuvers Soviet 
"cooperation" on the first Commission of Investigation had 
harmed the Communist cause; second, the Soviet and Polish 
members would undoubtedly be called upon to intercede between 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and UNSCOB and requested 
to ask the Balkan People's Republics to cooperate with the 
Committee; refusal to do so would indicate non-cooperation on 
the part of the Soviet bloc; third, the Greek guerrilla move-
ment under no circumstances could now be camouflaged as an 
uprising of persecuted Greek "democrats." 
The UNSCOB, composed of representatives from Australia, 
Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States began its work in 
Greece in November 1947.217 However, without Soviet participation 
217The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was with-
drawn officially in 1952. While in Greece, UNSCOB drew its material 
support from the Joint United States Military Aid Group, Greece, and at 
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UNSCOB's effectiveness in halting the disturbances on Greece's 
frontier was destined to fail and during nearly five years of 
operation UNSCOB added few new facts about the Greek problem. 
Its only significant accomplishment took place shortly after 
it arrived in Greece when it issued a warning calling all 
governments to refrain from extending recognition to the 
Communist "first Provisional Government of Free Greece" 
established on December 24, 1947 by General Harkos Vaphiades, 
lest such action complicate and worsen the dangerous situation 
in the Balkans. And finally, its investigation confirmed the 
findings of the earlier Committee of Investigation; however, 
its report was rejected by the chief Soviet delegate to the 
United Nations, Mr. Vyshinsky, who, indicative of the new turn 
of events following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, 
now denounced Greece as an American colony. Although the 
Soviets continued their campaign against the Greek Government 
and the "foreign intervention in Greece, and the new American 
imperialism" during 1948 and 1949, the attacks never approached 
their earlier fervor. During the autumn of 1948 the Greek 
question was considered again at the third session of the 
General Assembly. This time the leadership in presenting the 
Greek "Democratic" cause passed .from the Soviet Union to the 
Yugoslav representative. After the usual heated debate, 
the time of its dissolution, the author was a member of a Heport of 
Survey team conducting an investigation of United States property lost 
by UNSCOB members during operations in Greece. 
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three draft resolutions were voted on by the General Assembly 
on November 27, 1948. The first resolution was adopted by 
47 votes to 6, and primarily repeated the United Nations appeal 
to Greece's northern neighbors to cease aiding the guerrilla 
revolution against the Greek Government. The second resolu-
tion was adopted unanimously and called for a resumption of 
diplomatic relations and frontier conventions between Greece 
and the Balkan People's Republics. The third resolution, 
the most important from a humanitarian point of view, was 
adopted unanimously and concerned the problem of the Greek 
children who had been abducted from Greece. It recommended 
"the return to Greece of Greek children ••• when ••• their closest 
relative expresses a· wish to that effect;" however thousands 
of these Greek "children" still remain behind the Iron Curtain 
today. These children have since been used periodically as 
pawns in the Cold War by the Satellite States and returned to 
Greece when such action serves Soviet propaganda. Today, for 
example, Greece faces a new problem with these "children" and 
has quieted the clamor for their return. During their stay 
behind the Iron Curtain these same children, now in their late 
teens and early twenties, were given preferential treatment, 
taught trades, and schooled in Marxist studies, and upon their 
return to Greece have soon become disillusioned by the limited 
resources of Greece and in many cases have proven vocal 
advocates of the cause of "Socialism." 
The persistent Greek question again came before the United 
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Nations General Assembly on three occasions during April and 
May 1949. At these meetings the Soviet delegate indicated a 
willingness to come to an agreement on the Greek question for 
by now, the military outcome of the guerrilla war was a fore-
gone conclusion. The time had come for the Communists to 
retrench and salvage whatever possible from the rapidly dete-
riorating situation. Although Gromyko insisted that foreign 
troops should be withdrawn from Greece, he displayed an 
hitherto unknown inclination to agree on the control of 
Greece's northern frontier and the supervision of new elections. 
These Soviet "concessions," however, came too late. The Anglo-
American representatives, fully cognizant of the rapidly 
improving military situation in Greece shunned Gromyko 1s 
advances. They insisted that the basic issue in the Greek 
problem was the illegal support of Guerrilla forces by Greece's 
northern neighbors, and so long as the Balkan People's hepublics 
continued to assist the bandits, they intended to continue their 
aid to the Greek Government. The Truman Doctrine which sealed 
the fate of the Greek "Democratic" Army and saved Greece from 
Communism is the topic of the next chapter. 
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THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
On February 28, 1947 the United States Government dis-
closed that the British Government had announced on February 21, 
1947 that it could not render assistance to Greece beyond 
March 31, 1947. In addition, the British note which made the 
announcement was accompanied by a list of requirements for the 
Greek National Army. 
Contrary to popular belief, the British did not "pull out 
of Greece" as would be indicated by their pronouncement; in 
fact, the British position in Greece remained principally un-
changed. The United States was simply asked to underwrite 
the expenses incurred in rendering Greece economic and military 
assistance and share with Britain the task of offering the 
Greeks advice on how to put their house in order. 
At the time of the inception of the American military aid 
program to Greece under the Truman Doctrine no less than four 
British missions were engaged in training, supply and equip-
ment programs for the Greek Armed Forces as well as supervis-
ing the organizational and training work of the Greek security 
and police forces. These included the British Military Mission, 
the British Naval Mission, the Royal Air Force Mission, and a 
British Police and Prisons Mission which advised the Ministry 
of the Interior on matters concerning the civil police, 
gendarmerie, and the administration of prisons. In addition to 
these four missions, there was a force of some five thousand 
444 
British service and supply troops in Greece, who were remnants 
of General Scobie's original command and whose functions 
differed greatly from those of the British service missions. 
The British announcement of February 21 did not alter the 
status of the British missions in Greece. For the most part, 
they all remained active until April 1952 at which time the 
British Military and Royal Air Force Missions were deactivated. 
The British Police and Prisons Mission was also withdrawn from 
shortly thereafter; 
Greece I but the British Naval Mission, Greece (BNWG), which 
had operated in Greece in one capacity or another for over 
forty years, was withdrawn reluctantly some five years later 
upon the insistence of the Greek Government at the height of 
the Cyprus dispute. 
Even though training functions of the British Naval Mission 
passed to the u.s. Navy Section, Greece, (USNSG) after 1950, 
the British Naval Mission had remained in Greece reportedly 
for the purpose of observing Greek "usage" of British destroyers 
and lesser type vessels on loan to the Royal Hellenic Navy 
by Great Britain; 21~earer to the truth, however, was the fact 
that the BNWG had continued in Greece "to show the Flag," an 
indication of the continued importance attached to Greece in 
British Mediterranean planning. Needless to say the influence 
. 
218rhese vessels were supplied to Greece by Britain during and after 
the war on a loan basis and not as an outright transfer as was the case 
of U.S. ships given to the Greek navy under the American military assistance 
programs. In addition, the British Government had induced the Greek 
Government to underwrite the expenses of the BNM/G. 
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of the British Naval Mission upon the Royal Hellenic Navy was 
great. American training officers and advisory personnel 
upon their arrival in Greece found the Greek navy "the most 
British" of the Greek armed forces; Greek naval officers stated 
almost axiomatically "The English will never leave the 
Mediterranean (meaning Greece) but you Americans will leave 
some day, a fact which we must always keep in mind. 11219 
The operations of the British troops in Greece differed 
from those of the British services missions. Their sole 
military operations had been confined to the suppression of the 
insurrection of December 1944 and during 1945 some British 
units served as a para-police force to reinforce the local 
gendarmerie and police in the unsettled and remote areas of 
Greece. Otherwise, after the December revolt, their activity 
consisted mainly of garrison duty, the protection of British 
stores in Athens, Piraeus, and Saloniki, and relief and 
reconstruction work. Before the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) commenced operations in Greece 
219 The following is a striking illustration of this fact. After the 
departure of the British Military Air Force, and Police Missions in 1952, 
the continued presence of the BNM/G and its unnecessary drain on the Greek 
budget became repeatedly a topic of discussion in American military circles, 
especially since American dollars and assistance were making up the deficit 
in the Greek military budget. Therefore, theoretically, the expense of the 
BNM/G was being borne by Greece; but in reality the u.s. was underwriting 
it. However, invariably, each discussion on the theme of the BNM/G was 
concluded with the following observation: Conceded that the original 
mission of the BNM/G had passed to the USNSG; however, it would be diplo-
matically embarassing and well nigh militarily impossible for the U.S. to 
attempt to dislodge the BNM/G whose handful of officers and men. (under the 
command of a Rear Admiral no less who ranked at least equally W1th the 
Ctlief of the Joint U. s. Military Aid Groug, constituted the "last hold" 
which the British had on the Greek Armed Forces. 
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in April 1945, the British army was the principal agency 
engaged in relief and supplied the needy with the necessities 
of life. Elsewhere, it engaged in reconstruction work, prima-
rily in bridge building and restoring telephone and telegraph 
communications. 
Contrary to the propaganda attacks of KKE/EAM the presence 
of British forces in Greece exerted a stabilizing influence 
upon the Greek scene. Their presence constituted an element 
of encouragement for the majority of the Greek people who felt 
that as long as the British army remained in Greece foreign 
invasion from Greece's three Communist neighbors and a repeat 
of the Dekembriaka was most unlikely. In this respect, British 
forces in Greece worked against any plans which the Left might 
have entertained along these lines. At the same time, how-
ever, the presence of British forces in Greece, especially in 
provincial centers, had a moderating influence upon the Greek 
environment. They tended to allay the extremes of party passion, 
prevented Rightist elements from taking revenge upon the Left 
for the blood bath of December 1944, and had a restraining 
influence upon the Greek Governments. 
On March 4 the United States Department of State released 
the text of the Greek Government's urgent appeal to the United 
220 
States for "financial, economic and expert assistance," In 
his first announcement on the subject, the American Secretary 
of State stressed the primary importance of the Greek request, 
220see Appendix X, Request of Greek Government For Aid. 
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stating, "the problem itself was of far-reaching and trans-
cending significance," and an American mission was dispatched 
to Greece to investigate Greek needs prior to President 
Truman's special message to Congress. On March 12, 1947 he 
announced the celebrated doctrine which has ever since borne 
his name. The President statedf21 
"The very existence of the Greek State is today 
threatened by the terroristic activities of several 
thousand armed men led by Communists, who defy the 
Government's authority at a number of points, 
particularly along the border. Greece must have 
assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and 
self-respecting democracy... The United States must 
supply that assistance... There is no other country 
to which Greece can turn. 
"I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free people who are re-
sisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressures ••• We must take immeMate 
and resolute action ••• 
"It is necessary only to glance at a map to 
realize that the survival and integrity of the 
Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider 
situation. If Greece should fall under the control 
of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor 
Turkey would be immediate and serious. Confusion 
and disorder might well spread throughout the entire 
Hiddle East ••• and ••• would have a profound effect 
upon those countries in Europe whose people are 
struggling against great difficulties to maintain 
their freedom and their independence while they 
repair the damages of war ••• " 
Following the President's message the United States Congress 
immediately began to inquire into the implication of the 
President's message. It realized that the President had called 
221 Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, PP• 1980-
1981 (March 12, 1947). 
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for a revolution in traditional American diplomacy and inter-
national relations. 
The Congress debated the aid-to-Greece bill thoroughly. 222 
The President's hope that it would be passed before March 31 
was not realized. The Senate approved the legislation on 
April 22, and the House voted for it, 287 to 107, on May 9. 
The President signed the bill on May 22; and, in his words, 
"America served notice that the march of Communism would not 
be allowed to succeed by default." 223 
In the hearings Congress gave special attention to the 
extent of military aid insofar as utilization of American 
military personnel was concerned and the cost of such a 
military program. The War Department estimated that between 
ten and forty Army officers would be adequate for the task 
of determining the military requirements of Greece and of 
assuring that military assistance was effectively utilized. 
It also estimated that approximately $150,000,000 would be 
necessary to provide military supplies and equipment for the 
ground and air forces of Greece in order to combat the 
guerrilla menace. Both these estimates, however, fell far 
223H. S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, (New York, 1952) p •. 108. 
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below the program's final development. The American Military 
Mission which witnessed the successful conclusion of the Greek 
Guerrilla War in the latter half of 1949 numbered upwards of 
nearly five hundred officers and enlisted personnel, and the 
cost of defeating the Guerrilla effort alone, was far in ex-
cess of the original $300,000,000 authorized as the Greek. 
portion of Public Law 75, 80th Congress, An Act To Provide 
For Assistance To Greece and Turkey. 
While the Congress conducted extensive inquiry into the 
Greek-Turkish aid question, the War Department proceeded to 
develop the plans necessary for fulfilling its respcnsibilities 
in the event that the assistance program was written into the 
law. The Pentagon predicated its planning upon the list of 
needs of the Greek Army which had accompanied the British note 
of February 21, 1947 and a second list of requirements, dated 
March 14, from the United States Military Attach~ in Athens who 
had been directed to ascertain Greek military wants at the 
source. Eventually, a consolidated list of overall ground 
fouce requirements for the Greek army was brought back from 
London by a representative of the Plans and Operations Division, 
General Staff, United States Army on March 26; and ten days 
later, the War Department received a list of Greek Air Force 
requirements from the Royal Air Force Delegation in Washington. 
These two lists, consisting of ground and air force requirements, 
formed the working basis of War Department estimates for the 
Greek Turkish Aid Bill (S-938 and H.R. 2616). Consequently, by 
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the time the necessary enabling legislation was passed by the 
Congress, the required military items had been located in the 
United States and in the European and Mediterranean theatres 
and transportation plans laid to move the supplies to Greece. 
Unlike the situation in the remainder of Europe, where under 
the Marshall Plan American economic aid took precedence over 
military aid to combat the pressing threat of the Greek 
Corr~unists and their guerrilla forces. 
The Greek-Turkish aid legislation passed by the 80th Con-
gress and signed by President Truman embodied the central pro-
posal of the President in his message to Congress of March 12; 
and $4oo,ooo,ooo were appropriated "to carry out the provisions 
of the act." 224 The money was divided as follows: $300,000,000 
to be divided in equal parts for relief and military assistance, 
was allocated to Greece, and the remaining $100,ooo,ooo was 
consigned for aid to Turkey. 
Public Law 75, more commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, 
initiated a new phase in America's economic and military policy 
toward Europe. As in the wartime lend-lease programs, the 
United States once again undertook to assist countries whose 
independence it considered vital to America's security. The 
policy objectives announced by the President and incorporated 
in Public Law 75 had broad application and signified America's 
determination to hold the line against Communism in Europe 
and the beginning of the East-West post-war relationship best 
224 See Appendix XI, Public Law 75, 80th Congress. 
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described by the expression "The Cold War." 
After receipt of the British note of February 21, 1947, 
the War Department co~~enced discussions to decide the type 
of agency to administer the prospective military aid program. 
Initially, three recommendations were made and all of them 
presupposed that the British Military Missions would remain 
in Greece. The first envisioned the establishment of an 
American liaison section operating from the British Military 
Mission headquarters in Athens and serving as advisors at 
Greek army service depots. The many obstacles to such an 
arrangement, however, were obvious; most important being the 
difficulty of operating through a British headquarters. The 
second proposal envisaged the supervision of the military 
portion of the aid program through the Office of the u.s. 
, 
Military Attache in Athens. This, likewise, was deemed un-
satisfactory for the following reasons: first, the Office of 
the u.s. Military Attach~ was not organized to supervise such 
an aid program; second, the Attaches would be subjected to 
dealings with the Greek Government not especially conducive 
to 'the diplomatic functions" of their Office but, more 
important, this arrangement would make the U. s. Embassy in 
Athens susceptible to the charge of being the organ of a 
super government in Greece.225 
S_peculation on what type of agency should administer the 
225rn any case, the Communists insisted that the U.S. Embassy in 
Athens under Ambassador Grady and later under Puerifoy with General Van 
Fleet as "high commissioner" were pulling the strings ~hich operated the 
Monarcho-fascist puppet government of Greece. 
military aid program also included the possibility of a 
separate military group attached to the economic mission to 
administer the reconstruction and rehabilitation aspects of 
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the proposed aid program. Eventually, a modification of this 
idea evolved into a definite plan which contained provisions 
for a military group within the organization of a single over-
all American mission. 
On April 14, 1947 the United States Army Group, Greece 
(USAGG), a part of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), 
was organized in Washington. The table of organization of USAGG 
initially called for only seventeen officers, two enlisted men, 
and twenty-five civilians; and the group was designed to 
operate under the direction of the Chief of the ANAG, who, in 
turn, received his authority from the Secretary of State.226 
The USAGG was charged with determining supply requirements for 
the Greek National Army, the Gendarmerie, and the Royal Hellenic 
Air Force, and initiating the procurement of these items from 
British and American sources. In addition, to the Royal Hellenic 
Navy. A United States Navy Group, Greece (USMGG) was established 
soon afterwards to procure all other items of aid for the Greek 
navy. 
Although the functions of USAGG were not outlined under 
the provisions of Public Law 75, the War Department initially 
226
on July 10, 1947, Dwight Griswold, ex-governor of Nebraska, was 
approved as the Chief of AMAG. 
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restricted the USAGG to matters of supply since it believed 
that United States military assistance could be made effectively 
simply by furnishing the Greek Armed Forces with the supplies 
and equipment they needed to prosecute the war against the 
Guerrillas. Moreover, it insisted that no American military 
observers or advisors be stationed with Greek units in the 
field inasmuch as their presence there would create an im-
pression that the American officers were taking part in field 
operations against the Communists. The Chief, USAGG, was 
instructed to establish his headquarters in Athens and main-
, 
tain close liaison with the United States Military Attache 
in Athens. He was authorized to communicate directly with the 
War Department on strictly military matters. Finally, it was 
decided that the United Kingdom would continue as a procurement 
base for a portion of military supplies for the Greek Armed 
Forces (GAF) since the Greek forces had been primarily 
equipped with British arms and equipment and their organiza-
tional set-up, supply procedures, and training were also along 
British lines. It was felt that a sizeable equipment change 
would create a major shake-up in organization, training, and 
operating procedures, causing delay in operations against the 
Guerrillas. 227 An American Liaison Group was established in 
227 It was not until 1948-1949 and thereafter, that American weapons 
replaced worn out British equipment on any large scale. They consisted of 
American 75mm. pack howitzers, 60mm. and 8lmm. mortars, 57mm. and 75mm. 
recoiless rifles, 2.36 in. bazookas, etc. 
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London, England for the procurement and shipment of the 
necessary equipment and supplies from United Kingdom sources. 
Although the Liaison Group in London was not considered a 
part of the military missions to Greece Land Turkex/, its 
expenses were made chargeable to the aid funds provided under 
Public Law 75. 
In addition to preparing lists or requirements for the 
Greek Army and Air Force, the Army Group established two 
other objectives: one was to gear its organization to that of 
the British Military Mission and the corresponding Greek 
military supply units; the other was to determine the adequacy 
of Greek supply facilities prior to the arrival of military 
supplies and equipment under the aid program. The operation 
of the United States military aid program was thus clearly 
delineated. The USAGG was to concentrate directly on military 
supply matters, operating within the administration of a single 
American Mission. The basic task of the War Department was 
to assist the Greek military, by furnishing it with supplies 
and equipment, so that it could restore internal order and 
security and enable the vital processes of reconstruction in 
the war-ravaged country to proceed unhampered as envisaged in 
Public Law 75. 
The relationship between the Chief of the American 
Mission for Aid to Greece and the Chief of the United States 
Army Group and between the State and War Departments in respect 
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to the War Department's activities in fulfillment of its 
responsibilities in the Greek Aid Program under the Act of 
May 22, 1947 was outlined in the "Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Department of State and the Department of War." 228 
Other pertinent agreements on various phases of operation of 
the United States Mission activities in Greece included the 
following: "Note of the Greek Government to the United States, 
June 15, 1947, regarding measures the Government of Greece 
will take toward rehabilitation ";2,29 "Agreement on Aid to Greece, 
June 20, 1947, Between Greece and the United States"; 230 and 
the "Exchange of Notes between the Govern.'Tlents of the United 
States and the United Kingdom Regarding Procurement for the 
Greek Aid Program. 11231 
While the Army and Navy Groups of AMAG had been originally 
established for the express purpose of determining the supply 
requirements of the Greek Armed Forces, both groups soon be-
came involved in training programs to insure that American 
equipment was serviced and used properly. Instruction pro-
grams for the Greek Army Signal, Engineering, and Ordinance 
services were inaugurated by the USAGG Training Section and the 
228 See Appendix XII, "Memorandtun of Understanding Between the 
Department of State and the Department of War Regarding the Greek Aid 
Program. 
229 See Appendix XIII. 
230 See Appendix XIV. 
231 See Appendix XV. 
456 
three principal training establishments, the Signal Training 
Center at Haidari, the Technical Services Training Center at 
Athens, and the School of Military Engineering at Loutraki, 
had American technical advisors attached to their staffs. 
Later, the USAGG assigned American officers to the combat 
training centers and combat schools of the Greek Army. These 
included the infantry training centers, the .·heavy weapons 
training centers and the infantry, artillery, and armored 
schools. However, the BMM/G, for a time, continued to advise 
at the General Staff level the Greek Army training directorates 
of these installations. Finally the USAGG became involved 
in strategic, tactical, and even political planning since 
these proved essential components of the many-sided problem 
of how to transform the GrBEk Army and Navy into a more 
effective fighting force against the Communist guerrillas. 
Consequently, the United States Army and Navy Groups found 
themselves evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, 
appraising Greek operational plans and operations in order to 
determine if American equipment was being effectively used, 
and making recommendations for the personnel strength ceilings 
of the Greek armed services commensurate with their assigned 
tasks and equipment on hand, or on requisition. At the same 
time, the strength ceilings of the Greek Armed Forces involved 
the USAGG in the draft since the draft provided a steady influx 
of young men to fill vacancies caused by casualties or discharges 
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from duty because of age or other factors. But the draft had 
its own economic and political implications, in themselves, 
important problems of national policy. Therefore, although 
its primary responsibility was to supply the Greek Armed 
Forces with material and insure its effective utilization 
against the Guerrillas, the American Military Mission soon 
found itself burdened with decisions far beyond the functions 
of the original logistical staffs. 
In order to relieve the Army and Navy Groups of this work 
load, the Chief of the American Mission requested that the 
Army Group be augmented by a small planning staff; and a three-
member plans and policies staff become a part of the USAGG 
headquarters in October 1947. However, this meager augmentation 
proved insufficient to cope with the increased demands placed 
upon USAGG, resulting from requests from the Greek General 
Staff (GGS) for additional training instruction in the American-
type weapons and material with which the Greek Armed Forces 
advice 
were being re-equipped and operational and logistical/in order 
to cope with increased Guerrilla activity and operations. 
Consequently, it became manifest that not only would the 
military program of the AMAG have to be given priority over 
the economic side of the American Mission in Greece, but 
the formulation of plans and operations jointly by the Anglo-
American military missions and the Greek General Staff was 
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war against 
the guerrillas who now had emerged fully as the Democratic 
232 Liberation Army (DAS). 
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By a directive, the u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting 
under authority of Public Law 75, 80th Congress, on December 31, 
1947 established the Joint United States Military Advisory 
and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) to cope with the new situation at 
the USAGG. Major General William G. Livesay, Commanding 
General of USAGG, in addition to his USAGG duties, was designated 
Director of JUSMAPG under the Chief of the American Mission 
for Aid to Greece but was authorized direct communication to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on military matters 
in order to expedite his mission. The JUSMAPG itself was 
organized into three sections: Army, Navy, and Air. The 
Assistant Director of JUS~aPG was the head of the Army Section 
while the Chiefs of the three sections, Army, Navy, and Air 
comprised the Executive Committee, JUSMAPG to advise the 
232The formation of guerrilla b~nds into the DAS occurred as follows: 
Phase I, Jan.-June 1946, large scale .Withdrawal to the mountains and to 
Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria of former ELAS members wanted for criminal 
11activites11 committed during the occupation and revolution not covered 
by the amnesties. Generally speaking these bands were isolated and located 
for the most part in the mountains of northern Greece near the Greek 
frontier. Phase II, July-Dec. 1946, the fostering of increased lawlessness 
and raids upon governmental outposts in provincial centers by "influences" 
- foreign, political, autonomous - and the unification of guerrilla bands 
into two groups - NOF, a Slav organization, and EAM - ~~th distinct spheres 
of influence. NOF established itself in the frontier areas and established 
a headquarters at Aetomilitsa in the Grammos mountains. Phase III, Dec. 
1946-June 1947, the autonomous, national, and foreign influences among the 
guerrilla bands submerged by the formation of DAS under control of KKE and 
military command of Markos Vaphiades, self-styled "General" of the 
Guerrilla Democratic Army and first President of the Communist "Provisional 
Democratic Government of Free Greece" formed on December 24, 1947. 
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Director on all matters affecting the operations of JUSMAPG 
and the Greek Armed Forces. In addition, the JUSMAPG head-
quarters in Athens included four advisory staff sections, 
composed of army, navy, and air force officers, that rendered 
advice to the Greek Armed Forces on matters of Personnel, 
Intelligence, P.lans and Operations, and Logistics. 
An important new feature of the JUSMAPG was the American 
advisory teams which were assigned to Greek units in the field. 
During the period of operations against the Guerrillas a total 
of eleven American detachments were assigned by JUSMAPG to 
the Field Army Headquarters, Corps Headquarters, and each of 
the seven Greek Army field divisions. 'I'hese "field detachments" 
suffered all the privation of the units to which they were 
assigned •233 'I'he teams operated in the field serving as "eyes 
and ears" for the Director of the JUSMAPG and at the same time 
rendered Greek unit commanders on-the-spot operational and 
logistical advice. 'I'he field teams were specifically instructed 
not to command Greek troops or direct front line operations 
against the Guerrillas; it was emphasized that their mission 
233
rnnumerable Greek Combat Officers approached the author relating 
their high esteem for individuals who served with the field detachments, 
stating that it would be an honor "to serve" with them again. PossiblY 
as front-line ambassadors, these field detachments, more than anything 
else, gained the confidence of the Greek military, and eradicated early 
misconceptions prevalent among Greek officers relative to the military 
ability of American soldiers. 
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was solely advisory. 234 
A problem which confronted the JUSMAPG in the execution 
of its mission was its relationship with the BMM/G in pro-
blems with the Greek General Staff. Both JUSHAPG and BMWG 
realized that op~rational assistance would be effective only 
if the British and American missions agreed beforehand on 
advice given the Greek Armed Forces. In addition, this would 
keep the Greek General Staff from playing the JUSMAPG against 
the BNM/G. 
In an effort to preclude any division of opinion, the 
JUSMAPG and the BMM/G informally agreed that the primary con-
cern of JUSMAPG would be logistics and operations, while the 
British would continue to furnish advice on organization and 
training. Furthermore, the Chiefs of the two missions agreed 
to closely coordinate their planning in matters affecting the 
Greek Armed Forces so that unified directives and advice would 
always be presented to the Greek high comr,tand. On the whole, 
both missions cooperated closely in assisting the Greek forces 
to eliminate the bandits. 
234only once during the operation of the field detachments between 
1948-1949 was there an attempt by Allied observers to charge American 
officers with actually conducting operations against the bandits. In 
February 1949, a United Press correspondent in Saloniki filed a sto:y . 
stating that a JUSMAPG officer ha.d personally "led" a Greek army unlt ln 
an attack against the Guerrillas that has shelled Saloniki. The U.P. story 
stirred up protest in the United States where it had received wide circula-
tion. The officer concerned protested that he had not led the units and 
that he had acted only in his authorized capacity as advisor to the Greek 
commander. In the end the U.P. correspondent admitted that his story had 
given the lJirrong impression and that he had intended to convey the idea that 
the American officer has "accompanied" the unit rather than "led" it. 
On February 24, 1948 Major General James A. Van Fleet, 
replaced Major General William G. Livesay as the Commanding 
General of the USAGG and Director of JUSNAPG; and six weeks 
later, Brigadier General Reuben E. Jenkins joined General 
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Van Fleet's staff as Assistant Director. These two fine 
American officers were later joined on September 15, 1948 by 
Mr. Harry F. Grady who occupied the position of United States 
Ambassador to Greece and succeeded Mr. Dwight Griswold as 
Chief of AMAG.235 On January 21, 1949 Field Marshal A. Papagos 
assumed command of the Greek Armed Forces. Working harmonious!~ 
the triumvirate of Van Fleet, Grady, and Papagos was "to 
quarterback" the American military aid program in Greece to 
its successful conclusion. 
'I'he activation of JUSMAPG on the eve of 1948 found the 
Greek National Army and the National Defense Corps (a home-
guard organization used to replace the regular army in quiet 
sectors), influenced by Greek politicians, deployed in static 
defense positions guarding the centers of population against 
guerrilla attacks while the Communist guerrillas, numbering 
about 22,000, almost at random attacked and looted the isolated 
regions of the country. As a result, refugees by the thousands 
fled their farms which not only opened the interior to the 
guerrillas but caused a serious food and sustenance problem 
235Mr. Griswold had served as Chief of AMAG since its inception 
in July 1947. 
236 to an already disrupted economy. 
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The Guerrillas made capital g~in of the Nationalist 
Forces' lack of aggressiveness and static defense. They force-
fully abducted large numbers of recruits and pillaged the 
countryside. They were able to establish strongholds all along 
Greece's northern frontiers at Grammos, Vitsi, Kaimaktchalan, 
Boz Dog, Khaidon, and Evros and by the close of 1947 approxi-
mately 6500 Guerrillas, solidly entrenched in the Vitsi area 
of Northern Grec:Ce along the Albani;:n frontier, controlled 
four hundred square miles of Greek territory. These Guerrillas 
climaxed their activity for the year with a major operation 
in the nearby Zaghoria-South Grammos region in order to capture 
the city of Konitsa as a capital for their recently proclaimed 
"Government of Free Greece." Their attack which approached 
success was only thwarted by the heroic defense of a GNA divi-
sion after two weeks of savage fighting. Elsewhere they 
controlled the undefended areas in the Olympus, Agrafa, Roumeli, 
Othris, and Parnassos regions of Central Greece and disrupted 
communications in the Peloponesus by commanding the principal 
mountain ranges of southern Greece. As a result, air travel 
was the only safe means of transportation in Greece after 1947; 
so much so that between 1948-1949 Greece, reportedly, was the 
most air-minded country in the world. 
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nuring the Guerrilla War, it was estimated that approximately 
750,000 people fled to such cities as Athens, Piraeus, Saloniki, Ioannina, 
and Kalamata 
In addition to providing the Greek forces with operational 
and logistical advice, the JUSMAPG called upon the Greek 
General Staff to institute three important programs which en-
tailed retraining for all Greek Army units, the revitalization 
of the Greek Army and the NDC Home Guard Units, and the arming 
of civilians. 
At the time JUSMAPG was activated, the only training being 
conducted in the Greek Army was individual soldier training, 
and even this was unsatisfactory. Individual training, a 
responsibility of BMM/G, had not only been hindered by a 
shortage of advisory British personnel and qualified Greek 
instructors but the necessity for training recruits at great 
speed in order to have them join units in the field. As a 
result, training and coordinated field exercises by Greek army 
Lnits, so necessary in molding an effective fighting force, had 
not been conducted and this deficiency repeatedly contributed 
to the bogging down of Greek army operations against the 
Guerrillas. Consequently, when Greek operations again faltered 
in the summer of 1948 because of the lack of training, the 
JUSMAPG decided to take immediate corrective action to revitalize 
the training of the Greek Army. During this period the Greek 
Army was to execute only holding-type operations in order to 
permit as many units as possible to undergo the training. 
On July 1, 1948, a JUSMAPG Training Section was established 
to work in conjunction with BMM/G training officers in reorient-
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ing the Greek training program. Under the new training program 
the following important changes were made: first, all Greek 
Army training was conducted along American methods and doctrines; 
next, aggressive unit and field training was instituted with 
particular emphasis on infantry training and tactics; third, 
divisional units, as they could be spared from operations, under-
went division training; fourth, additional American training 
supervisors were assigned to important Greek Army training in-
stallations such as the Infantry School Command Training Center 
and the Infantry Heavy Weapons Training Center; and fifth, 
American advisors instructed and supervised the training of 
GNA units which had been re-equipped with American semi-
automatic rifles, mortars, automatic weapons, and recoiless 
rifles. As a result of the new training programs, the fighting 
ability of the individual Greek combat soldier and combat unit 
was brought to the level necessary to prosecute the war. 
The second major task faced by the JUSMAPG was the 
revitalization of the Army and NDC home guard. 
In 1948, the Greek Army was made up of older men while 
the NDC was composed of old reservists; and JUSMAPG made the 
following recommendations to the Greek General Staff in order 
to revitalize the fighting quality of the Greek Armed Forces: 
first, suspend releases of draftees or reservists unless they 
were members of prewar conscription classes; second, battle-
weary men of the Greek Army not eligible for release take the 
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place of reservists in the National Defense Corps; and third, 
the Greek National Army be reinforced by recruits from the train-
ing centers. 
The third major problem faced by JUSMAPG and the Greek 
General Staff was to devise an adequate defense system for the 
Greek countryside against marauding Guerrilla bands. The arm-
ing civilians was not only of military significance, but was 
necessary to relieve a serious economic and political condition. 
The flight of hundreds of thousands of peasants and townspeople 
from rural to urban areas as a result of the guerrilla war dis-
rupted the life of the cities which had already been plagued 
by a serious shortage in water, housing, food, fuel, and faced 
with severe unemployment as a result of the disrupted economy 
caused by World War II. The influx of these refugees to the 
cities compounded an already serious situation and, moreover, 
left the food producing sectors of the country vacant, causing 
a grave food shortage and placed large areas of the country 
at the mercy of the Communists. Last, but not least, the 
flight of refugees precluded the initiation of any country-
wide reconstruction effort. 
At the time of the activation of JUSMAPG, the defense of 
villages was the responsibility of the Greek Army, National 
Defense Corps, and HAY-MAD units ragged "minute-men 11 who were 
entrusted with the defense of their respective comnunities. 
Unlike the NDC units, the MAY-MAD was not subject to military 
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discipline nor paid for services and proved extremely 
ineffective in defending rural areas against the Guerrillas. 
The ineffectiveness was traced to two reasons: first, the 
MAY-MAD was armed mostly with captured German and Italian weap-
ons for which ammunition was extremely limited or in many 
instances no longer available; second, not subject to military 
control, MAY-MAD members were not only unable to carry out a 
unified defense of their villages but more important, in many 
cases, used their weapons in revenge against captured 
Guerrillas or Communist sympathizers which increased the 
fratricidal aspects of the Guerrilla War and caused new out-
breaks of disorder. In order to combat this situation, JUSMAPG 
recommended that the MAY-MAD units be disbanded and in their 
stead a new organization known as "Home Guards .ft'or Village 
Defense" be organized whose strength was to be limited to 
14,000 men armed with rifles and sub-machine guns and supplied 
with ammunition, all accounted for in the same manner as 
weapons in the Greek Army. Lastly the formation of units had 
to be approved beforehand by the Greek General Staff and each 
unit placed under the command of an Army officer. 
The formation of the new Home Guard units took place during 
the latter part of 1948 and in February and Y~rch 1949, the 
Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece approved the 
purchase of an additional 15,000 British rifles for the arming 
of refugees to be rehabilitated to their villages. The Village 
~7 
Home Guards soon helped to correct the unbalance in the Greek 
economy caused by the streams of refugees who had flocked to 
the cities. 
Prior to the establishment of JUSMAPG, the Greek Army had 
conducted no major operations of note against the Guerrillas. 
It had proven so deficient in the art of tactics and strategy 
that the initiative had passed to the Guerrilla Democratic 
Army. In many cases, the Army had ignored the principle of 
tactical unity and operations were fought on a piecemeal basis 
and, on the request of politicians, often times was forced to 
detach units from their parent unit in combat in order to pro-
tect certain areas. It was obvious that this situation could 
not long endure and JUSMAPG set out to convince the Greek 
General Staff that the initiative had to be wrested from the 
enemy, the urgency for large-scale coordinated operations 
against Guerrilla Army units conducted systematically in order 
of priority of the areas to be cleared, and necessity of 
eliminating political interference in tactical situations. 
By the middle of 1948, JUSMAPG decided that the Greek armed 
forces were ready to assume the initiative and for the first 
ti~e since the outbreak of the Guerrilla War Nationalist forces 
went over on the offensive in sustained calculated operations. 
These included a) Operation DAWN, Roumeli, April-Nay; b) 
Operation CROWN, Grammos, June-August; and c) Operation VITSI, 
in August-November. Although these attacks met initial success, 
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each operation soon bogged down after the Guerrillas were able 
either to cut off the battle and elude pursuing Greek army 
troops or fight the Greek Army to a standstill from their 
heavily defensive mountain positions. Nevertheless, at the end 
of these operations, known Communist casualties for the closing 
months of 1948 were the highest to that time, and not including 
Guerrilla wounded, numbered upwards of 10,000 men. These 
operations proved that, given the proper leadership and direction, 
the Greek Army could seize the initiative. These operations 
also proved, however, that notwithstanding these casualties, 
the Guerrillas could still field an army of over 20,000 fighting 
men, a situation in which Greece's neighbors played no mean 
role. 
Greece's three northern neighbors continued to provide 
assistance to the Guerrilla forces and offer them sanctuary 
when pursued by Greek units. These same guerrilla forces, re-
equipped and reorganized recrossed into Greece at a later date 
elsewhere on the frontier to harass nationalist outposts and 
isolated villages, or join other guerrilla units as was the case 
when elements of the Guerrilla force which had taken part in 
Operation Crown in the Grammos Mountains and had escaped into 
Albania turned up in the Vitsi area during Operation Vitsi. 
Operations Dawn, Crown, and Vitsi had one unexpected and 
lesser know result. The outcome of these operations added new 
ammunition to the growing split in the leadership of the Greek 
Guerrillas caused by the Tito-Cominform rift and induced a 
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major shake-up in the Guerrilla Command which, in turn, hastened 
the destruction of the Democratic Army and the end of "Round 
Three." 
The defeat of the Communist Guerrilla forces in their 
Grammos stronghold in August 1948 caused discontent within the 
Communist high command. General Markos who until that time, 
had been the hero and commander of the Democratic Army, was 
accused by Zachariades of cowardly conduct for refusing to 
prosecute the war against the 11l4onarcho-fascist" forces. 
Moreover, Zachariades held Markos personally responsible for 
the recent defeats suffered by the Democratic Army. Markos 
laid himself open to the purge when, in rebuttal to Zachariades, 
he issued critical statements against the leadership of the 
KKE politburo, where, unlike the DA, Zachariades held complete 
sway. 
The 4th Plenary Session of the KKE held following the 
Grammos guerrilla defeat, laid the groundwork for the removal 
of Markos. At this session, Zachariades openly blamed the 
Grammos failure entirely on poor military direction and 
instituted proceedings against the military leaders of the 
Democratic Army. Subsequently, Markos' top lieutenants were 
either executed, exiled to the Peoples' Democracies, or given 
lesser assignments; but Markos himself, remained the nominal 
Army leader since he was still popular with the troops. The 
feud between Markos and Zachariades continued unabated through-
out the remainder of 1948, and in November Markos published a 
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circular severely criticizing Zachariades' command of the KKE 
and political interference in the strategy of the war. It was 
not announced until February 8, 1949 that Markos had been re-
placed by the old-time Cooonunist I. Ioannides, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Democratic Army. In addition, the ex-Guerrilla 
chieftan had been forced to lay down the premiership of the 
"Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece." 237 
The first step in the formal removal of Markos from the 
leadership of the Guerrilla Army proved defense against 
Nationalist attacks of the guerrilla emplacements in the Vitsi 
mountains under Ioannides and Zactariades. Subsequent Guerrilla 
attacks against the towns of Kardhitsa, Sofadhes, Edhessa, and 
Naousa and Guerrilla re-entry into the Grammos area between 
October 1948 and the end of the year and the capture of the 
key towns of Naousa and Karpenision in January 1949 were 
announced to the Democratic Army as further proof that Markos 
was not indispensible. By January 1949 KKE political leader-
ship decided that the Guerrilla Army was sufficiently indoc-
trinated to accept the final removal of Markos. The 5th Plenary 
Session of the KKE held on January 30-31, 1949 expelled Markos 
and his remaining leading lieutenants from the KKE. The 
announcement was made, as noted earlier, one week later. 
The announced displacement of Markos from the guerrilla 
high command in February caused considerable unrest within the 
237At the time, the Guerrilla Radio, quoting what purported to 
be "an open letter" from Markos, announced that Markos had been relieved 
of his offices for "reasons of ill health." 
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guerrilla rank and file. The KKE leadership had misjudged 
Markos' popularity for notwithstanding attempts to discredit 
Narkos in the eyes of the Democratic Army it was estimated that 
approximately 70% of the bandits were still Markos followers 
whereas only 30% were supporters of the Zachariades line. 
However, as in the wont of Communist organization, mere 
numbering meant little, if anything, for the 30 percent following 
Zachariades included the leadership of the KKE and die-hard 
Communists who dominated the Democratic Army. 
As if the crises in the Greek Communist Party and the 
Democratic Army caused by the rift between Zachariades and 
Markos was not enough, on March 1, 1949 "Radio Free Greece" 
broadcast the resolution passed by the Second Plenum of the 
NOF Central Council on February 2, 1949, Lattended by 
Zachariades and Karagiorges, com:'tanding the guerrillas in the 
Peloponnesos and the former editor of the Communist organ 
RIZOSPASTI§/ to build a "Front of Macedonian National Libera-
tion" into which all Macedonians-Greek, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, 
Albanian, and even Turks - were to be brought into an 
11autonomous" state under Cominform auspices. The Communists 
later (April) went so far as to announce the "government" for 
the new Macedonian Piedmont which included two non-Greeks 
described as Slavo-Macedonians. 
The rift within the Greek Communist Party which continued 
between July 1948 and February 1949 was evidenced openly as a 
policy struggle between Markos on the one hand and Zachariades 
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and Ioannides on the other. Markos was charged with chauvinism 
by Zachariades because he opposed the separation of Macedonia 
from Greece and entertained dilatory tactics because he con-
sidered foreign aid indispensible for guerrilla success, and 
reportedly objected to continued devastation without assurance 
of ultimate victory. On the other hand, Zachariades had 
insisted, if need be, the Greek guerrillas must fight alone. 
He demanded unconditional allegiance to the Cominform line and 
had also contrived in the proposed formation of an "autonomous" 
Macedonian Republic under Bulgarian auspices and mainly at 
Greek expense. He had chosen I. Ioannides to supercede Markos 
and Ioannides, a senior member of the KKE and an old inter-
nationalist with a sense of devoted loyality to Moscow, reported-
ly had gone so far as to agree 
"in July 1943 with a Bulgarian Communist named 
Dushan Daskalov to carve a Macedonian State 
out of Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav territory 
after the war and 2i~corporate it directly into the Soviet Union. j 
Needless to say, the Zachariades-Markos dispute and the open 
assumption of control of the Guerrilla War by KKE Russophiles 
and Bulgarophiles who submitted if not admitted to the Slav 
conspiracy against Greece not only split the unity of the 
Democratic Army but had a magnifying effect upon Greek national 
unity. At last the Communist conspiracy in Greece had exposed 
itself as an instrument of international Communism which placed 
238H. F. Armstrong, Tito and Goliath, (New York, 1951), P• 190. 
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the interests of the Soviet Union and its satellites above those 
of Greece. Guerrilla propaganda which had formerly been 
anxious to portray the movement as a spontaneous manifestation 
of the Greek people, now boasted openly that it had received 
the wholehearted support of the "peoples democracies." 
The final detention and disposition of Markos could be 
attributed to three reasons: first, Markos' opposition to the 
Guerrilla political leadership's grandiose idea for a new 
order of battle based on all-out warfare in lieu of guerrilla 
activity; second, Markos' alleged friendship with Tito, from 
whom he had received aid and comfort, and who now had been 
expelled from the Cominform;239 lastly, Markos 1 reported un-
favorable reaction to the dec~sion of the 5th Plenary Conference 
of the KKE to form the foundation of an independent Macedonia 
at the expense of Greece which made him subject to charges 
of national deviationism. 
Markos had correctly estimated that a guerrilla army is 
no match for regular forces in pitched battle. 
With the assumption of command of the Democratic Army by 
Ioannides, the Greek Guerrillas, forsaking guerrilla tactics 
strategy 
and V~rkos'/that a Guerrilla army is no match for regular forces 
in pitched battle, attacked the major centers of population 
239Ibid., PP• 190-194, All too much has been made of Markos' 
purported friendship with Tito as the reason for his purge. It should 
be noted that Markos was not finally purged until eight months after 
Yugoslavia's ouster from the Cominform; and, least known is the fact that 
Tito did not close the sanctuary which Yugoslavia offered the Greek 
guerrillas until June 1949, a full year after his ouster from the Cominform. 
in Greece and extended their operations simultaneously from 
the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier down through the middle of 
Greece to Karpenision. In February 1949, the Guerrillas even 
came out of the hills and the interior to shell Saloniki. In 
each instance, except for the shelling at Saloniki and the 
attack on Florina, the Guerrillas were forced to abandon their 
gains only after they had occupied and sacked the towns and 
inflicted casualties upon the population as well as abducting 
hundreds of civilians to reinforce Guerrilla ranks. For 
example, from December 11 - 13, 1948 Guerrilla units occupied 
Kardhitsa, population about 16,500 and forced 980 recruits, 
mainly teenagers, to accompany them; the Guerrillas occupied 
Naousa from January 11 - 15, 1949, population 12,000, and 
before evacuating the town sacked it almost completely, 
murdered 80 persons including the mayor, and abducted 600 per-
sons for their army; from January 20 - February 9, 1949, after 
occupying Karpenision, a town of less than 10,000 people, for 
a little more than two weeks, the guerrillas abducted 1,300 
civilians and took 50 hostages~4°After evacuating Karpenision 
24°The first JUSMAPG casualty occurred on January 21, 1949 
during the guerrilla attack on Karpenision when a Royal Hellenic Air Force 
plane in which Lt. Col. Selden R. Edner, USAF, was riding as a passenger 
was shot down on the outskirts of to~~. The American officer had been 
aboard the plane, piloted by a Greek Air Force lieutenant, as an unarmed 
observer performing duties as a member of JUSVillPG. Col. Edner's multilated 
body was recovered by an American investigation party on February 9, 
after the guerrillas had evacuated Karpenision. The investigation re-
vealed that Col. Edner had survived the crash only to be murdered by the 
guerrillas. 
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the Guerrillas moved south with the intention of attacking 
in turn Agrinion, Amfissa, Levadhia, and Lamia "to recruit" 
10,000 civilians for the Democratic Army. For awhile it 
appeared that the new Guerrilla tactics would be crowned with 
success; however, the bold decision of the Guerrilla Army 
to risk open battle with the Greek Armed Forces resulted in 
its downfall six months later. The Greek General Staff with 
JUSMAPG assistance had prepared plans for three operations to 
meet the new Guerrilla tactics and remove the armed Communist 
menace from Greece. 
The first operation, labelled Operation Pigeon, was to be 
conducted in the Peloponnesos where guerrilla raids and 
sabotage had started in July 1946 and had grown increasingly 
by 1948,241 cturing which time the Nationalist forces concerned 
themselves with the more salient problem of northeznGreece. 
The second operation, dubbed Rocket entailed engaging the 
Guerrilla forces of Central Greece; and the third called Torch, 
involved an all out assault into the Vitsi-Grammos mountain 
guerrilla stronghold. 242 
241rhe estimated numerical strength of guerrilla forces and 
sympathizers in the Peloponnesos on the eve of Operation Pigeon was as 
follows: armed troops, 2600; service troops, 600; "self-defense" and 
"popular civil guard" forces, 2500; suspected civilian Communist or 
Communist sympathizers, 5000. Total 10,700. 
242rhe British were violently opposed to this plan of attacki 
they insisted that the operation should proceed from North to South and 
repeatedly challenged the wisdom of the JUSMAPG plan. General Van Fleet, 
however, remained adamant. In the end, the American plan won out if for 
no ther reason than the fact that Van Fleet was in a position to order it 
since as the Director of the JUSMAPG he controlled "the purse strings" of 
the military aid program to Greece. 
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The strategic plans of the Greek General Staff had called 
for an all out clearing operation in the Peloponnesos in the 
fall of 1948, but the operation had been postponed on account 
of the unexpected guerrilla resistance in the Vitsi area. How-
ever, JUSMAPG insisted that the Nationalist Forces again turn 
their attention to the Peloponnesos, especially since severe 
winter snows precluded new operations in northern Greece. 
JUSMAPG emphasized that a successful campaign in the Peloponnesos 
would be a boost to the Greek economy since it would permit 
large numbers of refugees to return to their homes and 
simultaneously provide a sound basis for a spring offensive on 
the Greek mainland in 1949. 
The plan for Operation Pigeon was ready on December 15, 
1948 and January 3, 1949 was set as the opening date; however, 
the preliminaries began on December 19 and consisted of the 
following: (a) preliminary operations designed to clear the 
coastal area bordering the Gulf of Corinth of guerrillas in 
order to secure the rear areas and lines of communication of 
Nationalist forces and at the same time cut off the guerrillas 
in southern Greece from those in Sterea Hellas; (b) a tight 
sea blockade of the Peloponnesos by the Greek Navy to prevent 
reinforcement, resupply or retreat of the guerrilla forces by 
sea; (c) security measures to eliminate the local guerrilla 
civilian intelligence system. Consequently, on the eve of 
military operations, the gendarmerie and the town police in 
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a surprise move, seized every known or suspected guerrilla 
sympathizer in the Peloponnesos. In this manner nearly 4000 
individuals suspected of being guerrilla collaborators were 
taken into custody and interned at island camps. This drastic 
move was undoubtedly extra-legal and unfair to many persons. 
Needless to day, this "round-up" did not win the Greek 
Government much favor in liberal circles at home or abroad. 
But it did accomplish its purpose of breaking up the elaborate 
intelligence and sabotage network which, heretofore, the 
guerrillas had use so successfully to impede Nationalist 
operations. 
On the eve of operations in the Peloponnesos two major 
changes took place in the Greek Government which facilitated 
the Nationalist victory over the guerrillas in 1949: first, in 
January the veteran Liberal Party leader Sophoulis established 
a new government with a broad political base. The Sophoulis 
government included representatives from the Liberals, Populists, 
National Unionists and New Parties, and received an overwhelming 
vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies which inspired 
widespread public support and cooperation for the new govern-
ment; second, one of the first acts of the Sophoulis government 
was to recall General A. Papagos from retirement on 
January 21 , t949, appoi.A:ting him Commander-in-Chief of the 
Greek Armed Forces. By royal decree Papagos was given extensive 
powers which authorized him to conduct the war as he saw fit 
and prevented meddling by politicians, government, and Palace 
officials. 
Overnight the Commander-in-Chief accomplished many of the 
recommendations which JUSHAPG had long advocated. In one 
sweep Papagos eliminated political interference in the prose-
cution of the war, enforced much needed discipline in the 
senior ranks ·of the Army, on-the-spot retired or discharged 
incompetent and insubordinate officers, laid stress upon 
mobility and aggressiveness, ordered the severest penalty for 
stragglers and deserters, and insisted upon the whole-hearted 
acceptance of the JUSMAPG-sponsored training program. Finally, 
the future Field Marshal stated to General Van Fleet that he 
wished to maintain a closer relationship with JUSMAPG than had 
existed under the previous leadership of the Greek Armed 
Forces. Thus the stage was set for the successful conclusion 
of the war. The effect of the new Greek leadership upon the 
conduct of the war was quickly in evidence. By March 1949 
forced recruiting by the Communists for all of Greece dropped 
from a high of 1848 in December 1949 to an all-time low of 
319. Operations in the Peloponnesos were concluded on March 25, 
1949 which was followed by Operation Rocket (May 1 - September 21, 
1949) which freed the Central Greece region of houmeli-Agrafa-
Tzoumerka from CoF~unist banditry(43operation Rocket, in turn, 
243Guerrilla casualties during Operation Rocket included 1570 
killed, 2500 captured, and 1400 bandits surrendered. It was estimated that 
three guerrillas were wounded for each one killed. In addition 650 guer-
rilla underground personnel were either killed or captured. 
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was followed by Operation Torch (August 10-31) against the 
guerrillas located south of the Albanian border in the Vitsi-
Grammos region of Greece and within three weeks the GNA had 
overrun these so-called "impregnable defenses 11 which covered 
an area of over two hundred square miles of mountainous terrain. 244 
By August 31, 1949, guerrilla strength in Greece was reduced 
from 24,000 on January 1, 1949 to 3500, the lowest total figure 
since records were established in 1946. This figure was re-
duced to 800 by December 31 as a result of mopping-up operations 
throughout mainland Greece and the islands, and for all practi-
cal purposes, December 31, 1949, two years to the day that the 
Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group was 
activited, the Guerrillas ceased to be a threat to Greece. 
The Truman Doctrine has become a reality in Greece. 
The total funds made available for military aid to Greece 
from the inception of Public Law 75 until December 31, 1949 
totalled approximately $355,000,000 Lincluded in this amount 
was approximately $75,000,000 expended to procure supplies from 
244Guerrilla strength before Operation Torch in the Vitsi sector 
was estimated at 7750. Of this amount approximately 1000 were killed, 
500 captured, and 130 surrendered. It was believed that approximately 
3000 Guerrillas had been wounded and 50-60% of the 7750 initially reported 
in the region had either entered Albania or eluded GNA troops and moved 
into the Grammos region to reinforce Guerrilla units there. On the eve 
of Operation Torch (Grammos) 7000 guerrillas were reported located in 
the mountainous area. Guerrilla casualties for the operation included 
900 killed and 950 captured and/or surrendered. It was estimated that 
approximately 2500 Guerrillas had been wounded but unlike what happened 
in Central Greece, once again, as in Vitsi, a sizeable force had escaped 
capture, which is further evidence of the safety the Greek frontier 
offered the Guerrillas. 
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the United Kingdom source~. Approximately four hundred 
vessels had delivered 606,000 weight tons of supplies and 
equipment from the United States. In addition, an estimated 
total of 65,000 tons had been delivered from the United King-
dom and British Middle East sources in one hundred and seventy-
five British vessels. The items included 225 aircraft, with 
the necessary maintenance and spare parts and 6 million gallons 
of aviation gasoline, 245 35 Air Force prefabricated barracks, 
90,000 bombs and rockets, 7t million artillery and mortar 
shells, 500 million rounds of ammunition, 6 military hospitals 
for persons and 4 for animals, 4000 mortar and artillery pieces, 
11,000 vehicles and some 55,000 tires and 45 million gallons 
of gasoline, 12,000 mules, 7000 radio sets, 150,000 small arms 
and major items of uniform in the amount of 6t million pieces. 
The aforementioned indicate the size of the military 
aid program needed to assist the Greek Government in the war 
against the Communist Guerrillas. These supplies and equipment 
so necessary to prosecute the war against the guerrilla bands 
could neither be provided from resources within Greece nor 
could they be supplies by Britain. Only the United States had 
245During the initial phases, Operation TORCH 1949, the 
American Military Mission realized the necessity of providing the Greek 
Air Force with a plane which could effectively dive-bomb Guerrilla posi-
tions in the Grammos sector. American Navy Helldiver planesand napalm 
bombs were off-loaded in Piraeus and turned over to the Greek Air Force 
on August 17, 1949. Oneweek later, these same planes with Greek pilots 
played a dicisive role in the Grammos victory. 
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the means and resources to provide them; and their effective use 
under the direction of the U.S. military missions proved the 
basis for the re-establishment of Greece's internal security 
which in turn, at long last, permitted the U. s. Economic 
Cooperation Administration, Greece (ECA/G) to institute the 
herculean reconstruction program to remedy the effects of almost 
ten years of continuous war, occupation, and civil war. Finally, 
but most important from an American point of view, when the 
Soviet ambition extended into Greece Land Turkei/ and created 
anew the Greek Question Land the Eastern Question/, it forced 
upon the United States a series of decisive actions which com-
pletely uprooted traditional American diplomacy. Whether~ 
Americans(or Greeks for that matter) like it or not, the United 
States is in Greece to stay, at least until Great Britain decides 
to resume its "traditional responsibilities 11 in Greece. In con-
elusion, the history of modern Greece can best be illustrated 
by the following three brief statements: 
"A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece 
is .H.ussian or she is English; and since she must not 
be Russian, it is necessary that she be English •••• " 
-Sir Edmond Lyo£l~' British Minister to 
Athens, 1841 • 
"A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece 
is Russian or she is English; and since she will not 
be English, it is necessary that she be Russian." 
-By the Candidate? as descriptive of Soviet 
Foreign Policy v1s a vis British Foreign 
Policy since 1941. 
2461. Bm"'er and G. Bolitho, Otho I: King of Greece, (London, 
1939), P• 106. 
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"A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece 
is Russian or she is English; however, since she must 
not be Russian and she can not be English, it is 
necessary that she be 'American'." 
-By the Candidate, as descriptive of Greek 
and American Foreign Policy since 194-7. 
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APPENDIX I 
SOHE FIGURES BEHIND THE MACEDONIAN RIDDLE 247 
The Macedonian Question has caused a war of ethnological 
statistics and falsifications. Owing to the lack of a system-
atic population census of the Ottoman Empire, everyone--
Turkish administrators, church and school comF.unities of the 
various nationalities of the empire, foreigners including 
consular agents, travelers, publicists, geographers, ethnolo-
gists, and even anthropologists--who tried to solve the 
Macedonian question by measuring the cranial angles, compiled 
statistics, no two of which were in agreement, on the census 
question. Hence the distortions and discrepancies were fan-
tastic, to say the least, and nowhere was this more evident 
than in the figures recorded for the various nationalities in 
Macedonia for about the turn of the century. For example: 
ALBANIANS - (1'he figures go from a low of 6,036 




Ignored them completely and 
classified them as Muslims •••••••• 
(Richard von Mach, Per Machtbereich 
des Bulgarischen Exarchats in der 
'I'urkei, 1906) ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Est. 
Population 
• • • • • • 
247The authors quoted herein, unless otherwise noted, have been 
taken from Christopher J. Christides, The Macedonia Camouflage, In the 
Light of Facts and Figures, (The Hellenic Publishing Company, Ltd., 
Athens, 1949), PP• 32-36. Mr. Christides was a member of the Mixed 
Greek-Bulgarian Emigration Commission for several years which operated 





French (G. Routier, Le Macedoine et les 
Puissance, 190) •••••••••••••••••••••• 661,000 
Bulgarian: (J. Ivanoff, La Question Macedonienne, 
1 920) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 9 5 '000 
TURKS- (The figures go from a low of 120,132 (males 
to a high of 1,795,000) 
Est. 
Source: Population 
Serb: (St. Verkovitch, Esguisse Topo-
graphigue et Ethno,raphigue de 
la Macedoine, 1889 •••••••••• 120,132 (males) 
Bulgarian: (V. Kantchoff, La Macedoine, 
Ethnographie et Statistique, 
1900) •••••••••••••••••••••••• 494,964 
Turkish: Official Turkish statistics •• 1,795,000 
BULGARIANS - (The figures go from a low 57,000 





Bulgarian: (V. Kantchoff, La Macedoine, 
Ethnographie et Statistigue 
12QQ) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1,184,036 700 
Bulgarian: (D. M. Brancoff, La Macedoine 
et sa Populations Chretienne, 
1905) does not find a single 
Serb in Macedonia, only a few 
thousand "Serb-sympathizing" 
Bulgarians •••••••••••••••••••••• 
GREEKS - (The figures go from a low of 65,000 to 
a high of 660,000) 
Source: 
Belgian: (E. de Laveleye, La Peninsule des 






German: (Richard von'Mach, op. cit.) •••••• 
German: 
Russian: (Prince Tcherkasky, Documents 
pour L1Etude de la Bu1iarie, 
.ll122.) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Bulgarian: (D. M. Bramcoff, op. cit.) ••••••• 
Bulgarian: (V. Kantchoff, op. cit.) ••••••••• 







(St. Verkovitch, op. cit.) ••••••• 
(G. Routier, op. cit.) ••••••••••• 
(Amadore-Virgili, La Questione 
Rumeliota e la Politica 
Italiana, 1908) •••••••••••••••••• 
1912 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
(A. Chalkiopoulos, La Macedoine 
StatistiQue e~hnolog::ue de~ 
Vilavets de Salonigue; 1210 •••• 
(Official Ottoman Statistics 
















Attempts were also made to establish the relative position 
of Christian subjects in Macedonia through quotation of 
Ottoman statistics, Christian gendarmes in Macedonia recruited 
in proportion to race and religion as applied under the 
Muerzteg Re~orm Scheme, and representation to the various 
Ottoman Parliaments. 
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Ottoman Statistics: Greeks 
ASR (Turkish newspaper of Saloniki, issue 
January 2, 1905) ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Rene Pinon (L'Euro~e et l'Empire Ottoman, 
1908, p. 143, 4) •••••••••.••••.••••• 
/Statistics of last census 
("Greek Patriarchists"--Serbs and 
Vlachs appearing separately) of 
Macedonian vilayets of Saloniki 
and Monastir in accordance with the 
orders of (Hussein) Hilmi Pasha and 
given to the author by the Inspector 
General himsel!l 
Christian Gendarmes: (Statistics taken from 
book of Bulgarian author Dragonoff,248 
La Macedoine et les Reformes, 1908, 
pp. 111-113). 
Number of recruited gendarmes: 
Vilavets Greeks Bulgarians Serbs Vlachs 
Saloniki 137 71 7 5 
Monastir (Bitolia) ~ .2a - ~ 
-
Total for the 
2 vilayets 236 129 7 31 
Kossovo __.3.3. __il 24 35: 
Total for the 
3 vilayets 269 182 31 64 
Political Representation: Greeks Bulgarian§ 
12.Q§.: First Ottoman Parliament 










248The author contests the disproportionate number assigned to 
Muslims (e.g., author's claims that in vilayet of Saloniki Muslims 
constituted 47% of population but assigned 84% of Gendarmes) but in no 
case contests proportlons assigned to other nationalities. 
Political Representation 
1908 (Cont'd) 
4, Thrace; 3, Epirus 
(~hich incluges Argyrokastro 
LGj inokos teL'). 
1211: Elections (Information from Edward s. Forstert 
A Short His tory of Hod ern Greece, 19 57, p. 42 J • 
The Young Turks' policy of Ottomanization 
led to a reconciliation between the Greeks and 
Bulgarians of Macedonia and Thrace with the 
object of combining against the Turks in the 







Allotted to Christians Greeks Bulgarians 
11 8 3 
4 3 1 
"This agreement," the author states, "which 
received the blessing of the Oecumenical 
Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate, is 
interesting as an official admission by the 
Bulgarians that the Greeks enjoyed a numerical 
superiority over the Bulgarians of Macedonia in· 
a ratio of 8 to 3 in Macedonia and in Thrace in 
a ratio of 3 to 1." 
APPENDIX II 
SETTLEMENT OF THE INDEMNIFICATION QUESTION EMINATING FROM 
ATTACKS BY GREEK TROOPS AND CONS1'ANTINISTS UPON THE 
ENTENTE LANDING PARTIES AND VENIZELISTS IN THE PIRAEUS-
ATHENS AREA ON DECEMBER 1-2, 1916 249 
The Mixed Tribunal to adjucate the indemnification 
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question was named by Britain and France after Venizelos re-
turned to Athens in June 1917. It was given full power to 
determine its own investigable procedure and authorizedto 
commence the investigation immediately. It has jurisdistion 
over Greek as well as foreign claims, and all decisions were 
to be final and binding on the Greek Government. It was 
decided that claims and judgments due foreign officials and 
the Allied military and naval forces that suffered in the 
debacle of December 1 and 2 be processed through diplomatic 
channels. The final report of the Commission was presented 
to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 27, 1918. 
The Commission report revealed the following: 
Period of Operation: September 1917-December 1918 
Meetings Held........................... 437 
Decisions Made.......................... 6,018 
Total Indemnities Allowed, in Drachmae •• 7,000,000 





Real Estate Property Damage............. 66 
249cited by Gibbons, P• 293. 
Claims Allowed, Breakdown: (Cont'd.) 
Damage to Newspapers (Suspensions 
and destruction of printing presses •••• 
Involuntary Abandonment of Property by 
Expulsion or Flight to Avcid Harm by 
the Authorities or Reservists (who 
acted in the capacity of a Home-Guard). 
31 
900 




THE DODECANESE ISLANDS 
In 1912 the Italians were welcomed in the Dodecanese 
Islands as 11liberators," but when it became evident that Italy 
contemplated something more than just a temporary occupation, 
the Dodecanese General Assembly on July 1, 1912 addressed a 
letter to the "Sister-nation Italy," expressing a desire for 
enosis but a willingness to undergo a transition period as an 
independent state to be known as the 11Aegean Commonwealth." 
Thereafter, the Italians adopted a restricted policy towards 
the islands, forbidding public gatherings and prohibiting 
demonstrations and expressions of patriotism towards Greece. 
Under the Secret London Agreement of April 26, 1915 with 
the Entente, Italy received entire sovereignty over the 
Dodecanese. Following a plebiscite held in the islands on 
April 29, 1919, Italy recognized the Greek character of the 
islands and in the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement of July 29, 
1919 promised to cede the islands to Greece when the Treaty 
of Sevres went into effect. In a second agreement, on May 14, 
1920, Italy agreed to the immediate cession of the islands 
to Greece, except Rhodes which was to have a plebiscite at the 
end of fifteen years; but, in the end Italy renounced her 
agreements with Greece regarding the Dodecanese on October 8, 
1922 on the plea of the collapse of the Sevres Treaty with 
Turkey, an event which Italy had done much to bring about. 
The islands were formally ceded to Italy by Turkey in the 
Lausanne Treaty between Turkey and the Entente Powers which 
replaced the unratified treaty of Sevres. 
In the period between the wars the Italian occupation 
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of the Dodecanses and the Italo-Greek rivalry in Albania re-
mained a sore in Italo-Greek relations, culminating in Italy's 
attack upon Greece on October 28, 1940 which embroiled Greece 
in World War II. The adverse effect of Italian rule on the 
islands is indicated by the fact that during Italy's domina-
tion, the population of the islands in some cases was reduced 
upwards of fifty percent as a result of emigration and forced 
expulsions in attempts to curb the Greek character of the 
islands and the elan for enosis. The Dodecaneses, liberated 
from the Ottoman yoke in 1912, were not to be "liberated" from 
Italy until 1947 when Italy was forced to cede the islands to 
Greece by the peace treaty ending World War II. 
APPENDIX IV 
TREBIZOND AND OTHER HISTORIC 
GREEK SETTLEMENTS IN ASIA HINOR 
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The two former lands of Armenia and Kurdistan have long 
since overshadowed Trebizond in history, but there was a time 
when Trebizond was the Empire of Trebizond, one of the Greek 
successor states to the first Byzantine Empire and an earlier 
time when it was a formidable part of the Byzantine Empire; 
there was an earlier time when with the adjacent region known 
as Pontus, it was an integral part of early ancient Greek 
history. The Pontus and Trebizond abounded with Greeks whose 
Ionian ancestors had emigrated from Central Greece, especially 
Attica. These Ionians had initially settled upon the Anatolian 
coast about 1200 B.c., and upon the site of native villages 
they established Greek cities. The region afterwards became 
known as Ionia and included the cities of Smyrna and Ephesus 
and extended from Attica and Euboea in Greece to the central 
Asia Minor littoral. 
'I'he Ionians for centuries were the most brilliant and 
most versatile of Greeks. In the age of their glory they 
became the standard-bearers of civilization and for centuries 
spread settlements to Cyprus, the Cilician coast, all around 
the shores of the Black Sea, the northern European coast of 
the Aegean, Sicily, Sardina, Corsica, Massilia (Marseilles), 
and the Valencia region of Spain. They settled the region 
of Pontus and Trapezus (Trebizond) around the 7th century B.c., 
and Greeks remained there in great numbers until uprooted 
by Kemal after the great Asia Minor disaster of 1922 and the 
exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey between 
1923-30. Over the course of history these unredeemed Greeks 
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on the southern Black Sea littoral known as Trabizoundi or 
Ponti, saw many masters and weathered many hardships but never 
lost their Hellenic origin and heritage. Possibly of all the 
Greeks in the early diaspora, the Trabizoundi and Ponti, far 
removed from orthodoxy and hellenism, clung more tenaciously 
to their Hellenic heritage than other Greeks. These isolated 
Greeks continued to speak "Greek" over the course of thirty 
centuries in a sea of Armenians, Persians, and Turks, even 




The Fiume settlement was five years in the making and 
caused Italy to undergo various vicissitudes in the immediate 
post-war settlement period. First, Gabriele d'Annunzio, 
writer, eminent nationalist, and precursor of Benito Mussolini, 
seized Fiume on September 12, 1919 with a band of volunteers. 
While D'Annunzio's act was disavowed by the Italian government, 
d'Annunzio's forces remained in possession of the city. Second, 
on November 12, 1920 Italy and Yugoslavia concluded the 1reaty 
of Rapallo which envisaged an autonomous status for Flume 
which caused d'Annunzio, on December 1, 1920 to declare war 
on the Italian government and pitched Italian troops, Fiume 
autonomists, and Italian nationalists into a civil war over 
the Fiume question. The conflict lasted until March 3, 1922 
when Fascists captured the city and four days later turned it 
over to Italian troops. The Fascist coup of Fiume presaged 
similar coups against the Italian cities of Milan and Naples, 
and culminated on October 27, 1922 with the successful "Harch 
on Rome." On October 31, the King summoned Hussolini to form 
a government, thus ushering in the Fascist ''millenium." 
On October 23, 1922 Italy and Yugoslavia in the Treaty 
of Margherita reaffirmed the autonomous status of Fiume 
envisaged by the Treaty of Rapello. In fact, however, the 
signatories continued to allow Italian domination of Fiume 
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until the Italo-Yugoslav deadlock was resolved on January 27, 
1924 by the Treaty of Rome by which Italy received Flume and 
in return surrendered to Yugoslavia. Porto Barros, a port of 
the Dalmatian coast previously assigned them by the Treaty of 
London, and port facilities at Flume. Ultimately, however, 
the Yugosla~by-passed the Flume facilities, developing 
Shibenik, Split (Spalato), and Dubrovnik (Ragusa) as their own 
Adriatic ports, thereby giving fact to Point II of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points by which Serbia was to be "accorded free and 
secure access to the sea." 
The development of Shibenik, Split, and Dubrovnik and 
Yugoslav hostility to Italy helped ring the death knell to 
the commercial import of Trieste and Flume, heretofore the 
trade outlets for Central Europe. While Italy sought vainly 
to maintain the level of commerce through these former chief 
ports of Central Europe in the inter-war years, total traffic 
through either port never approached its pre-World War I level. 
Flume is an excellent case in point for even in its best year, 
1929, total traffic was less than one half of 1913, and by the 
mid-thirties, Flume had become a ghost port. The competition 
of German North Sea ports and Italian tariffs were instrumental 
in lessening the trade through Trieste and Flume in the post-
war period, but equally important was the development by the 
Yugoslavs of rival ports which played a considerable role in 
the demise of Trieste and Fiume which before World War I had 
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almost exclusively served Austria-Hungary and carried Central 
250 European trade. 




OIL AND MANDATES, AND CONFLICTING PROMISES; 
THE PROBLEMS WHICH HELD UP THE NEAR EAST SETTLEMENT 
The question of oil and mandates and conflicting promises 
held up the Near East settlement. The oil question centered 
on the petroleum deposits of Mosul in northern Mesopotamia; 
the mandate question focused on Syria; the conflicting promises 
converged on Syria and Palestine. The first involved Britain 
and France mostly; the second involved Britain, France, and 
the Arabs; the last attracted Britain and France and the Arabs 
and Zionists. The issues themselves, however, like most Near 
East problems, became inextricably interwoven and the Ottoman 
settlement had to await their propitiation. 
Before the war the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), 
representing 75% British interests and 25% German had received 
a letter from the Porte in July 1914 promising to grant TPC 
a concession for development of the oil resources in the 
vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad; the war, however, broke out 
before the promised concession was granted. During and after 
the war the Mosul question became the subject of concern 
between Britain and France, who sought to replace Germany in 
the oil concession, and the Arabs and Turks, and Dutch and 
.American interests who insisted that they be allowed to share 
in the Mesopotamian petroleum deposits. 
Under the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Mosul region fell 
to the projected French zone of influence, but at the pre-
liminaries to the Paris peace conference in December 1918, 
Clemenceau and Lloyd George agreed to the transfer of Mosul 
to the British sphere of influence in return for which France 
was promised a share in the Mosul oil deposits as part of the 
prospective general post-war settlement in the Near East. 
On April 8, 1919 the Berenger-Long agreement, the first of a 
series of Anglo-French instruments in 1919 by which the Mosul 
transfer was to be effecte~was initiated; but the French 
refused to confirm the transfer until France, in addition, 
received British approval of her demand for a single mandate 
over Syria and the Lebanon. This French condition, however, 
conflicted with British war-time commitments to the Sharif-
Husayn of Mecca who in letter number 5 of the Husayn-MacMahon 
Correspondence July 14, 1915-V~rch 10, 1916, had indicated 
that "the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea 
coasts are purely Arab vilayets ••• " to which MacMahon, in 
letter number 6, replied that "with regard to the vilayets of 
Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have fully 
understood and taken careful note of your operations, but, as 
the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both 
the question will require careful consideration and further 
co~~unication on the subject will be addressed to you in due 
course." In addition, by a series of British and Anglo-
French statements to the Arabs from January 4 - November 7, 
1918 in which the principle of self-determination permeated, 
it was generally believed that the Amir Faysal, the third 
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son of King Husayn of the Hijaz, formerly Sharif of Mecca, 
would be permitted to set up a provisional Arab government at 
Damascus at the war's end. But then the British were plagued 
further in the Syrian question by the British (Balfour) 
Declaration of sympathy with Zionist aspirations promising 
Zionism the establishment of a Jewish National Home in that 
part of the Arab lands known as Palestine also coveted by 
Faysal as part of Syria. 251 
The "Syrian Question" was never clarified during the war 
since Britain could neither alienate the Arabs nor the French 
nor the Zionists as the exigency of war demanded Arab military 
support for Britain against the Ottoman armies in the Near 
East, France in the war against Germany, and world Jewry and 
international Zionism and especially its influential English 
and American branches to the general war effort. After the 
war the matter drifted along almost aimlessly only to cause 
boundless problems at the post-war peace settlement. At the 
end of the war, England at first went as far as to support 
a Faysal provisional Arab government seated in Damascus but 
later withdrew her support of Faysal in favor of France and 
indirectly for the cause of Zionism in Palestine. 
251 For the Husayn-MacMahon Correspondence, July 14, 1915 -March 10, 
1916, see Hurwitz, Diplomacy, II. pp. 13-17; for the British and Anglo-
French Statements to the Arabs, January- November 1918, Ibid., pp. 28-30; 
for the Balfour Declaration, Ibid., p. 26. 
The "Syrian Question" was brought to a head on ~larch 8, 
1920 when the second General Syrian Congress covened at 
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Damascus and proclaimed the independence of Syria, naming Faysal 
king of the new Syria to include Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, 
and the territory later to be known as Transjordan. A year 
before on February 6, 1919, and again in September 1919, 
Faysal, heading the delegation of the Hijaz which claimed to 
speak for all Arab Asia, had appeared before the Supreme 
Council at the Peace Conference and in vain appealed for the 
fulfillment of Allied promises to the Arabs, the Arab right 
of self-determination, and the establishment of Arab Govern-
ments for the former various Ottoman provinces of Arab Asia. 
At about the time Faysal made his second appearance at Pari~ 
the British and French, on September 15, 1919, signed a 
military convention by which French forces would take over the 
British Cilicia and O.E.T.W. (the Ras en Nakura, Haifa, 
Alexandretta region) and British forces would also be with-
drawn from O.E.T.E. (the territory east of Jordan and the 
Syrian interior between Damascus and Aleppo) which had been 
under the command of Amir Faysal, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Arab forces, representing his father the King of Hijaz. 252 
252 After the liberation of the Ottoman territory between the 
Egyptian frontier and the Ainanus Mountains, the region was divided 
into three administrative districts by General Sir Edmund Allenby, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force which had.l~berated 
the area. The liberation forces consisted of an aggregate of Br1t1~h, . 
Arabs, French, and Italian troops with the British and Arabs predom1nat1ng 
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Thus in effect, Syria had been partitioned into two military 
zones, one occupied by French forces headquartered at Beirut 
and the other by Arab forces centered at Damascus. The 
division of Syria between these two rival forces became reality 
in November 1919 when the British, in fulfillment of their 
promise to the French, evacuated the coastal region of Syria. 
Thereafter a provisional modus vivendi operated between the 
opposing French and Arab forces for six months during which 
the French command refrained from advancing beyond Baalbek 
and thus tacitly recognized Faysal's rule in the Syrian hinter-
land. This rather uneasy situation continued until the un-
toward act by the Syrian Congress and the consequences of this 
action caused the French and British to resolve the Syrian 
enigma. 
French refusal to force a Syrian settlement earlier was 
in part conditioned because of French uncertainty of the degree 
of American participation in any Arab settlement in which the 
United States had continually shown an active interest and 
until the question of mandates could be determined. By the 
Spring of 1920, however, the United States Senate had repudiated 
all Wilsonian arrangements, thus making it evident that the 
and the French and Italians compr1s1ng never more than token forces. 
The Districts were known as Occupied Enemy's Territory South (O.E.T.S.) 
which was Palestine; Occupied Enemy's Territory East (O.E.T.E.) and 
Occupied Enemy's Territory West (O.E.T.W.) as noted above in the narra-
tive. All were under the supreme command of General Allenby with 
O.E.T.S., O.E.T.W., and O.E.T.E. administered by a British military 
governor, a French military governor, and the Amir Faysal respectively. 
·.....__ 
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United States would play a lesser role in the peace settlements; 
furthermore, the Covenant of the League of Nations had be-
come a ratified instrument and could serve as a basis for 
assigning mandates. Paragraph 4 of Article 22 pertained to 
the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
The action by the second General Syrian Congress was 
repudiated by Britain and France on March 15, and the ensuing 
disturbances in Syria and in Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews 
during April 4 - 9 served to emphasize to the British Govern-
ment the urgency of an early settlement of the entire Syrian 
Question. The Arabs had overplayed their hand. They had 
adversely provoked the British by the incorporation of Palestine 
into the greater Arab dominion of Syria, which ran counter 
to the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist Organization's 
Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Peace Conference, 
February, 1919, which requested that 11Great Britain act as 
Mandatory of the League of Nations for Palestine ••• on the 
ground that this is the wish of the Jews of ~he world and the 
League of Nations in selecting a Mandatory will follow as far 
as possible, the popular wish of the people concerned. The 
preference on the part of the .Jews for a British Trusteeship 
.is unquestionably the result of the peculiar relationship of 
England to the Jewish Palestinian problem." (Eurewitz, 
Diplomacy, II, p. 47). 
The incorporation of all Syria and the Lebanon into the 
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new Arab kingdom, according to the Frenc~ran counter to the 
historic rights of France dating from the time of Louis XIV, 
and these regions claimed by France "no other Government in 
the world, (apparently the French saw fit to exclude the 
Arabs in their argument) held as strong an historic and 
traditional case." 
France's case for Syria had been represented forcefully 
by the French Foreign Minister Stephen Jean Marie Pichon 
before "A Secret Meeting of the Supreme Council at Paris to 
Consider the Sykes-Picot Agreement 11 on March 20, 1919 at which 
time M. Pichon detailed the historic role, political, economic, 
and social, played by France in Syria. "No other country," 
stated M. Pichon, "had anything like so complete a development 
in these regions. Hence France could not abandon her rights." 
'I'he French Foreign Minister concluded his presentation by 
asking that "France should become the mandatory of the League 
of Nations of this region." (Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, p. 52). 
The Supreme Council reassembled at San Remo to consider 
the Syrian problem on April 19, 1920, following the Syrian 
turmoil. Within the week, the British acceded to the French 
request for an enlarged Syrian mandate, thus making possible 
the settlement of the Mosul question. On April 25, 1920 
Britain and France concluded the Oil Agreement by which ~ranee 
was to receive a 25% interest in any concessions that might 
exploit the Mosul oil resources and, in return, France agreed 
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to permit the transport of oil by pipeline or rail from 
Mesopotamia and Persia through the French spheres of influence 
to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The settle-
ment of these key issues removed the two major obstacles 
which had held up the Ottoman settlement. The next day the 
Supreme Council of San Remo quickly reached an agreement on 
the clause of the Ottoman treaty. 
The San Remo agreements between France and Britain over 
the projected mandates and the oil concessions concluded on 
the surface the Arab phase of the Peace Conference, and the 
Treaty of Sevres which followed was the first public document 
to state officially that Syria and Mesopotamia were provision-
ally recognized "as independent states subject to the render-
ing of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory 
until such time as they are able to stand alone." However, 
Great Britain and France were not able to exercise their man-
dates until after Britain, in the case of Mesopotamia from 
May - October 1920, and France, in the case of Syria from 
July - August 1920, stamped out Arab insurrections against them. 
True to Great Power diplomacy the San Remo agreements 
showed marked contempt for the realities of the Arab problem 
which was not missed by the Arabs of the region. The Arabs of 
Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine having fought for and 
witnessed the liberation of their lands from the Ottoman Turk, 
were in no mood to accept the imposition of a new foreign 
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overlord. Like the Turkish nationalists, they fought to oust 
their new occupiers and overturn the peace settlement; but un-
like the Turks who had only to contend with Greece, the Arabs 
had to pitch battle against Great Powers and Arab nationalism 
was made to heel quickly before the superior forces of Great 
Britain and France. The decisions of San Remo brought no 
Pax Brittanica or Pax Franca to supplant the Pax Ottomanica 
which had reigned previously and for a stormy quarter of a 
century thereafter the Mandatories continued to Tetain control 
over their mandates until World War II presided over the 
"liquidation" of the British Empire and forced France to re-
lease her hold on Syria. Unfortunately, however, the region 
is still plagued by petty jealousies and Great Power rivalries 
and Arab independence has not resulted in a Pax Arabianica. 
But the Arabs are no more to blame for making the Near East 
the twentieth century counterpart of the Balkans than the 
Balkan peoples were wholly responsible for making Balkania 
"the powder keg of Europe." Both are the result of the Powers 
' imposing their unreal solutions upon the real problems which 
plague the region. 
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APPENDIX VII 
A CRRONOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL TRIALS AND 
TRIBULATIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN 











After Smyrna destruction Generals Plastiras 
and Gonatos revolt on Chios and establish a 
revolutionary regime. 
Venizelists occupy Saloniki and demand 
abdication of Constantine. 
King Constantine abdicates and the Crown 
Prince ascends throne as George II. 
Treason trial of Constantinists ministers and 
military commanders. Gounaris and five other 
high ranking Constantinist lieutenants 
executed. 
Revolutionary regime proclaims a Decree of 
Amnesty for all political offenses. 
Venizelists victorious at elections. 
King George II leaves Greece pending results 
of a proposed plebiscite • Admiral Paul 
Koundouriotis appointed Regent. 
Venizelos become Premier of Greece. Opposes 
summarily deposition of King by a simple vote 
in the Chamber of Deputies; proposes a 
plebiscite to decide the question of Republic 
or Honarchy. 
Failing to convince Republican military junta 
on the plebiscite issue, Venizelos resigns 
and leaves Greece. Succeeded by M. G. 
Kaphandaris and then M. A. Papanastasiou, who 
proposed that the monarchy should be first 
abolished by a resolution of the House, to be 













Chamber votes abolition of monarchy, pro-
claims the Republic. 
507 
Plebiscite res·lts in overwhelming vote for 
the establishment of republic, (758,742 
votes for the republic and 325,322 for the 
monarchy). 
Republic officially proclaimed with Admiral 
Koundouriotis as provisional president. 
Venizelist deputy H. 'l'hemistocles Sophoulis 
succeeds Papanastasiou as Premier and in turn 
is succeeded by M. Andreas Michalakopoulos. 
Coup d'etat by General 'I'heodore Pangalos, 
former Ninister of War in the Cabinet of 
M. Papanastasiou. 
General Pangalos, having dissolved the National 
Assembly, publishes the terms of the new 
Constitution by proclamation. 
General Pangalos makes himself dictator--
voiding constitution of September 30, 1925--
one week before the scheduled elections of 
January 10. 
General Pangalos announces that a new 
Constitution would be ready by the end of 
April which envisaged that the Powers of the 
President would be similar to those of the 
President of the United States of America, 
candidates for election must be between 45 and 
60 years of age and all members of the Royal 
family and M. Venizelos were expressly 
excluded from standing for election. 
President Koundouriotis resigns over the 
political antics of General Pangalos. 
General Pangalos elected president in an 
election in which he found himself the only 













33 electoral divisions since election 
arrangements were incomplete in the other 23. 
General Pangalos takes the oath as President. 
Induces M. Eutaxias, a gentleman of advanced 
years who had last served in the Delyiannis 
ministry in the previous century to accept 
the puppet Premiership. 
Dictator-President Pangalos overthrown by 
General G. Kondylis who assumes the Premier-
ship and recalls Admiral Koundouriotis to 
the Presidency. 
New constitution proclaimed. 
Republicans win bare majority in elections 
but unable to form Republican cabinet. 
Veteran statesman M. A. Zaimis accepts 
Premiership and forms coalition government, 
including the leading Royalists General Metaxas 
and M. P. Tsaldaris and the Republicans M. M. 
Kaphandaris, Michalakopoulos, and Papanastasiou. 
Chamber passes new Constitution embodying 
provisions for the Presidency and Senate. 
Previously in April Koundouriotis threatened 
to resign unless prompt action was taken on 
the Republican Constitution and Kondylis, 
heading the Republican party, brings pressure 
on the Government to bring the Constitution 
before the House. 
Zaimis reshuffles cabinet after M. Tsaldaris, 
Royalist Party leader, resigns over the 
question of the gold reserve of the National 
Bank. Zaimis Coalition begins to skid. 
Zaimis reshuffles cabinet after M. Papanastasiou 
resigns owing to disagreement over a scheme for 
road construction. 
Venizelos returns to Athens. 
May 19 
May 28 












Kaphandaris quits Zaimis Cabinet and resigns 
his leadership in the Progressive Republican 
Party. Venizelos resumes leadership of the 
Liberal Party and called into consultation by 
the President to form a Government in case 
Zaimis unable to reform his Cabinet. 
Zaimis reconstructs new Cabinet, but disagree-
ments continued, Coalition falls. 
Venizelos assumes office of Prime Hinister. 
Venizelos dissolves Chamber, fixes August 19 
as the date for new elections and persuades 
President to issue Decree modifying the 
electoral law by the abolition of proportional 
representation in favor of majority 
representation. 
Venizelos sweeps election. 
Bill introduced to establish Senate, passed 
in December. 
Zaimis elected President of the Senate. 
Senate (abolished in 1862) restored by 
Venizelos in hope of stabilizing a republican 
regime. 
Cabinet portfolios of War, Health, and 
Aviation, previously held by Venizelos, 
assigned to respective undersecretaries of 
these departments. 
Admiral Koundouriotis, advanced in years, steps 
down from Presidency and is succeeded by 
Zaimis. General Paraskevopoulos, a former 
Commander-in-Chief in Asia Minor, succeeds 
Zaimis as President of the Senate. 








General Pangalos, the former Dictator-President, 
tried for breach of trust in connection with 
the questionable grant of a concession for a 
gambling casino in Eleusis. Pangalos sentenced 
to two years' imprisonment and loss of civil 
rights for five years. Pangalos supporters 
attempted abortive revolts in October and again 
in 1932. 
Venizelos criticized by opposition for 
authoritarian metrods and denies unconstitu-
tionality of his actions. Claims he is carry-
ing out mandate entrusted to him by the 
electorate and will remain in office until 
the legal expiration of the Chamber in the 
autumn of 1932. 
Venizelos resigns over bitter controversy 
aroused by a bill to reintroduce proportional 
representation and another bill to impose 
restriction of the Press to combat the violent 
attacks against the Government by the Royalist 
press. 
Venizelos resumes Premiership after the 
Republican Papanastasiou fails to enlist the 
support of Tsaldaris' Populist Party and 
effect a working coalition amongst the 
Liberals. A Military League forms to support 
the Republic and is alleged to be the work 
of Venizelos. Venizelos counters critics 
that if the Royalists and the various opposi-
tion parties pledge not to raise the regime 
question for ten years, the League would dis-
band itself. 
Venizelos dissolves Chamber after he fails to 
receive pledge from the opposition parties on 
the regime question, and delivers a speech in 
which he reviewed the achievements of his four 












1 9 3 2 (Con t 'd ) 
Venizelists fail to win a majority of the seats 
in the election owing to the deepening 
economic depression and Venizelos' economic 
retrenchment. Previously, in January and 
April, Venizelos, to no avail, visited the 
European capitals and appeared before the 
Council of the League of Nations to plead 
Greece's economic plight. Growing power of 
the Royalists becomes evident. 
Venizelos resigns. 
Tsaldaris forms·a Coalition Government composed 
of the various anti-Venizelist parties and 
declares loyalty to the republic. The moderate 
Royalist Tsaldaris Government lives on the 
sufferance of the opposition for eight months. 
Tsaldaris fails to receive vote of confidence 
on the general financial policy of his Govern-
ment and resigns. 
Venizelos succeeds Tsaldaris, dissolves 
Parliament, decrees new elections. 
Venizelos suffers defeat in elections (Liberal 
Party seats decline from 102 to 96, Populist 
seats grow from 96 to 135, a clear majority, 
but received only 40.33% of the 1,141,331 
total votes cast). Attempted coup d'etat of 
"March 5, 1933" by General Plastiras "in 
order to save the republic" fails. 
Tsaldaris again becomes Prime Minister as 
leader of the majority Party. Plastiras' 
abortive coup d'etat dominates discussions in 
Chamber for remainder of the year. 
Attempted assasination against Venizelos adds 
new fire to the March 5 coup d'etat question. 
Venizelos' "private police" arrest notorious 
brigand Karathanasis, under suspicion for 











embitters relations between Venizelists and 
the Government•and causes resignation of the 
Minister for Home Affairs and the replacement 
of the Chief of the Athens Police and the 
Comn1ander of the Gendarmerie. Venizelos retires 
to Crete and refuses to continue his duties as 
a deputy until steps are taken to bring to 
trial those who had been arrested on suspicion 
of having been implicated in the attempt on his 
life. 
Zaimis, nearly eighty years of age, reelected 
President in deal by which Liberals agreed to 
support Zaimis candidacy proposed by Tsaldaris 
in return for which Tsaldaris promised to 
undertake the repeal of the electoral law. 
In the absence of Venizelos, a combined meeting 
of the leading party leaders reaches agreement 
on a six-year development program. 
Extreme Republicans, after some months in pre-
paration, attempt second revolution in Athens, 
Crete, and Nacedonia "in order to save the 
republic." Venizelos on Crete assumes leader-
ship of the revolution, but after some limited 
successes in Athens and Macedonia the revolu-
tion is put down by General Kondylis, the 
Minister of War, who takes the field against 
the main body of insurgents in Macedonia. 
Venizelos flees to the Dodecanese and then to 
France. 
Chamber passes measure abolishing the Senate, 
suspends permanency of the judiciary and the 
Civil Service, dissolves the House, sets date 
for new elections to return members to a 
National Assembly. 
General Papoulas, "President of the Republican 
Defense League," tried by military court martial 
and condemned to death and executed. In addition 
Venizelos and Plastiras, who had been the chosen 
leader of the uprising but had taken no active 
part, were condemned to death in absentia. 











1935 (Gont 'd) 
Civil Service, universities, schools, and the 
armed forces. 
Election held in which 243 members of Tsaldaris' 
Populist Party, 37 supporters of General 
Kondylis, 7 followers of General Metaxas, and 
6 Independents were elected. Republicans 
abstain from the voting. 
First meeting of the National Assembly held, 
votes in favor of a plebiscite on the restoration 
of the monarchy but fails to fix date for 
plebiscite leaving same to the Government. 
General Kondylis' attempts to press Tsaldaris 
on his personal attitude on the question of the 
future regime. Tsaldaris refuses to express 
opinion, Kondylis resigns. Tsaldaris reforms 
new Government and is joined by Kondylis after 
which the Government issues proclamation fixing 
November 3 as date for the plebiscite. 
Admiral Koundouriotis dies at age of eighty 
years. 
Coup d'etat by General Kondylis ou~s Tsaldaris. 
National Assembly declares for restoration of 
the monarchy and recall of George II. General 
Kondylis appointed Regent, and M. Zaimis' 
duties as President of the hepublic come to an 
end. 
Plebiscite results in a vote of 97% in favor of 
Restoration, but the honesty of which was 
seriously challenged--e.g., Crete, the 
Venizelist strcnghold, voted 50,655 to 1,214 in 
favor of Restoration. 
George II arrives in Athens, requests Kondylis 
carry on the administration. Breach occurs 
between King and Kondylis who refused to grant 
a general amnesty to all those implicated in 
the March revolution as desired by George II. 
Kondylis succeeded by M. Demerdjes, professor 
of civil law at the University of Athens, to 
prepare country for new elections. 
King George II restored to the throne, proclaims 








Elections held. Llections a victory for the 
Venizelists, who, however, fail to gain a 
majority in the Parliament. Liberal Party 
under M. Sophoulis secures 126 seats and the 
support of the Agrarian and hepublican Parties 
give them 142 seats: the Populist Party of 
Tsaldaris received 69 seats and receive the 
support of the 63 members of the Popular 
Radical Party led by General Kondylis and M. 
Theotokis, 7 members of General Metaxas' party 
and 4 members of a Macedonian group, giving 
them a total strength of 143 members. The 
balance between the two blocs, Royalists and 
Republicans, rests in the hands of the Communists 
who elected 15 members and become a new force 
on the Greek political scene. 
Kondylis dies at age 57, Ending a phenomenal 
career during which he rose from a private in 
the army to General, Premier, and the 11King-
maker" and in the process veered from a loyal 
supporter of Venizelos and the republic to 
the leader of the ultra-Royalists. 
Sophoulis, leader of the Liberal Party, 
elected President of the Chamber but fails to 
secure the support of Tsaldaris for a coalition 
cabinet. 
Demerdjes receives support of Sophoulis and 
forms Cabinet in which General Metaxas is 
names Deputy-Premier and Minister of War. 
Venizelos dies in Paris at age 72 ending a 
career wtich saw him rise from revolutionary 
in Crete to become eight times Prime Minister 
of Greece and prominent figure in European 
politics. 
Demerdjes dies suddenly, King appoints Metaxas 
to succeed Demerdjes as Prime Minister. 
Metaxas receives vote of confidence of Chamber, 
after which Chamber is prorogued for five 
months during which time the ~overnment is 
empowered to govern by decree subject to the 
approval of a Committee of forty members which 







General strike in Saloniki to protest "anti-
labor" policy of Metaxas against labor leaders 
and unions and the enactment of a Compulsory 
Arbitration Act which declared strikes illegal 
results in death of 30 workers and injury to 
400. Unions issue orders for a nation-wide 
general strike on August 5. 
Tsaldaris dies suddenly. ihus within the 
brief period of a few months three important 
parties deprived of their political leaders, 
not to mention the passing from the scene of 
Venizelos who, although in exile in Paris, 
held nominal leadership of the Liberals. 
Sophoulis and Theotokis, who succeeded 
Kondylis as leaders of the ultra-royalists, 
inform the King that they were ready to form 
a government that would have majority support. 
King signs decrees declaring state of emergency, 
dissolving Parliament without setting a date 
for new elections, and suspends the provisions 
of the constitution guaranteeing personal 
liberties. Metaxas proclaims martial law, 
arrests scores of opposition leaders through-
out the country, puts down demonstrations on 
the plea that these measures were justified 
in order to combat the impending general strike 
which was designed "to overthrow the legal, 
political and social system of the country." 
Thus ended the Republic and there came into 
being the "Fourth of August Regime" as the 
Metaxas dictatorship became known. 
APPENDIX VIII 
THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR AND THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN GREECE 
The legal basis for the presence of British troops in 
Greece was found in the fact that these forces were invited 
to enter and remain in the country by the Greek Government. 
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The Greek Government first entered into such an agree-
ment at Caserta, Italy, on September 26, 1944 which was signed 
by the Prime Minister of Greece G. Papandreou and N. Servas, 
and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, General 
H. Maitland Wilson. 253 Later, when King George II delegated 
his authority as head of the Greek State to Archbishop Damaskinos 
as Regent in December 1944 this clergyman-Regent authorized the 
presence of the British forces in Greece and expressed his 
nation's gratitude for the services the British forces had 
rendered. Continuing in January 1945, the Sophoulis Government 
formally affirmed that the British forces were present in 
Greece upon the invitation of the Greek Government, and this 
position was affirmed by officials of the successor governments 
after Sophoulis. 
On the other hand, it was the position of those who 
questioned the legality of the presence of British forces in 
Greece that (1) the governments which extended and subsequently 
253For the text of the Caserta Agreement, see C. M. Woodhouse, 
Apple of Discord, (London, 1951), PP• 306-307. 
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confirmed the invitation were not constitutionally chosen 
representatives of the Greek people, and (2) that the constitution 
by implication prohibits any government from inviting foreign 
armed forces to remain in the country. Nevertheless, all the 
Powers recognized these Greek Governments, the U.S.S.R. having 
done so in December 1944 at the height of the Civil War and at 
a time when British troops were instrumental in crushing the 
EAM/ELAS insurrection in Athens and Piraeus and it was only 
later, on the eve of the "Third Round," that the Soviet Union 
seriously brought up the question of the legality of British 
forces in Greece. Until that time Stalin had repeatedly assented 
to the presence of British forces in Greece. 
APPENDIX IX 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CAREERS OF TWO KEY GREEK 
COHMUNIST LEADERS: NTh.OS ZACHARIADES AND GEORGE SIANTOS 
Zachariades and Siantos were the two most influential 
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individuals in the pre-war Communist movement in Greece and the 
Cow~unist-inspired resistance movement during and after the war. 
Both were schooled in Marxist studies in Russia and both attended 
the Moscow School of Eastern Studies where Zachariades made a 
brilliant record reputedly graduating with the highest grades on 
record. 
Zachariades' first contact with Corununism took place at the 
time of the Russian Revolution when as a youth of 15 years of 
age and for some years thereafter worked as a Greek sailor in 
the Black Sea. Before he reached his twentieth birthday, 
Zachariades jumped ship in a Russian port to begin his career 
as an active Communist. In 1923 he returned to Greece to head 
the Greek Communist Youth movement graduating to the Party it-
self three years later, seeing service in Saloniki where he was 
imprisoned by the dictatorial Government of General Pangalos. 
Escaping from jail, Zachariades made his way south to Athens 
and became a member of the Athens Regional Committee of the 
Communist Party. He was arrested in 1929 for killing a 
political opponent, a Trotskyite, and jailed only to escape 
once again. This time the youthful Zachariades went to Russia 
for safety and enrolled in the above-mentioned school in 
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Eastern Studies. 
Zachariades is by far the better known of the two in the 
West since, as opposed to Siantos, he preferred the limelight 
and represented the professional internationalist serious revo-
lutionary, serving as the Secretary General of the KKE in 1931 
at which time he healed a rift in the Greek Communist Party. 
In 1935 he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern and became Secretary of the Balkan Communist Bureau, 
directly subordinate to the Comintern Cpief, George Dimitroff, 
but head of all the Balkan Communist organizations. When 
Metaxas came to power, Zachariades was jailed and he remained a 
prisoner until the invading Germans removed him to Dachau where 
he was liberated by the American Army at the close of World 
War II, and, in an anti-climax of future events, flown back to 
Greece in a British plane to take up the struggle against the 
same "imperialists" who had liberated him and returned him to 
Athens. 
Siantos' career was as star-studded as Zachariades', but 
whereas Zachariades was an "internationalist," Siantos was more 
distinctly a national-type Communist. 
Siantos began his career as a prominent member of the 
Tobacco Workers' Federation of Greece and later (1922) helped 
to organize agrarian disturbances in Thessaly which led to the 
breakup of a few larger estates there. Siantos was instrumental 
in bringing about the affiliation of the Socialist-Labor Party 
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with the Third International, subsequently became a charter 
member of the Political Bureau of the new Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) and in 1925 Secretary General of the Central Committee of 
the KKE. In 1928 Siantos attended the Sixth Congress of the 
Comintern as the Representative of the Greek party, and in 1930 
entered official political life as a member of the Greek 
Parliament. In 1931 he was ouster from the leadership of the 
KKE on the ground of deviation from true "lVlarxist-Leninist 
principles" and departed for Russia to attend school. Siantos 
returned in 1933 and was quickly rehabilitated. He first took 
over direction of the Communist organization in Piraeus, one 
of the largest in Greece at that time, and within three years 
he was restored to the Political Bureau and attained influence 
in the party second only to that of Zachariades. 
Siantos was arrested by Metaxas in 1937 and exiled to a 
remote Aegean island from where he escaped and in seclusion took 
over the leadership of the KKE in the absence of Zachariades. 
Arrested again in 1939, he fell into Italian custody at the 
outset of the occupation but once again escaped and, in due course, 
while remaining in the background Siantos became the most 
influential single individual and power behind the KKE, the 
Communist directed resistance movements the ELAS/EAM, and the 
1944 Communist Provisional ~overnment known as the Political 
Committee for National Liberation (PEEA). The events of 
December 1944 were as much his making as anyone and from which 
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he emerged as the ELAS/EAH's counterpart to General Scobie. 
Siantos led the EAM delegation which signed the Varkiza settle-
ment. Varkiza proved Siantos' last outstanding act. With the 
return of Zachariades, Siantos became number two in the Party; 
however, it was Siantos who since 1941 had prepared the way 
for resumption of the East-West struggle over Greece. 
APPENDIX X 
Athens, March 3, 1947 
REQUEST OF GREEK GOVERN~lliNT FOB AID 
Message from the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to the President and the Secretary of State. 
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Sir: I have the honor, on instructions of my Government, 
to convey the following urgent message to His Excellency the 
President of the United States and to Your Excellency: 
"Owing to the systematic devastation of Greece, the 
decimation and debilitation of her people and the destruction 
of her economy through four invasions and protracted enemy 
occupation, as well as through disturbances in the wake of war, 
and despite the valuabe assistance rendered by our Allies dur-
ing and after the war for which the Greek people feel profoundly 
grateful, further and immediate assistance had unfortunately 
become vital. It is impossible to exaggerate the magnitude of 
the difficulties that beset those survivors in Greece who are 
devoting themselves to the restoration of their country. Such 
means of survival as remained to the Greek people after the 
enemy withdrew have now been exhausted so that today Greece is 
without funds to finance the import even of those consumption 
goods that are essential for bare subsistence. In such circum-
stances the Greek people cannot make progress in attacking the 
problems of reconstruction, though substantial reconstruction 
must be begun if the situation in Greece is not to continue to 
be critical. 
"The Greek Government and people are therefore compelled 
to appeal to the Government of the United States and through it 
to the American people for financial, economic and expert 
assistance. For Greece to survive she must have: 
"i. The financial and other assistance which will enable 
her immediately to resume purchases of the food, clothing, 
fuel, seeds and the like that are indispensable for the sub-
sistence of her people and that are obtainable only from abroad. 
"2. The financial and other assistance necessary to 
enable the civil and military establishments of the Government 
to obtain from abroad the means of restoring in the country 
the tranquility and feeling of security indispensable to the 
achievement of economic and political recovery. 
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"3· Aid in obtaining the financial and other assistance 
that will enable Greece and the Greek people to create the 
means for self-support in the future. This involves problems 
which unhappily cannot be solved unless we surmount the 
crisis immediately confronting us. 
114. The aid of experienced American administrative, 
economic and technical personnel to assure the utilization in 
an effective and up-to-date manner of the financial and other 
assistance given to Greece, to help to restore a healthy condi-
tion in the domestic economy. 
"The need is great. The determination of the Greek people 
to do all in their power to restore Greece as a self-respecting 
democracy is also great; but the destruction in Greece has 
been so complete as to rob the Greek people of the power to 
meet the situation ~y themselves. It is because of these cir-
cumstances that they turn to America for aid. 
"It is the profound hope of the Greek Goverrunent that the 
Government of the United States will find a way to render to 
Greece without delay the assistance for which it now appeals. 
"Signed: D. Maximos, Prime Minister, c. Tsaldaris, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs." 
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
PAUL ECONOMOU-GOURAS 
His Excellency George c. Marshall 
Secretary of State 
Washington, D. c. 
APPENDIX XI 
(PUBLIC LAW 75 - 80TH CONGRESS) 
(CHAPTER 81 - 1ST SESSION) 
(S. 938) 
AN ACT 
TO PROVIDE FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE 
AND TURKEY 
WHEREAS the Governments of Greece and Turkey have sought 
from the Government of the United States immediate financial 
and other assistance which is necessary for the maintenance 
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of their national integrity and their survival as free nations; 
and 
WHEREAS the national integrity and survival of these 
nations are of importance to the security of the United States 
and of all freedom-loving peoples and depend upon the receipt 
at this time of assistance; and 
WHEREAS the Security Council of the United Nations has 
recognized the seriousness of the unsettled conditions pre-
vailing on the border between Greece on the one hand and 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other, and, if the 
present emergency is met, may subsequently assume full 
responsibility for this phase of the problem as a result of 
the investigation which its commission is currently conduct-
ing; and 
WHEREAS the Food and Agriculture Organization mission 
for Greece recognized the necessity that Greece receive fin-
ancial and economic assistance and recomn1ended that Greece 
request such assistance from the appropriate agencies of the 
United Nations and from the Governments of the United States 
and the United Kingdom; and 
WHEREAS the United Nations is not now in a position to 
furnish to Greece and Turkey the financial and economic 
assistance which is immediately required; and 
WHEREAS the furnishing of such assistance to Greece and 
Turkey by the United States will contribute to the freedom 
and independence of all members of the United Nations in 
conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter; 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President 
may from time to time when he deems it in the interest of 
the United States furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey, 
upon request of their governments, and upon terms and con-
ditions determined by him -
(1) by rendering financial aid in the form of loans, 
credits, grants, or otherwise, to those countries; 
(2) by detailing to assist those countries any per-
sons in the employ of the United States; and the provisions 
of the Act of May 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 442), as amended, appli-
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cable to personnel detailed pursuant to such Act, as amended, 
shall be applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to this 
paragraph; provided, however, That no civilian personnel shall 
be assigned to Greece or Turkey to administer the purpose 
of this Act until such personnel have been investigated by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
(3) by detailing a limited number of members of the 
military services of the United States to assist these coun-
tries, in an advisory capacity only; and the provisions of 
the Act of May 19, 1926 (44 Stat. 565), as amended, applicable 
to personnel detailed pursuant to such Act, as amended, shall 
be applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to this para-
graph; 
(4) by providing for (A) the transfer to, and the pro-
curement for by manufacture or otherwise and the transfer 
to, those countries of any articles, services, and informa-
tion, and (B) the instruction and training of personnel of 
those countries; and 
(5) by incurring and defraying necessary expenses, 
including administrative expenses and expenses for compensa-
tion of personnel, in connection with the carrying out of 
the provisions of this Act. 
SEC. 2 (a) Sums from advances by the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation under Section 4(a) and from the appropriations 
made under authority of section 4(b) may be allocated for any 
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of the purposes of this Act to any department, agency, or 
independent establishment of the Government. Any amount so 
allocated shall be available as advancement or reimbursement, 
and shall be credited, at the option of the department, agency, 
or independent establishment concerned, to appropriate appro-
priations, funds or accounts existing or established for the 
purpose. 
(b) Whenever the President requires payment in advance 
by the Government of Greece or of Turkey for assistance to be 
furnished to such countries in accordance with this Act, 
such payments when made shall be credited to such countries 
in accounts established for the purpose. Sums from such 
accounts shall be allocated to the departments, agencies, or 
independent establishments of the Government which furnish 
the assistance for which payment is received, in the same 
manner, and shall be available and credited in the same manner 
as allocations made under subsection (a) of this section. 
Any portion of such allocation not used as reimbursement 
shall remain available until expended. 
(c) Whenever any portion of an allocation under sub-
section (a) or subsection (b) is used as reimbursement, the 
amount of reimbursement shall be available for entering into 
contracts and other uses during the fiscal year in which the 
reimbursement is received and the ensuing fiscal year. 
Where the head of any department, agency, or independent 
establishment of the Government determines that replacement 
of any article transferred pursuant to paragraph (4) (A) of 
section 1 is not necessary, any funds received in payment 
therefor shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous 
receipts. 
(d) (1) Payment in advance by the Government of Greece 
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or of Turkey shall be required by the President for any articles 
or services furnished to such country under paragraph (4) (A) 
of section 1 if they are not paid for from funds advanced 
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under section 4 (a) 
or from funds appropriated under authority of section 4 (b). 
(2) No department, agency, or independent estab-
lishment of the Government shall furnish any articles or 
services under paragraph (4) (A) of section 1 to either 
Greece or Turkey, unless it receives advancements or reim-
brusements therefor out of allocations under subsection (a) 
or (b) of this section. 
SEC. 3· As a condition precedent to the receipt of any 
assistance pursuant to this Act, the government requesting such 
assistance shall agree (a) to permit free access of United 
States Government officials for the purpose of obser·ving 
whether such assistance is utilized effectively and in accord-
ance with the undertakings of the recipient government; (b) 
to permit representatives of the press and radio of the United 
States to observe freely and to report fully regarding the 
utilization of such assistance; (c) not to transfer, without 
the consent of the President of the United States, title to 
or possession of any article or information transferred pur-
suant to this Act nor to permit, without such consent, the 
use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such 
information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or 
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agent of the recipient government; (d) to make such provisions 
~s may be required by the President of the United States for 
the security of any article, service, or information received 
pursuant to this Act; (e) not to use any part of the proceeds 
of any loan, credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered 
pursuant to this Act for the making of any payment on account 
of the principal or interest on any loan made to such govern-
ment by any other foreign government; and (f) to give full 
and continuous publicity within such country as to the pur-
pose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of 
United States economic assistance carried on therein pursuant 
to this Act. 
SEC. 4. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and 
directed, until such time as an appropriation shall be made 
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, to make advances, 
not to exceed in the aggregate $100,ooo,ooo, to carry out the 
provisions of this Act, in such manner and in such amounts 
as the President shall determine. 
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(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated 
to the President not to exceed $40o,ooo,qoo to carry out the 
provisions of this Act. From appropriations made under this 
authority there shall be repaid to the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation the advances made by it under subsection (a) 
of this section. 
SEC. 5. The President may from time to time prescribe such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry 
out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise 
any power or authority conferred upon him pursuant to this 
Act through such department, agency, independent establish-
ment, or officer of the Government as he shall direct. 
The President is directed to withdraw any or all aid 
authorized herein under any of the following circumstances; 
(1) If requested by the Government of Greece or Turkey, 
respectively, representing a majority of the people of either 
such nation; 
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(2) If the Security Council finds (with respect to which 
finding the United States waives the exercise of any vote) 
or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance 
furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of such 
assistance unnecessary or undesirable; 
(3) If the President finds that any purposes of the Act 
have been substantially accomplished by the action of any 
other inter-goverrunental organizations or finds that the 
purposes of the Act are incapable of satisfactory accomplish-
ment; and 
(4) If the President finds that any of the assurances 
given pursuant to section 3 are not being carried out. 
SEC. 6. Assistance to any country under this Act may, unless 
sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concur-
rent resolution by the two Houses of the Congress. 
SEC. z. The President shall submit to the Congress quarterly 
reports of expenditures and activities, which shall include 
uses of funds by the recipient governments, under authority 
of this Act. 
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SEC. 8. The chief of any mission to any country receiving 
assistance under this Act shall be appointed by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall 
perform such functions relating to the ad~inistration of this 
Act as the President shall prescribe. 
APPROVED Nay 22, 1947 
APPENDIX XII 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF WAR REGARDING THE GREEK AID PROGRAM 
(Approved by the Secretaries of State and War) 
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1. This memorandum shall govern the relationship between 
the State and War Departments in respect to the War Department's 
activities in fulfillment of its responsibilities in the 
Greek Aid Program under the Act of May 22, 1947. This 
arrangement is made pursuant to Regulation 5 of Executive 
Order 9857 of May 22,. 1947. 
2. The Department of State will consult with the War 
Department on matters of common interest. Such consultation 
will be in accordance with established practice by which either 
Department may present policy issues to the Secretaries 
of State, War, and Navy in meeting, or may introduce policy 
questions in the proceedings of the State-War-Navy Coordina-
tion Committee, as occasion may require. 
3. Questions of policy involving departments other than 
the State, War and Navy Departments, and questions of imple-
mentation will be raised initially with the Interdepartmental 
Interim Greece-Turkey Assistance Committee. Meetings of this 
committee will be called by the Chairman (The Coordinator for 
Aid to Greece and Turkey) at the request of the War Department 
or other members department or agency, as well as upon his own 
initiative. Problems of procedure and administration will be 
brought first to the attention of the Committee. 
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4. The \·Jar Department will assign the requisite number 
of military and civilian personnel to the military section of 
the American Mission. They will serve under the Senior Army 
member, who will be responsible to the Chief of Mission. The 
War Department will provide for the instruction of Greek 
Military personnel in the United States or elsewhere, when 
determined to be necessary by the Chief of Mission, after 
coordination with the Chief of the United States Army Group. 
Any training conducted will be to fulfill the purposes of the 
Act of May 22, 1947, and will be subject to the availability 
of funds appropriated for this purpose. The regular pay and 
allowances of members of the United States Military Services 
detailed to the military section of the American Mission, or 
engaged in programs in the United States to train Greek 
nationals, will be paid from regular appropriations of the 
War Department. Dependents of military members of the American 
Mission to Greece will be authorized to proceed to Greece as 
living accommodations become available. Travel expenses, per 
diem while traveling, and extra compensation for the additional 
cost of living in Greece be paid to all military personnel 
attached to the Mission in Greece from funds other than United 
States War Department. Appropriations as arranged by the State 
Department and at rates determined by the State Department 
uniformly for the Mission as a whole Travel expenses for 
dependents of military personnel attached to the Mission in 
Greece will be paid from funds other than United States War 
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Department appropriations as arranged by the State Department. 
Administration of War Department civilian personnel, including 
payment, of salaries and travel of civilian employees, will be 
a matter for administration by the Central Administrative Unit 
established by the State Department. 
5. The War Department will also assign such personnel 
as may be agreed to the civilian sections of the American 
Mission. The necessary expenses incurred in connection with 
their assignment will be paid out of funds other than United 
States War Department appropriations on the same basis as 
the expenses of personnel assigned to the military section, 
except that the War Department will also be reimbursed for pay 
and allowances of military personnel assigned to the civilian 
sections of the Mission. 
6. The channel of communication between the military 
section of the Mission and the War Department in matters of 
policy guidance will regularly be through the Chief of Mission 
and the State Department. Communications relating to techinal 
matters and problems associated with implementation of approved 
programs will be direct. The Chief of Mission in his discretion 
may authorize further direct communication in the interests of 
expedition or administrative convenience. The State Department 
will be kept fully informed on matters of importance. 
7. Requirements of the Greek Military Forces approved 
by the Chief of Mission will be forwarded by the Chief of 
Mission to the War Department directly. The State Department, 
upon request of the War Department, will allocate funds as re-
quired to cover the cost of approved procurement and supply, 
and training programs, including administrative and transporta-
tion expenses, subject to availability of funds and within 
limits established by the State Department. The War 
Department will have full responsibility for arranging the 
procurement and supply, inland and ocean transportation, and 
delivery of supplies and equipment for the military program to 
the ports of debarkation in Greece as determined by the Chief 
of Mission. 
8. The War Department will maintain accounts of obliga-
tions and disbursements made from funds allocated to it by 
the State Department out of appropriations under the Act by 
May 22, 1947, and will make reports as requested by the 
State Department after consultation with the War Department. 
9. The War Department will keep such records and make 
such reports of its activities as may be necessary for the 
preparation of the quarterly report to Congress. The form 
and content of these Departmental reports will be determined 
by the State Department after consultation with the War 
Department. 
10. The War Department will be responsible for such 
services, supplies, and facilities as are considered neces-
sary by the Chief of Mission and as mutually agreed between 
State and War Departments, including the following: 
(a) Equipment for the efficient operation of 
necessary messes. 
(b) Establishment and operation of a lost Exchange. 
(c) Establishment and operation of commissary 
facilities. 
(d) Motor vehicles for a pool to be operated in 
accordance with the recommendation of the Chief 
of Mission. 
(e) The services of three aircraft for the use of 
the Mission. 
(f) Reactivation of the transmitter in Athens for 
the Mission's communications. 
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APPENDIX XIII 
Note of the Greek Government to the United States of June 15, 
1947 regarding measures the Government of Greece will take 
toward rehabilitation. 
THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
No. 29824. 
Your Excellency: 
Athens, June 15, 1947 
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By your note No. 230 of May 26, 1947, you were good enough 
to inform me that, in response to an appeal by the Greek Govern-
ment in its note of March 3, 1947 to the Government of the 
United States and through it to the American people, for finan-
cial, economic and expert aid to assist the Greek people in 
restoring their country, the President of the United States has 
been authorized to extend assistance to Greece under the provi-
sions of an act of Congress signed May 22, 1947. 
In reply, I have the honour to request that you be kind 
enough to convey to the United States Government the following 
communication from the Greek Government: 
The hearts of the Greek people are profoundly touched by 
this proof of the generosity and goodwill of the American people 
and of the benevolent interest of a great and friendly nation 
in the welfare of Greece. The Greek Government on its own be-
half and on behalf of the Greek people, wishes to express its 
deepest appreciation for this magnanimous response to the re-
quest of the Greek Government and takes this opportunity to 
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repeat that it turned to the United States for aid only because 
the devastating results of the war were such as to render 
impossible the enormous task of reconstruction with the resources 
remaining to Greece after years of conflict and enemy occupation. 
The Greek Government wishes to give assurance that any 
assistance it may receive will be used in conformance with the 
purposes for which it may be made available. Aid given for 
military purposes will be used in the restoration and main-
tenance of internal order. Aid furnished for the economic re-
covery and physical reconstruction of the country will be 
expended in a manner which will have a lasting beneficial effect 
on the country as a whole. 
The Greek Government also wishes to make known at this 
time its own plans for action which will lay a basis for 
American assistance in Greek recovery and reconstruction. The 
Greek people realize that ultimate solution of their problem 
requires great and continuous effort by themselves. They 
are aware that the extensive aid of the United States will not 
alone be sufficient to meet the large costs of restoring 
public order and recc·nstructing productive facilities over a 
period of years. The Greek Government will lead its people 
in their effort to achieve these ends. This responsibility 
entails the composing of internal differences, the collection 
of more revenues, the rebuilding of foreign trade, the conser-
vation of foreign exchange, the reconstruction of public works, 
the improvement of Government administration, assistance and 
guidance to agriculture and industry, establishment of pro-
tective labor measures, encouragement of democratic organiza-
tions among economic and social groups, measures to control 
inflation and assure equitable distribution of supplies and 
services, and the restraint of excesses and extravagances on 
the part of any segment of the population. The Greek Govern-
ment will undertake these and all other necessary measures 
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to marshal Greece's own resources to the fullest extent in 
attaining the ends for which American assistance may be ex-
tended. The organization of Greek effort will require economic 
contributions and cooperation from all. 
The Greek Government is ever mindful that primary 
responsibility for the economic welfare of the country rests 
with the Greek Government, and it is therefore proceeding with 
plans for the early institution and vigorous administration of 
those measures which will enable full use of capital, productive 
facilities, manpower resources and natural wealth to be found 
in Greece. Certain measures proposed by the Greek Government 
are stated in general terms in this notE, these and other 
measures will be developed further after consultation with 
American advisers. 
In order to achieve budgetary balance and economic 
stability at the earliest possible time the Greek Government 
will undertake to rehabilitate its national and local revenue 
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system by all necessary measures including the modernization 
of tax administration, elimination of tax evasion and the use 
of every practicable source of revenue. Full regard will be 
given to equitable distribution of the tax burden and to the 
principle of ability to pay. Measures will be taken to control 
and curtail expenditures of the Government. The Government 
audit and accounting system will be strengthened, and the 
budget will be published and used as an effective control of 
expenditures. 
With a view to steadily increasing the ration of official 
acquisitions of foreign exchange to import requirements, a 
program will be undertaken to increase the amounts of foreign 
exchange coming into the Greek economy through normal commer-
cial channels. Vigorous efforts to increase exports, includ-
ing the resumption of the export of olive oil and the rebuild-
ing of foreign markets, will be made. l•.leasures will be adopted 
to assure the operation of Greek shipping in a manner which 
will provide the greatest benefit for the national economy. 
Existing regulations on the import and export of foreign 
· exchange will be enforced and strengthened by all possible 
means. 'l'o make the most effective use of available exchange, 
imports will be limited to those wrich are essential to the 
Greek economy; and they will be brought in as an integral 
part of a national import program which includes goods purchased 
with American aid. 'I'he planning and supervision of the 
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administration of the program of public and private imports 
and exports will be centralized in a foreign trade committee 
comprizing Greek and American technicians and headed by an 
American in the employ of the Greek Government. To guard 
against further inflation, a vigorous program will be under-
taken to hold down prices and to establish an equitable rela-
tion between proces and wages. As further deterrents to 
inflation, rent control and rationing of commodities will be 
continued and controls on credit and banking will be instituted. 
The agriculture and industrial production of the country 
will be increased by Government guidance and financial 
assistance. Unduly restructive taxes, detrimental employment 
practices and monopoly regulations will be reexamined and all 
unnecessary deterrents to production eliminated. To this end 
the Greek Government will encourage increased labor productivity 
while fostering the right of workers to organize and join free 
democratic labor unions and to engage in activities to promote 
their mutual protection and economic status. 
In order to fill its increasingly active role in guiding 
the recovery and reconstruction efforts during the American 
aid program, the Government will undertake an extensive program 
to improve its governmental organizations and civil service, 
which were so disrupted by the long years of war. 
The Greek Government wishes to take this opportunity to 
renew its request to the United States Government for American 
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personnel who can assist in the Greek recovery effort, includ-
ing a special American Mission to administer the extension of 
American aid, observe its use by the Greek Government and 
advise the Greek Government. In order to expedite recovery 
in Greece and because of the large financial contribution of 
the United States to Greece, the Mission should participate in 
the development of revenus and expenditure policies, approve 
Government expenditures for activities which directly or in-
directly involve the use of American aid, take part in the 
planning of the import program, and approve the use of foreign 
exchange. The Greek Government would also wish the Mission to 
assist in the execution of reconstruction projects, improvement 
of public administration, technical training of civil servants 
and other personnel, .continuation of the health program, 
development of exports, programming and disposition of Govern-
ment purchased supplies, promotion of agricultural and 
industrial recovery, and regulation of wages and prices. In 
general, the Greek Government will wish to consult with the 
Mission before taking any economic steps which might affect 
the success of the American aid program. 
In addition to the members of the Mission who will act as 
representatives of the United States Government, the Greek 
Government wishes the assistance of the United States Govern-
ment in employing a limited number of American experts to act 
in technical and supervisory capacities within the Greek 
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Government. The Government will continue a currency committee 
consisting of Greeks and foreign experts with functions modi-
fied to fit in with those of the American Mission. As mentioned 
above, a Foreign Trade Administration headed by an American 
technician is also planned. 
In the light of the recent legislation by the Congress of 
the United States and of the views expressed by the United 
States Government in its Note No. 230 of May 26, 1947, it is 
suggested that the two Governments should enter into a formal 
agreement on these matters. 
I avail myself to this opportunity to renew to Your 
Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. 
c. Tsaldaris 
His Excellency 
Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh 




AGREEMENT ON AID TO GREECE 
The Government of the Kingdom of Greece having requested 
the Government of the United States of American for financial, 
material and technical assistance to avert economic crisis, 
promote national recovery, and restore internal tranquillity; 
and 
The Congress of the United States, in the Act approved 
May 22, 1947, having authorized the President of the United 
States to furnish such assistance to Greece, on terms consonant 
with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries; 
and 
The Government of Greece, in a note to the Government of 
the United States of June 15, 1947 having proposed certain 
measures within Greece which it deems essential to the effective 
use of United States assistance and of Greece's own resources in 
promoting reconstruction and recovery in Greece as soon as 
possible; and 
The Government of the United States and the Government of 
Greece believing that the furnishing of such assistance will 
help to achieve the basic objectives of the Charter of the 
United Nations and will further strengthen the ties of friend-
ship between the American and Greek peoples: 
The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments for that purpose have agreed as follows: 
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Article 1 
The Government of the United States will furnish the Govern-
ment of Greece such assistance as the President of the United 
States may authorize to be provided in accordance with the Act 
of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any Acts amendatory or 
supplementary thereto. 
Article 2 
The Government of Greece will make effective use of any 
assistance furnished to Greece by the United States and of 
Greece's own resources in order to advance reconstruction and 
secure recovery in Greece as soon as possible. To this end the 
Government of Greece has already undertaken, and hereby agrees, 
to effectuate the measures proposed in its note of June 15, 
1947 to the Government of the United States and will take such 
further action as may be appropriate. 
Article 3 
The Government of the United States will send to Greece a 
mission to be known as the American Mission for Aid to Greece 
(hereinafter referred to as the American Mission). The Chief 
of the American Mission designated by the President of the 
United States will represent the Government of the United States 
on matters relating to the assistance furnished under this 
Agreement. 
Article 4 
The Chief of the American Mission will determine, in 
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consultation with representatives of the Government of Greece, 
the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall 
from time tc time be furnished under this Agreement. Under the 
direction of the Chief, the Mission will provide such advisory 
assistance and will exercise such functions are are necessary 
and proper to assist the Government of Greece to make the most 
effective use of any assistance furnished to Greece by the 
United States and of Greece's own resources and thereby to 
advance reconstruction and secure recovery in Greece as soon as 
possible. Certain of these functions are contained in the 
measures proposed by the Government of Greece in its note of 
June 15, 1947. 
Article 5 
The Government of Greece will furnish all practicable 
assistance to the American Mission to facilitate the performance 
of its functions, the movement of Mission personnel to, in or 
from Greece, the employment of Greek nationals and residents, 
the acquisition of facilities and services, and the performance 
of other activities of the Mission. The personnel of the 
American Mission and the property of the Mission and of its 
personnel shall enjoy in Greece the same privileges and i~!uni­
ties as are enjoyed by the personnel of the United States 




The Government of Greece will permit the members of the 
American Mission to observe freely the utilization of assistance 
furnished to Greece by the United States. The Government of 
Greece will maintain such accounts and records, and will fur-
nish the American Mission such reports and information, as the 
Mission may request for the performance of its functions and 
responsibilities. 
Article 7 
The Government of Greece and the Government of the United 
States will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United 
States and Greece full information, consistent with the security 
of the two countries, concerning the assistance furnished to 
Greece by the United States. To this end--
(1) Representatives of the press and radio of the United 
States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully 
regarding the utilization of such assistance; and 
(2) The Government of Greece will afford the American 
Mission opportunity for, and will cooperate with it in provid-
ing, full and continuous publicity within Greece, including 
periodic reports by the Mission, as to activities under this 
Agreement and the prupose, source, character, scope, amounts, 
and progress of such assistance. 
Article 8 
The Government of Greece will make such provisions as may 
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be required by the President of the United States for the 
security of any article, service, or information received 
pursuant to this Agreement. It will not transfer, without the 
consent of the President of the United States, title to or 
possession of any such article or information nor permit, with-
out such consent, the use of any such article or the use or 
disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an 
officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Greece or for 
any purpose other than that for which the article or information 
is furnished. 
Article 9 
The Government of Greece will not use any part of the 
proceeds of any loan, credit, or other form of aid rendered 
pursuant to this Agreement for the making of any payment on 
account of the principal or interest on any loan made to it 
by any other foreign government. 
The Government of Greece will not, except with the approval 
of the Government of the United States, allocate any funds or 
make available any foreign exchange for payment of principal 
or interest on the foreign indebtedness now in suspens of the 
Government of Greece and of all public and private debtors. 
Article 10 
Any or all assistance authorized to be provided pursuant 
to this Agreement will be withdrawn--' 
(1) If requested by the Government of Greece representing 
a majority of the Greek people; 
(2) If the Security Council of the United Nations finds 
(with respect to which finding the United States waives the 
exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly of the United 
Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the 
United Nations make the continuance of assistance by the 
Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement 
unnecessary or undesirable; 
(3) Under any of the other circumstances specified in 
section 5 of the aforesaid Act of Congress or if the President 
of the United States determines that such withdrawal is in the 
interest of the United States; or 
(4) If the Government of Greece does not take reasonable 
steps to effectuate those measures proposed in its note of 
June 15, 1947 or subsequently agreed upon which are essential 
to reconstruction and recovery in Greece. 
Article 11 
This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. 
It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by 
the two Governments. 
Article 12 
This Agreement shall be registered with the United Nations. 
Done in duplicate, in the English and Greek languages, at 
Athens, this 20th day of June, 1947. 




For the Government of the Kingdom of Greece:-
CONSTAN'I'INE TSALDAhiS 
Deputy Prime Minister and 




Exchange of Notes Between the Governments of the United States 
and the United Kingdom Regarding Procurement for the Greek Aid 
Program. 
The Secretary of State to the British Charge d'Affaires ad 
interim. 
July 25, 1947 
Sir: 
Due to the lapse of time between the approval of the Act 
to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, effective 
May 22, 1947, and the actual arrival of American military 
equipment and supplies in Greece, the Government of the United 
States wishes to establish an arrangement with the Government 
of the United Kingdom which would: (1) provide for the contin-
uation of the furnishing of such supplies and equipment by the 
United Kingdom as are necessary for the Greek military program 
until United States supplies arrive in Greece; (2) provide for 
the continued procurement by the Government of the United 
Kingdom of certain supplies required by the Greek Armed Forces 
which the Government of the United States is not now in a 
position to provide from its own resources. 
Pending further arrangements, the Government of the United 
States hereby undertakes to the extent provided in this note to 
pay the Government of the United Kingdom for supplies and 
equipment issued, and for services incident to the procurement 
and delivery of such supplies and equipment provided by the 
Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Greece 
for the Greek Armed Forces after May 22, 1947. Such issues 
shall be deemed to include all arrivals in Greece of such 
supplies and equipment after May 22, 1947. Such supplies, 
equipment, and services shall deemed to exclude items which 
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the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to provide free 
of charge, including 
(a) certain initial equipment and supplies for the Greek 
Army provided against demands submitted before ~ay 22, 1947 
(estimated to be approximately ~2,000,000 in value); 
(b) any supplies for the Greek Air Force which were 
included subject to availabilities in the order of ~attle 
agreed with the British Air Ministry in 1946 and certain special 
items added thereto in 1947; 
(c) any other items which the ~overnment of the United 
Kingdom has agreed to provide free of charge in accordance with 
arrangements previously made by the Government of the United 
Kingdom with the Greek Government or against payment of the 
Greek Government from funds made available by the Government of 
the United Kingdom for that purpose. 
Pending the establishment of military and naval supply 
progra~s in accordance with the fourth paragraph hereof, it is 
the understanding of the Government of the United States that 
the British authorities concerned will issue within reasonable 
limits necessary supplies and equipment based on their past 
experience and upon the essential needs of the Greek Govern-
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ment for the maintenance of its military forces. The Govern-
ment of the United States, however, does not undertake financial 
responsibility for any issues beyond such reasonable limits. In 
order to assure that continuing requirements of the Greek Armed 
Forces are met with respect to certain limited and vital equip-
ment and supplies which the Government of the United States is 
not now in a position to provide from its own resources, it is 
specifically requested that the Government of the United Kingdom 
continue procurement of (1) food requirements of the Greek 
Armed Forces through August 31, 1947 for 176,000 men, or such 
other number as may be agreed, on the same scale as now used, 
and (2) necessary ammunition and maintenance supplies, in 
quantities agreed between representatives of the two Governments, 
for equipment of British origin now held by the Greek Armed 
Forces. 
Personnel of the military and naval sections of the American 
Mission for Aid to Greece will have arrived in Greece shortly 
after the effective date of the Act. These representatives 
will cooperate with the British military, naval, and air missions 
in Greece in the estimations of military supply requirements 
which might be met from British sources and will ordinarily re-
quest the Government of the United Kingdom through appropriate 
channels to supply such categories of supplies and equipment as 
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the War or Navy Department may deem appropriate. The Government 
of the United States will be financially responsible for, but 
only for, all issues made by the Government of the United 
Kingdom against such requests. Representatives of the Govern-
ment of the United States will review with representatives of 
the Government of the United Kingdom questions relating to the 
establishment of the basis for prices. This note, of course, 
in no way affects the status of lend-lease articles which are 
subject to the United States-United Kingdom Military Holdings 
Agreement of March 27, 1946, any transfers of which will be 
made without charge to the Government of the United States. In 
the event that the Government of the United States requests 
changes in procurement which require the cancellation by the 
Government of the United Kingdom of any items previously re-
quested by the Government of the United States for which pro-
curement action has been initiated, the Government of the United 
States will be responsible for any financial loss to the 
Government of the United Kingdom in connection therewith. 
The Government of the United States will wish to conclude 
more detailed understandings with respect to the pricing, methods 
of accounting, and of payment for the equipment and supplies 
provided by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Greek 
Government in accordance with the paragraphs above. Pending 
such detailed arrangements, it is requested that the Government 
of the United Kingdom keep detailed accounts and records to 
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facilitate the settlement of accounts between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom. 
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration. 
G. C. MARSHALL 
The Honorable 
J. Balfour, K.C.M.G. 
Sir: 
Minister Plenipotentiary, 
British Charge d'Affaires ad interim 
The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State 
British Embassy 
Washington, D. c., 9th October, 1947. 
With reference to your note of the 25th July, addressed to 
Mr. Balfour, concerning the provision of supplies to Greece, 
I have the honour to inform you that the arrangements therein 
set out are acceptable to His Majesty's ~overnment in the United 
Kingdom, subject to the following considerations which are pre-
sented by His Majesty's Government for the sake of clarification 
only. 
With regard to sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph 
of your note, His Majesty's Government confirm that they have 
undertaken to provide to the Greek Government after ta 31st 
March, 1947, free military equipment and supplies to the 
approximate value of ~2 million. A considerable proportion of ~ 
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equipment and supplies forming part of this gift was delivered 
to the Greek Government before the 22nd May, 1947, but it is 
confirmed that, insofar as deliveries of initial equipment and 
supplies forming the balance of the gift are made after the 
22nd May, 1947, against demands submitted before that date, they 
will be provided free by His Majesty's Government. 
His Majesty's Government confirm further that they have 
undertaken to provide the equipment and supplies covered in the 
second paragraph of your note and that the aforementioned equip-
ment and supplies constitute the total amount of assistance 
which His Majesty's Government have agreed to supply free of 
charge. 
His Majesty's Government assume that the third paragraph of 
your note will a~ply to all issues made within reasonable limits 
against any demands submitted by the Greek authorities before 
the arrival of the United States Mission, excluding those 
covered by sub-paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) of the second para-
graph of your note, and, therefore, that the United States 
Government accept liability to pay for items issued within such 
limits from British sou~ces to the Greek armed forces outside 
the agreed programmes in respect of Greek demands submitted 
after the 22nd May but before the arrival of the United States 
Mission and before the agreed programmes were drawn up. 
With reference to the fourth paragraph of your note, His 
l~jesty's Government confirm that your note in no way affects 
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the status of Lend-Lease articles which are subject to the 
United States-United Kingdom Military Holdings Agreement of the 
27th March, 1946, which sets out the procedure to be followed 
when either the re-transfer or the re-capture of such articles 
is to be carried out. 
It is assumed that any supplies sent by His Majesty's 
Government to the Greek Government for the use of the Greek 
civil police will be dealt with in the same way as supplies to 
the Greek Army and Gendarmerie. 
I avail myself of ttis opportunity to renew to you the 
assurance of roy highest consideration. 
INVER CHAPEL 
The Honourable 
George c. V~rshall, 
Secretary of State of the United States, 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
What follows is an attempt at a compre-
hensi ve .Bi 'bliography ot significant works on 
the Balkans and the Near East concernin' the 
Eastern Question and the Greek Issue. 
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Greece's difficulties are not new nor entirely Greek and 
they became acute, from time to time, as a result of unusual 
circumstances. Deep problems underlie the fluctuating cur-
rents of Greek history, and the Great Powers have been party 
to many of Greece's difficulties, while Greece's neighbors 
have been instruments of Great Power machtpolitik in the 
Balkans. 
Greece's tragedy has been fourfold: first, its territory 
occupies the peninsula which commands an arena of intense 
political rivalry. Second, since its creation it has been a 
small and poor nation occupying a strategic geographic position. 
Third, Greek liberation was made possible by the aid of many 
Powers that continued to retain their "interest" in Greece. 
Lastly, Greek nationalism which found fertile soil in the 
"Great Idea" with the belief that for survival the little 
kingdom had to strengthen itself economically and politically 
by absorbing adjacent lands. These lands, however, more 
often than not, were inhabited predominantly by Greeks who 
were faced with absorption or annihilation by a reawakening 
of Slavic Balkan peoples or renascent Ottoman nationalism. 
This situation led to a fervent and natural desire for enosis 
by exohellenes and the historical anagke and almost religious 
passion felt by the Greek Government to effect a union so 
long sought after and for so long desired. 
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From the outset the Greeks were caught between East and 
West, for Greece's independence and later the extension of its 
boundaries could be realized only at the expense of Turkey 
and the policies of Austro-Hungary and England. For Austria, 
a continental Power, this meant maintenance of Metternich's 
"consecrated structure"; for England, an insular Power, it 
meant maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
since its dissolution would not only disrupt the equilibrium 
of Europe but its dismemberment would remove the last sub-
stantial political bulwark to Russian expansion. It is not 
surprising that Castlereagh could set aside his doctrine of 
noninterference in the Greek issue since, as in the Lowlands, 
its application would have threatened British interests. At 
the same time, Greece could expect little from Russia, for con-
cessions from that quarter, notwithstanding the Tsarist ruse 
of protecting co-religionists would be at the expense of Pan-
Slavism and Tsarist expansion. Furthermore, being non-
"Catholic," Greece could expect no sympathy from Catholic 
powers. Finally, her early boundaries, like most boundaries 
in the Near East, reflected neither a political nor an 
economic necessity but were drawn to guarantee weakness and 
rivalry and became an object of power politics. This inherent 
situation has brought Greece periodic chastisements and 
unsolicited transgressions by the Great Powers with serious 
effects on her domestic life as well as her inter-national 
position. 
Historically, Austria-Hungary, England, France, and 
Germany, individually or in collusion, had prevented Russian 
domination of the Balkans and the Near East; but recent history 
proved more favorable to the Soviet Union until Soviet designs 
against Greece and Turkey after World War II forced the 
United States to take a series of decisive actions best 
described as the 11Truman Doctrine 11 which caused international 
Communism to suffer in Greece its first and only major defeat 
in the post-war period. As a result, Greece found a new 
protector in the United States, but at the same time fell 
more securely into the Western orbit. In 1841, Sir Edmund 
Lyons, the British Minister to Athens, made the prophetic 
statement, 11A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. 
Greece is Russian or she is English; and since she must not 
be Russian, it is necessary that she be English. 11 In 1947, 
the Truman Doctrine reaffirmed this dictum with the modifi-
cation that since Greece cannot be English, it is necessary 
that she be "American." 
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